'JAPAN' AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: BEGINNING A CONVERSATION

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy of The Australian National University

MEREDITH ANNE PATTON

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This is to confirm that this thesis is entirely my own work.

Meredith Anne Patton

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CONTENTS

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PREFACE

THE NEED FOR CONVERSATION

I first began to think about the relationship between Japanese Studies and International Relations (IR) in 1994, when I returned from Japan to Australia with an MA degree in International Politics from Kôbe University. My Masters dissertation dealt with Japanese security relations in the Asia-Pacific region and, upon my return, I intended to extend this line of research into a broader work about Japan's future global role, concentrating primarily upon issues of military security and other areas where Japan was already acknowledged to be a major actor (e.g. the global economy). The timing seemed perfect. Amid the general sense of uncertainty associated with the end of the Cold War, one of the few IR themes acknowledged as having some certainty attached to it was Japan's role as a major actor in the 21st century.

Pondering this theme, I began to feel that I still knew very little about what was meant by a 'global role' in the first place. This feeling was prompted by two discoveries. The first was the discovery that 'International Relations' encompassed a far wider range of concerns, issues and perspectives than I had been aware of during my years as an undergraduate and graduate student in Japan. In particular, I now became aware of a whole body of critical IR literature which, instead of starting from the 'givens' of an orthodox IR education — e.g. states, power, the security dilemma, etc. — sought to question the whole process by which we assume these issues to be 'given,' in order that we might address the international-cum-global arena in more comprehensive, inclusivist and, hopefully, less dangerous ways, in the wake of the Cold War.

My second discovery was that among the large and diverse Japanese Studies community in Canberra, there were a number of people engaged in a similar kind of enterprise, as they explored a complex, multifaceted Japanese society, itself seeking to engage with and adapt to the new conceptual and structural parameters of the post-Cold War era. It struck me then that in the orthodox IR literature I had read for my MA, there had been little or no mention of domestic Japanese society. The impression gained from this literature was that the 'inside' of Japan did not really matter in terms of the foreign policy processes that define Japan on the 'outside;' i.e., in the international system as global actor.

After speaking with a range of people in the Japanese Studies community, and reading the literature that influenced them, I then began to notice how much of it complemented (implicitly if not always explicitly) the IR literature that was, by now, beginning to influence my thinking and that of a generation of IR scholars at the ANU. And yet the more I engaged the two analytical communities, the more it became apparent that they were effectively unaware of each other. It was at this point, I suppose, that I decided that I wanted to explore the possibilities of bringing these literatures together, in order to contribute to the beginning of a conversation that I increasingly felt was crucial to a more complete understanding of Japan and of International Relations in a changing, volatile world.

The thesis that follows is my contribution, albeit rudimentary, to this conversation. It deals with a range of issues, some involving complex philosophical themes that I have often found very difficult, and to be honest, intimidating. But the more I have engaged them, the more I have come to realise how important it is that we expose and seek to

critically re-address the first principles of the knowledge form-as-political power that is International Relations. This, however, is not meant to be a 'theoretical' work per se, but rather one of connection, between (often hidden) theoretical first principles and everyday social and political practice, and between effectively divorced yet intrinsically engaged scholarly communities, seeking in their different ways to make sense of 'Japan' in International Relations.

CHAPTER ONE

POST-COLD WAR ANXIETIES

1. "We Told You So."

> The Japanese economic miracle itself seems to have been discredited, which has been especially sobering to a journalist like me, since it's a miracle I had hailed here on the News Hour in our 1987 Japan series. You may even remember some of the images we showed you back then: Loyal, well-trained workers who ran rather than be late to work; focused, efficient businesses; farsighted investors; and working with them hand in glove, brilliant government bureaucrats whose long-term industrial policy, Japan, Inc., discouraged everything American from large discount stores to boxers weighing more than 140 pounds.
>
> Paul Solomon, 1999.[1]

> The question is whether they have the moral leadership — the moral capital, if you like — to play the role. Since they haven't reformed themselves, they're not a very credible player in telling other countries to reform. In a way they've been through the Asian crisis, the stock market crash, the land market crash, you know, a number of years ago, and they've been sitting with the luxury of being a much wealthier, stronger economy. They've been sitting and really not responding to it for a long time.
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> Paul Krugman, 1998.[2]

> Japan is a millstone around the neck of the global economy.....
>
> Unidentified U.S. bureaucrat, 1999.[3]

Using the above selection of excerpts, and others like them, one could make the case that a certain sense of triumphalism, even smugness, has permeated the debate about Japan in International Relations (IR) of late. The onset of the Asian currency crisis during the mid 1990s saw Japan, along with many other countries in the region,

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[1] Paul Solomon, "Bursting the Bubble," May 03, 1999. Sourced from PBS Online at http://www.pbs.org/plweb-cgi/.
[2] Interview with Paul Krugman, Steve Levinson, Michael Armacost and Winston Lord by Jim Lehrer, for PBS, January 12, 1998. Sourced from PBS Online at http://www.pbs.com.
[3] Solomon, "Bursting the Bubble," *op. cit.*

plunged into an economic recession from which it has only recently begun to extricate itself. Moreover, the efforts of Japanese politicians, bureaucrats and economists to formulate new responses to the challenges lumped collectively under that ubiquitous term, 'globalisation,' have generated, for the most part, only further charges of inadequacy and ineptness, both inside and outside Japan. Nowhere is this scorn more prevalent of course, than in the United States, where stories of corporate failure, fiscal incompetence and political dislocation emanating from a society so recently promoted as structurally unique, and superior to its Western counterparts, cannot but buoy up the current sense of satisfaction associated with America's strong economic performance in recent years.

Both self-congratulation and criticism have also been reflected in the current 'theoretical' backlash against the Japanese economy. Once hailed as an economic 'miracle,' Japan is now regarded in many circles as being the representative *par excellence* of a particular type of "developmental capitalism" that is not only out of date, but, quite possibly, fundamentally to blame for the Asian economic crisis. The result, as one analyst points out, has been an increasingly vociferous chorus of 'we-told-you-so's,' in response to ongoing Japanese (and Asian) economic difficulties.

> Having 'won' the Cold War against Soviet-style collectivism, no sooner is one bout of triumphalism over than liberalism is now gleefully protesting its superiority over the 'developmental statist' approach towards capitalist economic development. The speeches of senior US policy makers and opinion formers have been peppered with references to the need to jettison the remaining vestiges of the developmental statist model.[4]

Yet if assumptions about Japan's status as an economic superpower have been, at best, moderated in this context, the more general themes concerning its role as a post-Cold War international power have not, I argue, changed fundamentally since their

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[4] Richard Higgot, "The Asian Economic Crisis: a Study in the Politics of Resentment," *New Political Economy* 3:3 (1998): 333-356, on p. 339. The drop in enthusiasm concerning a once-feted Asian dynamism, is reflected in the works of writers such as the economist Ross Garnaut, who has moved from titles such as *Sustaining Export Development: Ideas from East Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), to *East Asia in Crisis: From Being a Miracle to Needing One?* (London; New York: Routledge, 1998).

initial articulation during the early to mid-1990s, when the dominant perception of Japan was of a state that, in many ways, had emerged as the true victor of the Cold War, but which also needed to assert itself as a major actor in the global arena. In 1992 for example, the prominent journalist Yôichi Funabashi described Japan as remaining "an immature political player;" a state with "a first-class economy [but] with 'economy class' politics," that badly needed to establish a better international self image. At the same time Funabashi, and many others, saw possibilities for this image change in the broader changes taking place in international affairs, where:

> Japan's unorthodox power portfolio ("economic giant and military dwarf") should not be viewed as an unstable and transitional phenomenon. On the contrary, the portfolio's very nature gives Japan a golden opportunity to define its power and role in the radically changing world of the 1990s. The changing nature of power in the increasingly interdependent world will upgrade economic and technological capacity, educational quality, and the developmental model effect in which Japan excels.[5]

Paul Kennedy was even more direct than Funabashi when he described Japan in 1993 as a "new kind of superpower;" a natural world leader in a re-configured global hierarchy where technological development, capital wealth and market access had emerged as the new indicators of national and international power. Thus, "while global forces bear down on all societies," Kennedy argued, "some peoples are better prepared than others to handle the biotech revolution, or the population explosion, or the consequences of global warming and sea-level rises... [because] as in all other revolutions and significant changes in history, there will be winners and losers."[6] Similar views are articulated in Frank Langdon's notion of "post-hegemonic order,"[7] Hans W. Muall's conception of Japan as one of the "new civilian powers," [8] Richard

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[5] Yôichi Funabashi, "Japan's International Agenda for the 1990s," in Yôichi Funabashi (ed.), *Japan's International Agenda* (New York & London: New York University Press, 1994), 11.
[6] Paul Kennedy, "Japan: A Twenty-first Century Power?," in Craig Garby and Mary Brown Bullock (eds.), *Japan: A New Type of Superpower?* (Baltimore: The Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 1994), 194.
[7] Frank Langdon, "The Post-Hegemonic Japanese-U.S. Relationship," in Tsuneo Akaha and Frank Langdon (eds.), *Japan in the Posthegemonic World* (Boulder & London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1993), 75.
[8] Hans W. Muall, "Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers," *Foreign Affairs* 69:5 (1991): 90-106, on p. 91.

Rosecrance's "new concert of powers,"[9] and the "global partnership" rhetoric that punctuated the public exchanges between the Bush and Miyazawa administrations in the early 1990s.[10]

These themes, then: the radically changing global context, global economic interdependence, global environmental change, and the growing importance of technology, remain central to the discussion on Japan's international future, even if anxiety about Japan's capacity to adapt to these circumstances is currently higher than ever before. This is not to suggest either, that 'conventional' (i.e., military) power dynamics have disappeared from consideration. Indeed, it is in the realm of military security that Japan is regarded by the international community (again; particularly that sector of it located in the U.S.) as having most to do in order to fulfil the responsibilities expected of it as a great (post-Cold War) power. This, moreover, is a perception increasingly prevalent among Japan's own political and policymaking elite, judging by the initiatives taken by successive Japanese governments in defence-related affairs since the end of the Gulf War in 1991. During this time, Japan's potential capacity to play a military role in regional security has increased to levels which, little more than a decade ago, would have been politically unthinkable.

The continuity of certain themes however, cannot override the appearance of other dimensions to the debate over Japan's global persona -- dimensions which, until quite recently, had little or no status in the broader lexicon of concern associated with IR analysis, and its definitions of geo-political and/or global economic reality. Most of these new debates are connected by the recognition of a growing sense of crisis and division within Japanese society itself. Crisis articulated, for example, in the advice given to Tokyo and Osaka mothers to cease breast-feeding their babies, because of unprecedented levels of poisonous dioxin levels detected in urban

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[9] Richard Rosecrance, "A New Concert of Powers," *Foreign Affairs* 71:2 (1992): 64-82, on p. 64. "Five great bases of power," Rosecrance wrote, "again control the organisation of the world order: the United States, Russia, the European Community, Japan and China." *Ibid*., 65.
[10] Michael Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation* (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 257.

environments.[11] In record levels of stress-related death and illness among 'white-collar' workers; and in record voter cynicism towards a governing elite riddled with corruption, and hopelessly stagnant in its responses. Division, articulated in the increasingly vocal attempts of people to gain acknowledgement of their particular, and diverse experiences of what it means to be Japanese. At one end of the archipelago, for example, Ainu people assert an ethnic and cultural identity subsumed and dispersed for centuries under the twin colonial discourses of national unity and racial homogeneity; while at the other, Okinawan citizens with a complex, multiethnic heritage, struggle to create a future for themselves as something other than the supporting cast for American military power in the Pacific Ocean. Japanese women everywhere intensify their contest against deeply entrenched assumptions about gender-based social roles, and ethnic Korean and Chinese people living in Japan work to deconstruct centuries of racial prejudice. Finally, a fast-dwindling band of former "comfort women," prisoners of war, and slave labourers, some within Japan, many more outside, continue to fight for justice and redress for the abuses committed upon them more than fifty years ago, their efforts part of an increasingly bitter public wrangle over Japan's modern history.

One of the main questions I want to ask in this thesis concerns the still-uncertain status of issues such as these in the context of Japan's international relations. More precisely, it concerns the question of why these issues continue to feel peripheral to what really *matters* about Japan in terms of its role as a major global actor. From some perspectives, of course – i.e., those perspectives hailing from the more mainstream sectors of the IR community – it is an easy enough question to answer, given that the issues invoked above simply do not come under a mainstream IR agenda. While undoubtedly important, they are 'internal,' 'ethnic,' 'gender,' 'sociological,' and 'cultural' issues, rather than 'IR' issues per se. In short, even in the age of international political economy (IPE) and a broadened agenda of politico-

[11] "Toxic Waste in Japan: The Burning Issue." *The Economist*, July 25, 1998. Sourced online at

analytical concern, the question of Japan remains, fundamentally, a question of state-as-actor in a world which follows traditional (Westphalian) patterns of power-politics behaviour and structural constraint.

In the chapters to follow, I aim to problematise the conventional approach outlined above, and indicate why it is vital that the dominant framework of understanding on Japan be opened up to include the complex, changing dimensions of Japanese life at the end of the 20th century – dimensions which, I suggest, are still effectively ignored in the great majority of IR theory and practice. In this regard, I argue that debate on Japan in an IR context continues to be centred on a narrow, highly selective, even clichéd image of Japanese society. I argue that IR continues to cling to this image of Japan, in the teeth of evidence attesting to its inadequacy for understanding and responding to the crises and opportunities faced by millions of Japanese people at the end of the century. Finally, and somewhat more controversially, I argue that those literatures and discussions which *do* evoke a more 'complex' Japan, with all its attendant problems, are not as effective as they could be because of their tendency to remain cloistered within a 'Japanese Studies' community, whose connections with IR debate are too sporadic and tenuous.

At one level, accordingly, this thesis is a 'theoretical' engagement with the ideas, assumptions and beliefs that give meaning to our perceptions of global reality – in particular to our perceptions of Japanese reality. At the same time it is intrinsically concerned with the everyday implications of this meaning-making process – the implications of IR theory *as* practice.[12] As such, it shares a general concern with many scholars in the contemporary era, who seek to open up effectively closed theoretical spaces, in order to at least indicate the possibility for more sophisticated (and less dangerous) social and political practices.

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http://www.corpwatch.org/trac/corner/worldnews/other/185.html.

[12] As with many of the ideas expressed in this work, the notion of 'theory *as* practice' cannot be attributed to any single textual source. Its usage in this particular context is derived from Jim

One of the more notable contributions in this context has been that of John Lewis Gaddis, the eminent (and conservative) Cold War historian. Gaddis is also one of the very few 'mainstream' scholars who, in the immediate aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, had the courage to suggest that these events demanded a response other than the proclamation of Western 'victory' in conventional politico-analytical terms. On the contrary, he argued, the dominant analytical techniques involved in charting the Cold War and its conclusion, known as Realism or neo-Realism, ensured that "both the historians and the theorists got it wrong."[13] The main error arose, Gaddis suggested, "from the way we calculated power during the Cold War years" – a calculation invoked:

> almost entirely in monodimensional terms, focusing particularly on military indices, when a multidimensional perspective might have told us more. The end of the Cold War made it blindingly clear that military strength does not always determine the course of great events: the Soviet Union collapsed, after all, with its arms and armed forces fully intact. Deficiencies in other kinds of power – economic, ideological, cultural, moral – caused the USSR to lose its superpower status, and we can now see that a slow but steady erosion in these non-military capabilities had been going on for some time.[14]

Here, Gaddis is taking to task a whole generation of postwar scholarship, which, for most of the post-WW2 period, assured us that the Soviet Union could *only* be understood in the "monodimensional" (i.e., Realist, and later, neo-Realist) terms to which he refers. It is his broader point however; i.e., that concerning the general inadequacy of simple, clichéd models of global reality, which has most import for this thesis, and which has been reiterated and developed by scholars across the political and analytical spectrum, in relation to a variety of post-Cold War issues. From Stanley Hoffmann's meditations on the traditional, power-politics-inspired response that generated the hi-tech carnage of the Gulf War,[15] to David Campbell's

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George's *Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re) Introduction to International Relations* (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1994), 15.

[13] John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 284.

[14] *Ibid*.

[15] Stanley Hoffman, "Delusions of World Order," *New York Review of Books* April 9, 1992: 37-42.

deconstruction of the horrors that befell Bosnia during the break-up of former Yugoslavia,[16] there is a growing sense that conventional thought and practice in IR is facing a watershed; the feeling that things "simply cannot go on as they have done."[17]

It is this feeling that I wish to analyse in the context of Japan's post-Cold War international role, at a time when its future as one of the great powers of the 21st century is generally acknowledged to be one of the few certainties in an age of chronic uncertainty. And, while the Japan context is perhaps not as dramatic as that associated with the former Soviet Union, what I am suggesting here is that there are some important analogies to be drawn between the one-dimensional, caricatured representations of Soviet life and society that underwrote the Cold War Soviet 'threat,' and contemporary representations of Japan as international actor. This is perhaps most obvious, as I will seek to demonstrate, in the way that debate on Japan's international role, particularly in the United States, has been prone to oscillate – between, on the one hand, continuing invective against Japan as a threat to global and regional security (i.e., U.S. economic hegemony-as-security) and on the other, nagging demands for Japan to undertake a greater real-world contribution towards upholding global security and stability. In a period when more nuanced and complex insights into Japanese reality are readily available, this is a framework which badly needs updating and expanding. Before this can happen however, some fundamental questions need to be asked: about how we speak about 'international roles' in the first place, and how certain aspects of social reality are deemed relevant or important to discussing international agency, while others are not.

In asking these questions, this thesis seeks to make a contribution to the contemporary debate on Japan as an international actor. It does not, however, aim to provide definitive answers to these questions, or construct a replacement agenda for

[16] David Campbell, *National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998). This work is discussed in more detail in Chapter Five.
[17] R. B. J. Walker, *One World, Many Worlds: Struggles for a Just World Peace* (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1988), 14.

Japan's international future. Indeed, this thesis is far less a project of construction, than it is one of *connection* — between texts, voices and ideas which, despite their crucial points of convergence, remain strangely separated from each other. As I will demonstrate in the course of the chapters to come, a whole range of literature, debate and commentary already exists within 'Japanese Studies,' which offers opportunities for thinking about Japan in different, more incisive and productive ways. Yet, rarely if ever does this body of work find its way onto the IR agenda on the question of 'Japan.' In the chapters to follow, I will explore why this is so, and how this situation might be changed. For now, however, I will return to the major issues surrounding Japan's international role as they are generally represented in mainstream debate, and explore a little further the question of how this debate developed, historically and intellectually.

2. Modern Japan: Defining and Re-Defining an International Role.

Looking at the broad themes which have tended to dominate discussions of Japan's international role in the world over the past century and a half, a certain sense of continuity emerges. For the purposes of this thesis, my discussion begins with the emergence of the modern Japanese state through the Meiji Restoration (*Meiji Ishin*), in 1868, when a group of political leaders drawn from the samurai class succeeded in establishing a new centralised political authority, headed by a revived imperial structure.[18] The Restoration however, was not just an internal 'revolution from above.' Rather, and as a number of scholars have pointed out, it was a response to the increasingly urgent perception among the Japanese elite, that Japan needed to assert and defend its existence, in a world order that was by now irrevocably defined in terms of Western concepts of space and time.[19] Thus, as Japan began to import the technologies and structures that had enabled the West to encroach upon its autonomy

[18] Marius Jansen, "The Meiji State: 1868-1912," in Tim Megarry (ed.), *The Making of Modern Japan* (Dartford: Greenwich University Press, 1995), 67-85.
[19] Tessa Morris-Suzuki, *Re-Inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1998), 20-21.

in the mid-nineteenth century, its governing elite also worked to solidify the image of Japan as a united, centralised modern state.

As Stefan Tanaka and others have argued, the circumstances of Japan's emergence as a modern state necessitated particular ways of representing Japan's place in the world – a place geoculturally connected to Asia, but which also had to be recognised as historically equivalent to the modern West, if Japan were not to suffer the same fate as colonised China.[20] In this sense, the phrases and slogans coined to express Japan's post-Restoration destiny – such as *Bunmei Kaika* ("civilisation and enlightenment"), and the more famous *Datsu-A-Ron* (disassociation from Asia theory), conveyed neither the abandonment of Japanese cultural identity, nor the unambiguous celebration of Western superiority.[21] Rather, they were meant to express Japan's unique location, both geographically and historically, as the mediator of Western civilisation and modernity (which, as Tanaka has shown, were by no means necessarily one and the same) to the East – and the representative of Eastern civilisation and culture to the West.[22]

Inevitably however, as Japanese and Western strategic interests came increasingly into conflict in the region – and particularly after the Japanese defeat of Russia in 1905 – this relatively benign view began to change. Instead of the emphasis on mediation, and *Tôzai bunmei chôwa* (the harmonisation of Eastern and Western civilisation), Japan's role came to be seen increasingly as protector and guide to the cultural and geographical space of Asia against the expansionist ambitions of the West, with the emphasis now more upon the inherent incompatibility of Eastern and

[20] Stefan Tanaka, *Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts into History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 26.
[21] *Datsu-A, Nyû-O* (literally: "out of Asia, into Europe") was coined by the nineteenth century educator Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901), one of the most famous figure in Japan's nineteenth century modernisation. Stefan Tanaka suggests, however, that such slogans were not simply about leaving a backward Asia behind and 'Westernising;' rather, they reflected the ideal of a truly universal knowledge (which happened to come from the West), which Japan had to emulate if it were to survive and prosper as a modern state. Tanaka, *Japan's Orient*, 37-38.
[22] *Ibid*.

Western civilisation (*Tôzai bunmei taiketsu*).[23] The broad rationale for Japanese leadership remained more or less the same: Japan, it was argued, was the best qualified to lead Asia (with which it remained culturally and ethnically connected), against Western domination, precisely because it had, by now, temporally surpassed the rest of Asia in modernising achievement.[24] And, as some have noted, it was a rationale that was initially welcomed by many other Asian, particularly in Malaysia, Burma and Vietnam, where there was experience of Western, but not Japanese colonialism.[25]

The tragic events of Japan's pre-war and wartime colonial adventure have been well documented elsewhere, and need not be reiterated here. My point for now is that when Japan's home-grown model of Asian hegemony finally disappeared in a puff of carcinogenic ash in August 1945, few people envisaged that it would be ever be resurrected. Yet it was; the very circumstances of Japan's defeat ensuring for it a postwar international role that would be, in many respects, a mere modification of the original Meiji/Shôwa vision. Occupied by the United States, and locked into the rapidly developing Cold War confrontation between the postwar superpowers, Japan would lead Asia again, but this time as the protégé and junior partner of postwar U.S. hegemony; an integral link in the bulwark of Free World defence against the threat of Soviet expansionism in the Pacific. It was envisaged, as the historian Bruce Cummings expresses it, in terms of a rolling back of the clock, "to an earlier conception of Japan's place in the world, before it went on the lamentable bender that

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[23] Yamamuro Shin'ichi, "Ajia Ninshiki no Kijiku" (Criteria for Japanese Perceptions of Asia), in Furuya Tetsuo (ed.), *Kindai Nihon ni Okeru Ajia Ninshiki* (Perceptions of Asia in Modern Japan; Kyoto: Kyoto University Humanities Research Centre and Kyôdô Insatsu, 1994), 25-27.
[24] Yûzô Yamamoto, "'Dai Tôa kyôei maki:' kôsô to sono kôzô" (Structure and Rationale in the Greater Eastern Co-Prosperity Sphere), in Tetsuo Furuya (ed.), *Kindai Nihon no Ajia Ninshiki* (Kyoto: Kyoto University Humanities Research Centre and Kyôdô Insatsu, 1994), 46.
[25] John Dower, for example, describes how Ba Maw, the leader of Burma during the 1930s, evoked the vision of "a thousand million Asiatics." Later, bitterly disillusioned by the reality of Japanese 'leadership' in Asia, Ba Maw would denounce Japanese "brutality, arrogance and racial pretensions." *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 6-7.

ended with Pearl Harbour: an economic conception rather than one that would again loose a Japanese army on Asia."[26]

To this end, Japan had to be re-made in the image of American capitalist democracy; a project captured in the famous twin Occupation objectives of *democratisation* and *demilitarisation*. In later years, this prophetic coupling of slogans would come to signify many of the tensions and contradictions associated with Japan's international role.[27] In the interim, however, democratisation and demilitarisation found permanent expression in the new Constitution, promulgated in 1947 under Occupation supervision. In particular, they were enshrined in the now-famous Article Nine, which states that:

> Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
>
> In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognised.[28]

Almost as soon as it came into force, Article Nine came to be regarded, by both the U.S. and Japanese conservative elite, as fundamentally incompatible with Japan's new role as Cold War ally of the West. Consequently, by the time of the Korean War in 1950, Occupation "reverse-course" policies had already begun to jettison many of the initial, more radical reforms carried out in the name of democratisation and demilitarisation. By the war's end, Eisenhower's administration had upgraded, from "desirable" to "imperative," Japan's role as an "active participant" in the containment of communist expansionism in Northeast Asia.[29] This objective was partially achieved through the signing of the U.S. - Japan Security Treaty in 1953,

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[26] Bruce Cumings, "Japan's Position in the World System," in Andrew Gordon (ed.), *Postwar Japan as History* (Oxford, England: University of California Press, 1993), 46.
[27] John Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (London: Allen Lane, 1999), 73-83, and 526-527.
[28] The Constitution of Japan, Article Nine, 58.
[29] Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 533.

which re-equipped Japan with a standing army of 180,000 "Self-Defence" personnel, and confirmed virtually unlimited U.S. access to Japan as a major conventional and nuclear base in the Pacific.[30] It was only the beginning of a long, steady erosion of Article Nine, through successively lenient "interpretations" (*kaishaku*) of it under Japanese law. These interpretations were unsuccessful to the extent that Article Nine remains, even today, a powerful rallying point for those opposed to Japan assuming an international military profile again, but they would prove effective enough in propelling Japan, albeit unwillingly, toward a more 'normal' participation in military security.

If Japan, as a 'peace state,' continued to be a thorn in the side of U.S. Cold War military strategy, its role as a bulwark of capitalism was to evolve beyond anything which the founders of *Pax Americana* could have dreamed of in the early 1950s. The procurements bonanza precipitated by the Korean War kick-started the postwar Japanese economy, paying for more than a quarter of Japanese imports between 1951 and 1956.[31] Massive capital and technological inflow, and access to foreign markets under U.S. sponsorship allowed re-industrialisation and economic rationalisation to a degree that simply would not have been possible otherwise.[32] A mass consumer culture began to develop, as did a postwar power elite, whose conservative political hegemony eventually became known as the "1955 System;" a symbiotic set of relationships between big business, conservative (right-wing) politicians, and a powerful bureaucracy that eventually came to achieve almost disciplinary status in own right among postwar Japan analysts. And, it is typical of the fractured, paradoxical history of U.S.-Japan relations that, despite being the quintessential

[30] More will be said on this topic in Chapter Seven.
[31] Tessa Morris-Suzuki, *Shôwa: An Inside History of Hirohito's Japan* (Sydney: Methuen Australia, 1984), 141.
[32] Particularly in industries such as iron, steel, and petroleum refinement, where the improvement of Japanese products would form an important basis for later prosperity. Laura E. Hein, "Growth Versus Success: Japan's Economic Policy in Historical Perspective," in Gordon (ed.), *Postwar Japan as History* (*op. cit.*, 1993), 109.

legacy of Occupation policy, the 1955 System would eventually become a major target of the U.S. critique in the 1980s. [33]

Japan's emergence as an economic power during the 1960s was important in both consolidating the 1955 system, and re-casting Japanese perceptions of what an international role for Japan should be. International prominence re-awakened feelings of national pride, if not exceptionalism, in Japan's miraculous postwar recovery. Inevitably, it also reopened tensions in the U.S.-Japan relationship that dated back to the signing of the San Francisco Treaty. U.S. discontent with the rise and rise of Japanese economic strength, particularly its penetration of U.S. domestic and foreign markets, re-awakened resentment concerning Japan's perceived "free ride" in both economic and military security. It was further exacerbated by the escalation of U.S. involvement in Indochina towards the end of the 1960s.

In Japan, the major effect of the Vietnam war and its aftermath was a desire for increased sovereignty and independence in the world, that, not surprisingly, resonated across the political spectrum, albeit for very different reasons. Japanese military bases, particularly Okinawa, were indispensable to the U.S. war in Vietnam, but the televised devastation of another Asian society in the name of the "free world," of which Japan was emphatically part, awakened widespread feelings of public doubt and resentment. The Japanese grassroots organisation *beheiren*, or People's Organisation for Peace in Vietnam, played a significant role in the social protests that rocked Japanese urban society through much of the late 1960s, along with other public groups campaigning on sensitive policy issues of the day (e.g.

[33] Dower, "Peace and Democracy in Two Systems," in Gordon (ed.), *Postwar Japan as History* (*op. cit.*, 1993), 14-15, and, more expansively, in the final chapter of *Embracing Defeat* (*op. cit.*, 1999), 547-64. The "reverse course" policy involved, among other things, the rehabilitation of prominent political figures who had been purged by the MacArthur administration because of their wartime associations, the easing of restrictions on the giant conglomerates, or *zaibatsu*, which had been the core of the imperial war effort, and the tightening of labour restrictions; especially those concerning industrial unionism. In 1950, the reverse swing became even more dramatic as McCarthyism extended to Japan. A succession of Red Purges between 1950 and 1952 saw over 700,000 workers lose their jobs in factories, public enterprises and the media. William K. Tabb, *The Postwar Japanese System: Cultural Economy and Economic Transformation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 79.

relations with China, Okinawa, and the renewal of the Mutual Security Treaty).[34] Meanwhile, conservatives who supported Japan's general adherence to the U.S. vision of capitalist security and stability in Asia were increasingly unhappy with what they saw as continued Japanese subservience to U.S. strategic and economic interests. Subsequent, and decidedly unilateral American initiatives to change the bilateral relationship (Nixon's unannounced visit to China in 1971, and the announcement of his "new economic policy") only confirmed the perception, whatever one's political convictions, that Japan's place in the world was being dominated from "outside." And, while many specific points of difference would be officially resolved by the mid-1970s, the feeling that the 'special' postwar relationship was out of kilter remained prominent on either side of the Pacific. It would find new, and powerful forms of expression in the 1980s.

"Burden-sharing" During the 1980s: The Lead-up to the Gulf War

The Vietnam war fuelled another timely economic boom in Japan, one that proved a major turning point in terms of Japan's location within the global political economy. Even by the end of the 1970s, Japan was not yet, as Ezra Vogel so famously expressed it, "number one;"[35] yet its growing economic strength, accentuated by the relative decline in U.S. fortune, made it clear that the gap was closing. By the mid 1980s, another enormous blow had been dealt to traditional images of the U.S.-Japan relationship, when the U.S. became the world's largest debtor country and Japan the world's great creditor. Japan was now undoubtedly an economic superpower, a fact that created immense structural and psychological problems for the U.S., and tensions within the U.S.-Japan relationship that would be pivotal to the "burden sharing" debate of the 1990s

It must also be noted that during this period, Japan came under the prime ministership of Nakasone Yasuhiro (1983-1987), a committed supporter of the

[34] Dower, "Peace and Democracy in Two Systems," 22-24.

(U.S.) view that Japan should accept a greater share in the military defence of the region. Under Nakasone, accordingly, the Japanese government breached self-imposed guidelines on Japanese military spending, jettisoned embargoes on the export of weapons and military-related manufactures, and opened access to advanced Japanese technology to assist Reagan's "Star Wars" vision. [36] Such policies were reinforced, on the U.S. side, by a renewed commitment to Japan as America's most important regional strategic ally. Yet, it was also during this period that Japan 'bashing,' particularly in the realm of economic relations, reached new, ugly and often hysterical heights. Foreign criticism, most of it from the U.S. media, blasted continuing Japanese economic growth as "adversarial," and "neomercantilist," and the continuing closure of its domestic market as "unfair."[37] In Japan, meanwhile, 'internationalisation' or *kokusaika* was becoming the public catch-cry of the 1980s, representing a new, more cosmopolitan Japan to the world. As I will explain in Chapter Seven, *kokusaika* was itself underwritten by a particular sense of nationalism which, as Japan moved from success to success, was to manifest itself in equally chauvinistic, "counter-bashing" terms towards the U.S., and in a renewed sense of superiority toward other 'Asian' foreigners.[38] More and more, Japanese interpretations of the incredible postwar recovery would play down the influence of 'external' factors (such as American patronage and war booms) in Japan's success, preferring to dwell instead on the 'uniqueness' of Japanese identity and values.

In this way, as the Cold War drew to an end, debate about the U.S. - Japan relationship remained riven with tension and doubt on either side. While the

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[35] Ezra F. Vogel, *Japan as Number One: Lessons for America* (London: Harvard University Press, 1979).

[36] The 1-percent-of-GNP ceiling was formally introduced in 1976, by which time, Japanese military spending in real money terms already ranked seventh in the world. Numerous critics have argued that the guideline was, and is deceptive, because depending on what calculations are used, real Japanese military spending has generally exceeded one percent of its GNP. Even were this not the case, one also needs to heed Dower's observation that "1 percent of a huge and [until recently] constantly expending economy is by definition itself huge and constantly expanding." Dower, "Peace and Democracy in Two Systems," 30.

[37] Masao Miyoshi, *Off Center: Power and Culture Relations Between Japan and the United States* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1991), 120.

military/security relationship forged against the now defunct Soviet Union continued to function, Japan was increasingly represented as a "threat" in U.S. media, academic and foreign policymaking circles, often via a vocabulary of danger, irrationality, and contrasts between (American) 'individualism' and (foreign) 'groupism' that were drawn directly from anti-Soviet rhetoric during the Cold War.[39] Even when the tone was more moderate and optimistic, an unmistakable unease regarding the future of Japan's international role persisted, an unease that would eventually erupt again into bitter disagreement – this time however, in a post-Cold War context, via the events of the early 1990s.

The Gulf War: Re-Igniting the Burden Sharing Debate

When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the response from the major industrial powers was, as Noam Chomsky has pointed out, twofold:

> The first [response] was an array of economic sanctions of unprecedented severity. The second was the threat of war. Both responses were initiated at once, even before Iraq's annexation of the invaded country. The first response had broad support. The second is pretty much limited to the U.S. and Britain, apart from the family dictatorships that had been placed in charge of the Gulf oil producing states. As leader of the two-member coalition, the U.S. moved quickly to ensure that sanctions could not be effective and to bar any diplomatic initiative.[40]

Chomsky's observations about international responses to the first major post-Cold War conflict shed important light on how and why the Gulf War managed to precipitate the issue of Japan's burden-sharing from the relatively low-level status it had in formal U.S.-Japan relations, to a major, acrimonious controversy, framed in terms of 'real' contributions to global peace and security. The initial Japanese government response to the war was to comply with the sanctions imposed by the

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[38] Harumi Befu, "Internationalisation of Japan and *Nihon Bunkaron*," in Hiroshi Mannari and Harumi Befu (eds.), *The Challenge of Japan's Internationalisation: Organisation and Culture* (New York: Kodansha International, 1983), 262.

[39] Good examples of this approach include James Fallows' *More Like Us: Making America Great Again* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989), and Woronoff's *Japan as Anything But Number One* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1991).

[40] Noam Chomsky, "The Gulf Crisis" (Sourced at *The Noam Chomsky Archive* on the Internet, at http://www.zmag.org/chomsky/intro.cfm), 1.

UN, but the plans submitted by Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, to send a (largely symbolic) contingent of Self-Defence Force troops to the Gulf, were scotched by the Japanese Diet on the basis that such a move would be unconstitutional. A subsequent pledge of thirteen billion dollars towards Operation Desert Storm did nothing to mitigate criticism of this decision in Europe and the United States, where Japan's lack of 'global responsibility' was trumpeted almost daily. Proclaimed *The Economist*:

> Stand up, Japan, the world needs you. By hiding behind a doubtful interpretation of its war-renouncing constitution, say Japan's critics, it is forfeiting any say in shaping the new world order its western partners want to construct. After Japan's role in the Gulf War — a role so retiring as to be embarrassing — they want to see a more assertive political leadership, matching the country's diplomatic weight to its economic muscle. It would be a Japan that stopped saying no.[41]

The traditional association of military activity with global 'responsibility,' ensured that Japan's paying more for global security was never going to alleviate the demand for 'active' participation in the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty. In Japan itself, as the *Economist* article suggested, this was a view supported by many members of the governing elite, explicitly or otherwise. As Yamaguchi Jirô later explained:

> In the Gulf War, Japan did nothing but pay money to prosecute the war. Leaders of the government and the LDP said that this kind of 'chequebook diplomacy' appeared quite selfish, and would drive Japan into total isolation.[42]

The speed with which the Western powers overwhelmed Iraq ensured that Japan never got to play the active role demanded of it in this particular conflict. In the long term however, the Gulf war proved pivotal in directing debate on Japan's place in the post-Cold War world. In June 1992, hastening to counter accusations of "chequebook diplomacy," the Japanese Diet (Parliament) passed the International

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[41] "Time to Wake Up." *The Economist*, 9 March 1991, 58-59.
[42] Jirô Yamaguchi, "Japanese Security Policy After the End of the Cold War," in Richard Leaver and James L. Richardson (eds.), *The Post-Cold War Order: Diagnoses and Prognoses* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1993), 172.

Peace Cooperation (IPC) Legislation,[43] allowing the overseas dispatch of Japanese military forces to participate in UN Peacekeeping Operations.[44] Almost immediately afterwards, a contingent of Japanese Self-Defence Troops was sent to participate in the United Nations Transitional Authority operation in Cambodia. Japan's first 'real' contribution to the new world order was generally deemed a great success, particularly in the West, where it was hailed as demonstrating a new maturity in Japanese foreign policy. Such commendation, combined with the absence of SDF casualties[45] and the ostentatiously "non-military" nature of the duties performed by the SDF in Cambodia,[46] helped to mollify public anxiety and anger over the further erosion of Article Nine, and since then, there have been further successful dispatches of SDF peacekeepers (to Mozambique, Bosnia, Zaire/Rwanda and the Golan Heights).

Today, it is difficult to evoke the original sense of urgency and crisis associated with the SDF peacekeeping issue in Japan in the early 1990s. Indeed, it has become all but a non-issue, particularly since 1994, when a celebrated policy reversal by Japan's Socialist Party effectively banished the constitutional status of the SDF itself, to the very periphery of political debate.[47] Now, it is less a matter of debating where the SDF fits into Article Nine, than how Article Nine can be fitted ('interpreted') around the far bolder steps that have been taken to ensure that Japan continues to modify its military profile and capacity in keeping with a 'real-world' superpower role. This

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[43] Better known as the 'PKO [peace-keeping operation] Law.' *Ibid*., 175.
[44] Eventually, Japanese minesweepers were also dispatched to the Gulf region, to participate in cleanup operations under the auspices of the United Nations. *Ibid*., 178.
[45] During the course of the operation, two Japanese civilian policeman were killed, in an apparent Khmer Rouge ambush. A private volunteer worker, Nakata, was also shot and killed in a separate incident.
[46] SDF activities were mostly confined to "non-military" tasks such as road-building: initial public sensitivity towards the PKO Law saw them barred even from tasks such as mine clearing. *Ibid*.
[47] This reversal was part of a famous compromise, via which the SPJ (now known as the Socialist Democratic Party) formed a coalition government with its long-standing enemy the Liberal Democratic Party (headed by Tomiichi Murayama). Gavan McCormack, *The Emptiness of Japanese Affluence* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, Ltd., 1996), 212-13. At the time of completing this thesis, the national convention of the Japan Communist Party (which, of all the major political parties in Japan, had always taken the most uncompromising stance on Japan's remilitarisation) was widely expected to approve a proposal to revise its charter in order to tolerate the mobilisation of the SDF in "a military emergency." Despite this, the JCP still maintains that the SDF is fundamentally unconstitutional. Minoru Tada, "Communists to 'Tolerate' SDF," *The Japan Times Online* at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion.htm.

sense of Japan bowing to the inevitable, the rational, is reflected in the perspective of former Prime Minister Ryûtarô Hashimoto, who argued in 1993, prior to assuming his leadership, that:

> At present, when we consider Japan's role in global security, Japan faces three choices. It can continue as a "merchant state" [*shôjin kokka*], or it can become a country that carries the bare minimum of necessary armaments, separating itself from those dangers which threaten people in other countries. Or, it can choose to carry arms commensurate with the spirit of the United Nations, becoming a "normal country" [*futsû no kuni*]. Those of us in the LDP at least, do not see "merchant statehood" as an option for Japan.[48]

For Hashimoto, as for countless other Japanese commentators, national pride, as much as global responsibility, is at stake in Japan's 21st century foreign policy choices. In this sense, the traditional connection between *real* power and politico-military practice is re-affirmed in the connection of the SDF/Constitution/Defence Agreement debate, to an increasing sense of grievance associated with Japan's share of global decisionmaking power. Contemporary Japanese discussions of Japan's post-Cold War global role rarely omit the claim that Europe and the United States continue to deny Japan the indices of global power that successive Japanese governments have been asking for since the early 1990s. Commonly cited examples include Japan's (to date, unsuccessful) attempts to obtain a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, and increased voting rights and decisionmaking power within the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. There is also the Japanese government's parallel interest in increasing its input into organisations and events associated with global cultural power: UNESCO, the Olympic Federation, and even the World Cup football tournament.[49]

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[48] Ryûtarô Hashimoto, *Vision of Japan: Waga Kyôchô ni Seisaku Arite* (Vision of Japan: Policies in Alignment; Tokyo: K. K Besutoserâzu, 1993), 106.

[49] For example, while Japan today pays approximately 20 percent of total UN dues, there are only about 115 Japanese nationals employed by the UN; approximately half of the percentage that would reflect Japan's financial input to the organisation. The most senior of these employees is Koichiro Matsuura, who became UNESCO Secretary-General in November 1999. Matsuura has spoken publicly about the need for Japanese people employed within international organisations "to have the guts to assert themselves aggressively." Kiroku Hanai, "English is Not the Answer," *The Japan Times*, June 26, 2000. Sourced from the Japan Times Online Archive, at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/search.htm.

The more immediate point however, is that Hashimoto's vision for Japan in the future (and it is a widely shared one), draws upon a highly conventional sense of IR rationality and logic concerning the possibilities for world order and security – despite the vastly changed circumstances in which Japan finds itself. Against this, it is hardly surprising that government responses to the global role challenge since the 1990s, have included ever bolder steps towards ensuring that Japan increase its military contribution towards regional order and stability, while affirming its traditional position within the framework of security thinking and geopolitical practice of the United States. Of particular importance, in this context, are the series of joint declarations by Japan and the U.S. on security issues since the mid-1990s, culminating in the 1997 Review of the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defence Cooperation.[50] The Review is based, as a preceding declaration explains, on the understanding that:

> (S)ince the end of the Cold War the possibility of global armed conflict has receded. The last few years have seen expanded political and security dialogue among countries of the region. Respect for democratic principles is growing. Prosperity is more widespread than at any other time in history, and we are witnessing the emergence of an Asia-Pacific community. The Asia-Pacific region has become the most dynamic area of the globe.
>
> At the same time, instability and uncertainty persist in the region. Tensions continue on the Korean Peninsula. There are still heavy concentrations of military force, including nuclear arsenals. Unresolved territorial disputes, potential regional conflicts, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery all constitute sources of instability.[51]

Against this framework of post-Cold War 'change,' which remains, nonetheless, underwritten by the age-old certainties of power politics, the Review stipulates that existing U.S.-Japan security arrangements are to be supplemented by greater

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[50] "Completion of the Review of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defence Cooperation," sourced online at the U.S. Department of Defence Web Site at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/japan/rpt-usjpn/defense9/0923.html.

[51] "U.S. - Japan Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century," 1. Sourced online at the U.S. Department of Defence Web Site at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/japan/jointsec.html.

Japanese activity, both in its own defence and, more controversially, in "situations in areas surrounding Japan" that are deemed to have "an important influence on Japan's peace and security."[52] Such activities remain, of course, firmly under the direction and control of the United States military forces and, to date, confined to "non-combatant support:" for example, the evacuation of refugees, the provision of rear area material support (excluding weapons and ammunition), transportation duties, repair and maintenance services to U.S. machinery, and so on. Yet the document also makes it clear that this is by no means a finished project, stating that Japan and the U.S. "will review the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner, when changes in situations relevant to the U.S.-Japan security relationship occur and if deemed necessary..."[53]

In short then, Japan's 'new' international role in the 21st century is, once again, that designed for it in 1945, albeit in a context of far greater tensions between Japan and its erstwhile postwar mentor. At a moment when change is acknowledged at all kinds of levels, the role of Japan in the world remains essentially constant – as do its concerns for "normal statehood," which are, I suggest, a testament to the influences upon its decision making elite, foremost among which remains the claim for 'realism;' still anchored, as Gaddis lamented, in Cold War perspectives and premises.

In this respect, Japan's dilemma is not particularly unique, given the continuing dominance of Cold War frameworks for international theory and practice. Commenting on this dominance, Ken Booth has argued that, while the Cold War may have come to an end as a particular historical period, its cognitive influence is much harder to shake off, with the "experience lessons, remembrances and forgettings" of the four and a half decades after 1945 remaining pivotal in international theory and practice, while the very memory of the Cold War is itself "a

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[52] "Completion of the Review of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defence Cooperation," 2.
[53] *Ibid.*, 12.

prize to struggle over."[54] Thus, Booth writes, "the apparently 'academic' debate over what the Cold War *was* is part of the politics of deciding what the post-Cold War *is*."[55] More importantly, he suggests, the particular mindset that helped generate and justify the 'historical' train of events that we understand as the Cold War, represents a much older phenomenon — a 700-year-old international political culture of conflict. Booth describes this phenomenon as the "cold war of the mind" which manifests itself:

> when a confrontation between nations or states ceases to be simply a matter of a political clash of interests and instead takes on the character — the depth, the persuasiveness, the semi-permanence, the identity and the commitment — of an eschatological political culture.[56]

In the course of this thesis, and especially in Chapter Three, I will show how Japan became locked into this "cold war of the mind," in a way which profoundly influenced its postwar development, and which continues to resonate in the decisions being taken today by the Japanese policymaking elite in regard to Japan's international role. This, of course, has long been recognised by many within the Japanese Studies community. In particular, 'critical historians' such as John Dower (1986, 1993, 1999),[57] Laura E. Hein (1990, 1993),[58] Bruce Cumings (1989, 1999)[59] and Andrew Gordon (1993),[60] have illustrated the effects of the cold war mindset in Japan, rightly attributing to it developments such as the reversal of early postwar democratic reform; the establishment of a conservative oligarchy which discouraged public reflection upon wartime aggression; the development of the myth of homogenous, "mass middle class" Japanese society; and the pursuit of a growth-at-

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[54] Ken Booth, "Cold Wars of the Mind," in Ken Booth (ed.), *Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 29.
[55] *Ibid*.
[56] *Ibid*., 31-32.
[57] John Dower, *War Without Mercy* (*op. cit*., 1986); *Japan in War and Peace: Selected Essays* (New York: The New Press, 1993); and *Embracing Defeat* (1999; *op. cit*.).
[58] Laura E. Hein, *Fuelling Growth: The Energy Revolution and Economic Policy in Postwar Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), and "Growth versus Success: Japan's Economic Policy in Historical Perspective" (*op. cit*., 1993).
[59] Cumings, "Japan's Position in the World System" (*op. cit*., 1993), and *Parallax Visions: Making Sense of American-East Asian Relations at the End of the Century* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999).

all-costs economic policy, whose full environmental and social implications are still being accounted for.

In this regard too, there are many Japan observers for whom the question of Japan's future requires something other than simple assumptions about the all-powerful nature of market relations and/or state-centric anarchy, not to mention the stable, progressive and homogenous nature of postwar Japanese society. Their work is important to this thesis, which will use it to illustrate other 'Japans' that have hitherto escaped the notice of those primarily concerned with Japan as an international actor. Yet my point here, to reiterate it, is not just that the accepted truths of Japan's postwar progress, and its future needs, can be rendered problematic through other narratives and other perspectives. Rather, it is that these perspectives are unlikely to be acknowledged as valuable, or even relevant, while Japan's international identity remains locked within the sort of politico-intellectual framework that creates and sustains "cold wars of the mind" – the framework that has dominated IR theory and practice.

My broader point, and one that defines the critical ambition of this thesis, is that neither the alternatives that exist for Japan as a post-Cold War international actor, nor the need for them, can be understood without reflecting upon what 'IR' means in this context, and how its dominant tradition of theory and practice has impacted upon the way 'Japan' has been conceived of and written about, as an IR subject. This brings me more directly to the question of Realism, or more recently, neo-Realism, undoubtedly, the dominant perspective(s) on global reality within IR intellectual and policy circles since WW2, and the primary conduit of the 'Japan' which is the subject of scholarly and policy reference in the 1990s.[61] In the attempt to construct some kind of dialogical bridge between IR and Japanese Studies as the thesis

[60] Andrew Gordon, Introduction to *Postwar Japan as History* (*op. cit.*, 1993).
[61] On the dominance of Realism/neo-Realism, see Steve Smith, "New Approaches to International Theory," in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 168-69.

progresses, I need to confront this Realism issue, and explain how and why it has been largely responsible for the lack of dialogue thus far. In so doing, another question needs to be confronted, one that is even less commonly engaged in the debate over IR and Japan.

This is the question of positivism which, I suggest, operates at the ontological core of Realism and is, therefore, the mainspring of its knowledge of global reality. In chapter Two, I will seek to explain in more detail the nature and significance of positivism in this context. In chapter Three, my aim is to show a positivist based Realism in practice, as it were, particularly on the issue of Japan as a global actor. The aim of chapter Four is to show how neo-Realist perspectives continue to shape and direct the IR and Japan debate while chapters Five, Six, and Seven are concerned more directly with opening the critical bridge between IR scholars and Japanese Studies scholars, in order to address 'Japan' beyond the parameters of positivist Realism. In these chapters, in particular, my concern is to show what is *systematically left out* of the orthodox debates over Japan, and why a more inclusive engagement with Japanese society and peoples is necessary in any adequate analysis of its nature and role in the new millennium. For now however, and to conclude this introductory chapter, my aim is to further introduce some of the complex 'theoretical' themes touched on above in brief, but in a manner which hopefully provides a further sense of their importance to the thesis.

3. IR Realism, Japanese Studies and Positivism: Some Introductory Remarks.

There are at least four fundamental assumptions underpinning the Realist approach to IR. The first is that individual, sovereign states are the most important actors in the international arena, and therefore the primary unit of realistic IR analysis, even in the age of global (economic) interdependence. The second, that the international arena is the site of endemic anarchy, the location for the struggle for (military and market) power which remains the essential characteristic of the global system. The third is that this anarchy has within it an inherent rationality, expressed in starkly utilitarian

terms (either as self-interested pursuit of maximum interest, or of regime maintenance) Finally, that, for all the cooperative posturing of recent times, there is a general absence of cooperative behaviour among states and other actors, except in cases where self-interest makes it worthwhile. These assumptions have remained intrinsic to Realism since its seminal U.S. scholar, Hans Morgenthau (1948), insisted that they correspond to the "objective laws" that govern political life at the international level.[62]

These are, I suggest, also the assumptions that continue to inform current IR debate about Japan's options in the world, despite the generally broader IPE and neo-liberal agenda that has characterised global commentary since the early 1980s. Underpinning these assumptions about what is real in the current era, is a particular approach to knowledge and reality per se known as positivism. While the term 'positivism' has been much misused in IR, often muddling together different, if interrelated methodologies and philosophical premises, I use the term here to refer to a specific approach to 'knowing' the world, derived from a unified view of science, which seeks to explain reality in terms of a dichotomy between cognition and 'fact.' Or, as Ernest Gellner has pointed out, it represents a commitment, in contemporary Anglo-American social thought in particular, to the distinction between an independent world of fact, and a realm of theorised knowledge derived either deductively or inductively from it.[63] For Gellner, as for many others, the endurance of the fact/theory dichotomy has little to do with its logical merit, which has been questioned, in varying ways, by scholars from Gallileo to Kant. For all this, it has remained at the core of Anglo-American social science, particularly during the post-WWII period, with enormous implications for IR .

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[62] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (5th edition; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973). More will be said on this work in Chapter Two.

[63] Ernest Gellner, *Legitimisation of Belief* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 175-177. "The world of regular, morally neutral, magically un-manipuable fact," Gellner writes, "which some of us are now in danger of taking too much for granted and which is presupposed by science, is in fact not at all self-evident." *Ibid*., 180.

As indicated, I will touch on these implications more thoroughly in Chapter Two. For now, I will merely reiterate the importance of these issues for IR in both theory and practice. Quite simply, and as one scholar puts it:

> if one takes the view that knowledge is derived from activities "out there" in the real world (e.g., knowable via testing procedures designed to separate out the facts from mere interpretation), then there is little point in further reflection upon the process by which these activities are understood. One simply responds to them in ways which best serve, for example, the national interest.[64]

In terms more specifically connected to this thesis, this can mean, for example, that there is little 'practical' value in reflecting critically upon the choice made by Japan to re-arm in the post WW2 period. From the above perspective Japan-as-state is simply acting realistically in responding to an 'external' phenomenon – an anarchical world of states (and other actors), all engaged in the competition for power and hierarchical status.[65] In this context also, there is no need to contemplate the specific historical and political circumstances under which some Japanese citizens (namely, the people of Japan's southernmost prefecture, Okinawa), have borne a grossly unfair share of the burden involved in defending Japanese 'national interests' (nor, indeed, the nature of such 'interest'). One simply assigns them the status of necessary, if unfortunate victims of a greater public good.[66]

This is not to suggest of course, that there are any easy answers to the issues posed above, or the others that will be examined in this thesis in regard to Japan as a global actor. Rather, my point is that before we, as citizens of the world, can begin to re-address the questions of what matters to us concerning Japan and its peoples, we need to readdress the question of 'what matters' in IR per se. And, before we can

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[64] George, *Discourses of Global Politics*, 21.
[65] This is certainly the view, for example, taken by Geoffrey Hawthorne, who explains that Japan's current foreign policy "is now more consistent than it has been with beliefs beyond East Asia *about what national interests are and what matters for international security* [emphasis added]." Hawthorne also warns against supposing that "the end of the Cold War has marked the end of the defensive and incipiently aggressive competition between nation states. No East Asian state, certainly, is rash enough to suppose that it has been" Geoffrey Hawthorne, "A New Japan? A New Security?," in Ken Booth (ed.), *Statecraft and Security* (*op. cit.*, 1998), 219.
[66] Okinawa and its role in Japanese national security will be explored further in Chapter Seven.

begin to do this in any profound way, we need to know something of the way in which 'what matters' in IR *has been made to matter*. It goes without saying that this is a long and complex process, yet it is increasingly being taken up by those in the IR community for whom the various crises of contemporary global life require some other response than acquiescence to traditional truths about the way the world 'just is.'

This thesis, as indicated, seeks to make a contribution to this process, by considering the impact of positivism upon IR scholarship and Japanese Studies. It does so in a context in which such influences have been very powerful, but almost never explicitly addressed. On the odd occasion when 'theoretical' issues have been traversed, the power of positivism and Realism have been evident enough. This was so in the very important work of Edwin Reischauer, whose detailed observations of Japanese society were made from an anti-Soviet Realist perspective that set the broader political tone for 'what mattered' about Japanese political economy and society until well into the 1970s. Above all, Reischauer was to play a pivotal role in the intellectual push to explain Japan's spectacular postwar progress in terms of Modernisation Theory during the 1960s and, in doing so, bring knowledge of Japan into line with the positivist-based behaviouralism that had come to dominate social science thinking and research in the U.S. From the perspective of this thesis, consequently, Reischauer's work remains very important as an important conduit of Japan-related knowledge within the general context of Anglo-American 'scientific' theory and the broader Realist agenda in IR, and I will return to his contribution, and others like it, in Chapter Three.

The (ostensible) demise of Modernisation Theory will receive more attention in Chapter Four, as will the challenges to Realism during the early 1970s, a period which saw U.S. analysts in particular beginning to re-think some of their dominant assumptions and techniques in the aftermath of events that were no longer explicable in traditional terms. This was particularly evident for IR analysts struggling to come

to terms with, among other things, the failure of U.S. policy in Vietnam, the decline of U.S. economic hegemony, the crises in the Third World and, importantly, the relentless rise of Japan as a major economic competitor. As I will show however, the mainstream response to these events was to reformulate, rather than abandon, its conventional Realist assumptions, albeit with greater emphasis on international economic relations and the systemic forces that determine the behaviour of major global actors. Here, the structuralist arguments of IR scholars such as Kenneth Waltz played a key role in the Realist reconfiguration, which saw an amalgam of conservative structuralism, neo-classical economics and a Popperian variation on positivist themes re-presented as *neo-Realism*.

It was via this 'new' systemic approach that mainstream scholars (in the U.S. in particular) would, in the 1980s, be able to return to the issues that had occupied them in the post WW2 era, having satisfied themselves that they had resolved the difficult questions of theory and policy practice asked of Realism during the immediate post-Vietnam period. One of these issues was, of course, Japan, and the question of Japan was prominent in the neo-Realist literature both in mainstream IR and in Japanese Studies, where it profoundly influenced the post-Vietnam 'reassessment' era. In this latter context, major new Japan 'texts,' notably Chalmers Johnson's *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*, would be credited with establishing new theoretical parameters for understanding Japan. As I will explain in more detail in Chapter Four, Johnson rejected what he termed the "projection" of dominant Western politico-economic theories onto Japan's 'miracle,' seeking instead to locate this miracle in the context of the specific historical events and forces which had shaped Japan's emergence as a modern state, from a perspective that came to be known as 'revisionism' in Japanese Studies circles. Assessments of this perspective, whether positive or negative, have rarely been located in the broader context of IR, but from the point of view of this thesis there is an important chronological and thematic connection between the establishment of neo-Realism as the dominant paradigm of mainstream IR, and the emergence of a perspective which, while claiming to significantly 'revise' dominant

Western perceptions of Japan, remained very much located in the basic world view of structural anarchy and competition that had been re-established via the neo-Realist makeover.

This connection was subsequently confirmed, as I will demonstrate, by the adoption of many of Johnson's key themes in the late 1980s by the 'generalist' IPE and IR scholarship of figures such as Robert Gilpin, Stephen Krasner, and Robert Keohane, who utilised them to produce Japan-specific variations on what had, by then, become the overarching concern of mainstream analysis, e.g. the need for maintenance of the global status quo via U.S. economic and political hegemony, against the threat of politico-economic anarchy. While Japan's perceived role in this threat scenario ranged from benign (as in the 'burden sharing' debates) to openly threatening (as represented in the more extreme variants of Japan bashing), the fundamental nature of the world in which Japan exists was never really in doubt. It remained, as Realists from Morgenthau to Waltz have asserted, a never-ending struggle for power in an inherent state of anarchy.

Contemporary Diversions: A Word on the "neo-neo" Debate

This thesis takes the perspective that options for Japan's contemporary international role continue to be framed in predominantly neo-Realist terms. I am aware that this stance potentially ignores one of the more enduring debates within IR circles, concerning what has come to be known as neo-liberalism, or neo-liberal institutionalism. As is well known, the perceived stand-off between neo-Realism and neo-liberalism concerns, primarily, the degree to which cooperation among states mitigates the Realist/neo-Realist depiction of international life as a never-ending struggle for maximum advantage in the absence of a central authority (anarchy), with the neo-Realists arguing for the continued predominance of conflict, while neo-

liberals tend to emphasise the role of cooperation.[67] The end of the Cold War, coupled with the greatly increased globalisation of economic activity has seen something of a renaissance of this debate, as analysts try to map out the nature and circumstances of conflict and interdependence.

There are, of course, differences in emphasis and style within the neo-liberal/neo-Realist debate, and some important differences in specifics (i.e. on the role of regimes, and the extent to which domestic politics influence international relations).[68] My own position however, concurs with that of scholars such as Steve Smith and Ole Waever, who have argued, convincingly, that the 'differences' between neo-Liberalism and neo-Realism are less important than their convergences.[69] Robert Keohane has also concurred with this view from the 'inside' of the "neo-neo" circle, arguing that neo-liberalism "borrows as much from realism as from liberalism: it cannot be encapsulated as simply a 'liberal' theory opposed at all points to realism."[70] Smith's point however, goes beyond the shared assumptions of neo-liberalism and neo-Realism; rather, it is that both neo-Realist and neo-liberal perspectives have, over the years "shared *a specific view of how to create knowledge* (emphasis added)... look[ing] at the same issue from different sides."[71] In other words, the "neo-neo" debate is actually two sides of the same coin, with both perspectives sharing the same (positivist) image of global reality.[72]

My thesis does pay attention to the influence of the neo-neo debate in Japanese Studies, which has been evident, I suggest, in both the updated Modernisation themes that service the lingering 'Asian values' identity debate; and, more recently, in several prominent Japanese contributions to the developing literature on

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[67] David A. Baldwin, "Neoliberalism, Neorealism and World Politics," in David A. Baldwin (ed.), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 6-8.
[68] Keohane, "Institutionalist Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War" in Baldwin (ed.), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (*op. cit.*, 1993), 272.
[69] Smith, "New Approaches to International Theory," 170.
[70] Keohane, "Institutionalist Theory and the Realist Challenge," 274.
[71] Smith, "New Approaches to International Theory," 170.
[72] *Ibid.*, 172.

globalisation. These issues and the texts that speak about them will be debated more fully in Chapter Seven. My point for now is that the 'neo-neo' world view does not provide the thinking space that is needed if we are to understand the tensions and possibilities of a major global actor such as Japan, in something other than the crude clichés associated with our understanding of the former Soviet Union. The location of such space is the focus of the second half of the thesis.

4. Critical Convergences: International Relations and 'Other' Japans.

As I illustrated at the beginning of this chapter, Japan, for many, can still be seen as one of the global 'winners' (in Kennedy's terms) of the post-Cold War world order. Economic crises notwithstanding, it remains one of the world's most affluent and (seemingly) stable societies, difficult to associate with widespread poverty, violence or extreme social fragmentation. Yet as I also pointed out, there is growing evidence that for many, Japan's modern experience is under profound strain. At stake here, in addition to the specific examples of social, political and environmental disruption cited earlier, is a more general sense of crisis and foreboding that, paradoxically, seems to be motivated in part by Japan's very success in the world. One of the most eloquent articulations of this sense of malaise comes from the Australian scholar, Gavan McCormack who, in 1996, laid bare some of the ironies attendant upon late twentieth century membership of the 'miracle' economy.

> In Japan the approach of the end of the century is experienced with particular pain and unease, because the long quest for the holy grail of modernisation and equality of status with the West is over, but, having "made it," people are bombarded with messages urging them to redouble their efforts, to work harder (because of the fierce rivalry stirred by the success of their efforts so far), to import more (to help other countries pay for their Japanese goods), and to consume more, so that the trajectory of growth may be resumed. The object of the long quest of the modern age is chimerical, a bird glimpsed momentarily through the foliage that flew away so quickly that perhaps it was never there in the first place. In no country is social life so structured around the imperatives of economic life, or are people subjected to

> more pressure to consume. Nowhere is the emptiness of affluence more deeply felt.[73]

McCormack wrote this in the aftermath of the Great Hanshin Earthquake, which devastated the western Japanese port city of Kôbe in early January 1995. To him, the earthquake and the Japanese response to it, were tragic metaphors for much that has gone wrong in Japanese society during its postwar quest for modern achievement. The human and environmental costs of Japan's "total economism," he argued, were evident everywhere in the stories that emerged from the rubble of Kôbe. There was, for example, the bureaucratic insistence on 'proper procedure' that had impeded national and overseas offers of assistance which could perhaps have prevented more deaths in the aftermath of the earthquake.[74] More disturbingly, McCormack also cited the post-quake revelation of geological research dating back nearly twenty years, identifying the Kôbe region as a high-risk area for the type of quake it suffered — research which was suppressed by successive municipal and central governments in the interests of development projects.[75] In the course of reconstructing Kôbe's devastated infrastructure, it was found that in many instances, even nominal standards for construction based on worst-case disaster scenarios had been ignored, compounding the damage suffered by Kôbe's infrastructure. Perhaps worst of all however, was the virtual absence of any self-reflective analysis among Japan's governing elite in the wake of the clean-up. Instead, according to McCormack, the response has been characterised, for the most part, by the same "techno-hubris" that had contributed to the disaster in the first place, with those in charge proffering

> higher standards, more materials, massive reinforcement of the nation's infrastructure (in order to quake-proof everything), plus a National Emergency Law to allow centralised authority to suspend the law and mobilise the military (Self-Defence Forces). While many thousands of its citizens were still subsisting in refugee camps, Kôbe City was preparing to use the rubble from the disaster as "filling" for the construction of phase two of Port Island and for the base of the

[73] McCormack, *The Emptiness of Japanese Affluence*, 289.
[74] *Ibid*., 10.
[75] *Ibid*., 11.

> planned Kôbe Airport, while pitching its plans for recovery around the hosting of a Kôbe Leisure World 2000 to mark the end of the century."[76]

Documenting these and other incidents, McCormack came to the conclusion that a fundamental re-think of human and social needs in relation to conventional economic logic will be crucial to Japan's future — both as a stable, liveable society, and as a regional and global leader. In this latter context, he argued, the legacy of the Kôbe fiasco reaches well beyond its immediate location, to other societies where the slavish emulation of 'Japanese-style' rapid economic growth has generated similar ecological, social and political dislocations.[77] There is, as McCormack points out, a "sad, historical irony" at work here, given that the regions pressing hardest to emulate Japan's model of growth-at-all-costs are precisely those which bore the brunt of Japanese colonial expansionism in the early decades of the previous century. In these countries, he argues, "Japan's corporate skills in mobilising and accumulating are revered almost as much as its former single-minded pursuit of military hegemony was (and is) hated, without the inner connection between the two being grasped."[78]

McCormack's observations are not isolated ones. They form part of a growing body of literature, in which scholars both within and outside Japan have worked to shed light on issues and voices which were effectively marginalised in Japan's postwar rush to prosperity, and demonstrate their importance in confronting the problems and choices faced by Japanese people at the end of the century. This is true not only of the 1990s, moreover, but also of those decades prior to the time when critical approaches to knowledge and social theory began to acquire status and credibility within the broader Japanese Studies community. Even during the years when intellectual and political certainty associated with Japan's 'miracle' was at its peak, there were observers for whom this miracle inspired concern, rather than complacency. Saburô Ienaga's fight to have Japanese wartime atrocities

[76] *Ibid.*, 17.
[77] *Ibid.*, 290.
[78] *Ibid.*, 292.

acknowledged in school textbooks for example, dates back to the 1960s, as does Norie Huddle's exposure of the domestic environmental disasters precipitated by fast-track industrialisation.[79] Later, in a work whose influences are evident in McCormack's study, Rokurô Hidaka drew upon his own wartime experiences, and his postwar career as an educator of young Japanese people, to question what he saw as a narrow and dangerous interpretation of Japan's 'miracle' economy that had become prevalent among most Japanese people, effectively blinding them to the costs at which it had been achieved.[80] Like Ienaga, Hidaka was especially perturbed at what he saw as a progressive desensitising of young Japanese people towards Japan's wartime aggression in Asia – most obviously, through the direct censorship of educational texts, but also through the postwar growth of an inward-looking, consumer-oriented mass popular culture, in which education was now valued primarily as a means toward obtaining greater material comfort.

Of course, these particular examples are not necessarily representative of the entire breadth of 'critical' Japanese Studies literature, which brings me to another important point, concerning how one defines such literature at all. McCormack, Huddle, Ienaga and Hidaka for example, might all be classed, on one level, as scholars more or less directly critical *of* Japan. More precisely, they are critical of the governing elite of Japan – those who wield most power not only over how Japanese economic, political, and social life is conducted on a day-to-day basis, and how it impacts upon the rest of the world, but over how that life is *represented*, to the world and to Japanese people themselves (e.g., in the teaching of history, which is Ienaga's main concern).

The issue of representation – and it is a crucial one for this thesis – brings up another area of concern for critical Japanese Studies literature: namely, the study of

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[79] Norie Huddle and Michael Reich, *Island of Dreams: Environmental Crisis in Japan* (Vermont: Schenkman Books, Inc., 1975).
[80] Hidaka Rokurô, *The Price of Affluence: Dilemmas of Contemporary Japan* (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1984), 4-15, and 85-100.

those Japanese people who have sought to define alternative sites of being and doing for themselves, often in ways which confront the state and its definitions of order, identity, community, and so on. On this basis, a definition of critical Japanese Studies literature needs also to include the work of scholars such as Norma Field (1989),[81] Sang-jung Kang (1995, 1996a, 1996b),[82] and a whole range of scholarship on feminist issues in Japan (see Chapter Six). Following on from this, one comes to work which has confronted the even broader question of how we even come to conceptualise something like 'Japan' at all. It is here, I suggest, that the choice becomes even more confusing, for it conceivably encompasses a truly vast range of methodology, styles and concerns: from the rigorously empirical studies of Ross Mouer and Yoshio Sugimoto aimed at debunking the 'group model' (1986), to the work of Nagao Nishikawa (1992), Naoki Sakai (1996) and Tessa Morris-Suzuki (1998), on deconstructing concepts of national identity, to Stefan Tanaka's Foucauldian-inspired genealogy of the Japanese discipline of 'East Asian History' (*Tôyôshi*) and its role in framing Japan's relations with Asia and the West (1993).

I am aware that this list is nowhere near exhaustive, and while many of the works cited above are examined in this thesis (along with other examples not mentioned here), at least as many other good and relevant examples of critical Japanese Studies are not. My explanation for this is that this thesis is first and foremost about defining and explaining *International Relation's understanding of Japan*, and how it frames the contemporary debate on Japan's international relations. Such a project, I argue, necessarily involves a primary focus on IR literature, as well as the portrayal of Japan through a more 'mainstream' Japanese Studies literature which, while it may have sought to fill in the details of Japan as a global actor, remains content with the

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[81] Norma Field, *In the Realm of a Dying Emperor: Japan at Century's End*. New York: Random House, 1990.

[82] Sang-jung Kang, *Futatsu no Sengo no Nihon: Ajia Kara Tou Sengo 50-Nen* (Two Postwar Japans: A View from Asia Fifty Years On; Tokyo: Sainichi Shobô, 1995); "Datsu Orientarizumu no shikô" (Thoughts for Deconstructing Orientalism), in Naoki Sakai (ed.), *Nashonariti no Datsukôchiku* (Deconstructing Nationality; Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobô, 1996); *Orientarizumu no Kanata e: Kindai Bunka no Hihan* (To the Orientalists: A Critique of Modern Culture; Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996).

broader IR community's definition of what is and is not important in analysing the 'global' or the 'international.'

On this basis too, I suggest, the definition of what constitutes a 'critical' Japanese studies becomes more flexible; for it can, I argue, encompass a variety of works which look for different interpretations of Japanese life and society. These interpretations have always been available to those willing to look beyond the rather narrow borders of Japanese Studies in International Relations, where, as argued above, the issue of Japan as global actor is effectively reduced to the basic thematic of the neo-neo agenda, and in particular, the concern with macroeconomics and the intricacies of global corporate management.[83] My broader point, and it is one which sustains the core argument of this thesis, is that these critical perspectives are becoming more and more important, as the traditional parameters of IR thought and practice come under sustained pressure. At a time when the categorisation of human activities according to their spatial location 'inside' or 'outside' the nation state (to borrow R. B. J. Walker's famous phrase)[84] has become perplexing, if not impossible, it is less easy to dismiss these studies and their concerns as 'domestic' or 'internal.' They are important and relevant, not only in their own right, but in the support and background they provide for an expanding critical IR agenda.

The themes of this critical challenge are set out in Chapter Five, where I look at some of the major textual examples of the "third debate" in International Relations. Here, I will not be attempting to venture very deeply into the highly complex philosophical debates that accompany the 'critical' IR agenda. Rather, I will concentrate, in broad terms, on the major ways in which critical scholarship has opened up Realist/neo-Realist IR and its policy framework, to themes drawn from philosophy of science

[83] A good description of these preoccupations within the Japanese/Asian Studies mainstream is given by David Wright-Neville in his description of the Western "Asia Industry" — "a crude commodification of presumed differences slickly packaged to sell the secrets of East Asia success to eager Western bureaucrats and business people." David Wright-Neville, "The Politics of Pan-Asianism: Culture, Capitalism and Diplomacy in East Asia" (*Pacifica Review* 7:1, 1995: 1-26), on 4-5.

sources and from European philosophy and social theory. As I will demonstrate, these perspectives challenge the very foundation of the dominant IR-Japanese Studies world view, in challenging the ontological/political basis by which the world is reduced to a fundamentally constant set of actors, forces and interactions, ultimately attributable to the anarchical nature of the international system.

Not surprisingly, the resulting "third debate," particularly in the Euro-American IR community, has been a contentious, and often bitter one. As David Campbell points out, the very language of critical IR approaches, often expressed via terms such as "discourse," "textuality," and "genealogy," tends to induce:

> anxiety if not apoplexy among those convinced that there exists an unproblematic domain ("the real world") impervious to interpretation. To such true believers, any analytic mode that implicitly or explicitly questions the facticity of the external world is at best misleading and at worst dangerous.[85]

As Richard Bernstein has explained, this fear of rejecting the positivist world view is itself derived from a deeply positivist assumption; namely, that there is *either* certain, objective knowledge of the world, *or* no real knowledge at all.[86] For many critical IR scholars, however, challenging the notion of a single, irreducible world of fact 'out there,' far from being a descent into relativism or nihilism, represents a powerful opportunity. It is the opportunity to reassume analytical and political responsibility (and power), in a world where to be 'realistic' involves accepting, and working through, the myriad of normative and political contexts in which human life takes place. From this perspective, one can continue to provide answers to complex questions and seek to solve difficult global problems – not via externalised realms of certainty, and their non-negotiable options, but via a continual, self-reflective

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[84] Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). This work is discussed in more detail in Chapter Five.
[85] David Campbell, *Politics Without Principle: Sovereignty, Ethics and the Narratives of the Gulf War* (Boulder & London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1993), 8-9.
[86] Richard J. Bernstein, *The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons of Modernity/Postmodernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 17.

engagement with the world and its complex network of cultural, linguistic and social practices.

Moreover, and in light of the concerns about contemporary Japanese society touched on above, this perspective removes the opportunity to relegate concerns about the 'internal' aspects of state-bounded societies, to the margins of IR theory and practice. In a more general context, this theme of reconsidering 'what matters' in IR has been taken up by a number of scholars, notably Rob Walker, whose contributions are examined in detail in Chapter Five. Here however, I will invoke Walker's 1989 work, *One World, Many Worlds* to briefly illustrate my current point. In it, Walker analyses how people around the world have worked to reclaim decisionmaking power in their own lives – often in circumstances of great difficulty and danger. The point being, from Walker's perspective, that when people confront the institutions and structures which restrict them and damage their lives, they also confront the conceptual boundaries which give meaning to these institutions and legitimise the power relations they sustain. In this way, argues Walker, people can begin to re-construct the parameters of the possible – both immediately, in their own lives, and in the broader structural relations between peoples globally. Thus,

> Critical social movements are necessarily involved in the attempt to undermine dominant universals. They are also, and more significant, necessarily involved in trying to reconstruct our relationship between universal and particular, between the recognition of our planetary vulnerability and identity, on the one hand, and the proliferation of histories, experiences and identities, on the other. This is not a matter of complex or abstract philosophy. It is something that has to be explored and achieved through ongoing human practices everywhere.[87]

Walker's point then, is that all critical social movements, however 'local,' are part of a global struggle against "dominant universals" in One (interdependent) World – but they are also representative of the politics of Many Worlds, in which "both present structures and future aspirations are encountered and articulated on the basis

[87] Walker, *One World, Many Worlds*, 136.

of many different experiences, many different histories."[88] Recognising this, Walker recognises also that, contrary to dominant assumptions about power and significant agency in IR, the disparate, localised, and often fragmented nature of critical social movements is an integral aspect of their potential. Thus:

> The significance of critical social movements is not to be assessed only by their overt power to bring about change by themselves or by the credibility of their specific policy recommendations. It lies in their capacity to recognise, interpret, and symbolise patterns of contemporary transformation and to find new ways of being and acting that enhance the capacity of people to exercise control over the processes that affect their lives. It lies in their ability to articulate ways of being together that enhance the possibilities of justice and undermine the need for violence. It lies in their ability to act in specific circumstances while becoming more and more aware that to act in specific circumstances is to engage with processes that affect people everywhere.[89]

It is at this juncture, I suggest — between the specific and the global, between One World and Many Worlds, that it becomes possible to think about the issues of a changing Japanese society raised above, and at the beginning of this thesis, in a way that is entirely connected to the question of Japan as an international actor. Chapter Six takes up this challenge, via the contributions of a now rapidly expanding critical Japanese studies literature. As I will demonstrate, the diverse intellectual and political perspectives of this literature are nonetheless connected by a shared commitment: the commitment to seeing Japan in changing, complex terms, rather then the static, "black box"[90] it has represented to the mainstream academic and policymaking elite for so long. In this sense, albeit in different ways, and to different degrees, they all contribute to the project of acknowledging "One Japan, Many Japans;" whether via issues of gender, environment, or racial/ethnic identity, to name the categories that will be specifically examined.

The final chapter of the thesis is an exploration of the globalisation themes that have emerged to dominate both Japanese Studies and IR discussions in recent years. I am

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[88] *Ibid.*
[89] *Ibid.*, 144.

interested in particular here, in exploring the extent to which 'globalisation' might (or might not) become a space for facilitating the theme of interdisciplinary connection/conversation between International Relations and Japanese Studies that is so central to my argument. As many would acknowledge, ideas about how to define and respond to globalisation have worked something of a catalyst in both Japanese Studies and International Relations of late. In particular, they have brought issues of identity to the forefront of debate – and with them, a whole lexicon of terms that, until recently, had little or no currency within conventional IR circles: culture, ethnicity, race and civilisation, for example.

To some, this shift in emphasis represents a major reworking of the accepted paradigms of IR. Foremost among them of course, is Samuel Huntington, whose stark pessimistic image of the future has, of course, come under strenuous attack from IR scholars and area studies specialists alike, with many objecting to the notion that the future holds nothing but a stand-off between "the West and the Rest." Despite this, as Charles William Maynes confirmed in 1995, the 'cultural' agenda outlined in *The Clash of Civilizations* has "shaped [U.S.] foreign policy debate for the last few years."[91] Its influence in Japanese and Asian Studies however, has been less acknowledged. One of the reasons for this, as David Wright-Neville has observed, is that Asian (including Japanese) Studies specialists have long tended to distance themselves from IR specialists such as Huntington, in the belief that IR continues to fail the test of incorporating the nuances of cultural/civilisation difference into its theoretical assumptions.[92] Wright-Neville's point is particularly important with regard to the contemporary globalisation debate in Japan, which has seen a wide range of writers – Takashi Inoguchi, Ogura Kazuo and Japan's own 'Mr. Yen,' Sakakibara Eisuke, for example – re-cast the question of Japanese identity as crucial to Japan's future international role. While the results have been

[90] This phrase is coined by Bruce Cumings in "Japan's Position in the World System," 34.
[91] Charles William Maynes, "The New Pessimism," *Foreign Policy* 100 (Fall 1995): 33-49, on pp. 38-39.

both interesting and significant, there remains, I argue, a conservative aspect to this debate: one which invokes the same basic categories of understanding as Huntington in fleshing out otherwise more tolerant perspectives (on "globalisation," "multi-civilisational globalisation" and "multiple capitalisms"), than he has ever been willing to countenance.[93]

From my perspective, and as I will argue in Chapter Seven, the still developing debate on identity/globalisation issues in Japan is, for all its problems, potentially important in achieving the kind of dialogue that I have argued to be necessary between International Relations and Japanese Studies, if we are to move beyond both Japan as "black box" and the 'culturally sensitive' variant of the neo-neo debate in Japanese/Asian Studies that is posited as its main alternative. In this envisaged dialogue, the capacity for meaningful thought and action is not confined to the parameters set out by dominant understandings of global or 'Japanese' existence, and the following chapters comprise my attempt to contribute toward such a dialogue, albeit from a perspective acutely aware of the problems of such a task, and of my still developing understanding of the complex critical literatures in IR and Japanese Studies. This process begins, in the following chapter, at its most fundamental level, via an explanation of how an IR orthodoxy, based on positivist first principles, has served to disconnect global 'reality' from the everyday realities of Japanese society for so long.

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[92] Wright-Neville, "The Politics of Pan-Asianism," 4, and 15-16.
[93] These terms are all invoked in the Japanese globalisation texts mentioned here, which are discussed in full in Chapter Seven.

CHAPTER TWO

KNOWING JAPAN/KNOWING THE WORLD: EXPLORING THE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN POSITIVISM, REALISM, AND JAPANESE STUDIES

Questions about how we know the world tend not to arise in conventional discussions of Japan's international role. By the time one arrives at 'Japan,' especially within a discipline as established as International Relations (IR), the world of which it is part is just assumed to *be there*; its dominant institutions and actors accepted as given features of international reality against which statements about Japan as an international actor are accorded meaning. The most powerful, if largely unspoken, justification for this pre-assumption of stable foundations in this regard, is the proposition that one has to start somewhere. After all, if everybody began by pondering the most foundational, philosophical questions of meaning and knowledge, then surely there would be neither time nor space to get down to understanding Japan at all...

Accordingly, typical discussions of Japan's post-Cold War international role tend to depart, not from 'theoretical' issues of truth or reality, nor even from a discussion of the significance of Realism or neo-Realism, but from a more immediate and prosaic context – usually in the form of a general description of the post-Cold War international system, and where Japan fits in. Even developments and changes within the system itself (including the emergence of Japan as a "new type of superpower") tend to be discussed in terms which remain committed to a stable set of assumptions about how the world really works – its major actors, power, security, regimes and so on. For the majority of scholars, these assumptions are so commonsensical that they hardly need be mentioned at all, let alone questioned or doubted. Their role is as crucial as it is silent, cutting the 'theoretical' corners for those who want to get on with discussing the more specific issues at hand, for

example, the necessity of a continued U.S.. military presence in Japan, the inherent 'threat' posed by 'unstable' states such as North Korea and China, or the feasibility of a continued, Japan-led expansion of the Asia-Pacific economy.

This chapter goes against this established practice by seeking to resurrect these theoretical corners, and, in doing so, explain how and why discussion of Japan in IR tends to assume particular patterns of reality and relevance. In the process, I seek to open up some intellectual themes rarely invoked when speaking of Japan's international role, but nonetheless central to the way in which Japan is commonly thought of and spoken about in an IR context. As I suggested in the previous chapter, the key issue here is the process by which 'Japan' has been given its global identity within a Realist cum neo-Realist tradition, dominant in IR circles since 1945. As I also suggested earlier, this is a process with deeper historical and philosophical foundations – in positivism.

In this chapter, consequently, I seek to illustrate the significance of these positivist foundations, not only for variants of IR Realism, but for Japanese Studies also. In the process, I will begin to explain why the existing conduits of information between IR and Japanese Studies have been so resistant to more comprehensive critical insights on Japanese society and Japan's place in the world, and to indicate how these critical insights might become integral to future understandings of Japan and indeed IR per se.[1] Accordingly, my discussion begins with a brief (and admittedly rather superficial) history of the development of contemporary positivism, as a means of explaining its significance in the present context.

1. Positivism: A Brief History of Some Basic Themes and Assumptions.

[1] There are, of course, a number of works that have undertaken this project in other contexts; notably David Ricci's *The Tragedy of Political Science: Politics, Scholarship, and Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); George's *Discourses of International Politics* (*op. cit.*, 1994), Steve Smith, Ken Booth & Marysia Zalewski's *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) and, in a slightly more complex manner, R. B. J. Walker's *Inside/Outside: Political Theory as International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). All of these texts have been influential in the compilation of this chapter, and a more in-depth discussion of *Inside/Outside* will be taken up in Chapter Six.

To say that the dominant Realist tradition of IR is built upon, and largely directed by, positivist principles and premises begs, of course, an obvious question – the question of what positivism means. While volumes of work have been written on this topic alone, a (very) simple answer might sound something like this: positivism is a particular way of understanding the world and its objects, via specific intellectual and methodological processes derived from modern scientific perspectives. More profoundly, positivism is an approach to 'knowing' which represents itself as *corresponding* to real knowledge per se. It does this via a central tenet – its 'unity of science' assumption – which holds that knowledge in and of the social and natural worlds are comprehensible through scientifically established logics and modes of reasoning which can provide irreducible knowledge of reality as it 'is.'[2]

This 'unity-of-science' assumption has, in varying degrees of rigidity, been intrinsic to positivism's dominance in the development of the social sciences over the past century or so. As a number of scholars have demonstrated however, its broader historical origins are much older, emerging out of the great discoveries of 'new physics' scholars such as Bacon, Galileo, Kepler, and Newton who, in the modern era, precipitated the search for scientific knowledge derived from direct empirical observation. They worked within the intellectual framework established by philosophers such as Descartes, who had announced that modern rational-man had access to the mysteries of existence, via the interaction between the human mind, and a detached realm of (empirical) fact.[3] On the basis of these fixed, indubitable foundations, for example, Isaac Newton would trace out "a series of truths bound each to the next," as the foundation of a set of universally applicable laws about matter and motion.[4]

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[2] Steve Smith, "Positivism and Beyond," in Smith *et. al.* (eds.), *Positivism and Beyond* (*op. cit.*, 1996), 16.
[3] Timothy J. Reiss, *The Discourse of Modernism* (Icatha: Cornell University Press, 1982), 40.
[4] Roger Scruton, *A Short History of Modern Philosophy: From Descartes to Wittgenstein* (London: Ark Books, 1984), 85.

Inevitably, beyond the ambition to establish a true model of the world "such as it is in fact," came the ambition to explain and restructure modern human society in correspondence with a body of independent factual reality. Thus, as Bacon explained when speaking of the breadth and applicability of this new approach to the world: "It may also be asked whether I speak of natural philosophy only, or whether I mean that the other sciences, logic, ethics, and politics, should be carried on by this method. Now I certainly mean what I have said to be understood of them *all*."[5] This authorisation of Western scientism as the model and exemplar of all "discourses of truth" set the grounds for, among other things, Hobbes' application of Newtonian principles to moral and political theory. More profoundly, it confirmed the nature and purpose of the modern-rational self — as a being capable of observing the material *and* social worlds in detached, objective terms, and gaining certain knowledge of it.[6]

This objectivist theme underwrites the second major assumption of contemporary positivism, namely the dichotomy it proposes between a realm of 'fact' and a realm of 'theorised' knowledge derived (either inductively or deductively) from it. The terms for this dichotomy were initially set out in the 18th century by the great Enlightenment philosopher David Hume, who sought to dispel the lingering tensions between an increasingly powerful inductivism, and the kind of rationalism that championed 'innate,' mind-centred ideas in themselves. He did so via an epistemological distinction between "ideas" and "impressions," which restricts knowledge of the world *as it really is* to the latter; that is, immediate sensory data. All other cognitive activity Hume argued, is 'theoretical;' in that it takes place after the experienced 'fact' and therefore, it does not correspond to reality per se. On this basis, general statements about the world that are not referable to independent, observable atomised objects (including those based on 'normative' judgements such

[5] From *The works of Francis Bacon*, quoted in Reiss, *The Discourse of Modernism*, 198-199, and 233.
[6] Richard Tarnas, *The Passion of the Western Mind: Understanding the Ideas That Have Shaped Our World View* (New York: Harmony Books, 1991), 345-48.

as cultural or moral values), are not afforded real knowledge status – i.e., they do not constitute 'facts.'[7]

Thus, in Hume's organisation of knowledge, 'theorising' about known facts takes place separately from experiencing them (practice), and as part of an always *retrospective* attempt to organise and categorise them. Theory in short, is separate from practice.[8] On this basis, Hume sought to establish the basis of a truly secular, scientific philosophy of knowledge – one that confirmed and promoted the unity-of-science assumption that all knowledge, including social and political analysis, is amenable to a single scientific method.[9] As Hume put it:

2. Contemporary Positivism and the Fact/Theory Dichotomy.

It is difficult to overstate the significance of the fact/theory dichotomy for any discussion of positivism, especially in an International Relations context – where, as I will demonstrate in this chapter, it operates at the discursive core of Realist detachment from the 'facts' of global life. In Japanese Studies, I suggest, it is even more powerful, because of the way in which knowledge of Japan continues to be 'area studied' within a still predominantly Anglo- (North) American International Relations discipline. To put it another way, Japan's geocultural 'otherness' to the West tends to induce a certain preoccupation, if not anxiety, about 'getting Japan right' – about understanding it as it *really is* – with all the weighty qualifications of linguistic and cultural literacy that this implies.[10]

For the reasons described at the beginning of this chapter however, one rarely finds any direct acknowledgement of this preoccupation in Japanese Studies – far less any exploration of the tensions in the process by which early positivism, with its 'unity of science' premise and its dichotomies of fact/theory was transferred to the

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[7] *Ibid.*, 347.
[8] George, *Discourses of International Politics*, 52.
[9] Tarnas, *The Passion of the Western Mind*, 349.

contemporary era. Hume's own work is characterised by these tensions, particularly on the question of whether the most scientific of logics could, ultimately, provide the certain knowledge propounded for it. This tension he worked out via the problems of inductivism, concluding that we never actually experience anything 'directly,' because all our impressions of things are mediated through the mind. Consequently, all we can establish are causal explanations of sensations that are intrinsic to the process by which the mind gives *meaning* to the impressions it receives of the 'real' things it observes.[11] Or, in slightly simpler terms, the notion of a 'knowable' reality external to the human mind can never be conclusively established, even via the most rigorous scientific procedures. The world's intelligibility, such as it is, reflects only "habits of the mind," not the nature of external, objective reality per se. Thus, from one of the modern fathers of positivism came the conclusion that *there is no logical basis, even in positivism's own terms, for the proposition that 'real' knowledge is derived from a realm of external reality.*

> It is a question of fact whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects resembling them. How shall this question be determined? By experience, surely, as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience, is and must be entirely silent. The mind never has anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connection with objects. The supposition of such a connection is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning.[12]

While Hume's scepticism about the basis for positivism has often been ignored or explained away in mainstream Anglo-American scholarship, it was re-affirmed by another of the acknowledged 'greats' of modern philosophy, Immanuel Kant. Seeking a resolution of Hume's dilemma (i.e., how it can be possible to have certain knowledge of the world when our knowledge is ultimately dependent on impressions

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[10] See Norma Field, for example, on how non-Japanese scholars of Japan, particularly when making critical observations, are often dismissed as 'not understanding' Japan properly. Field, *In the Realm of a Dying Emperor* (*op. cit.*, 1990), 275-78.

[11] Tarnas, *The Passion of the Western Mind*, 351-53.

[12] David Hume, *Inquiry into Human Understanding*, cited in Richard Schacht, *Classical Modern Philosophers: Descartes to Kant* (London & New York: Routledge, 1984), 197. Ultimately however, Hume advocated his original, empiricist approach to knowledge and society, in an exemplary instance of Bernstein's "Cartesian anxiety" (see Chapter One, 38). There must, Hume reasoned, be pursuit of "assurance and conviction," or we would find ourselves "trapped within the sphere of [our] own experience without even the assurance of a self to whom that experience belongs." *Ibid.*, 200.

that cannot be externally verified) Kant came up with a solution that acknowledged the inevitably 'theory-impregnated' nature of our knowledge. Neither empiricism nor rationalism, he argued, can logically prove the existence of independent sources of knowledge, because our knowledge of reality is always drawn from the meaning we give to objects, not directly derived from the objects in-themselves.[13] Kant was not suggesting here that we cannot have a modern, 'scientific' philosophy per se; indeed he championed such an enterprise. His point was, rather, that this scientific knowledge could never be meaningfully detached from the human interpretivist engagement of the 'philosopher' – that the dichotomy between subject and object was 'humanly' impossible.

The greatest contemporary challenge to positivism and its objectivity theme however, came, not from the scepticism of Hume, nor the interpretivist logic of Kant, but from the heart of the 'natural' sciences after the 1920s, when theoretical physicists such as Einstein, Heisenberg and Bohr began to cast more profound doubt upon any notion of scientific objectivity via external 'real-world' reference points. Here, it was the engagement with a new science centred on sub-atomic particles that undermined any claims to 'objective' knowledge in the most sophisticated of modern scientific circles.[14] The point being, of course, that sub-atomic particles cannot be observed 'objectively' – nor, therefore, can the factual foundations of knowledge about the real world 'out there' be derived from such observations. Instead, such knowledge is intrinsically and unavoidably part of a process in which the observing subject/scientist 'theorises' and interprets the location, nature and significance of the 'facts out there.' Equally disturbing in this regard was Einstein's work which, as David Ricci points out, projected an image of the 'real world' that had profoundly "retrogressive" implications for modern scientific philosophy. The trouble, Ricci points out,

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[13] Tarnas, *The Passion of the Western Mind*, 350.
[14] David Ricci, *The Tragedy of Political Science*, 89.

> lay in [Einstein's] notion of relativity — of all thing being relative to all others rather than having absolute character in time and in space. Relativity in this sense seemed to destroy forever the rationale for saying that there is a natural, fixed order of things, within which men have a certain and equal status.[15]

By the time Einstein published his arguments, however, social scientists, especially in Britain and North America, had already embarked on the task of conforming their knowledge to the ideals of scientific method, influenced by German applications of the "scientific method" in humanities scholarship which promoted an accumulative, progressivist approach to knowledge epitomised in scientific discovery.[16] The philosophical arguments of Comte played a significant role in this regard — as did those of the Vienna school of logical positivism, which explicitly sought to eliminate from 'real' knowledge status any statement that could not be scientifically established.[17] The aim of scholars such as these was to remove the fledgling science of human society from any 'premodern' metaphysical doubt, via an increasingly strict emphasis upon scientific methods of verification. And, by the 1950s, the logical positivist quest for a knowledge of human society based on verifiable fact was more or less embedded at the core of social science thinking and research, especially in the U.S.[18]

3. Post WWII: Behaviouralism, and the Influence of Karl Popper.

At the intersection of these various quests for scientific certainty was the behavioural 'revolution' which swept through U.S. intellectual and political circles in the 1950s and 1960s. Behaviouralism adopted, as its central tenets, the basic features of positivism — its 'unity of science' theme, and the associated dichotomy of fact/theory. Also present, however, was an explicitly Cold War concern to distinguish between the modern "good" society (i.e., U.S. pluralist society), and its

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[15] *Ibid.*, 91-92.
[16] *Ibid.*, 41-50.
[17] Smith, "Positivism and Beyond," 14.
[18] Ricci, *The Tragedy of Political Science*, 51.

"bad" alternative (i.e., Soviet/Nazi totalitarian society).[19] The key to this distinction lay in the open, scientifically verifiable (and therefore, inherently rational) nature of Western pluralism, as opposed to the closed ideology of (irrational) Soviet Marxism.[20] In this way, behaviouralism embodied the desire to establish 'science' and an objective, open methodology as the basis of a progressive (liberal-capitalist) modernity. This was a (largely unspoken) issue in the debate over 'is' and 'ought' which re-emerged with a vengeance in Anglo-American circles during the first flush of post WWII behaviouralism, expressed now in terms of a scientific approach which, "deals with what is, and nonscience which might be theology, ethical theory, ideology, or something else [which] takes as its province those things *that ought to be*"[21] (emphasis added).

Not surprisingly, the behaviouralist 'revolution' was a major influence in the development of post-WWII International Relations, as (primarily) U.S. scholars sought to establish the intellectual ground rules for the conflict with the Soviet Union. In so doing, they drew upon behaviouralism in the social sciences, and also upon the Newtonian model of scientific certainty in their quest for a knowledge of global reality which actually corresponded with the 'is' rather than the 'ought.' And, this is where one scholar in particular, Karl Popper, becomes a major influence in the story of the Realist/Positivist nexus; albeit, one rarely acknowledged in IR circles. Seeking to resolve once and for all the question of what is 'scientific' (and therefore 'real' or 'reliable') knowledge and what is not, Popper advocated four basic criteria for debate (i) *testability* (the extent to which it is possible to associate scientific statements with unambiguous evidence); (ii) *falsification* (the process by which a scientific claim can be tested - for its falsifiability); (iii) *tentativity* (the notion that scientific certainty is always open to rules of contingency); and (iv) *the privileging of method over results*; in other words, while scientific reality might itself change, it is

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[19] Ian Jarvie, "Popper's Ideal Types: Open and Closed, Abstract and Concrete Societies," in Ian Jarvie and Sandra Pralang (eds.), *Popper's 'Open Society' After Fifty Years* (London & New York: Routledge, 1999), 76-77.
[20] Ricci, *The Tragedy of Political Science*, 50.

always obtainable via the application of the correct methodology. For Popper, these criteria characterise the scientific enterprise, and help overcome any "sociological" (i.e. normative influences) on scholarly communities.[22]

It was regarding this latter issue, and via his second and third criteria in particular, that Popper also claimed to have moved beyond the "hard-core" (logical) positivist obsession with fixed, external certainty and its crude inductivist premises. Whether scientists study the physical world or society, he argued, they make recommendations for the improvement of the human condition which have to be offered in a spirit of rational experimentation and only contingent 'fact.' Accordingly, and as Popper declared in his seminal Cold War text, *The Open Society and its Enemies*, this committed behaviouralist science (and the free West) to the ideal of an "open society," in which democratic institutions operate as the political agency of (social scientific) inquiry.[23] It was in this way that behaviouralism, centred on positivist first principles (and a selective memory regarding those principles) gained contemporary credence as a non-ideological mode of reasoning in a world threatened by its opposite – ideological regimes and thought processes associated with the quest for totalitarianism and irrationality (e.g., in the USSR).[24]

There is more to the Popperian contribution than this, of course, and in particular, there is a great debate of sorts concerning Popper's actual status in regard to positivism, given his explicit rejection of the term and its connotations.[25] I cannot engage this debate here, except to say that I follow the lead of a number of other scholars, who consider Popper to be very much part of the positivist tradition outlined above – albeit as its most sophisticated exponent. This sophistication is particularly evident in regard to the falsificationist clause in his thinking, and

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[21] *Ibid.*, 136-137.
[22] *Ibid.*
[23] Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, Vol. 2: *The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath* (4th edition; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul: 1962), 13.
[24] Ricci, *The Tragedy of Political Science*, 119.
[25] See in particular Popper's response to the Frankfurt School, in "Reason or Revolution?" in Theodor Adorno *et. al.*, *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology* (translated by Glyn Adey & David Frisby; London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 1976), 288-300.

certainly Popper was one of the few early postwar social theorists to confront seriously the limitations of Cartesian rationalism and the extreme inductivism of much of the logical-positivist school.[26] Likewise, there is a certain anti-dogmatism in Popper's re-worked *Critical Rationalism*, which seems to distance it from the often highly dogmatic stance of much IR Realism. As I will also show at the end of this chapter, this anti-dogmatism has helped to popularise Popper's critical rationalist approach among to some Japan (and other 'area') specialists, with interesting results.

For all this, however, a whole range of scholars have remained unpersuaded by this distancing, concluding instead, as I do, that Popper's contribution is integral to the positivism and IR Realism of the present context.[27] One of the more succinct of these criticisms, as mentioned in Chapter One, comes from Ernst Gellner, who argues that while Popper might have rejected logical positivism and its rigid inductivism, his Critical Rationalism retained its connection to a major positivist principle – namely, the 'unity of science' – and to its associated (Newtonian) connotations regarding independent factual worlds 'out there'.[28] In Popper's work, this commitment is evident enough in his emphasis upon the importance of method – *the method of the natural sciences*, which consists "of offering deductive causal explanations, and in testing them (by way of predictions).[29] As Ricci, another critic of behaviouralism, has pointed out, this effectively locked post-war political analysis into a "scientific community," whose work:

> was modelled after the methodological assumptions of the natural sciences. In this sense, political scientists were seen as potential novitiates for a larger vocation, if only they would adopt appropriate habits..... if political scientists would only adopt the principles and procedures of science, patiently checking each other's

[26] Richard Bernstein, *The New Constellation* (*op. cit.*, 1991), 61.
[27] While there is no space here to discuss their dialogue in detail, one of the most strenuous early attacks on Popper came from Thomas Kuhn in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). On the debate between Popper and Kuhn, see Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers Limited, 1983), 4, and in *The New Constellation*, 61-63. On Popper's dispute with the Frankfurt School (which is discussed further in Chapter Five), see Adorno *et. al.*, *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology* (*op. cit.*, 1976).
[28] Ernest Gellner, *Legitimation of Belief* (*op. cit.*, 1974), 175-80.
[29] Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), 130.

> propositions, the discipline could come to constitute a scientific community, with reliable results, in the Popperian style.[30]

The implications of Popper's Critical Rationalism for IR have been raised more recently in some of the critically inclined literature which acknowledges its significance. Steve Smith, for example, has discussed this issue as central to a post-positivist 'illusion' he perceives within contemporary IR.[31] For Smith, the illusion resides in the way that IR scholars seek to distance themselves from any negative connotations associated with positivism, by following Popper's strategy of simply reducing positivism to inductive logic and 'hard core' (logical-positivist) perspectives. It is in this context that Smith recalls:

> many discussions with leading specialists in my own research area at the time (foreign policy analysis) who denied outright that they were positivists, associating it with a crude form of behaviouralism which had failed 'to produce the goods.' This was very evident in the mid 1970s when the comparative foreign policy movement lost its impetus... The response [however] was *not* to abandon positivism... but rather to reject the excessive reliance on quantitative data characteristic of behaviouralism, and also to question the belief in an inductive route to general theory. But, of course, *neither of these moves involved a rejection of positivism, only one component of it, and a rather extreme one at that*.[32] (emphasis added)

The reason that Smith's erstwhile colleagues were so reticent about their positivist connections, of course, was the disrepute that scientific modelling and game-theorised approaches fell into in IR circles in the 1970s, particularly after the Vietnam War, when the 'scientific' Realism of U.S. analysts was shown to be somewhat less that adequate in its predictive and strategic capacities. But as so often in the past, proof of inadequacy did not prevent the development of further attempts to apply positivist principles to the IR arena. The most obvious example of this, and one that utilised precisely the same Popperian strategy as Smith's colleagues in the foreign policy community, was the development of neo-Realism in the late 1970s

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[30] Ricci, *The Tragedy of Political Science*, 140.
[31] Smith, "Positivism and Beyond," 32.
[32] *Ibid*., 33.

and 1980s, particularly via Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* (1979), which has continued to be a major influence on IR and Japanese Studies ever since.

I will return to Waltz's revamped Popperian positivism shortly. The point I seek to make at the moment is that Popper's adjustments to positivism served to further cement the status of behaviouralist social theory and IR Realism within an academic and policymaking community already immersed in the struggle between Cold War "open" and "closed" societies. In the following chapter, I will develop this theme in a Japanese Studies context by showing how the privileging of the former on "scientific" grounds would prove irresistible logic to thinkers such as Edwin Reischauer and his Modernisation Theory-inspired colleagues in the 1960s. Prior to this however, I wish to add more detail to the connection point between positivism and IR, by saying something about the historical and intellectual process by which that connection took place. .

4. International Relations and Positivist-Based Realism.

The main conduit in this connective process, as indicated above, has been a Realist tradition which, after WW2, became synonymous with IR per se for the great majority of the international scholarly and policy community. As IR scholars began to make their claims for knowledge that corresponded with reality as it 'is,' they did so via a historical narrative that objectified the past in exemplary positivist terms, and which accorded a selected group of thinkers in the past, an essentialised knowledge of the present. Important figures in this regard are Thucydides, Augustine, Hobbes and above all Nicolò Machiavelli, whose vision of "good political order" is based on the widely held tenet that:

> the manner in which men live is so different from the way in which they ought to live, that he who leaves the common course for that which he ought to follow will find that it leads him to ruin rather than to safety... A Prince therefore who desires to

> maintain himself must learn to be not always good, but to be so or not as necessity may require.[33]

The eternal wisdom to be gained here was that which was to underpin and define Realism thereafter – i.e., that the is/ought dichotomy is intrinsic to understanding the international arena per se (an arena which, as Hobbes insisted, was the site of endemic and unyielding anarchy). This was a theme already evident in the first of the modern great texts of Realism, E. H. Carr's *The Twenty Years Crisis* (1939) which, as the title suggests, sought to explain the real nature of international affairs in the inter-war years (between WW1 and WW2).

E. H. Carr: Establishing a Genuine "Science of International Politics"

As others have argued, Carr was a sophisticated and incisive thinker, and a great deal more subtle than many of those who articulated his Realism in later years.[34] On the other hand, there are many passages in *Twenty Years Crisis* (when read without noting the associated caveats) which lend themselves to the kind of crude, positivist-based Realism that has characterised much IR analysis in the post WW2 era. Emphasising the failure of Wilsonian liberalism to provide peace and stability in the inter-war years, for example, Carr emphasised also the need for a "science of international politics," as the basis of a Realist alternative.[35] In so doing, he represented this scientific approach to reality in terms of a series of dichotomies which illustrated its superiority over its liberal counterpart which, by definition, was 'idealist' in comparison. In particular, Carr maintained, there was a "fundamental antithesis" between a liberal utopianism characterised by "an inclination to ignore what was and what is in contemplation of what should be," and a Realism

[33] Niccolò Machiavelli, excerpt from *The Prince*, reproduced in John Vasquez, ed., *Classics of International Relations* (2nd edition; New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1990), 22.
[34] Ken Booth, "75 Years On: Rewriting the Subject's Past – Reinventing its Future," in Steve Smith *et. al.* (eds.), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 329. A good discussion of this issue is also found in the first chapter of Charles Jones' *E. H. Carr and International Relations: A Duty to Lie* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), especially pages 6-12, where Jones criticises the conflation of Carr with post-war North American Realism.
[35] E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years Crisis: 1919-1939* (2nd edition; Edinburgh: R. & R. Clark, Ltd, 1946), 1-3.

characterised by "an inclination to deduce what should be from what was and what is."[36]

Having thus rekindled the is/ought dichotomy as the basis of this new, scientific Realism in IR, Carr utilised the 'unity of science' premise to strengthen his Realist case, arguing that the template for any genuine Realism in IR must be the procedures and attitudes of the natural sciences, where conclusions "can be nothing more than a true report on facts."[37] This was so, Carr argued, because in the natural sciences facts exist "independently of what anyone thinks about them."[38] Admittedly, he conceded, the intrinsic concern of the political sciences with "human behaviour" meant that the facts themselves were more liable to change and mutation, meaning that political science would always be, to some extent, the "science of what ought to be."[39] Despite this, Carr argued, the concentration on "the initial stage of wishing," in the political sciences had to be succeeded by "a stage of hard and ruthless analysis," if one wished to achieve serious and critical thought about international problems. In other words, the successful analyst of international politics understands,

> that no political utopia will achieve even the most limited success unless it grows out of political reality. Having made the discovery, he will embark on that hard ruthless analysis of reality which is the hallmark of science... he will have reached a stage when purpose by itself is seen to be barren, and when analysis of reality has forced itself upon him as an essential ingredient of his study.[40]

In this atmosphere, the Realist quest to slough off the distraction of transforming "ought" into "is" was defined by Carr in terms of a positivist privileging of "the observation and collection of facts" over the metaphysical meanderings of philosophy – thereby, he argued, achieving what International Relations had failed to do in its earlier, "idealist" (utopian) stage; namely, an objective, factual analysis of the international realm *as it is*. In short, as Carr proclaimed in one of his best-known

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[36] *Ibid*., 11.
[37] *Ibid*., 3.
[38] *Ibid*.
[39] *Ibid*., 4-5.
[40] *Ibid*., 10.

dictums, International Relations in its new, 'mature' (Realist) manifestation understood what the inter-war idealists had not: that "the function of thinking is to study a sequence of events *which it is powerless to influence or alter*."[41]

In this way, Carr established major positivist dichotomies (is/ought, theory/reality, unity of science) as integral features of how we know the reality of IR. His legacy has endured in IR theory and practice to this day, where Realists of all hues continue to objectify the 'given' or 'irresistible' characteristics (e.g. anarchy) of an international realm of detached reality, and privilege the voices of those (i.e. Realists) who most successfully detach themselves from that reality. In short, as Bradley Klein has put it, IR particularly in its post-war manifestation:

> is predicated upon an analysis of a world that stands on its own, *as an externality upon which the researcher gazes*. The task of rigorous academic investigation is to devise terms of analysis and understanding that come as close as humanly possible to the logic and reality of that realm... In this sense, International Relations has been shaped decisively by the injunction to be dispassionate, realistic, and above all, practical.[42] (emphasis added)

As indicated above, it was in the early years of the Cold War that the implications of this positivist based Realism would become most evident and, understandably perhaps, its greatest impact was not in Carr's Britain, but in the U.S., where a new generation of IR scholars and policymakers sought some kind of foundational understanding of their new (Cold War) world order. Here, importantly, it was not just explicit behaviouralism that accorded such understanding, but perspectives in IR which explicitly *opposed* behaviouralism. And, in this regard, the contribution of Hans Morgenthau was vital in developing further the positivist/Realist tradition in IR.

Hans J. Morgenthau: Power Politics as IR Reality

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[41] *Ibid.*, 10.
[42] Bradley S. Klein, *Strategic Studies and World Order: The Global Politics of Deterrence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 16.

In his great work (and still the most influential book in IR history) *Politics Among Nations* (1948), Morgenthau followed Carr's lead in distinguishing between two major schools of thought relevant to IR; a liberal/idealism, and a Realism, which "believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature."[43] These 'objective laws,' insisted Morgenthau, are "impervious to our preferences," and the most important of them is the anarchical nature of the international system. "It is sufficient to state," he wrote, thus, "that the struggle for power is universal in time and space and is an undeniable fact of experience. It cannot be denied that throughout historic time, regardless of social, economic, and political conditions, states have met each other in contests for power."[44] In this way, then, a positivist determinism is employed to declare a culturally and historically specific aspect of human society (i.e., the European post-Renaissance era) to be "universal in time and space," allowing Morgenthau to claim, in turn that "international politics is of necessity power politics."[45] More importantly, in this way, the major metaphor of modern Realism in Morgenthau's account, namely, the 'balance-of-power' strategy, becomes represented, in the Cold War era, as "the essential stabilising factor in a society of sovereign nations;" that is, the only realistic means to tame an anarchical world order.[46]

In regard to a methodology for analysing modern anarchy, Morgenthau again utilised exemplary positivist themes, proposing that the task of the Realist scholar is to discover the ways in which the "objective laws' of politics and IR operate in the Cold War era, thus both predicting and assisting the behaviour of states and diplomatic elite's in their quest for order. In this context, above all, the competent Realist must distinguish:

> between truth and opinion - between what is true *objectively and rationally, supported by evidence and illuminated by reason*, and what is only a subjective

[43] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (5th edition; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), 4.
[44] *Ibid.*, 34.
[45] *Ibid.*, 33.
[46] *Ibid.*, 167.

> judgement, *divorced from the facts as they are* and informed by prejudice and wishful thinking.[47] (emphasis added)

Here again then, the positivist dichotomies of 'is' and 'ought', and 'fact' and theory' are invoked as the keystone of understanding reality in the world — a reality which is represented as independent of the theorist-cum-policymaker, who can only engage the factual evidence from a (positivist) distance.

Having said all this, there is, in Morgenthau, something more than crude positivism. As with Carr (and Popper in the broader context), there were elements of Morgenthau's work which clearly indicated an intent to go beyond objectivism and 'unity of science' prescriptions. In particular, as Rob Walker and others have pointed out, Morgenthau was influenced greatly by Max Weber, and there is, in *Politics Among Nations* much of the tension of Weber concerning the complexities of social-scientific thinking and the place of the human interpretative subject.[48] In Morgenthau's case this tension is expressed best perhaps in the passages which deal with the role of the statesman in international affairs. In this context, as Jim George has argued, Morgenthau's work has dimensions beyond an obvious positivism, in which an adequate Realism must, on this basis (i.e., privileging the "position of the statesman"),

> seek to understand and explain the norms, rules, ideologies and competing interests of diplomatic statecraft. Realist analysts must [according to Morgenthau] attempt to get "inside" the world of the diplomat, the foreign policy maker, the strategist and the power broker. Realism is validated, in this sense, when it has meaning for the diplomat statesman, *the human agent of power defined as interest*. Realist scholarship, following these broad hermeneutic principles, must do more than simply reaffirm the anarchy of the system or make rigorous and systematic the evidence of an endemic struggle for power and influence.[49] (emphasis added)

It is on the basis of passages such as this that Morgenthau, like Carr, has usually been categorised as a Classical or Traditional Realist rather than a more 'scientifically'

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[47] *Ibid*., 4.
[48] R. B. J. Walker, *Inside/Outside*, 55-56.
[49] George, *Discourse of Global Politics*, 92.

inclined Realist. My view, however, as intimated above, is that fundamentally he followed positivist first principles, and was integral to the transference of those principles to IR in the 1960s and 1970s. This is a view supported by Stanley Hoffman who, in 1977, proposed that the Realism of scholars such as Morgenthau was indeed integral to the transference of more systemic approaches to the discipline during the 1960s and 1970s.[50] And, as John Vasquez has illustrated in detail, the behaviouralists who moved into the IR spaces created by Carr and Morgenthau and other Classical Realists, did not for a moment seek to challenge their fundamental assumptions about the world, but rather, sought to impose Popperian adjustments (e.g. falsificationist procedures) upon those fundamental assumptions.[51] In this regard too it is not as surprising as it might seem to find a major neo-Realist of the 1990s, John Mearsheimer, invoking Morgenthau as a primary source of his thinking rather than the more obvious 'scientific' Realists.[52] The most obvious influence upon neo-Realists such as Mearsheimer, of course, is Kenneth Waltz, and I want to finish this present chapter by saying something briefly about Waltzian neo-Realism, and its contribution to the IR and positivism connection in the 1980s and 1990s.

5. Neo-Realism: Re-Organising Realist 'Fundamentals.'

It is generally conceded that what we know refer to as neo-Realism emerged in the aftermath of a period of profound crisis in (Realist) U. S. foreign policy practice. The fluctuating strength of U.S. economic status, the failure of Modernisation Theory in the Third World, and above all, the U.S. defeat in Vietnam, generated a range of criticisms within the IR community about the theoretical and 'real-world' inadequacies of Realism.[53]

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[50] Stanley Hoffman, "An American Social Science: International Relations," in James Der Derian (ed.), *International Theory: Critical Investigations*, ed. by James Der Derian (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1995), 221-224.
[51] John A. Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics: A Critique* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1983), 25.
[52] John Mearsheimer, "Disorder Restored," in Graham Allison & Gregory Treverton (eds.), *Rethinking America's Security* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1992).
[53] George, *Discourses of International Politics*, 111-112.

George (1994) has suggested that the challenge to Realism emanating from the critical literature on the Vietnam war brought forward three key themes. First, there was the inadequacy of Realist-derived images of the state system (the keystone of its eternal wisdom concerning global anarchy); the problem being, that its essentialised, universalistic image of reality told us nothing terribly useful about the *actual nature* of the Vietnamese state nor about the history, culture, and sociopolitical structure of Vietnam, its peoples, or its struggles.[54] Secondly, the behaviouralist methodology of Realist analysis, with its claims for precision and strategic predictability (based on game-theorised accounts of rational-actor behaviour) was manifestly unable to predict or explain the 'irrational' behaviour of the North Vietnamese in the face of the catastrophic losses and damage inflicted by U.S. escalation strategy. Finally, the crude Realist/Modernisation conception of power (i.e., in terms of advanced military/technological capacity) was seriously undermined by the defeat of the most powerful state in human history at the hands of a 'traditional' (i.e., 'primitive) society.[55]

These problems, I suggest, are integral to the larger problems of understanding and limitation associated with the whole 'Japan' question in IR and I will touch on similar themes in the chapters to follow, in more direct terms. For now, my concern is to explain, briefly, how a new form of positivist-Realism emerged from the ashes of the old in the wake of Vietnam and directed mainstream IR thinking into the 1990s. The seminal figure in this metamorphosis was Kenneth Waltz, via his *Theory of International Politics* (1979), which sought to repair the damage done to Realism (and U.S. foreign policy) by addressing the problems Waltz perceived in Classical Realism and its behaviouralist counterpart.

Waltz: Addressing the Structural Inadequacies of Classical Realism

[54] *Ibid*., 112.
[55] *Ibid*. More will be said in the following chapter on this third theme, as it is particularly important to the development of Asian area studies in the post-Vietnam period.

Waltz's repair kit was borrowed from Popper, and, to some degree, from Adam Smith. He began however, by conceding (like the behaviouralists before him), that the most fundamental assumptions of the Realist world view are correct; that is to say, the world is, essentially, an anarchical realm characterised by an ongoing security dilemma; the nation state is still the primary actor in the anarchical system (albeit now in competition with a range of other 'economic' actors); and the lust for power and hierarchical status remain the basis of state interest and behaviour. On this basis, the balance of power remains the only realistic strategy for maintaining order.[56]

Having said this, Waltz also argued that Realist theories (prior to his) had made one major error in gauging the real nature of global reality. They had utilised an inductivist methodology and a 'unit-level' mode of analysis.[57] Consequently, following the Popperian template, Waltz sought to re-define his position in terms which retained a rigid positivist framework but which appeared original and invulnerable to anti-Realist critique. He did so, initially, by doing what Popper did (and what Steve Smith found so widespread among his IR colleagues; see above), by defining positivism, in a mainstream Realist context, as *logical positivism*: that is, as little more than fact-grubbing inductivism which claims to 'extract' reality from observable facts. And, like Popper, Waltz then sought to distance his neo-Realist approach from this perspective by arguing for a *deductivist* approach to knowledge, based on the structuralist laws of IR, rather than theories about them.

> If we follow the inductivist route, we can deal only with pieces of problems. The belief that the pieces can be added up, that they can be treated as independent variables whose summed effects will account for a certain portion of a dependent variable's movement, rests on nothing more than faith... [t]he hope apparently rests on the conviction that knowledge begins with certainties and that induction can uncover them. But we can never say with assurance that a state of affairs inductively arrived at corresponds to something objectively real.[58]

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[56] Timothy Dunne, "Realism," in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 116.
[57] *Ibid.*, 118.
[58] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1979), 4-5.

It was on this basis (and, incidentally, precisely after the manner of Classical Realists such as Carr and Morgenthau) that Waltz ended up drawing a firm distinction between 'laws' and 'theories.' Laws, he explained, are derived from observation and testing – as per the natural scientific model – whereas theories "cannot be constructed through induction alone, for theoretical notions *can only be invented not discovered*."[59] In other words, 'theories' are mind–centred and therefore susceptible to normative distortion, while 'laws' are 'out there,' waiting to be discovered as things-in-themselves, susceptible only to falsificationist logic.

In Waltz's neo-Realist structuralism then, the most important task of the IR analyst is the discovery of such laws; an engagement which sees the vital separation between "what is unchanging and foundational in the international system" and that which is merely "ephemeral and susceptible to change."[60] And, as *Theory of International Politics* goes on, it becomes clear enough that "what is unchanging and foundational," *and therefore invulnerable to (non-scientific) theoretical critique*, is the state of anarchy between states following self-interest.

> In an unorganised realm each unit's (state's) incentive is to put itself in a position to take care of itself since no one else can be counted on to do so. The international imperative is "take care of yourself!" Some leaders of nations may understand that the well-being of all of them would increase through their participation in a fuller division of labour. But to act on the idea would be to act on a domestic imperative, *an imperative that does not run internationally*. What one might do in the absence of structural constraints is different from what one I encouraged to do in their presence. States do not willingly place themselves in situations of increased dependence. In a self-help system, considerations of security subordinate economic gain to political interest.[61] (emphasis added)

The assumption of anarchy as a fundamental law of the international system is integral of course, to all preceding Realist perspectives on the world. The really extraordinary thing about Waltz's updated version of Realist folk-lore, however, is that which his pure structuralist approach leaves out of the equation – which, as I

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[59] *Ibid*., 5.
[60] *Ibid*., 69.
[61] *Ibid*., 107.

will show in Chapter Four, has had major implications for what has consistently been left out of discussions of Japan in the postwar/post-Cold War era. In Waltz's case, this omission is achieved through his insistence that certain questions and issues are no longer worth asking of IR, in the search for a 'scientific' approach beyond the concern with state-units per se. Thus, he argues, we must leave aside "questions about the kind of political leaders, social and economic institutions and ideological commitments states may have."[62] Going further, he insists that we must also no longer be concerned with certain issues regarding relations *between* states. Thus too, we must also "leave aside questions about the cultural, economic, political and military interaction of states."[63] The reason for this, Waltz maintains, is because the relationship and nature of states "is not a property of the units [states]... but a property of the system [of states]."[64] In other words having put aside questions about the political leadership, sociology, ideology, culture, economic and politico-military interaction of states we are left with "a purely positional picture of society" – that is, a structure. The advantage of this, Waltz concludes, is that "structures endure, while personality, behaviour and interaction vary widely."[65] Accordingly, "[structuralist] theories developed for one realm may with some modification be applicable to other realms as well.[66]

On this basis, Waltz redefined Realism in structuralist terms – attempting, in the process, to immunise it from criticism, and re-establish anarchy as the 'structure that endures' even in a world of economics and globalisation. Ironically, however, when faced with the question of how this structure has 'endured' historically (if it isn't to do with the ideology, leadership and political ambition of states) Waltz resorted to an 'economic' explanation derived from neo-classical economics and the logic of the market. In short, what he argued is that the structure of the state system is just like the structure of the market, because "international political systems, like economic

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[62] *Ibid.*, 80.
[63] *Ibid.*
[64] *Ibid.*
[65] *Ibid.*, 81.

markets, are individualist in origin, *spontaneously generated and unintended*" [67] (emphasis added). In other words, the state system 'just happens,' and the structure of the state system at any historical moment is just the way it is — "spontaneously generated and unintended."

Now, not even Waltz's supporters were satisfied by this proposition, with scholars such as Keohane complaining that his balance-of-power theory was "so general that it hardly meets the difficult tests that [Waltz] himself establishes for theory;"[68] and John Ruggie (1982) taking Waltz to task for the ahistorical implications of his work.[69] More critically inclined scholars meanwhile, were scathing about *Theory of International Politics*' paradoxical reductionism and the problems of its appeal to its (Popperian) positivist rigour. As Richard Ashley put it:

> Despite neorealism's much ballyhooed emphasis on the role of hard falsifying tests as the measure of theoretical progress, *neorealism immunises its statist commitments from any form of falsification*. Excluded, for instance, is the historically testable hypothesis that the state-as-actor construct might be not a first-order given of international political life but part of a historical justificatory framework by which dominant coalitions legitimise and secure consent for their precarious conditions of rule.[70]

As so many times in the past, however, the enormous problems of a perspective such as this have been ignored or reformulated in order to maintain the (positivist) bottom

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[66] *Ibid*.
[67] *Ibid*., 91.
[68] Robert O. Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 172.
[69] John Gerard Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Towards a Neorealist Synthesis," in *Neorealism and its Critics* (*op. cit*., 1986). Ruggie notes, for example, that Waltz's structuralism provides "no means by which to account for, or even to describe, the most important contextual change in international politics in this *millennium*: the shift from the medieval to the modern international system." *Ibid*., 141.
[70] Richard K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," in Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics* (*op. cit*., 1986), 270. The inadequacy of a structuralist theory that cannot explain where contemporary state structure came from, let alone individual states, has also laid Waltz open to criticism concerning the possibility of change within the international system. In order to explain the fact that change does occur in the international system, Waltz was ultimately forced to undermine his own argument by conceding that, "under certain conditions," units can resist systemic constraints. Even those more generally supportive of Waltz's anarchy principle have acknowledged that this represents a major contradiction, in an argument which insists upon the historical immutability of the system, and its constraining power upon the values, ethics and moral aspirations of individual states. Justin Rosenberg argues for example, that, in conceding that state behaviour varies according to determinations outside those encompassed within a Realist theory, Waltz thereby reduces his theory to the "not very profound" suggestion that "inter-state behaviour *can* be understood as a recurring

line. Thus, Robert Keohane insisted in 1986 that, for all the differences between the moderate, historically sensitive structuralists like himself, and Waltz, the basic assumptions of Waltz's structuralism (including, of course, the anarchy assumption) were correct, and as such, provided "a good starting-point for explaining the outcomes of conflicts... by directing attention to *fundamental questions of interest and power* within a logically coherent and parsimonious theoretical framework"[71] (emphasis added). More recently, with regard to the 'neo-neo' debate mentioned in Chapter One, Stephen Krasner has made it clear that, in regard to the history of the Westphalian system, both neo-realists and neo-liberals agree that there is, as Waltz insisted a "striking sameness in the quality of international life through the millennia;"[72] — a structural basis that endures 'out there,' continuing to underwrite global life even in the age of globalisation. Foremost among the aspects of this basis, for Krasner, is the fact that states (and other actors, depending on whether one subscribes to the neo-liberal viewpoint), are inherently rational, seeking to maximise their interests in a world of finite resources (and anarchical structure).[73] Moreover, he argues, the important issue, from an analytical perspective, is not the continuing differences of interpretation between neo-liberalism and neo-realism within IPE, so much as the fact that both "have been generated by an epistemology [i.e., positivist empiricism] that conforms with the Western Rationalistic Tradition."

> If liberal and realist analyses... have not provided definitive answers, they have offered systematic frameworks within which issues can be addressed. They have made statements about causal variables (power, security, group interests, ideas, values) and they have suggested the kind of evidence that would be relevant for testing these alternative arguments.[74]

In short, what Krasner is saying is that the only type of theory with anything useful to offer the human situation is one whose claims can be contested against empirical

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Prisoners Dilemma" Justin Rosenberg, "What's the Matter with Realism?" (*Review of International Studies* 16:4, 1990, 285-303), 293-94.

[71] Keohane, "Theory of World Politics," 191-92.

[72] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 66.

[73] Stephen D. Krasner, "The Accomplishments of International Political Economy," in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater (eds.), *Theories of International Relations* (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1996), 110-15.

evidence – against a realm of fact which (presumably) *just exists*, independently of what anyone thinks about it. In this way, the positivist detachment central to Realist understanding from Carr onwards, is once more invoked at the core of neo-Realist (and neo-liberal) dogma in the 1990s.

I will return to both Realism and neo-Realism in Chapters Three and Four respectively, where I will trace their influence in the development of postwar understandings of Japan as an international actor. Prior to this however, I wish to explain, somewhat more directly, the implications of positivism in Japanese Studies; firstly, in terms of the theoretical choices (or non-choices) being made by some mainstream discussants of Japanese foreign policy in the 1990s, but also, more broadly, via the contemporary debate about the changing status of 'area studies,' and the increasingly confident claims of some Japan specialists concerning the 'independent' theoretical status of their knowledge.

6. IR Realism and Japan.

As I argued at the beginning of this chapter, the philosophical foundations of IR have not generally been a major concern within Japanese Studies, where the necessity of getting down to specifics, without first having to wade through a whole lot of complex (and, for many, needlessly distracting) theory, is generally seen as a priority. Indeed, this is more or less what the traditional division of labour between 'area studies' (such as Japanese Studies) and 'disciplines' (such as International Relations) has been all about – as Keohane expressed it, "we must understand the context of action before we can understand the action itself."[74] Conversely, on this basis, by the time one arrives at "action" concerning Japan, it is assumed that one knows the context in which "Japan" acts.

The problem with this however, is that it effectively abrogates those approach Japan in this way, from any critical contemplation of their broader theoretical choices.

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[74] *Ibid.*, 124.

And, in the case of some Japanese Studies texts, the results are not just predictable, but for anyone remotely aware of broader debate, even in the more 'conservative' circles of contemporary International Relations, almost embarrassing. They are shown up especially, I suggest, in the surge of (predominantly) North American commentary on Japan's international role during the late 1980s and early 1990s, as the Cold War drew to an end – i.e., a time when, as I pointed out in the previous chapter, even conservative scholars such as Gaddis were already emphasising the need to re-think the fundamentals of Realist analysis, especially the power-politics metaphor. While it is not unreasonable to expect that some of these 'theoretical' musings might have filtered through to the mainstream Japanese Studies community, a quick look at some of the more prominent (English language) literature of this time indicates very little change in the fundamental assumptions of Japan specialists charged with discussing Japan's post-Cold War future.

Three years after the Cold war ended, for example, John Creighton Campbell was still invoking the "game" metaphor of Cold War power politics to describe relations between Japan and the United States. Under the sub-heading "The Diplomatic Game," for example, Campbell informed the reader that,

> Diplomacy refers to the grand affairs of world politics, the fundamentals of foreign policy, and the relationships of friendship or enmity among nations. For postwar Japan, the most crucial element of foreign policy has been to maintain its relationship with the United States. Tokyo keeps that in mind in conducting all its other relationships; it nearly always follows a simple set of behavioural rules resulting from a tacit understanding with Washington that evolved in the first half of the 1950s.[76]

Japan's 1990s foreign policy agenda is thus represented by Campbell, in language and imagery directly reminiscent of Realist orthodoxy at the height of the Cold War. Realism's assumption about the nation state as primary actor in "the grand affairs of world politics," for example, is the unspoken justification for Campbell's

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[75] Keohane, "Theory of World Politics," 193.

anthropomorphic posturing of "Tokyo" and "Washington." Similarly, the following of "behavioural rules" is entirely in accordance with a broader concept of universal, transhistorical "games" played among nations for a rational, pre-determined end – i.e., the maximisation of state power in a shifting, uncertain international arena. These "rules" are reiterated elsewhere in Campbell's essay, in terms of different variations of the "game;" for example, "the military game," where he describes the "ritualised conflict" between the U.S. and Japan on Japan's defence role.[77] Even when he concedes the specific interests at stake on this particular issue, Campbell still represents these interests in exemplary Realist/neo-Realist terms; i.e., of calculable, rational choice.

> The defence game illustrates how conflict can be functional for maintenance of a stable relationship. Each government is able to respond to discontent within its own country by opposing the other. Congressional and public opinion in the United States resents Japan's "free ride," so Washington presses for a greater effort; the Japanese public and opposition parties worry about remilitarization, so Tokyo stands up to these pressures.[78]

A similar approach is found in Martin Weinstein's essay on Japan's future foreign policy options, where he produces three possible scenarios for the post-Cold War world order, on the basis of the late 1980s economic and military "power balance" between Japan, the U.S. and Europe. Weinstein's first scenario is of continued Japan-U.S. economic and security cooperation; his second, of discontinued U.S.-Japan economic/security cooperation, and his third is of discontinued U.S.-Japan cooperation with a new twist via the return of the "Soviet Threat " – which, in Weinstein's account, takes the form of a "nationalistic, militaristic, authoritarian backlash in Russia [which] has thousands of advanced nuclear weapons.... and is

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[76] John Creighton Campbell, "Japan and the United States: Games That Work," in Gerald L. Curtis (ed.), *Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), 44.
[77] *Ibid.*, 46.
[78] *Ibid.*, 47.

determined to prevent encroachments on its territory by a unified Germany, China or Japan."[79]

The point here of course is not which, if any of Weinstein's scenarios have subsequently proved most accurate as the 'new' global paradigm. It is that for Weinstein, (or Campbell), there is no other way of imagining international reality – one can only speak of Japan's international role in (Realist) terms of power balances, alliance structures, and advantage-maximising "games."[80] My broader point however, is that the confidence of scholars such as Campbell and Weinstein about Japan's options is derived from the positivist closure integral to Realist knowledge, where reality is understood as coherent, complete and above all detached from the observer – making it accessible to universalised, essentialised and totalised understandings of it. From this perspective, relevant capable analysis of Japan as an international actor does not need sophisticated imagery of Japanese life and society; all it needs is an understanding of the ritualised behaviour patterns of states in the international system.

This is not to suggest that the sort of issues raised in a traditional, military security context are not important to the question of Japan's international role; nor is it to insist that all discussions on Japan as an international actor begin at the finer points of positivism (or even Realism). It is to suggest however, that thinking about traditional aspects of Japan's international role – including its role in military security – demands a more updated context than that assumed into existence above via the theoretical 'corner cutting' techniques employed by Campbell, Weinstein, and others of their ilk. To put it another way, classifying oneself as a 'Japan specialist'

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[79] Martin E. Weinstein, "Japan's Foreign Policy Options," in Curtis (ed.), *Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War* (*op. cit.*, 1993), 232-233.

[80] Besides Curtis's volume (in which the Campbell and Weinstein essays appear, and which is described on its cover as "'must' reading for anyone interested in Japan's evolving world role" by the Dean of the Edwin O. Reischauer Centre for East Asian Studies at Johns Hopkins University), other literature defines Japan's options as an international actor in these terms, even beyond the end of the Cold War. Other examples include the strategic studies analyses of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Sheldon Simon's *East Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), and the updated edition of Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel Okimoto's *The Political*

does not, I argue, remove analytical/philosophical responsibility for the assumptions which make it possible to think about something called 'Japan' in the first place; even if it is not always possible to confront those assumptions at great length.

This is a particularly important issue I suggest, in light of the rapidly changing nature of contemporary 'area studies' in Western communities. Today, in many universities, Japanese Studies has achieved almost disciplinary status in its own right. One result of this, as I argued in Chapter One, is that increasingly, many Japan/Asia specialists regard their knowledge as linguistically, culturally and even analytically separate from a more traditional Western disciplinary core. For such scholars, the issue at stake is not so much theoretical 'corner cutting,' as the relevance of Western social scientific theory and methodology to non-western contexts. Following the work of its own leading scholars,[81] Japanese Studies is no longer just about the interpretation of Japan by and for a Western audience, but about the building of whole new bodies of knowledge about traditional 'disciplinary' topics – such as economics, political theory and, of course, International Relations.

No-one could argue that the expansion and diversification of Japanese Studies has been other than stimulating and useful. Nonetheless, and as stated previously, I have some concerns about the seeming lack of communication between a 'theory building' Japanese Studies, and International Relations – a situation which David Wright-Neville has blamed for the growing sense among many IR (Asian) area studies specialists, that "their discipline is unique and capable of existing without any significant intrusions from theoretical developments elsewhere."[82] From my perspective, and as I argued at the beginning of this chapter, this sense of self-sufficiency is derived from the disinclination among many area specialists to

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Economy of Japan: The Changing International Context (2nd edition; Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1991). The Inoguchi/Okimoto volume is discussed in more detail in Chapter Four.

[81] E.g., Reischauer, whose work is covered in the next chapter; but more recently, the works of scholars such as Lucien Pye, who was one of the first Asian Studies specialists to apply the 'Pan Asianist' perspective to an IR/political theory context, in *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press/Harvard University Press, 1985). This work, and the perspective it embodies, is discussed at the beginning of Chapter Six.

[82] David Wright-Neville, "The Politics of Pan Asianism" (*op. cit.*, 1995), 2.

confront the 'how' questions raised in this chapter about our dominant ways of knowing reality, and how they influence our 'theory building.'

This concern is borne out, I suggest, by the fact that on the few occasions when Japanese Studies texts have explicitly confronted these issues, they have done so from a positivist perspective – albeit one which utilises (Popperian) critical rationalist themes to argue for the greater inclusion of 'non-western' values and ideas in the building and refining of social theory. The particular example I have in mind, and some of the most interesting writing to come out of Western literature on Japan in recent years, is the work of David Williams. Williams is one of the few scholars ever to have confronted the positivism issue in a Japan-specific context, and he does so from a political economy perspective that is particularly useful to this discussion, using overtly Popperian themes to justify a 'post-positivist' approach to understanding Japan's significance in the global system. As explained above, this has also been a crucial theoretical device for International Relations scholars, via the work of Waltz in particular. And, like Waltz, Williams work is significant because it fails to acknowledge what Popper's critics have pointed out – namely, the lingering positivist closure in his scholarship.

David Williams and the 'Japan-shaped hole:' Conquering the Eurocentric bias in Japanese Studies.

Williams' admiration for, and emulation of Popper's approach to knowledge is declared quite openly in the title of his 1996 work, *Japan and the Enemies of Open Political Science*, in which he argues that (logical) positivism has retarded acknowledgement of the challenge that postwar Japan poses to an established 'canon' of Western politico-economic thought. Williams' definition of positivism is, of course, indebted to Popper, whom, as explained above, based his claim to a postpositivist critical rationalism on the rejection of scientific foundationalism in the humanities, via the insistence that knowledge must always be subjected to falsificationist scepticism. In making this assertion, Popper argued that his approach

went beyond "positivist epistemology... the aping of the natural sciences by the social sciences."[83] The key move here, as acknowledged by admirers and critics alike, is that which equates positivism with logical positivism -- i.e. crude, "fact-grubbing" inductivism, with a rigid emphasis on the fact/value distinction.

Translated to a Japanese Studies context, this inductivist approach is associated with an old-fashioned (and ethnocentric) approach to the non-West, in which Western grand theory was, particularly during the 1950s and 1960s, applied to Japanese circumstances, without taking any particular note of historical and/or cultural contexts. And this, according to Williams, remains the dominant approach to Japan, especially when evaluating the postwar Japanese political economy. As first explained in his 1994 work, *Japan: Beyond the End of History* (1994), there has been no notable integration of Japanese economic and political thought, and its results, into "the Western canon" of political philosophy and economic theory, despite the fact that postwar Japan represents "one of the great political experiments of history, fully compared to Plato's Athens, Machiavelli's Florence, or James Madison's America." This "marginalisation [of Japan] in global consciousness,"[84] Williams argued, persists because Western theorists are unable to concede that

> the post-war Japanese miracle offers a significant intellectual challenge to some of the more rooted assumptions of the Western mind. To neglect Japanese political and economic success is to create a 'Japan-shaped hole' in the discourse of modern Western social science and political analysis. Though the point may be lost on Europeans and Americans ensconced in the heartland of Western civilisation, this incipient 'hole' is the object of bitter feelings in Japan and the Third World.[85]

More specifically, and as Williams subsequently argued in detail in *Japan and the Enemies of Open Political Science*, the 'Japan shaped hole' persists because Western social science, particularly economics, remains dominated by a hard-core (logical) positivism, which is inimical to the natural concerns of the area specialist –

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[83] Popper, "Reason or Revolution?" in Adorno *et. al.* (eds.), *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology* (*op. cit.*, 1976), 299.
[84] David Williams, *Japan: Beyond the End of History* (Routledge: London & New York, 1994), 190-91.

linguistic, historical and cultural context. The result, Williams claims, is that Western scholars persist in trying to squash Japan into universal grand theories located within the Western canon, rather than admit that Japan's postwar experience has a genuine contribution to make. On the basis of the available literature about Japan, he writes,

> ...the mainstream Western scholar may safely conclude that Japan has nothing special to say to him. Japan comfortably conforms to the Euro-American paradigm in which John Maynard Keynes and Friedrich Hayek divide the public policy world between them. This represents a victory for the ghetto mentality that pervades Japan studies on both sides of the Atlantic... where once the mind of Europe celebrated the singular feats of the Venetian Republic and the miraculous surge of English power after the Glorious revolution, today we greet Japan's record of political achievement with the fog of empirical denial.[86]

While there is no space here to develop the fine details of Williams' thesis, basically, his solution to the Japan-shaped hole is the same falsificationist logic employed by Popper – expressed, in *Japan and the Enemies of Open Political Science*, as an expanded "dialogue" between Japan specialists and the disciplines.[87] Such a dialogue, he argues, would take into account the other "great tradition"[88] of Asian studies; namely, the tradition of Orientalism. Here, "Orientalism" is interpreted by Williams in a predominantly positive sense which (correctly) pays tribute to the great early descriptive and philological studies of Japan in nineteenth and early twentieth century scholarship by writers such as Lafcadio Hearn (1850-1904)[89] and George Samson (1883-1965)[90] – in other words, Williams argues, scholarship based, on "micro-observation," grounded in "a commitment to cultural geography as an ordering motif in human learning."[91] This approach, he observes, has been largely

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[85] *Ibid*., 191.
[86] Williams, *Japan and the Enemies of Open Political Science* (Routledge: London & New York, 1996), 137.
[87] *Ibid*., 249.
[88] The first being (behaviouralist) social science; in particular, Modernisation Theory, on which more is said in the following chapter. *Ibid*., 269.
[89] Lafcadio Hearn, collected essays on Japanese language, culture and religion, in Louis Allen and Jean Wilson (eds.), *Lafcadio Hearn: Japan's Great Interpreter. A New Anthology of his Writings: 1894-1904*. Folkstone: Japan Library Ltd., 1992
[90] George Bailey Sansom, *Japan: A Short Cultural History* (Revised edition; New York: Appleton-Century, 1943).
[91] *Ibid*.

swept aside in the postwar rush to conform to "the conceit, so powerfully alive in much American political science, that the term 'methods' must, where rigorous, apply to certain quantitative tools alone."[92] If Japan's "canonic" status in the lexicon of politico-economic knowledge is ever to be acknowledged, Williams suggests, it is vital that the "micro-observation" techniques of this type of scholarship be allowed to re-enter the domain of genuine knowledge, thereby eradicating

> the massive wall that has been erected during the twentieth century between the humanities and the social sciences. For the area student, philosophy and literature matter more than physics or higher mathematics, although it is the latter that have served, for far too long, as the dominant epistemological model for so-called rigorous social science. Orientalist precedent should encourage the regional specialist to say 'goodbye' to someone that he never knew very well, but whose legacy has been allowed to exert a baleful influence on the human sciences: Sir Isaac Newton.[93]

In actual fact, Williams' ideas are not, in themselves, startlingly new; echoing, as they do, long-standing concerns about the ethnocentric bias of conventional (Western) social theory shared by a wide range of scholars, and particularly evident among Japan/Asia specialists. By the mid 1970s for example, scholars such as James White and Lucien Pye were already willing to concede that the traditional division of labour between area specialists and disciplinary theory-builders was no longer viable.[94] Later, Chalmers Johnson (whose work is examined in detail in Chapter Four) would go even further, producing a compelling argument for Japan's 'miracle' to be examined as a major challenge to Western politico-economic theories.[95] Where Williams differs to these scholars however, is in the directness with which he confronts the philosophical foundations of Western scholarship. In this respect, and also in his deliberately cross-disciplinary approach, and encouragement of an

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[92] *Ibid*.
[93] *Ibid*., 270.
[94] James White, "Tradition and Politics in Studies of Contemporary Japan," (*Journal of World Politics* 3, 1974: 400-427), in which he argued against the "ethnocentric" Western social scientific definition of concepts such as 'tradition' and 'modernity' which equated them, dichotomously, with 'undeveloped' and 'developed' (*Ibid*., 403-05). See also Lucien Pye's early comments on this matter, in "The confrontation between discipline and area studies," in Lucien W. Pye (ed.), *Political Science and Area Studies: Rivals or Partners?* (Bloomington & London: Indiana University Press), 1975, 24-26.

enhanced 'dialogue' between usually separated sectors of knowledge, Williams has been inspirational to my own project, explained in the previous chapter, of 'connecting' the concerns and themes shared by contemporary International Relations and Japanese Studies.

On the other hand, I have deep reservations about Williams' overtly Popperian position on the positivism issue – a position which leads to the same, problematic result; namely, that which saw Popper (at least, from the perspective of his critics) replicate in his work, the very positivist closure he claimed to have moved beyond. In *Japan and the Enemies of Open Political Science*, this is most obvious when Williams, in arguing that "some knowledge of Japan is indispensable to a sound grasp of the contemporary world,"[96] spells out his certainty that Japan is 'out there' to be known. In other words, it is possible, through various levels of micro and macro analysis, *based on empirical observation*, to understand the true nature of Japanese reality from a detached, unbiased perspective. Accordingly, even as he denigrates the "monoist orthodoxy" in a behaviouralist Japanese Studies, which denies the relevance of linguistic knowledge and cultural frames of reference (for example, in the rational choice theory used to explain Japanese voting patterns),[97] Williams remains fundamentally committed to the objectivist stance of 'true' science as a whole – a commitment that is never more evident than when he berates scholars such as Edward Said for their inability "to square up, honestly and clearly, to an obvious truth: it is possible for a White man or woman to study Asia *in an objective and disinterested manner*. A rigorous science of the Orient is not only conceivable, it has been achieved."[98]

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[95] Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982).
[96] Williams, *Japan and the Enemies of Open Political Science*, 140.
[97] *Ibid.*, 129.
[98] *Ibid.*, 152-53. A further irony pervades Williams' defence of science on page 263 of *Enemies*, where he conflates the scientific achievements of "Newtonian or Einsteinian physics." This underlines the (Popperian-derived) narrowness of William's grasp on positivism, given the profound challenge that Einstein's achievements represent to the Newtonian world view, as indicated above.

Now, in terms of the primary assumptions of positivism noted at the beginning of this chapter, this represents positivism – at the heart of one of the most explicitly "anti-positivist" statements that has ever been made in a Japanese Studies context. The result is that Williams' concerns about squashing Japan's modern experience into grand theorised, Western generalisations of "how the world works" are, ironically, expressed in terms which re-confirm the most basic assumption of Western grand theory – namely, the scientific accessibility of the world 'out there.' In this respect, his work ultimately connects to those who are far less self conscious about invoking "generalised" structures of thought – such as Weinstein or Campbell, whose prognoses for post-Cold War Japan are unapologetically located in Cold War Realism. Even more importantly, it connects to the problems identified by Wright-Neville, concerning the efforts of Japan/Asia specialists to create and impose 'canonic' statements about Japanese/East Asian reality, that are grounded in a single, essentialised reading of that reality. As Wright-Neville concludes, while the attempt to transcend Western reason to recognise that "there are other ways of thinking than those enshrined in the reified categories of Western epistemology" is perhaps worthwhile:

> the task is immediately problematised by the fact that the apparent object of liberation from the tyranny of Western hegemonic categories, the non-Western individual, is doubly ensnared by [those] who, despite their heady rhetoric on defending cultural integrity, are themselves dependent upon the continuation of categories of difference initially imagined and imposed by Europeans.[99]

In subsequent chapters, I will return to the problem of negotiating the division between Japanese Studies and the "disciplines" (in this case, International Relations). For now however, I will return to the Realist/positivist influence in Japanese Studies, focussing on the postwar period, and the construction of Japan's international role in the shadow of the Cold War.

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[99] Wright-Neville, "The Politics of Pan Asianism," 25-26.

CHAPTER THREE

POSTWAR JAPAN (I):

REALISM AND THE CREATION OF THE 'BLACK BOX.'

The issue of Realism and postwar Japan is best encompassed, perhaps, in two observations concerning Cold War mind sets and their continuing influences in IR. The first, by Ken Booth, compliments the position taken in the previous chapter on the question of positivism and the restricted images it allows of global reality. For Booth, these restrictions were never more evident than in relation to the approach of Western (and Soviet) strategists during the Cold War. The problem here, he argues, is that those who planned Cold War strategy and invoked their images of the 'is' of the world, did not understand that "there is no clear dividing line between images [of the world] and reality. [That] the reality of our strategic world is inextricably interconnected with our manner of conceiving it."[1] Developing this point further Booth explains that, in Cold War terms, this process of 'conceiving' global reality:

> is premised on a clear conception of the nation-state (billiard ball) model of international relations: governments are seen as the chief actors: defence is conceived to be the primary duty of the authorities: *national stereotypes are seen at their clearest*: So-called realism is the prevailing philosophy [and] conflict and war are seen to be necessary and normal because of the struggles for power which determines the major clash of [inter-state] interests.[2]

The problem with this perspective, for Booth, is precisely that which Gaddis and others have pointed to in the 1990s; i.e., that while it might make for the kind of parsimonious theory beloved by policy makers, in practice, it tells us nothing much about the peoples and cultures and differences of global society beyond reductionist, stereotypical images of them. As I indicated in the previous chapter, this was to have particularly disastrous consequences in Vietnam. More recently, and as a whole range of scholars have pointed out, it resulted in a general failure to predict, or even

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[1] Ken Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* (London: Croom Helm, 1979), 9.

acknowledge, the possibility of the Soviet implosion — despite trillions spent on surveillance and intelligence analysis.

The value of Booth's comment in the present context has a slightly different connotation, however, because as well as reiterating the power and influence of a Realist image of the world at the core of Cold War thinking, it adds an important yet rarely discussed dimension to the issue of Realism and IR, with significance for Japan and this thesis — namely, its ethnocentrism. This dimension of Realism has seen an almost exclusively Western (or more precisely western European) image of the world, derived from the historical and intellectual experiences of the post-Renaissance period, universalised into global reality per se. The result, as Booth's observations indicate, is a 'real-world' of IR invested with the structural and philosophical characteristics of a particular (social, cultural and historical) image of reality, in which other peoples, cultures, histories and experiences are reduced to a 'billiard ball' scenario or, at best a series of "national stereotypes."

The most important political and analytical implication of this restricted perspective, as earlier intimated, is that in this essentialised context there is no real need to understand the complex, 'inside' of state-actors if, as the Realist perspective insists, all states act in fundamentally the same ways for fundamentally the same purposes in a world which follows the same fundamental patterns.[3] For Booth, however, writing at about the same time that Waltz was arguing *precisely this* in updated positivist terms, this was indeed a major problem, that needed to be re-addressed in theory and acted upon in practice. In particular, he suggested, the study of global strategy divorced from area studies is little more than "thinking in a void"[4]

The second observation I want to highlight on this issue also comes to this conclusion, and it also points to the rampant ethnocentrism at the core of Realist

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[2] *Ibid.*, 22.
[3] Jim George, *Discourses of Global Politics* (*op. cit.*, 1994), 33.
[4] Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*, 157.

Cold War thinking about Japan. It comes from Bruce Cumings who, in the early 1990s, took up some of the themes introduced by Booth to try, in retrospect, to work out the nature of past U.S.-Japan relations, and provide a sense of what future relations might look like. In the present context, it is a basic question asked by Cumings that is of most interest. The question is this: "What does Japan look like when it is viewed from without, as if it were a black box, as if little that happened in Japan was of great moment?"[5] For Cumings, this is an entirely appropriate way to begin any inquiry into postwar U.S.-Japan relations because, he argues, Japan has been little more than a 'black box' for Western analysts for the past sixty-odd years; particularly in the United States during the Cold War, of course, when those charged with Japan-related policymaking "did not study Japan, nor did they know it; [instead] they wished to situate Japan structurally in a world system shaped by the United States so that Japan would do what it should without having to be told"[6]

What Cumings points to here is vital in understanding the very profound impact that a Realist dominated IR perspective has had on Japan, because what he points to is the process by which 'Japan' was given a particular Cold war identity and a particular structural location in U.S. geo-political strategy. Via this strategy, I suggest, Japan became little more than a 'black box' for Realist analysts. Even when this approach was altered slightly in the 1960s to re-locate Japan as primarily a geo-economic asset and, among some Japanese Studies specialists, the jewel in the Modernisation Theory crown, Japan remained very much an essentialised, universalised entity in Western Cold War planning.[7] Moreover, much of the negativity associated with U.S. perceptions of Japan in the 1970s, which developed into the 'Japan bashing' era of the 1980s and the uneasy relationships of the current era can be traced, I believe, to this initial (positivist induced) objectification of Japan in the 1940s and 1950s as a passive Western (i.e. U.S.) ally in Asia which, as Cumings puts it, "would do what it

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[5] Bruce Cumings, "Japan's Position in the World System" (*op. cit.*, 1993), 34.
[6] *Ibid.*

should without having to be told."[8] In this respect, Cumings is correct, I think, to point to the tensions of the 1990s as derived initially from U.S. perceptions of Japan's designated location in post-WWII U.S. global strategy, via which the U.S. policy community imposed "distinct outer limits on Japan's behaviour." According to Cumings, these limits persist to the present day, in the (Cold War) mind-set of many within the U.S. foreign policy elite, to whom any shift from a passive to an active Japan (even in a burden sharing context) "sends a chill up the American spine."[9]

This chapter will explore this issue, or at least some elements of it, as part of a discussion which seeks to connect the political and intellectual process by which 'Japan' was represented in IR in the Cold War era, to the larger 'theoretical' issues thus far developed in this thesis. In this context, as the chapter progresses, I want to connect the issue of a caricatured Cold War Japan more precisely to the issue of ethnocentrism at the core of Realism and positivism. In particular, I want to explore the period which saw Japan become not only a Cold War geo-strategic bulwark against Communism in the 1940s and 1950s, but the (Asian) exemplar of Western modernity for the (first phase) Modernisation Theorists of the 1960s. This, I suggest, is also an important point of connection for my developing discussion on Japanese Studies, and my claims about its continued dependence on themes drawn from the influences of IR Realism and positivism, and the kinds of perspectives associated with Modernisation Theory in the 1960s. In the chapter to follow, I will develop this discussion further in terms of the neo-Realism of the 1970s and 1980s, and the second phase of Modernisation Theory at the heart of the neo-liberalism of the 1990s.

1. Re-Modelling Japan: The Geo-strategic/Geo-economic Asset.

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[7] This is a particularly important point with regard to the early Japanese Studies texts of scholars such as Edwin O. Reischauer, on whom more will be said in this chapter.
[8] Bruce Cumings, "Japan's Position in the World System," 34.
[9] *Ibid*.

> The post-war history of Japan is an object lesson in what international politics are really about.
>
> Peter Calvocoressi, 1985.[10]

In Chapter One, in particular, I touched on issues concerning the early years of post-WWII Occupation policy, and specifically, the desire to demilitarise and democratise a Japan which had paid the ultimate (nuclear) price for its brutal activities in the 1930s and 1940s. The major objectives of this restoration of Japan under U.S. tutelage were articulated and, to varying degrees, implemented, primarily between 1945 and 1948 – a period when the vast majority of Japanese people were struggling desperately to survive the material and psychological aftermath of war and defeat. In this context, as John Dower has written, the reforms implemented by the Occupation represented nothing less than a "revolution from above... an extraordinary, and extraordinarily fluid moment; never seen before in history and, as it turned out, never to be repeated."[11] In its initial stages too, it was a revolution with enormous popular support. There is little doubt, Dower argues, that the reforms implemented under MacArthur were a great source of inspiration for millions of Japanese, helping them to transcend the economic chaos and social hardship of these years, to begin rebuilding their lives.[12]

The keystone of the democratic makeover of course, was the 1947 Constitution, which metamorphosed Japan into a new Western style constitutional monarchy in which power was situated within the elected Diet rather than in the hands of the powerful zaibatsu combines and the Emperor.[13] While this was never a process that in practice entirely coincided with its stated aims,[14] the new Constitution was a

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[10] Peter Calvocoressi, *World Politics Since 1945* (7th edition; London & New York: Longman, 1996), 77.
[11] John Dower, *Embracing Defeat* (*op. cit.*, 1999), 84.
[12] *Ibid.*, 119-20.
[13] J. A. A. Stockwin, *Japan: Divided Politics in a Growth Economy* (2nd edition; London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1982), 198-200.
[14] Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 405-410. For example, in its preservation and protection of Emperor Hirohito, which, as Dower argues, effectively erased the issue of war responsibility. Later too, it became increasingly obvious that "democratization" had never been intended to flourish to the extent

genuinely revolutionary document, drafted by a working committee who set out to interpret the guidelines set down by MacArthur "towards the most liberal interpretation possible."[15] The result was a document that not only overturned many of the traditional ("feudal") aspects of Japanese society, but which, in some instances went beyond even the institutions of its creators in stipulating the conditions of democratic life. The section enumerating the "rights and duties of the people," for example, "was, and remains, one of the most liberal guarantees of human rights in the world... it even affirmed "the essential equality of the sexes" — a guarantee not explicitly found in the U.S. Constitution."[16]

Initial Cold War Concerns and Acheson's "Great Crescent."

Less than a year after the Constitution's promulgation however, such aims had already become secondary ones. By now, it was clear that the post-war identity of Japan was ceasing to be an issue primarily of U.S. policy in East Asia, becoming, instead, an issue of U.S. and Western global policy in the Cold War. Two issues in particular accelerated this shift in strategic thinking. The first centred on the ever-worsening relationship between the Western powers and the Soviet Union in central Europe. The second concerned the increasing vulnerability of the Nationalist Chinese under Chiang Kai-shek and the increasing likelihood of a major Communist victory in Asia. This latter possibility was a significant blow to the post-WWII planners in the U.S., in particular, who, initially at least, had looked upon China under the Kuomintang Nationalists as a key strategic and economic ally in any long-term confrontation with the USSR.[17] By mid-1948 however, the Northern regions of China were under Communist control and, even more disconcerting for Western

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that it might override the democratisers themselves; freedom of speech, for example, was strictly curtailed under Occupation authorities, who were assiduous in suppressing critical and/or satirical comment on their efforts. *Ibid.*, 406.

[15] *Ibid.*, 369.

[16] *Ibid.*

[17] Cumings, "Japan's Position in the World System," 36.

strategists invoking images of a 'monolithic communism' spreading outwards from Moscow, a People's Republic was now proclaimed in North Korea.[18]

The response of the Western powers was the containment policy of the Truman administration which, in its formal articulation, in November 1948, was concerned to "reduce the power and influence of the USSR to limits which no longer constitute a threat to the peace, national independence and stability of the world family of nations."[19] In this context, and with the U.S. increasingly committed to its role as 'world policeman' and generator of a political and economic strategy designed to contain the perceived expansionism of Soviet Communism, each member of the (free) "world family of nations" was designated a role in this strategy under U.S. leadership and guidance.[20] Japan's role was a clear and important one in this context, situated as it now was at the centre of the 'great crescent' of strategic threat defined by U.S. Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson in 1947, which took in the immediate danger areas of China and Korea and a range of potential 'domino' states stretching from Japan down through Southeast Asia and around India to the oil-rich regions of the Persian Gulf.[21]

Within this 'great crescent' perspective, Japan had a dual importance for the U.S. The first concerned U.S. strategic interests in Asia and, as a prominent State Department expert on Japan explained it in late 1948, the problem here was that victory for the Chinese Communists and for Communism in Korea would increase the difficulties of "holding Japan within the U.S. sphere," and eventually "destroy U.S. security in the Pacific."[22] On this basis, it was vital that Japan be confirmed as a major strategic ally of the Western powers in the 'great crescent;' the major bulwark in the defence of U.S. security interests in the Pacific region. This new strategic role

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[18] Tessa Morris-Suzuki, *Shôwa: An Inside History of Hirohito's Japan* (Sydney: Methuen Australia, 1984), 130.
[19] National Security Council Document 20/4: "U.S. Objectives With Respect to the USSR to Counter Threats to United States Security," quoted in Colin S. Gray, *The Geo-Politics of Super Power* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1988), 117.
[20] *Ibid*.
[21] Cumings, "Japan's Position in the World System," 39.

was to be supplemented however, by the role Japan was also to play as the keystone of a regional economic policy designed "to develop in non-Soviet Northeast Asia a group of independent people...who, on an economically viable basis, are capable of successfully resisting communist expansion."[23]

In this regard, Japan was now taking on the role that West Germany had been designated in Europe – erstwhile enemies now 'remade' in the image of the United States, to become passive symbols of the free-world and the struggle against ideology and oppression. As such, these newly sanitised states were to be given all of the benefits of both the U.S. strategic arsenal (or at least guaranteed protection under the U.S. nuclear umbrella), and the surging U.S. economy. Moreover, this was an attitude that penetrated even those with reservations about the speed of the rehabilitation process who, for the most part, conceded that "they had nothing to fear from Japan and Germany, as long as they were kept on capital, technological, defence and resource dependencies"[24]

If anything, Japan was by now already more important to the U.S. than was Germany; to the extent that, while the (West) Germans were pivotal to the success of the Marshall Plan and 'economic' containment in Europe, Germany was still a divided society and as such, not totally amenable to U.S. influences. Japan, on the other hand, was not only a complete entity, but its people had been regarded from the outset, as more malleable to instruction – being, as MacArthur famously described them, "Oriental peoples [who] suffer from an inferiority complex which leads them to 'childish brutality' when they conquer in war and to slavish dependence when they lose."[25] While not all would have expressed it thus, Japan was certainly widely regarded as being, effectively, a clean slate for U.S. Cold War theory and practice, just as it had been, three years previously, a clean slate for American democratic

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[22] *Ibid*., 42.
[23] *Ibid*.
[24] *Ibid*., 38.
[25] MacArthur to Truman, October 1945; quoted in Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 223.

ideals. This was very much the way, for example, that the arch Realist George Kennan saw Japan – and it was Kennan who was to have a major voice in the way that Japan was restructured, socially and conceptually, as a Cold War asset of the Western alliance.

2. The Kennan Factor: Taking Cold War Realism to Japan.

The significance of Kennan is particularly worth noting here, because his influence as a Realist theorist of the Cold War goes far beyond his importance in the makeover of Japan. In fact, as Charles Nathanson and others have argued, Kennan's Realism and his positivist history is intrinsic to the way in which U.S. Cold War policymakers came to know the Soviet Union and respond to its natural expansionist ambitions after 1945.[26] In this sense, Kennan is perhaps the major architect of the Cold War mind-set which gripped U.S. policy and analytical circles in the wake of WWII, and which was to have such a profound effect on policy towards Japan.

The point here, as Nathanson explains it, is that in 1945 the Soviet threat thesis per se *did not exist* in U.S. policy thinking. Rather, at this time, a range of interpretations of the Soviet Union and its post-Cold War intentions permeated the U.S. decision making community, with the anti-Communist propensities of the Truman administration generally balanced by U.S. intelligence reports which argued that the Soviets were neither capable of, nor interested in, any further expansion.[27] The key actor in shifting this ambiguity into concrete reality was Kennan, via his secret 'X' telegram in February 1946. In this telegram, Kennan insisted that U.S. policy should not be based on negotiation and traditional diplomacy but on force, because force, argued Kennan was the only thing the Soviets understood.[28] Moreover, he claimed, the Soviet Union had a "neurotic view of world affairs" provoked in the main by its contact with "the more competent, more powerful... and economically advanced"

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[26] Charles E. Nathanson, "The Social Construction of the Soviet Threat: A Study in the Politics of Representation." *Alternatives*. XIII (1988: 443-483), 443.
[27] *Ibid*., 444.

states of the West.[29] This underpinned a foreign policy "fanatically committed to the belief that the U.S. way of life [must] be destroyed [and] the international authority of [the U.S.] be broken."[30]

Expanding his point, Kennan explained that the Soviets would seek to pursue their agenda at two major levels: 'internally' by infiltrating "labour unions, youth leagues, women's organisations, racial societies, social organisations, cultural groups, liberal magazines etc" and by setting the "poor against rich, black against white, young against old."[31] In the international arena, their tactics were to "weaken the power and influence of the Western powers" by gaining power and influence among "colonial backward, or dependent peoples."[32] Moreover, there was, Kennan warned, no point in trying to find compromise with the Soviets on any of these problems, because they were "impervious to the logic of reason...and seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality."[33] The only realistic solution, he advised, was the traditional balance of power logic, in which the free-world acted in alliance to contain an enemy which could only be deterred if its "adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it."[34]

Importantly, as Daniel Yergin indicates, Kennan's telegram strengthened the position of the anti-Communist cold warriors around Truman, and was the catalyst for the global containment strategy and for the NATO alliance.[35] But, crucially, it was not a response to any change in the character of Soviet behaviour. Rather, suggests Yergin, Kennan's perspective on the Soviet Union actually had very little to do with Soviet behaviour in 1945-1946, but emanated instead from an objectivised view of *Russian* history, coloured by a deterministic view of communism as a fundamentally

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[28] *Ibid*.
[29] Kennan's "Long Telegram," quoted in Nathanson, "The Social Construction of the Soviet Threat," 455.
[30] *Ibid*., 456.
[31] *Ibid*.
[32] *Ibid*.
[33] *Ibid*.
[34] *Ibid*., 457.

evil force in world affairs.[36] Thus, Kennan understood the Soviet aim as an extension of Russian imperialist aims which, from the revolution of 1917 on, was interpreted as "world-wide revolution...[and] the destruction of all governments as now constituted."[37] Nothing, on this basis, could change this interpretative-cum-objective 'fact,' apart from a global U.S. led alliance against the spread of communism. This provided an interpretative framework for aggressive, expansionist Soviet behaviour even when its behaviour appeared not to be motivated by aggressive or expansionist intent.

The more immediate importance of all this, for the present discussion, is that this objectivist interpretation-cum-factual reality in IR was now transformed into U.S. policy after 1946 – including, of course, its policy for Japan. Consequently, in the letter which White House special council Clark Clifford wrote for President Truman which drew on Kennan's analysis and which acted as a draft for the 'Truman Doctrine,' some intrinsic Realist themes began to shape the U.S. perspective on its role and that of its allies. The notion, for example, that "The language of military power is the only language which disciples of power politics [i.e. the Soviets] understand."[38] That, "compromise and concessions are considered by the Soviets to be evidence of weakness."[39] That, "the main deterrent to Soviet attack on the United States, *or on areas of the world which are vital to our security*, will be the military power of [the U.S.A.]" (emphasis added). That, "the United States should support and assist all democratic countries which are in any way menaced or endangered by the USSR." That, in this context, "providing military support in case of attack is a last resort: [but] a more effective barrier to communism is strong economic support...[Thus] Our efforts to...bring economic unification to countries now divided by occupation armies are also directed towards the re-establishment of

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[35] Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (London: Andre Deutsch Limited, 1978), 170.
[36] *Ibid.*, 171.
[37] Kennan, cited in Yergin, *Shattered Peace*, 169.
[38] Nathanson, "The Social Construction of the Soviet Threat," 459.
[39] *Ibid.*, 460.

vigorous and healthy non-communist economies"[40] Finally, and most pertinently, perhaps, came the conclusion that, "our [anti-Soviet] policies must be global in scope."[41] The significance of this being that while "by time honoured custom we have regarded 'European policy,' 'Near East' policy,' Indian' policy and 'Chinese' policy' as separate problems *to be handled by experts in each field*" (emphasis added), this was to change, because all the areas involved "border on the Soviet Union [meaning that] our actions with respect to each must *be considered in the light of overall Soviet objectives*"[42] (emphasis added).

Kennan's "Most Significant Contribution:" Setting the 'Reverse Course' in Japan

It is in this context, and against this background, that Kennan was dispatched to Japan in 1947 to oversee the 'reverse course' program, aimed at redefining Japan in terms of newly designated U. S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region. As indicated above, this required, on the one hand that Japan be transformed into a "regional power of the second rank, hamstrung by the hegemonic power but free to dominate its historic territory."[43] Above all, Kennan wanted Japanese power restored in order "to butt up against the Soviets, to establish a balance of power like that at the turn of the century" in Europe.[44] Accordingly, his draft provisions for the reverse course included, for example, the "moral right" of U.S. intervention in Japanese affairs, should "stooge groups" such as the Japanese Communist Party seek to gain influence. Kennan also recommended the swift restoration to power and respectability of various war criminals and business leaders, on the basis that they are both "the most stable elements" in society and that "they have the strongest natural ties with the U.S."[45] In short, he explained, Americans responsible for Japan had to

[40] *Ibid*., 461.
[41] *Ibid*.
[42] *Ibid*.
[43] Kennan, cited in Cumings, "Japan's Position in the World System," 40.
[44] *Ibid*., 39.
[45] *Ibid*., 40.

abandon the "aspiration to be liked," dispensing with concerns about "human rights" or "living standards," and instead, "deal in straight power concepts."[46]

In this way, the 'reverse course' program was constructed and implemented with U.S. power politics concerns at its core, and as it moved into effect, the conservative architects of Japan's prewar empire and the business groups that had supported them began to filter back into public life — among them, many who had previously been purged "for all time," for having actively abetted militarism and ultranationalism.[47] Complementing this trend, some of the more radical reforms that had blossomed under "democratisation and demilitarisation" were scaled back and, in some cases, revoked altogether. Notable among these was MacArthur's 1948 reversal of Occupation labour policy, by withdrawing the right to strike from public employees. Within organised labour generally, the Occupation worked hard to ensure that "democratisation" be increasingly linked to a virulent anti-communism, aided and abetted by conservative politicians, government bureaucrats and corporate management. The result was the infamous "Red Purges." Between the end of 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, some 11,000 activist union members in the public sector had been dismissed — a figure that was subsequently doubled when the purgers turned their attention to the private sector.[48]

The "reverse course" did not stifle the public ideals of democratisation and demilitarisation in postwar Japan. If anything, it helped to strengthen their appeal among ordinary Japanese people, in a legacy that, as I will later demonstrate, persists to this day. It did, however, drastically re-order Occupation priorities after the (Realist) manner recommended by Kennan. Concerns for the liberation of the Japanese people and economic equality for all (including the fair economic

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[46] Kennan, "Review of Current Trends: U.S. Foreign Policy." PPS 23, February 24, 1948; quoted in Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 123.
[47] Dower, *Embracing Defeat*," 271-73.
[48] *Ibid*., 273.

recompense of Japan's wartime victims in Asia)[49] had now been replaced with the harder-headed objective of shaping Japan for its 'external' role, as a politico-economic bulwark to communist influence in the region.

And, in regard to this 'external' role, decisionmakers such as Kennan were unimpressed by any need for a pacifist Constitution. Kennan himself argued openly for Japan to be allowed to re-engage militarily in its region, and his reasoning, as in everything else regarding the restructuring of Japan as (primarily) a Cold War geo-strategic asset, was Realist to the core. "The day will come, and possibly sooner than we think," he cautioned, "when realism will call upon us not to oppose the re-entry of Japanese influence into Korea and Manchuria. This, in fact, is the only realistic prospect for countering and moderating Soviet influence in that area."[50] All this, of course, was only a few years after the devastating events of the Japanese rampage through the region and its own devastation by nuclear bombs – a fact that would have cut no ice with Kennan or his supporters, given that their logic on this issue was not derived from immediate events or behaviour, but, as Cumings points out, on a forty year old power politics image of Japan, originally invoked by Theodore Roosevelt, which posited Japan against Russia, "so that each may have a moderative effect on the other."[51] In the same pronouncement, Kennan also reiterated Tyler Dennett's judgement that "Japanese ascendancy in the peninsula" would be preferable to at "Korean misgovernment, Chinese interference, or Russian bureaucracy."[52]

In pondering the dangers of Kennan's perspective on this issue, Cumings compliments the arguments thus far presented in this chapter with his insight that, for Kennan, the prospect of conflict with the Koreans or the Chinese over the re-

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[49] On this issue, Kennan was joined by MacArthur, who supported his recommendations for the scrapping of the 1946 Pauley reparations program. Reparations to former occupied territories had virtually ceased by 1948. Michael Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation* (*op, cit*., 1997), 12-14.
[50] Kennan, cited in Cumings, "Japan's Position in the World System," 40.
[51] This is Roosevelt's reasoning on the Japan issue in 1905, cited in Cumings, "Japan's Position in the World System," 41.

imposition of Japanese power "was of little moment" because, for Kennan, "Korea and China were 'black boxes' too."[53] And, while Kennan would eventually fail to wholly get his way on this dimension of Realist 'wisdom,' as the above discussion has sought to illustrate, his legacy was a powerful and long standing one in the re-making of Japan as a Western geo-strategic asset. Kennan himself would later evaluate his work in Japan, next to the Marshall Plan, as "the most significant contribution I was ever able to make in government."[54] Certainly, he was the major force in preparing Japan for the other aspect of its bulwark role, namely, its geo-economic status within a political economy focused at maximising "free Asia."

Japan as the "Workshop of Asia:" Geo-Economic Concerns, and the Intensification of the Cold War

The basics of Japan's strategic economic restructuring were set out in the 1947 Martin Plan, which called attention to the rapidly changing nature of the world economy and warned that an impending "dollar gap" crisis in Asia could only be averted by the swift development of Japan's capacity to export capital goods to Asian markets.[55] Two months later, Dean Acheson reiterated this perspective in a now-famous speech, in which he visualised Japan as the "workshop of Asia:" the base upon which Asian capitalism would fortify the Great Crescent.[56] To this end, the reparations program would be abandoned, and U.S. capital and technology would be directed at rebuilding and updating Japan's industrial core — a strategy regarded as effectively killing two birds with one stone. On the one hand, Japan would regain the international trade it needed to survive and prosper in its post-imperial age while, on the other, technological and financial dependence and U.S. power over naval and

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[52] *Ibid.*
[53] *Ibid.*
[54] Kennan, cited in Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*, 120.
[55] Dower, "Occupied Japan and the Cold War in Asia," in Dower, *Japan in War and Peace: Selected Essays* (New York: The New Press, 1993), 173.
[56] Meribeth Cameron *et. al.*, *China, Japan and the Powers* (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1952), 631.

maritime movement would keep Japan from ever breaking out of its position of "subordinate independence" within the U.S. Japan relationship.[57]

Woven into the picture of subordinate independence, as Dower has pointed out, was a fundamentally pessimistic view of the nature and limits of future Japanese economic growth. In 1947, when Joseph Dodge was appointed chief engineer for stabilising Japan's economy, the most optimistic view of the future was of achieving a watered-down version of the old Japanese economy, specialising in cheap exports such as glass, toys and ceramics, "Oriental" specialities such as tea and silk, and a limited number of labour-intensive (but second-rate) products such as textiles, paper, and simple electrical goods.[58] Even as late as 1954, when the economic boom created by the Korean war had long carried the Japanese economy out of the Dodge-inspired doldrums, Dulles was still privately advising Japanese leaders to find other markets than the U.S. for its products, because "the Japanese don't make the things we want."[59]

By the end of the 1940s, there was also a growing sense of pessimism, in U.S. circles, about the possibility of containing the Communist threat in Northeast Asia. As a consequence, Japan was perceived as an even more important, albeit vulnerable, asset in U.S. planning. As NSC-48/1 observed, "if Japan, the principal component of a Far Eastern warmaking complex, were added to the Stalinist bloc, the Soviet Asian base could become a source of strength capable of shifting the balance of world power to the disadvantage of the United States."[60] And, in the wake of Mao's victory in October 1949, the prospect of Chinese support was added to the spectre of a "giant Soviet co-prosperity sphere." As the journalist Stewart Alsop put it, "China and Southeast Asia... comprise Japan's whole natural trading area, and economic pressure

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[57] Dower, "Peace and Democracy in Two Systems," in Gordon (ed.), *Postwar Japan as History* (*op. cit.*, 1993), 12.
[58] Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 536.
[59] William K. Tabb, *The Postwar Japanese System: Cultural Economy and Economic Transformation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 15.
[60] NSC-48/1, reproduced in Thomas H. Etzold & John Lewis Gaddis (eds.), *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy 1945-1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 255.

alone could be enough to ultimately to bring Japan into the Soviet sphere."[61] With these fears in mind, the task was now increasingly to create a regional balance of power in this sphere of potential Soviet influence, centred on Kennan's image of Japan as a modern military-industrial empire.[62] But unlike those who favoured an explicit military role for Japan in the regional containment strategy (e.g., Kennan, Army Under-Secretary Draper, and Chief of Defence Louis Johnson)[63] others with exemplary Realist credentials, such as Acheson, MacArthur and John Foster Dulles, now argued that an over-militarised posture for Japan might create even more instability in the region.

For all this the dispute about the relative emphasis of Japan's geo-strategic or geo-economic role as U.S. asset was only ever one about means rather than ends. The strategic 'ends' – a U.S. 'counteroffensive' against communist influence in Asia was never in dispute, given the now dominant image of the world 'out there' as the site of struggle between the free-world, order and progress and the forces of aggression and global anarchy centred on the USSR. On the eve of the Korean War, in 1950, the 'means' were also agreed upon, at least in official circles, with Kennan's basic program underlying the efforts of the U.S. State Department and Dulles, in particular, to prevent Japan becoming encircled within "the communised parts of Asia."[64] by installing a "dynamic program" aimed at destabilising Communist controlled China and North Korea via Japanese economic power.[65]

In short, by 1950 Japan's geo-economic future had become inextricable from the pursuit of a 'hard' Cold War policy in Asia.[66] The pivotal theoretical articulation of this policy was set out in April 1950 by Paul Nitze, who had succeeded Kennan as head of the State Department's Policy Planning Section. But the statement, when it

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[61] Alsop, quoted in Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*, 180.
[62] *Ibid.*, 179-182.
[63] *Ibid.*, 183.
[64] *Ibid.*, 270.
[65] *Ibid.*
[66] Dower, "Occupied Japan and the Cold War in Asia," 177-181.

came, was pure Kennan. Thus, in the top-secret document NSC-68, delivered to President Truman in April, 1950, Nitze confirmed the central message of the "Long Telegram; " namely, that:

> The fundamental design of those who control the Soviet Union and the international communist movement is to retain and solidify their absolute power, first in the Soviet Union and second in the areas now under their control... The United States, as the principal centre of power in the non-Soviet world and the bulwark of opposition to Soviet expansion, is the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality must be subverted or destroyed by one means or another if the Kremlin is to achieve its fundamental design.[67]

Warming to his topic, Nitze warned the President that Kremlin policy towards the United States was animated "by a peculiarly virulent blend of hatred and fear,"[68] and that U.S. military capacity was becoming "dangerously inadequate" at the very time that the USSR was "developing the military capacity to support its design for world domination."[69] The point, he explained, was not about the strength per se of the U.S. Armed Forces, but rather, the fact that "coupled with the [numerical] inferiority of forces in being, the United States also lacks tenable positions from which to employ its forces in event of war."[70]

This latter point, of course, had particular implications for Japan — that is, in a U.S. context where the notion of 'monolithic communism' held sway, and where the Chinese and the North Koreans, and indeed any left-of-centre political organisation was perceived as part of a single, global conspiracy orchestrated from the Soviet Union (a theme on which Nitze again drew inspiration from Kennan, in his description of world communism as "a new fanatic faith antithetical to our own").[71] Indeed, if anything, NSC-68 actually goes beyond Kennan in terms of the scope of its perceived military-based solutions to the 'Soviet' problem. Whereas Kennan had

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[67] "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security" (NSC-68), reproduced in Etzold & Gaddis, *Containment* (*op. cit.*, 1978), 386.
[68] *Ibid.*, 394.
[69] *Ibid.*, 398
[70] *Ibid.*, 411.
[71] *Ibid.*, 385.

advised a military-industrial build up in selected areas (e.g. Japan), the new Realism of Nitze and his colleagues insisted on the need for a major build of U.S. forces around the world to 'contain' the USSR in all areas "along the Soviet perimeter."[72] If this were not done, NSC-68 warned Truman, the U.S. would be faced with a nuclear-armed USSR by the mid-1950s capable of "devastating' the USA."[73] Again echoing the "Long telegram," the Nitze document also pointed out that there was no value in negotiation with the Soviets; rather, the important thing was to recognise that the Cold War was "in fact a real war in which the survival of the free-world was at stake."[74] Once this was acknowledged, the Document concluded, the U.S. could engage "in a bold and massive program of rebuilding the West's defensive potential to surpass that of the Soviet World." Under such a program, the U.S. must abandon any distinction it might previously have utilised between "national" and "global" security.[75]

NSC-68 stands thus, as the exemplary statement of early Cold War Realism, centred as it is on a whole range of objectivised (positivist) assumptions about a world 'out there' full of 'black-box' actors engaged in traditional anarchical behaviour – albeit in a newly 'theorised' context in which one actor (the USSR) following its 'natural' and pre-determined historical course, seeks to destroy the order and progress of the state-system for ideological reasons. In this regard, as Woods and Jones suggest, NSC-68 projected a view of the world that was "both questionable and highly dangerous" particularly in its potential for global conflict as self-fulfilling prophecy.[76] More pertinently, in the present context, the danger of this classical Realist perspective was that in refusing to try and negotiate with the Soviets until "they were converted from their way of life," the U.S. set out ground rules in which only total victory would suffice. In this way, conclude Woods and Jones, the U.S.

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[72] *Ibid.*, 411.
[73] *Ibid.*, 412.
[74] *Ibid.*, 441.
[75] *Ibid.*
[76] Randall B. Woods and Howard Jones, *The Dawning of the Cold War: The United States' Quest for Order* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1991), 253.

perspective and global strategy "helped lay the groundwork for Korea and Vietnam"[77]

3. The Korean War.

There is of course, a huge literature on the causes of the Korean War, and this is not an issue I can engage in any detail here. Most would agree, nevertheless, that the decision of the North Koreans to attack the South in June 1950 had a good deal to do with the strategic and economic programs put into place by the U.S. in Japan as part of its 'great crescent' containment plan. More specifically, the explicit support in U.S. circles for Japan to become the regional 'balancer' against communist influence revived complex historical and cultural enmities among Korean people, as those in the North now linked together American and Japanese imperialism as an immediate threat to Korean independence.[78]

The decision by the U.S. (and UN) to confront the North Koreans was also influenced by this geo-strategic matrix, albeit without the historical and cultural nuances. The *New York Times* in May, 1950 summed up the situation by re-working the old theme of Korea as a 'dagger' pointed at the heart of Japan. Thus: "An abrupt American withdrawal [from Korea] ...would mean the collapse of the free Korean state and the passage of the dagger once more into Russian hands."[79] The solution to this problem, it was argued, was for the U.S. to make even more secure its Japanese asset via the logic "that if Japan is to be defended all of Japan has to be a base, militarily and economically."[80] This stance was supported by many within the right-wing South Korean elite, who, much like Kennan, saw the re-establishment of a Japanese 'presence' in Asia as the key to Korea's survival.[81]

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[77] *Ibid.*, 254.
[78] Cumings, "Japan's Position in the World System," 49
[79] *Ibid.*
[80] *Ibid.*, 50.
[81] *Ibid.*

The war itself, the only 'hot' confrontation between major powers (i.e., China and the U.S.) during the Cold War, was of course a tragic affair. In addition to the casualties among the anticommunist forces, over 3 million Koreans died, and many thousands more were rendered homeless. In the end, for all the death and destruction, and the increased tension between nuclear armed enemies, there was stalemate, and the edgy status-quo which continues to this day at the 38th parallel in Pjonmunjan. Both sides, of course, claimed victory, and the U.S., in particular solidified its geo-strategic position in Northeast Asia in relation to both Korea and China (via upgraded U.S. support for Taiwan). On the other hand, the U.S. containment policy was now being increasingly stretched by other events in Asia, and almost as soon as it had completed its task in Korea, the focus was already shifting to Vietnam.[82]

As far as Japan was concerned, the major effect of the Korean War was a re-affirmation and consolidation of the role already mapped out for it. The tension over a peace treaty was resolved by September 1950, with both the Defence and State Department policymakers agreeing that the best way to garner Japanese allegiance was the swift conclusion of a treaty, restoring Japanese independence on the condition of a continued U.S. military presence. Six weeks after the outbreak of the war, SCAP supervised the beginning of Japan's re-armament, in the form of a 75,000 man "National Police Reserve."[83] Far more importantly, it lifted Japan out of postwar depression via a "special procurements" bonanza that injected approximately $3.5 billion into the economy between 1951 and 1957.[84] This last aspect has been

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[82] Historians and policy analysts have long noted the ambiguities and seeming contradictions in U.S. policy towards Korea in the build-up to the war's outbreak in June 1950. As Gaddis suggests, however, the shifts and changes reflected both an increasing realisation of the financial burden of world policemanship, and the shift in emphasis of Far East policy as a whole – particularly as it became clear that Japan, not Korea, was a more suitable and self-contained arena for showcasing the superiority of democracy to the rest of Asia, and projecting U.S. strategic power in the name of containment. Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*, (*op. cit.*, 1997), 217. When the North attacked however, Korea became the site on which the rationale of NSC-68 had to be implemented, on the basis of Nitze's dictum that "in the context of the present polarisation of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere." Nitze, cited in Woods and Jones, *The Dawning of the Cold War*, 256.

[83] Morris-Suzuki, *Shôwa*, 207.

[84] Tabb, *The Postwar Japanese System*, 14-15.

emphasised by many Japan historians as the main reason why the Korean War was received with comparative equanimity in Japan (if not the rapturous reception suggested by Yoshida's description of it as "a gift of the gods") — in stark contrast to the massive political unrest caused by Japan's subsequent and equally vital military-industrial role in Vietnam.[85]

Above all however, the war consolidated, for the meantime, Japan's strategic value within the regional sphere of U.S. influence, as the centrepiece of a coordinated approach to Asia. In 1951, just prior to the conclusion of the San Francisco Treaty, the CIA summarised Japan's central place in American strategic planning as "a decisive factor in the balance of power in the Far East."[86] As the NSC Report had done before it, the CIA Report emphasised the importance of Japan's "strategic denial" to the Soviet Union as an industrial base, and the advantage of a Japan "rearmed and aligned with the West" represented as both "a potential military base in Northeast Asia" and as an encouraging example to "other non-Communist countries... in their fight against the spread of communism."[87] And, although the CIA's recommendation of a Japanese army of up to half a million men and a war-centred "industrial plant" was never to be realised, the assumption that Japan would "do what it should" with regard to rearmament was clear and confident. It was reiterated in the final terms of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty incorporated into the peace settlement which, as Dower has noted, ensured that "Japan's status... was less equitable than the status of any other nation that entered into a postwar security agreement with the United States."[88]

Overall then, the Korean War pulled together all the Realpolitik perceptions of Japan, articulated between 1945 and 1950, and set the direction for Japan's long-term diplomatic and economic orientation. It also, unwittingly, set up long-term problems

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[85] Morris-Suzuki, *Shôwa*, 147.
[86] Schaller, *Altered States*, 24.
[87] Central Intelligence Agency, "Feasibility of Japanese Re-Armament in Association with the United States," cited in Dower, "Occupied Japan and the Cold War in Asia," 187-88.

for U.S.-Japan relations which, although they would not surface fully until the late 1960s, were to twist the San Francisco System – predicated as it was on the status quo of Japanese inferiority and U.S. superiority – increasingly out of shape. In particular, as the economic and social dislocations associated with maintaining the 'great crescent' began to tell upon the U.S. (e.g. in Vietnam) Japan would be establishing itself as a major global power in a way that few Americans would have predicted (or wanted). This was a tendency that was already becoming apparent in the years following the end of the Korean war, when the image of Japan as 'black box' asset was already becoming problematic for Realist Cold war planners in the U.S.

4. Post-Korea: Early Problems with the "Black Box" Perspective.

> The Korean War accelerated many trends, yet the outline of American policy toward Japan, China, Korea and Vietnam for the next twenty years was set even before the fighting began.[89]
>
> Michael Schaller.

Schaller's insight above is, I suggest, particularly relevant to the growing conviction within American policy circles that Japan's economic development held the key to the *military* security of the United States in Asia. This was evident enough, as indicated above, in the pre-Korean War years, when Occupation policies centred on recreating Japan as a Cold War satellite were at their peak. It was central to the thinking of Joseph Dodge who, in 1948, imposed a series of harsh measures on the Japanese economy (subsequently known as the "Dodge Line") aimed at curbing deflation and accelerating an "independent and stable" Japanese economy. The immediate result of Dodge's policies was further hardship to a Japanese people still

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[88] *Ibid.*, 190.
[89] Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*, 298.

recovering from the wholesale destruction of their society.[90] This, however, was of little import to Dodge and the rest of the U.S. administration; what mattered, from the "black box" perspective, was that the Japanese economy and society be re-made in terms of the U.S. model. In this respect, as William Tabb has pointed out, Dodge's austerity measures complemented the broader goals of the "reverse course" policy, for, "as jobs became scarce, enterprise unions gained strength over workers ...great wage differentials between large and small companies became institutionalised and the structure of postwar industrial relations was established.[91]

For all this, Tabb argues, Dodge's reforms set the framework for an industrial structure that would help Japan make the most of the Korean War 'boom' which arrived a little over a year later (and eventually, in a major twist of irony, would be one of the subjects of U.S. complaints about 'unfair' Japanese business practices). Thus, when orders for war-related goods and services began to flow in under the Korean War procurements arrangement, massive technological and capital investment assisted Japanese production, as recommended by Dodge. Moreover, the expansion of demand for Japanese goods was strongest in industries such as textiles, steel products, and automotive equipment — the sectors that would lead Japan's export drive in the 1950s and 1960s.[92] Overall, during 1953-55, production levels in Japanese heavy industry regained the peak achieved during theWW2, and thereafter the speed of economic development accelerated.[93]

In this respect, while the Korean War and its immediate economic advantages were short-lived, the trends they established for Japan's development were to be crucial to its long-term growth. Ironically, the continuing post-Korea perception of Japanese economy and industry as weak and inferior to that of the U.S. (see Dulles' comments

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[90] For example, at a time when most people were barely surviving on rations, about 700, 000 workers lost their jobs under the 'efficiency' provisions of the Dodge Line. Tabb, *The Postwar Japanese System*, 79.
[91] *Ibid*., 80.
[92] *Ibid*., 91-92.

above) also helped, given the U.S. desire to enhance its military strategic containment strategy via support for its junior ally and its major regional 'asset.' Above all, as a 1953 NSC document reiterated, Japanese trade with the U.S. was vital to prevent the economic deterioration that "creates fertile ground for communist subversion."[94] Accordingly, America's Cold War leaders encouraged and facilitated Japanese access to its markets, with major Cold Warriors such as Dulles pushing through international trade agreements that favoured Japan, and ensuring U.S. patronage for Japan in the GATT.[95]

Moreover, in return for Japanese acquiescence in the containment of China, Japan received privileged access to U.S. patents and technical expertise, and U.S. backing in the conclusion of favourable reparations agreements with its former colonies (with the exception of Korea and Vietnam, Japan's reparations bills had all been settled by 1957, to the tune of about 1.5 billion U.S.$).[96] Meanwhile, Eisenhower urged U.S. industrialists to buy Japanese products "even if they did not meet U.S. quality standards,"[97] his encouragement backed up by an undervalued yen which benefited Japanese exports.[98] Such measures were crucial to the long-term success of Japan's economy, for they enhanced, albeit artificially, Japan's competitiveness in the world market and allowed its postwar economic architects to pursue the large-scale renovation and updating of the heavy industries (steel, chemicals and oil refining) that would become the backbone of Japanese high growth and monopoly capital until the 1970s.[99]

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[93] Takurô Seiyama, "A Radical Interpretation of Postwar Economic Policies," in Tessa Morris-Suzuki and Takurô Seiyama (eds.), *Japanese Capitalism Since 1945: Critical Perspectives* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1989), 49.
[94] NSC 53-4, cited in Tabb, *The Postwar Japanese System*, 92.
[95] Tabb, *The Postwar Japanese System*, 93.
[96] Jerome B. Cohen, *Japan's Postwar Economy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1958), 164-65.
[97] Tabb, *The Postwar Japanese System*, 92.
[98] Dower, "Peace and Democracy in Two Systems," 12.
[99] Seiyama remarks for example, that up to about 1955, the Japanese economy survived "by export methods that were often little more than [U.S.-sanctioned] dumping." Seiyama, "A Radical Interpretation of Postwar Economic Policies," 51.

In this period then, reaction to Japan's rapid economic growth among U.S. policymakers was positive, and reports on its progress often generous and enthusiastic. Thus, in 1956, it was recorded that:

> the Japanese economy is one of the richly productive economies of the world, and one of great promise for the Japanese people and for the world at large. Output per capita has more than kept pace with the rapid population growth of the postwar years.... [while] the continued pace of scientific and technological advance assures a continuation of advancing output per capita.[100]

Throughout this period Japan's deficit with the U.S. remained large, but inside the 'black box,' things were changing considerably for the better, as Japanese society began to reap the benefits of the "economic escalator."[101] And with this change in conditions inside Japan, small cracks were beginning to appear in its 'external' image as exemplary junior partner of U.S. order in 'free Asia.' At this time, U.S. order in the region was increasingly under strain as other Western allies (e.g. France) struggled to stave off the challenge from the Vietminh. From the perspective of U.S. Realists this was, predictably enough, perceived as part of a larger Soviet inspired process of undermining U.S. power in the world. Consequently, for Dulles, the conflict in Vietnam was a Soviet plot designed to "get" Japan through Indochina, thus gaining access to "the rice bowl of Asia" in the process.[102] Harold Stassen reinforced this perception by proclaiming that a French defeat in Indochina would "lead to the loss of all Southeast Asia."[103]

A major consequence of this preoccupation with a domino-like collapse, was the U.S. fortification of its economic containment of China. In 1951, the Truman administration had concluded that the Soviet Union planned to gain control of East and Southeast Asia, as well as Japan, "primarily through... exploitation of the

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[100] *Report on the Economic and Technological Feasibility of the Proposed Kobe-Nagoya Expressway*, cited in Jerome B. Cohen, *Japan's Postwar Economy*, 215.
[101] Morris-Suzuki, *Shōwa*, 220.
[102] Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*, 296.
[103] *Ibid.*, 297.

resources of Communist China."[104] To prevent this, it was argued, the U.S. needed to apply "countervailing military, political, economic and psychological power to depose the Chinese government or force a change in its policies."[105] To this end, Japan, in addition to joining COCOM, was pressured into signing a separate, secret bilateral agreement that imposed even more draconian limits on economic contact with China. By 1952, Japanese trade with China had shrunk to 0.04% of its exports, and 0.7% of imports – creating enormous resentment within Japan. Various efforts to offset this were made by U.S. planners, including opening up markets within Southeast Asia on a raw-materials-for-goods exchange basis. Dodge also recommended that Japan's military be redeveloped, both in order to further stimulate economic demand, and so that United States forces could be deployed elsewhere.[106]

Thus, whatever else it represented, the U.S. embargo on trade with China served to highlight the precise nature of the U.S.-Japan relationship, and this was a lesson learnt well by many within the Japanese elite, now restricted in their other economic and political relationships by the commitments of the San Francisco Treaty.[107] Tensions were now also emerging on the question of re-armament, and the role that Japan should play as a military actor in the region. Throughout the Korean War, Prime Minister Yoshida had steadily refused to yield on the 230,000 man Japanese army demanded by Dulles (although Japanese minesweepers did secretly take part in the war).[108] Yet U.S. demands for swift Japanese re-armament never ceased entirely, and while they complemented the stance of the conservative political hegemony established in Japan after 1955,[109] the LDP suggestion that Japanese forces might

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[104] NSC 48/5, cited in Schaller, *Altered States*, 52.
[105] *Ibid*., 54.
[106] *Ibid*.
[107] Specifically, U.S. congressional approval for the San Francisco Treaty was conditional upon Japan's acceptance of the trade embargo on China. Kaufman, "Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy with Respect to East Asia," in Warren I. Cohen & Akira Iriye (eds.), *The Great Powers in East Asia: 1953-1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 110. Until the 1970s, Japanese relations with China would continue to be defined and directed by the United States. Meanwhile, U.S. manufacturers in area such as textiles were already beginning to complain of 'unfair' Japanese trade practices and market advantages, in a refrain that would become the theme song of Japan-U.S. relations in the 1970s and 1980s.[107]
[108] Dower, "Peace and Democracy in Two Systems," 16.
[109] *Ibid*., 18.

eventually replace U.S. forces stationed in Japan was not quite what the U.S. had in mind.[110] Meanwhile, the majority of the Japanese people remained steadfastly opposed to any major military role for Japan in Asia. Sporadic protests against the expropriation of more land for U.S. missile launch sites and extended military runways continued throughout the 1950s, and in 1960, massive public demonstrations erupted over the scheduled renewal and revision of the Security Treaty.[111] This was, in many ways, a precursor to the kind of activities which would reappear on a much more substantial scale during the Vietnam War.[112] It was also an important factor in the development of a Japanese Studies literature on the nature and role of modern Japan which sought in the 1960s, in particular, to open up the 'black box.'

I will say something more directly about this Japanese Studies issue shortly. For now, and in summary, the point of the preceding discussion has been to illustrate how and why the influences of Cold War Realism became integral to the 'Japan' at the centre of IR understanding of it in the 1940s and 1950s. I then sought to indicate how the imposition of Realist theory and practice in relation to Japan began to have some dysfunctional consequences for the U.S., in particular, following the Korean War when the policies designed to enhance Japan's role as geo-strategic and geo-economic 'asset,' simultaneously became the basis of the tensions between the 'senior' and 'junior' partners in the alliance, as Japan's most favoured status gave it an opportunity for major power status, at least in economic terms.

In this context, while Japan continued to play its designated role within the containment strategy, *the strategy itself* was exacerbating the strains within the U.S.-Japan relationship that had existed ever since the postwar settlement. Ultimately, therefore, and ironically, the attempt to achieve a balance-of-power in Asia along

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[110] Marc S. Gallicchio, "The Best Defence is a Good Offence: The Evolution of American Strategy in East Asia, 1953-1960." In Cohen and Iriye (eds.), *The Great Powers in East Asia: 1953-1960* (*op. cit.*, 1990), 72.
[111] Morris-Suzuki, *Shōwa*, 190. The revisions were pushed through by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, but forced the resignation of (then) Prime Minister Kishi directly afterwards.

Realist guidelines and in line with U.S. hegemonic ambitions (i.e. a balance in 'our' favour) created the conditions that would significantly undermine U.S. hegemony in the 1970s and 1980s.

The economic containment of China, for example, forced the United States to prolong the expensive military procurements arrangement with Japan as it sought to assure Japanese economic access to a still-underdeveloped Southeast Asian market.[113] For Japan, this arrangement consolidated the capitalist boom set off by the Korean War and allowed the intensive upgrading and expansion of those industries that would underwrite Japan's most intense period of growth between 1960 and 1973, as it gained increasing access to the lucrative markets of the West. But for the United States, it meant a commitment to assuring the security and prosperity of Southeast Asia that eventually resulted in the tragic morass that was Vietnam, and a profound (if temporary) loss of confidence in the means, if not the ends of the containment project. In the wake of Vietnam, it would prompt increasingly rancorous accusations of Japanese "free riderism," leading to the outright hostility of the 'Japan bashing' 1980s, and the continuing tensions of the 1990s. This too is an issue for further discussion in the chapter to follow, which puts the whole debate in the context of the rise of neo-Realism and the resurgence of U.S. hegemonic perspectives.

My more immediate concern however, is to add a dimension to the discussion thus far, by reintroducing the issue of ethnocentrism, which is a core characteristic of IR Realism, of the positivism which underpins it, and of the U.S. social science perspectives which after WW2 complimented the more overt containment strategies with *Modernisation Theory*. In this context too, I suggest, Japan was represented in 'black box' terms (as indeed all other non-Western states were) — but here also, the

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[112] Dower, "Peace and Democracy in Two Systems," 21.
[113] Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*, 297.

original purpose of Realist Cold War theory was shown to be something other than 'realistic' in practice.

5. Modernisation Theory: Some Basic Themes.

The basic thrust of Modernisation (Development) Theory in its early, most optimistic manifestation, is nicely summed up in the title of Robert Packenham's influential 1973 study, *Liberal America and the Third World*. Looking back on the first two decades of U.S. foreign aid to the "developing world," Packenham observes the continuity with which U.S. scholars and policymakers conceptualised "the kinds of political systems they considered to be desirable and feasible;"[114] where both 'desirability' and 'feasibility' he argues, were derived from certain premises embedded generally in American culture and political thought which could be "collectively designated... as the American liberal tradition."[115]

It was the influence of this tradition and it assumptions, Packenham argues, that saw political development, in both its 'theoretical' and 'policymaking' conceptualisations, consistently defined between 1947 and 1968 in terms of "democracy, stability, anti-Communism, peace, world community, and 'pro-Americanism."[116] In this respect, he suggests, for both scholars and policymakers the goal of political development (expressed as "political modernisation and democracy") was regarded as both self-evident, and the major achievement of Western societies (particularly following the fall of fascism). The central issue was how this goal might be facilitated by the West in the 'traditional' societies of the Third World, in a Cold War containment context. And, inevitably, the answer was primarily one of applying an objective model of (Western, European) growth to non-Western societies. In this regard, the model proposed that:

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[114] Robert A. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World : Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 3.
[115] *Ibid*., 4
[116] *Ibid*.

> economic and technical assistance [to the Third World] contributed to economic development; and economic development in turn was seen as contributing to political development. Economic development was defined in terms of growth of per capita product (*sic*) and other conventional measures; political development was defined in terms of stability, democracy, anti-communism, "world community," peace, pro-Americanism.[117]

Integral to Modernisation Theory thus, was the kind of universalised, ahistorical image of modern reality which had served IR Realism so well – particularly in its behaviouralist, 'scientific' phase in the 1960s. For scholars of 1960s development, the scientific goals were similar, as was reliance on a few 'great men' and the wisdom of selected great texts. Indeed, as Gabriel Almond made it clear, the path to universal development was derived from "the classic formulations of Max Weber, Ferdinand Tonnies and Talcott Parsons."[118] At the core of these 'classic formations' was the dichotomy between "traditional and modern forms of society and polity."[119] And, it was on the basis of this dichotomy that modernisation theorists were able to discern the essence of social modernity, and articulate that essence via developmental models.

For most scholars, the essential prerequisite of the modern good society was the attribute of 'choice.' This, as David Apter pointed out, was most apparent in the economic context of modern civil society, as men find, "ways to assess preferences, controlling them within a context of a rapidly changing technology."[120] More generally, he argued, modernisation as a process originates when "a culture embodies an attitude of inquiry and questioning about how men make choices – moral (or normative), social (or structural), and personal (or behavioural)."[121] In short, as Apter put it, "to be modern means to see life as alternatives, preferences and choices...

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[117] *Ibid*., 5-7. For Packenham, this approach to modernisation was summed up in the Truman doctrine. *Ibid*., 8.
[118] Gabriel Almond, cited in Richard Higgot, *Political Development Theory: The Contemporary Debate* (London: Croom Helm, 1983), 16.
[119] *Ibid*., 18.
[120] David Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 9.
[121] *Ibid*., 10.

[and] self-conscious choice implies rationality."[122] In keeping with the dictates of a positivist, post-Kantian approach to social theory however, the 'moral' or 'normative' dimensions of rational choice could still be represented as essentialist and universal, in that "we generally accept some well-entrenched values as universals...*because they are sufficiently widespread to seem rooted in common sense*"[123] (emphasis added). Accordingly, the central task of modernisation, Apter noted, particularly in the Third World, was simply a matter of improving "the conditions of choice and the selection of the most satisfactory mechanisms of choice."[124]

In this way, Modernisation Theory could correlate its quest to find the most "desirable and feasible" modern society with a 'common sense' support for capitalism and the Western way (as the obvious historical and cultural site of 'choice'). Its role, in short, was to provide the developmentalist dimension of Realist Cold War IR, via its image of a universal, rational-utilitarian human behaviour model that, as indicated in the previous chapter, has always been a 'natural' factor in the story of the rise of the international state system.[125]

The Huntington 'Corrective'

This was a theme most immediately obvious within Modernisation Theory classics such as W. W. Rostow's *The Stages of Economic Growth: A non-Communist Manifesto*. It was taken up in even more significant fashion, however, in a work that represented itself as a corrective to much of the 'liberalism' that Packenham perceives as integral to Modernisation Theory. Samuel Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968) took Modernisation Theory scholars and the U.S. policy community to task for forgetting the fundamental task which faced the 'free world' under U.S. leadership. This, argued Huntington, was not liberalism or

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[122] *Ibid*., 11.
[123] *Ibid*., 11-12.
[124] *Ibid*., 15.
[125] Higgot, *Political Development Theory*, 21-22.

economic development per se, but *the maintenance of a particular kind of global order* in which liberalism and development could take place.

In this regard, Huntington reminded his peers in the 1960s that the keystone of U.S. global interests was order under U.S. hegemony – and that this must also be the goal of Modernisation Theorists, if 'development' was to take place without creating disorder and anarchy. The problem with a 'liberal-orientation' in this (Cold War) context, he warned, was that it blinded its advocates to a fundamental reality concerning political change, which is that, "the primary problem is not liberty but the creation of a legitimate public order."[126] Expanding this point, he explained thus:

> Authority has to exist before it can be limited [but] it is authority which is in scarce supply in modernizing countries where government is at the mercy of alienated intellectuals, rambunctious colonels and rioting students. [And] It is precisely this scarcity that communists and communist-type movements are often able to overcome.[127]

The problem, Huntington continued, was that Modernisation Theorists in the West – and the U.S. in particular – had missed the point about *the reality of the process by which social change takes place*, either progressive or otherwise. This process, he insisted, was centred on strong central power and political authority, not on market freedom or rational choice. And, while "communist type" groups already understood this, Huntington cautioned, American liberals did not. Accordingly:

> While Americans laboriously strive to narrow the economic gap, communists offer modernizing countries a tested and proven method of bridging the political gap. Amidst the social conflict and violence that plague modernizing countries, they provide some assurance of political order.[128]

A number of things might be said about this contribution of Huntington's, and about his 1990's reiteration of these themes in his 'Clash of Civilisations' proposition, which is, in its own way, another warning about the dangers of too much liberalism

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[126] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 7.
[127] *Ibid*., 8.
[128] *Ibid*.

at the international level.[129] In the present context however, the most immediate value of Huntington's work is that it makes clear the always integral relationship between the IR Realism at the core of U.S. Cold War thinking and the linear (positivist) progressivism at the centre of Modernisation Theory. In this sense, Huntington is the most candid of the Cold Warriors associated with the 'liberalism' of the 1960s and their attempt to develop the world in the image of the U.S. He was also one of the most influential, of course, with his particular brand of Modernisation Theory acknowledged by the Johnson Administration as integral to the attempt to 'liberalise' Vietnam in the mid-1960s.[130]

Even for Huntington, however, Japan was by now an exemplar of what could be achieved when order and authority underpinned development and modernisation programmes on the U.S. model. For him, and for many other scholars of this time, Japan, in this sense, was not just a geo-strategic and geo-economic exemplar, but, in many ways, the jewel in the Modernisation Theory crown.

6. Modernisation Theory and Postwar Japan: the Realism/Japanese Studies Nexus.

John Dower has best expressed the sense of Japan as the jewel in the Modernisation Theory crown with his insight, complimenting those above, which suggests that:

> Postwar American objectives internationally have rested on the twin pillars of counterrevolution and support of a capitalist mode of development, and in that scheme Japan plays a key role both materially and as an alleged Asian model of the advantages of gradual, nonrevolutionary development along capitalist lines.[131]

In this context, one can see some of the key Modernisation Theory themes – progress and linear development, "desirable and feasible" forms of polity and economy – utilised to represent Japan as an exemplary Cold War asset, particularly

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[129] I will return to this theme in more detail in Chapter Seven.
[130] Stephen Chan, "Too Neat and Under-Thought a World Order: Huntington and Civilisations," in *Millennium Journal of International Studies* 26:1 (1997: 137-142), 138.
[131] Dower, "E. H. Norman, Japan and the uses of history," 33.

during the Occupation period and in the "reverse course" era of the 1940s and 1950s. Not so obvious, I suggest, but just as evident, were attitudes intrinsic to Modernisation Theory concerning a 'natural' global hierarchy and a process of linear historical and cultural development.

This dimension was evident for example, in the representation of Japanese people as subjects of Occupation policy. Here, as Dower has pointed out, a representation originating in wartime stereotypes of the "Jap enemy" was swiftly modified to a more benign image of orientalised, 'Asian' identity.[132] Emphasised, in particular, were notions of Japanese 'backwardness' and 'naiveté,' articulated most commonly in terms of a pupil and master theme which was to be reiterated throughout the Occupation years. Such a theme was utilised most powerfully by MacArthur himself, who presented his understanding of the Japanese in predictably linear terms, and in comparison to civilised European and U.S. experience. Thus, for all their (Asian) 'history,' the Japanese:

> Measured by the standards of modern civilisation, would be like a boy of twelve as compared with our development of forty-five years. Whatever the German did in dereliction of the standards of modern morality ...he did deliberately. But the Japanese were entirely different. There is no similarity."[133]

This type of ethnocentric rhetoric (which presents German Fascism as, at least, mature!), as Dower has pointed out, was very much a personal trademark of MacArthur's.[134] Yet the fundamental 'black box' image it conjured up, of Japan as (immature) geocultural other to the West, had a broader appeal, and would remain

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[132] John Dower, "Race, Language and War in Two Cultures," in Dower, *Japan in War and Peace* (*op. cit.*, 1993), 259. Here, Dower notes, in particular, the differing attitudes in the U.S. towards Anglo-Saxon and "Oriental" foes during the war. Whereas a distinction was usually made between "Nazis" and "Germans," he points out, the Japanese were invariably inflated to a supra-Japanese foe — "not just the Japanese militarists, not just all the Japanese people, not just ethnic Japanese everywhere, but *the Japanese as Orientals*" (emphasis added). *Ibid.*, 260. This wholesale rendering of an ethnic 'other,' Dower writes, has a long and enduring legacy within the political ontology of white supremacism, applied, variously, against "Amerindians in the genocidal Indian wars, against Negroes ever since the slave trade, against Chinese since the opening of regular contact in the mid nineteenth century, [and] against Filipinos in the American conquest of the Philippines at the turn of the century." *Ibid.*, 261.

[133] U.S. Senate, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, quoted in Tetsuya Kataoka, *The Price of a Constitution* (New York: Taylor and Francis, 1991), 31.

[134] Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 223.

essential in legitimating the nature and extent of U.S. influence in Japan, both through the Occupation and beyond. As NSC 48/1 explained it to the Truman government in 1948, despite the "notable steps" taken towards its postwar rehabilitation, Japan remained, when all was said and done, an "Asiatic society," and as such, full of people who are "traditionally submissive to power" and "habituated to authoritarian government and the suppression of the individual."[135] Such people were, by definition, vulnerable to the influences of Communism, and therefore potentially unreliable allies of the Western powers in holding off a cunning and ruthless communist enemy in the vital Northeast Asia region.[136]

The task of the Occupation under MacArthur (and of the Reverse Course Policy under Kennan) was, in this 'modernisation' context, to overcome the natural dichotomies which separated Asian societies from the modern (Western) civilisations and democratic progress. In this way Asian political naiveté was to be transformed into Western political maturity, Asian groupism into Western individualism, and Asian backwardness and traditionalism into Western techno-rationality. With this transformation, it was argued, the situation inside Japan might supplement its new external status as regional bulwark against communism, and its future might finally coincide with the mainstream of IR history — at least as Western Realists tell the story.[137]

For the most part then, by the 1960s, U.S. Realists and their Modernisation Theory counterparts were comfortable with the 'black box' that was 'Japan' in IR. On the other hand, and largely parallel to this IR perspective, a more complex picture of Japan was emerging in a developing Japanese Studies literature which, while it generally followed the Realist and Modernisation Theory lead (albeit implicitly) was beginning to lift the lid a little on the IR 'black box.'

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[135] NSC 48/1, cited in Etzold & Gaddis, *Containment*, 254.
[136] Dower, "Occupied Japan and the Cold War in Asia," 174.
[137] *Ibid*.

At the forefront of this 'new' agenda was Edwin Reischauer, who in many ways was as important to early Japanese Studies as was George Kennan in the larger IR context. In many circles, Reischauer continues to be celebrated as the most distinguished of Western specialists on Japan. His major books continue to be designated classic texts in either language, particularly his writings on early postwar Japanese society.[138] Reischauer has also been dismissed, by more critically oriented scholars, as an outdated figure whose writings exemplify the ethnocentrism and rabid anti-communism of Cold War U.S. foreign policy, and as a major contributor to the indigenous status-quo reading of Japan's past, which continues to be criticised for its historical amnesia, insularity and jingoism.[139]

My own view is that Reischauer is a pivotal figure in the formation of postwar Japanese Studies which saw a classical Realist reading of IR and the Cold War transposed upon Japan in a way that continues to resonate in contemporary times. He is, therefore, too relevant to dismiss as an anachronism and remains an important figure in the present context. Recognising this, John Dower has proposed that Reischauer's work highlights, even to this day, the inherently conservative political implications, of much 'area studies' analysis and of postwar Anglo-American social science in general.[140] In the following discussion I want to briefly illustrate how this is so by looking at the way in which a figure such as Reischauer was able to open up the Japan debate to questions of cultural and historical diversity while constraining it within the confines of a Cold War Realist perspective and a positivist approach to 'knowing' the real-world.

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[138] Another important indicator of Reischauer's status of course, is the fact that, like many other 'great,' contributors to a particular field of study, his name is the title of a prestigious academic position; namely, the "Edwin O. Reischauer Professor of Japanese Politics" at Harvard.

[139] In particular, Reischauer was one of the earliest defenders-cum-apologists for Emperor Hirohito's role in the war, and a staunch advocate of the retention of the Emperor system in postwar Japan along with Douglas MacArthur. Among many Japan historians, the view is that it was the retention of the Emperor system which is largely responsible for the continuing inability of contemporary Japanese governments (and society) to confront the issue of Japanese responsibility for the war. H. D. Harootunian, "America's Japan/Japan's Japan," in Masao Miyoshi and H. D. Harootunian (eds.), *Japan in the World* (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1993), 212.

[140] Dower, "E. H. Norman, Japan and the Uses of History" in Dower (ed.), *Origins of the Modern Japanese State: Selected Writings of E. H. Norman* (New York: Random House, 1975), 47.

7. Making Japanese Studies: Reischauer, Realism and Modernisation Theory.

Reischauer's best-known work on Japan, *Japan, Past and Present,* was first published in 1946, going into two subsequent revised editions before being re-published in 1970 as *Japan, the Story of a Nation.*[141] During this period, particularly following Mao's rise to power in China, Reischauer's anti-Marxist stance became central to his work as a whole – but it was a stance that differed significantly from that of his MacCarthyite policymaking contemporaries. As he explained in a 1955 book-length policy recommendation entitled *Wanted: an Asian Policy*, Reischauer saw the Western "defeat" in China and Korea as the direct result of intellectual failure, referring to it as a case of "ignorance leading to catastrophe."[142] Analysts and policymakers, he argued, had simply failed to grasp the "naturally perplexing" nature of Asia.

> Whatever the differences between ourselves and the peoples of western Europe and Russia, the historical and cultural gap between us and the peoples of Asia is far greater. None of the civilisations of Asia is closely related to ours, even though they have felt the influence of the West in recent years. While in Russia we see an abhorrent system built on a substructure of Western civilisation, in Asia we often find familiar Western superstructures resting on what are to us strange if not altogether unknown foundations.[143]

Reischauer's Realist credentials are on display throughout *Wanted*, which represents knowledge of Asia in explicitly utilitarian terms to its policymaking audience, as an essential component of the means to U.S. power and control. Reischauer thus speaks at length on the failure of American policy to beat the communists in "winning minds," (and therefore "arms and bodies") in Asia, and outlines a proposed strategy in which an "arsenal of ideas" needs to be employed in this quest aimed at educating Asians to the developmental and political 'rightness' of the Western way. If this were done, he argues:

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[141] The latest edition of *Japan, the Story of a Nation* was published in 1991 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf).
[142] Edwin O. Reischauer, *Wanted: An Asian Policy* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1955), 14.
[143] *Ibid.*., 8-9.

> We could then more easily avoid self-defeating blunders and perhaps achieve much more with no greater over-all effort than we are expending today. Asian students who come to the West to study would not be forced to apply, within the limits of their own ability and understanding, the evolutionary experience of the West to the intricate and pressing problems of Asia, but would find guidance in this key problem from capable men who have devoted their lives to its study. Americans working in Asia would not go to their tasks innocently ignorant of the problems they face or the true significance of what they are doing. *Most important of all, Asian leaders would find at hand specific information and penetrating interpretations of its meaning that might save them from many dangerous pitfalls and enable them to go farther and more safely in their own thinking than they could without these aids.*[144] (emphasis added)

In Reischauer's prescriptions for meeting the 'real problems' of the West in Asia, it is easy to see how the bound-to-lead mentality of U.S. theorising remains dependent upon the early postwar contrast between Western superiority and Asian 'naiveté.' The central project of *Wanted,* of ensuring the Western way in postwar Asia, is thus expressed in elite-centred terms – to be achieved through "Asian leaders" and (Western-educated) Asian intellectuals. Underpinning this perspective one can discern the original NSC 48/5 dictate that Asian peoples lack the political maturity to rationally make the choice of democracy unassisted; something that becomes even clearer when Reischauer turns to the "theoretical addiction" to Marxism among Asian. This, he explains, is an entirely natural stage of development among people not yet *technologically* sophisticated enough to acknowledge the inherent superiority of the Western Cold War cause. In this sense, for Reischauer, the problem is not just one of historical development but of an "underlying [irrational, unmodern] anti-Western bias in the whole Asian response" to Westernism and modernity.[145]

The point I make here is not the obvious one about Reischauer's ethnocentrism, nor his stereotyped and essentialised images of 'Asians.' It concerns, rather, the affirmation in Reischauer's work of a universalised and essentialised image of the international system in which all state actors are reduced to a common 'cultural' need (Western democracy and modernity) and a common 'rationality' of purpose. This is

all the more important, given that it was, after all, Reischauer who later became a major force in developing Japanese Studies, and that his perception of his own work was that it represented a push to make Western knowledge of the non-West less ethnocentric and patronising.

This, for example was the central theme of *"Our Asian Frontiers of Knowledge"* (1958) in which Reischauer explicitly condemned the practice of regarding "Asian experience as merely a source for supplementary materials that can be used to confirm or possibly even amplify the solid truths about mankind already derived from the experience of the Occident."[146] In this context, Reischauer appeals for a knowledge of Asia that goes beyond even that of *Wanted*, urging the sensitive Western scholar to take Asia's own history "seriously," and even conceding that Asia might have something to offer the West. The idea that cultural and historical understanding and respect of different peoples are not only relevant, but indispensable to the pursuit of interstate relations, has of course been a fundamental assumption of Japanese Studies for many years — and it is certainly worth noting Reischauer's connection, in this context, to much of the more incisive scholarship that, pursuing this assumption, has since appeared.

Unfortunately, however, in Reischauer's case, this sensitivity was always undermined by his commitment to positivist theorising of the kind integral to his broader Realist commitments. Even in *Frontiers* for example, it is obvious enough, particularly when Reischauer speaks of the issue of historical development, and how it is to be understood as the key to Asian progress. Having previously rejected Marxist historical analysis on the grounds that it generalises history as "an inevitable, unilinear progression, from the slave state... to the Socialist Utopia," Reischauer

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[144] *Ibid*., 202.
[145] *Ibid*., 204.
[146] Reischauer, "Our Asian Frontiers of Knowledge," Reicker Memorial Lecture No. 4 (University of Arizona Press, 1958), 10.

unselfconsciously posits his own brand of universalism and linear essentialism, by explaining that:

> Asians realise that they are going through a period of cataclysmic change, and the more thoughtful of them - that is, the potential leadership groups - keep groping for the meaning of this painful process. They want a theory of history *that will explain and justify their present travail and will help to clarify the way ahead of them*. In fact, it is the historical theories in men's mind, more than any other factor under human control, that gives direction to the tremendous transformation of Asia now under way. This situation actually may not be unique to Asia. In this age in which even the philosophers have retreated into narrow specialisations in logic and semantics, the historian seems to have inherited the job of being the synthesiser of knowledge about mankind, *and it is the theories of the universal historian* that are sometimes the closest approach to what might be called guiding philosophies for modern man.[147] (emphasis added)

To sum up, Reischauer is, on the one hand, arguing for an interpretivist view of Asia that is not subject to Western (Marxist) universalist paradigms. On the other, he claims that the purpose of such an approach is a "universal theory of history" grounded in historical fact, that is to be provided to Asian people by the more experienced Western scholar, (as is more openly admitted in *Wanted*). The only way that Reischauer can do this of course, is through the representation of "history" in positivist, ahistorical terms; i.e., as a neutral set of concrete realities in the past, to be correctly interpreted by the detached Western analyst. The pivotal role of the Western scholar in helping Asians understand their own history is taken for granted because, as explained previously in *Wanted,* the West is in a more advanced stage of modernity than Asia.

This was a perspective that Reischauer held firm to when he was subsequently called upon by the Kennedy Administration to become Ambassador to Japan in 1961.[148] Indeed, as several scholars have noted, Reischauer personally defined his mission as a continuation of the tasks outlined in *Wanted* and *Frontiers*; namely, the defeat of

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[147] Reischauer, "Our Asian Frontiers of Knowledge," 11.
[148] Dower, "E. H. Norman, Japan and the Uses of History," 54.

Marxism ("our true foe in Japan"),[149] by assisting the Japanese in "taking on a new view of history."[150] For Reischauer, this process required the rejection of 'leftist' historical interpretations (in particular, those of Reischauer's most eminent predecessor, E. H. Norman), concerning the 'feudal' stage of Japan's class development, to concentrate on the actual facts of contemporary history. Central among these facts was Japan's historical status as a "late moderniser" in the latter half of the nineteenth century. For Reischauer, and his followers, this fact was pivotal, because it undermined leftist views of Japan's aggressive past and anti-democratic tendencies, and transformed that 'past' into a linear path to modernity which distinguished Japan and Japanese society as 'unique' within Asia. As Dower puts it, it was a reading of Japan that emphasised:

> the potentially merchandisable aspects of prewar Japanese development - such as gradualism, "community-centred" entrepreneurship, diplomatic "realism" and integration with international capitalism (prior to 1931), creation of "multiple elites," and bourgeois parliamentary democracy - and a concomitantly benign approach to related misfortunes such as exploitation, autocracy, economic and social imbalance, and engagement in overseas military adventures and war in every single decade of its modern existence with the exception of the 1880s.[151]

In this revised context, Japan's descent into fascism in the 1930s was represented as "a sudden reversal of the dominant trends of the preceding decade" by the militarists, rather than the inevitable result of the social and economic structures of the late 19th century.[152] Even more importantly, in this context, the events of the post 1945 period (particularly Japan's by now evident economic potential) were a phenomenon in line with a Japanese 'history' susceptible to Western guidance.

The implications of this invocation of historical 'fact' in Reischauer's work was beneficial both to the developing Japanese Studies discipline and to the developing political hierarchy within Japan. In the former context it allowed a re-working, in

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[149] Reischauer, cited in H. D. Harootunian, "America's Japan/Japan's Japan," 207.
[150] *Ibid*.
[151] Dower, "E. H. Norman, Japan and the Uses of History," 41.
[152] Reischauer, *Japan, Past and Present*, 82.

positive terms, of the Asian feudalism vs. Western modernity theme which had been central to the work of (leftist) historians like Norman, as well as to eminent Japanese intellectuals such as Gorô Hani and Hyôe Ôuchi.[153] But it also benefited the emerging conservative political elite within Japan, consolidated by the election of the LDP to government in 1955. Backed up by the prevailing Cold War atmosphere, and utilising the new positive 'history' of Japan, they could now re-engender some of the milder symbols of the past, and speak more openly of the values of prewar imperial life.[154] The formation of the Japan Cultural Forum in 1957 reflected the breadth of appeal of Reischauer's 'history' in the coming together of "liberal" conservatives and nationalist ideologues, now united by the concern to preserve a 'unique' cultural heritage, and Japan's successful economic modernisation.[155]

This emerging Japanese perspective (at least in conservative circles) is well summed by Carol Gluck, who proposes that:

> To the question "progress of and toward what?" the answer since Meiji had been, tautologically, "the modern." This belief in directed (or misdirected, but still purposeful) change since the nineteenth century led Japanese to think of the postwar task as the redirection of a longer evolutionary historical process... The alleged break in 1945 in fact posited a *continuity* not between prewar fascism and postwar democracy *but between modernisation in its first phase and the chance the second time to get it right*.[156] (emphasis added)

The re-narrativising of the past as part of a larger modernising/Cold War project, as indicated here, would reach its zenith during the 1960s, with the basic intellectual and political ground having been mapped out by Reischauer during his ambassadorship. In this period, scholars, both Western and Japanese, turned their attention specifically towards Modernisation Theory as the most effective conduit of

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[153] Dower, "E. H. Norman, Japan and the Uses of History," 52.
[154] E.g., the flying of the Rising Sun flag and the singing of the imperial national anthem in schools, and government support for the Yasukuni Shrine. Carol Gluck, "The Past in the Present," in Gordon (ed.), *Postwar Japan as History* (*op. cit.*, 1993), 70-71.
[155] J. Victor Koschmann, "Intellectuals and Politics," in Gordon (ed.), *Postwar Japan as History* (*op. cit.*, 1993), 407.
[156] Gluck, "The Past in the Present," 79.

anti-Marxist thought within Japan, and of connecting Japanese Studies more closely to mainstream concepts and methodologies in Western social science.[157]

Reischauer's work was, of course, integral to this project, primarily through his influential book, *A New View of Japan's Modernity* (*Nihon Kindai no Atarashii Mikata*, 1965), which was read widely in Japan, (although never translated into English).[158] Here, Reischauer explicitly appropriated Rostow's *The Stages of Economic Growth* as his analytical model, using its linear, progressivist tenor to explain how Japan had successfully avoided revolutionary excesses in its passage to a modern order. In doing so, he again appealed to the positivist value-neutrality theme to emphasise the difference between his support for the Western way and other 'ideological' and idealist perspectives.[159] This stance had been revealed in an earlier address, where, echoing E. H. Carr's dichotomy between 'is' and 'ought,' Reischauer explained that: "the most common sort of misunderstanding [about modernisation]...arises from the use by some people of the term 'modernisation' to mean what *should* happen, whereas I use the term to denote what *is* happening, good or bad, without making any value judgements."[160] In other words modernisation, in theory and in practice, is exempt from the value judgements of the critics/Marxists because, *as a naturally occurring process*, it represents part of a historical and cultural reality which goes beyond interpretation of its 'rights' and 'wrongs.' It was not Reischauer though, but his pupil, Marius Jansen, who would eventually make the ultimate statement about the value-freeness of the modernisation project (and hence, the Western way), in a 1961 paper presented at the International Christian University. In the modern world, Jansen proclaimed,

> the important thing is *that* people read, not *what* they read, that they participate in the generalised functions of a mass society, not whether they do so as free individuals,

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[157] Dower, "E. H. Norman, Japan and the Uses of History," 55.
[158] Reischauer, *Nihon Kindai no Atarashii Mikata* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1965).
[159] *Ibid.*, 30.
[160] Reischauer, "Towards a Definition of Modernisation," speech delivered to the Japan Cultural Forum, September 26, 1964, and subsequently published in *Jyû* magazine, September 1965. Dower, "E. H. Norman, Japan and the Uses of History," 56 (fn.).

> that machines operate, and not for whose benefit, and that things are produced, not what is produced. It is quite as "modern" to make guns as automobiles, and to organise concentration camps as to organise schools which teach freedom.[161]

Jansen, not surprisingly, had been a central figure at the 1960 Hakone Conference on Modern Japan some months earlier, which was convened specifically "to conduct a debate concerning the problem of Japan and the idea of modernisation."[162] The Hakone meeting produced a series of similar gatherings (including the ICU conference), whose results were eventually gathered together and edited by Jansen in the 1965 volume, *Changing Japanese Attitudes toward Modernisation*.[163] In its introduction, John W. Hall explained how, as its "starting point," the Hakone Conference had adopted some "self-evident" categories, including a "nine point description of the essential features of modern society"[164] – seven of which were lifted directly from the linear distinction between modern and traditional societies outlined by Almond and Coleman in that "near perfect and objective taxonomy of modernisation," *The Politics of Developing Areas*.[165]

Adopted too was a (highly simplified) reading of Max Weber's view on rationality in modern societies, which complemented and sustained the 'value-free' claims of the discussion in hand, by effectively reducing rationality to a dehistoricised means-ends relationship. In this relationship, it was argued, capitalism merged with political development in an ahistorical, neutral "process... [that] has tended to pick up momentum as human society has gained the means to purposely achieve rational control of its physical and social environment."[166] From the point of view of the

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[161] Marius B. Jansen, 1965 speech to the International Christian University, quoted in Dower, "E. H. Norman, Japan and the Uses of History," 55.
[162] Harootunian, "America's Japan/Japan's Japan," 205.
[163] Marius B. Jansen (ed.), *Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernisation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).
[164] John W. Hall, "Changing Conceptions of the Modernisation of Japan," in Jansen (ed.), *Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernisation* (*op. cit.*, 1965), 18.
[165] According to Hall, these seven characteristics were: urbanisation, a "high degree of use of inanimate energy," "extensive spatial interaction of members of a society," literacy, the presence of a mass communications network, the existence of "large scale social institutions" (i.e., government, business, industry), and "increased unification of large bodies of population under one control (nations) and the growing interaction of such units (international relations)." *Ibid.*, 19.
[166] *Ibid.*, 33.

Western delegates in particular, the rationality explanation was most attractive in helping direct the debate towards "simplification" rather than "diversification" – given, as Hall enthused, that "most other attempts at devising unitary explanations of the modernisation process, in fact, seemed merely to be special cases of this principle, in other words, they could be explained as manifestations of rationality operating in specific contexts."[167]

In this context too however, another 'Weberian' theme emerged that was also of value: namely, that concerning the role of cultural values and specific historical circumstances in shaping economic, political and social structures conducive to modern achievement (as opposed to the 'Marxist' focus on substructural factors such as class and economic forces). Here, certain 'Japanese' socio-psychological characteristics were perceived as having been peculiarly conducive to the 19th century modernising process – resulting, as Jansen remarked, in "a reasonable, almost a remarkable coherence about Japanese attitudes towards modernisation, toward the Japanese tradition, and toward Asia."[168] While this theme would be taken up most famously by Robert Bellah some years later,[169] for now, it allowed a satisfying distinction between the universal nature of modernisation, and the study of cultural differences between Japan and the West. Beyond its 'theoretical' value to the Japanese Studies community, however, this perspective allowed another Cold War point to be made – concerning the comparison between a 'stagnant' Chinese society, and a Japan that, while historically indebted to Chinese culture and civilisation, had been able to move forward. In this respect, scholars such as Robert Scalapino argued that even 'premodern' (i.e., pre-Meiji) Japan was more modern than China.[170] Another Western participant, Herbert Passin, went further, arguing that the conditions for the emergence of a "modern intellectual class" which "is one

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[167] *Ibid*., 24.
[168] Jansen, "Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernisation," 65.
[169] I.e., in Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion: The Cultural Roots of Modern Japan* (New York: Free Press, 1985), which sought to demonstrate an analogy between Tokugawa religious discourse, and the Protestant work ethic.
[170] Robert Scalapino, cited in Harootunian, "America's Japan/Japan's Japan," 207.

of the constitutive, defining elements of modern society," had been more vibrant in pre-Meiji Japan than in any other non-Western "traditional" society.[171]

The Modernisation project, of course, was never entirely monolithic. Differences would emerge out of the Hakone Conference, and its subsequent sessions, over the nature and meaning of modernisation itself, and also over methodology. Here, for example, Japanese scholars such as Masao Maruyama and Toyama Shigeki were quite ready to question Western scholars confidence in their "value-free" empiricist perspective, arguing, correctly, that it left no room for "historically mediated concepts, differing temporalities, and local experience."[172] As Harootunian has recently pointed out, this was not quite the critical breakthrough it appears to be at first glance, given that Maruyama and his 'dissenters' remained locked into the same basic (Cold war) mind-set, and its positivist assumptions. In this respect, he points out,

> none of the participants on either side ever questioned the problematic status of privileging as a standard criterion, the relationship between means and ends and its authorisation of a protean binarism that generated a whole catalogue of distinctions that automatically aligned societies according to their proximity to the universal or particular, and the instrumentality of a culturally specific conception of rationality masquerading as a universal value.[173]

Harootunian's observation backs up my own broad perspective on the Conference on Modern Japan – and my concluding point for this chapter – which is that the Conference represented, above all, the institutionalisation of a particular postwar Japanese Studies perspective that would continue to dominate images of Japan from the 'inside' for much of the Cold War. Originally and most powerfully invoked by U.S. Cold Warriors such as MacArthur, Kennan and Dulles, it was confirmed, and

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[171] Herbert Passin, "Modernisation and the Japanese Intellectual: Some Comparative Observations," in Jansen (ed.), *Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernisation* (*op. cit.*, 1965), 450-52. As Passin went on to explain, this did not imply that Japan had somehow been modern before its 'actual' modernisation in the late 1880s, but rather, that, for "the great non-Western civilisations, such as Japan, China, India, the Islamic word, and Southeast Asia, the starting point for modernisation is entirely different." *Ibid.*, 462.

[172] Masao Maruyama, "Patterns of Individuation and the Case of Japan: a Conceptual Scheme," in Jansen (ed.), *Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernisation* (*op. cit.*, 1965), 492.

given further credence by the postwar generation of Japan experts – including Reischauer, the 'Morgenthau' of Japanese Studies – who uncritically appropriated its Realist framework, refining it with more detailed information, that was nonetheless gathered and analysed via the same positivist principles.

Since the 1970s however, this perspective has been under challenge, as the theory and practice of IR Realism has also come under challenge, and as scholars in Western and Japanese settings have begun to seriously reassess the positivist first principles by which 'modern' peoples in general have come to know themselves and the real-worlds in which they live. The chapter to follow begins to explore this shift, which saw the U.S. reassess, and then reassert, its hegemonic status in the wake of the Vietnam War – and which saw Japan, the great 'asset' of global Westernism and modernism, become something of a problem-child for its U.S. mentor. The result in 'theoretical' terms was a reformulated neo-Realism in IR, and the development of a range of alternative perspectives in IR and Japanese Studies; while in 'practice,' increased tension between the U.S. and its global allies would usher in an new, less predictable era in everyday global life per se.

[173] Harootunian, "America's Japan/Japan's Japan," 204.

CHAPTER FOUR

POSTWAR JAPAN (II):
NEO-REALISM, IR AND JAPANESE STUDIES:
FROM PRIZED 'ASSET' TO 'PROBLEM CHILD'

This chapter continues the task begun in the previous one, of illustrating the connections between a dominant IR perspective (Realism) and its Cold War making of 'Japan,' and the development of post-WW2 Japanese Studies perspectives underpinned and directed by the (primarily) U.S. centred IR exemplar. The context of this chapter is somewhat different, however, in that its major themes are not those of emergence, development and consolidation, as in the previous discussion, but of challenge, reassessment and reassertion, and increasing tension between Japan, the once prized 'asset' and its U.S. mentor. More specifically, the historical context of this chapter is the period between the early 1970s and the present. The political and economic context is that which sees U.S. foreign policy in crisis in Vietnam and in attempts to regain its hegemonic credibility, and which sees Japan becoming a global economic power and a growing problem for the U.S. Finally, the intellectual context is that which sees the transition from Realism to neo-Realism within (mainly) U.S. analytical and policy circles – a neo-Realism which, in the Reagan era, in particular, made clear its increasing dissatisfaction and frustration with a Japan, even as it sought to lock Japan ever more securely into a "global partnership."

In order to cover these issues in a coherent manner, the chapter initially presents a broad historical and intellectual framework in which neo-Realism and its attitudes towards Japan might be best understood. Having established this framework, I will then concentrate more directly on the influences of the new IR orthodoxy on Japan, and within a developing Japanese Studies.

1. The Post-Vietnam Challenge for U.S. Foreign Policy.

As I indicated in Chapter Two, the challenge to Realism and to the U.S. image of the world associated with it, emanated primarily from the disaster that was the Vietnam War. In broad 'theoretical' terms at least, three fundamental problems became starkly evident during that war and in its aftermath. The first concerned, above all, the inadequacies of the Realist 'black box' approach to the world 'out there.' More precisely, the war in Vietnam illustrated that Realism had no theory of the state which allowed it an understanding of the 'inside' of states other than those it imagined via its Cold War model of 'black box' anarchy. There was, in other words, a general absence of U.S. foreign policy insight into "the history, culture, and sociopolitical structure of Vietnam, its peoples, or its struggle."[1] Secondly, for all its claims concerning universality and strategic predictability, the game-theorised methodology underlying the 'escalation strategy' model of war fighting in Vietnam was manifestly unable to predict or explain the 'irrational' behaviour of the North Vietnamese in not surrendering to overwhelming power (i.e., in the face of the catastrophic losses and damage inflicted by the Americans). Finally, and relatedly, the crude Realist conception of power, based on the superior capacity of modern military/technology, was seriously undermined by the defeat of a modern Western state at the hands of a 'traditional' (i.e., 'primitive') society.[2]

The debate which was provoked by the Vietnam War centred, initially at least, on some of the more obvious inadequacies of this Realist perspective (if not the positivist first-principles which underlay it). And, initially at least, it saw some interesting dimensions added to the IR analytical agenda, which began to acknowledge some of the blind spots and silences that had characterised the U.S. Cold War perspective. In particular, figures such as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye introduced notions of 'complex interdependence' as a more accurate and more

[1] Jim George, *Discourses of Global Politics* (op. cit., 1994), 112.
[2] *Ibid.*

incisive way of understanding the everyday workings of the global system in the 1970s.[3] In this context, interdependence theory sought to add dimensions to state-centric Realism via a more complex reading of "transnational interactions,"[4] that acknowledged the role of nonstate actors and institutionalised regimes (e.g., trading and/or politically cooperative regimes) in a changing global order. As Keohane and Nye explained it in 1972, "world politics" could no longer be conceptualised in purely state-centric terms; rather, it had to include:

> all political interactions between significant actors in a world system in which a significant actor is any somewhat autonomous individual or organisation that controls substantial resources and participates in political relationships with other actors across state lines. Such an actor need not be a state.[5]

In this context too, the notion of the 'black box' state was placed under scrutiny, given that, from an interdependence perspective, the state could not simply be viewed as "totally unitary," or "exclusively concerned with the militarist/diplomatic state of the realists."[6] Rather, and as another observer later argued, both the state and its diplomatic agenda were:

> penetrated by the need to satisfy broadly based social interests. The increased interdependence of domestic economies linked through the global economy and the similarity of their positions, obliges states to pursue policies through diplomacies aimed among other things at domestic stability. These forces in a changing international system account for the emergence of international regimes whose purpose it is to ensure this stability.[7]

In this vein too, John Ruggie sought to problematise the crude power theme in traditional Realist thinking, by arguing for an understanding of institutional/regime behaviour which connects international behaviour to the concepts of social

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[3] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye (eds.), *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972).
[4] *Ibid.*, xv.
[5] *Ibid.*, xxv.
[6] *Ibid.*, xxvi.
[7] Anthony Jarvis, "Societies, States and Geopolitics: Challenges from Historical Sociology," *Review of International Studies* 15 (1989: 281-293), 282. This is the interdependence position associated with Keohane and Nye in the first *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, and, to a lesser extent, its later edition, published in 1977.

legitimacy underpinning all political authority. International regimes, Ruggie suggested (unlike 'black box' states), are not to be known "simply by some descriptive inventory of their concrete elements, but by their generative grammar, the underlying principles of order and meaning that shape the manner of their formation and transformation."[8]

Broadly then, interdependence theory was about bringing a more complex matrix of power relations and politico-economic connections to bear on contemporary IR and power politics themes – albeit, within the framework of basic assumptions (endemic anarchy, the competition for survival, etc.) intrinsic to those themes. This interpretivist and more sophisticated approach to political interaction has had a number of variations in IR since the 1970s, and I will explore its implications for both IR and Japanese Studies, here and in following chapters. At this time too, I will readdress the institutionalist themes which have found their way into the neo-liberalism of the 1990s, with its faith in liberal institutions as the basis of global order in the globalisation era of the 21st century.

The more immediate point for now is that this critical space, which initially opened up in the early 1970s, was quickly closed down again with the advent of neo-Realism, which, in the early 1980s, emerged as part of a broad conservative backlash in the U.S. that saw U. S. foreign policy resurrected in the 'new Cold War' terms of the Reagan Administration.[9] To understand why these historical and intellectual themes developed in the way they did, and to explore some of their implications for Japan, is to appreciate that it was not just Vietnam that precipitated the sense of crisis

[8] John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," in *International Organization* 36 (1982: 379-415), 196. Ruggie argues that the dominant, Realist understanding of international behaviour (i.e., in terms of power capability and utilitarianism), while not "fundamentally wrong," does not help to understand regimes, because it does not recognise political authority as "a fusion of power *with legitimate social purpose*" (emphasis added). *Ibid*., 197. His notion of "embedded liberalism" is derived from Polyani's 1944 concept of normal, or "embedded" economic orders, in which "the economic order is merely a function of the social order in which it is contained. Ruggie uses this to explain the way in which the postwar economic order reflected "the shared legitimacy of a set of social objectives to which the industrial world had moved, unevenly but 'as a single entity.'" *Ibid*., 214. The theme of social legitimacy is also important, albeit in a slightly different context, in the work of Robert Cox, as I will show in Chapters Five and Seven.

within the U.S. at the start of the 1970s. Nor was it merely the politico-strategic status of the U. S. that was under challenge during this period. There were a range of other challenges too, many of which were aimed at the status of the U.S. as the global economic hegemon — and it is in relation to these challenges that much of the neo-Realist response was formulated.

As the European Union developed into a stronger and more efficient regional regime in the 1960s and 1970s for example, there were signs that some of the European states, such as Germany and France, were less willing to toe the American line on political and economic matters in the way that the U.S. had become accustomed to in the early World War years. Kennedy's earlier refusal to countenance European military (i.e., nuclear) parity with the U.S. had generated huge tension within Europe over the role of NATO, and in 1966, France, under de Gaulle, withdrew from all of NATO's military organs, expelling them from French territory.[10] While NATO continued to play the lead role in the Cold War defence of Western Europe, there was widespread suspicion among the European ruling elite that the U.S. was trying to extract a disproportionate price (in both manpower and financial resources) for this defence, and that it was doing so in a elaborate attempt to undermine the cohesion of the EC as an international actor.[11] The events of the early 1970s (see below) would do nothing to calm these suspicions — and in this context, while the economic shock-waves created by the oil crisis were hugely damaging to Europe, they also helped renew and strengthen the mindset of integration.[12]

Other challenges came from the Third World. As Calvocoressi points out, Third World solidarity originated in the rejection, by many new or emerging states in the early postwar period, of the either/or choice of alliances proffered by the

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[9] Fred Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War* (Thetford: The Thetford Press, 1984), 13.
[10] Peter Stirk, *A History of European Integration Since 1914* (London: Pinter, 1996), 175.
[11] Derek Urwin, *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration Since 1945* (London & New York: Longman, 1995), 160.
[12] This opened the way for the reconfirmation of the Franco-German entente within the Community, under the leadership, during the mi-1970s, of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, and Helmut Schmidt. *Ibid.*, 163.

superpowers, and their accompanying insistence "that, in the one case in democratic capitalism and in the other in communism, they had discovered a way of life which others need do no more than follow."[13] Moreover, as anti-colonial and non-aligned sentiments within these countries continued to gain impetus during the 1960s, many states began to openly criticise the assumptions of Modernisation Theory, and the major economic institutions behind it: namely, the Bretton Woods system and its accompanying organisations, GATT, the IMF and the World Bank. At the forefront of this dissatisfaction with the economic status quo were the OPEC countries of major oil producers, primarily in the Middle East, who now confronted the Western industrialised nations with the implications of their own systemic logic. More precisely, the OPEC Cartel shocked the industrialised world by threatening to withhold oil supplies, thus repositioning themselves in the international political economy (IPE) as price-fixers, rather than recipients of Western pricing procedures.[14] And, the results, for the Bretton Woods system were dramatic, to say the least, as the drastic rise in petrol prices, together with the suspension of the dollar's convertibility into gold (see below), nearly overwhelmed both the IMF and the World Bank, thus making it clear that:

> [o]stensibly worldwide in its purposes, the Fund – like the Bank – had operated as an adjunct of an economic system created by and largely for the developed capitalist world, but from the 1970s, it was impelled to take a wider view as the developing (and now independent) Third World clamoured to be treated as part of the world's economic problems and the richer countries began to realise the extent of their economic involvement with the poorer.[15]

The oil shocks also posed a particular kind of problem for the U.S. as global hegemon, even though it was a never a major importer of oil from the Middle East itself. Rather, the problem it faced was that those industrialised states who were major oil importers from the region – particularly Japan – now became openly critical of the U.S. and its seeming inability to act as hegemon in time of global

[13] Peter Calvocoressi, *World Politics Since 1945* (*op. cit.*, 1996.), 171.
[14] Urwin, *The Community of Europe*, 160.

crisis.[16] In itself, this represented an important moment in the post WW2 relationship between the U.S. and Japan, but in the present context it is also an important theme in any explanation of later neo-Realist attitudes, and the tensions within U.S. foreign policy concerning Japan in particular.

Japan and the United States: Emerging Tensions

Most immediately, the friction over the OPEC issue brought to the surface a tension that had been building for some time, which I touched on in general terms in the previous chapter, but which I would like to develop a little further here, concerning Japan's rapid economic growth in the era after the Korean War. By the early 1970s, this rise to power was an obvious and worrying reality for the U.S., and one that it found difficult to treat with equanimity. The sense of unease was only heightened by the fact that Japan's rise seemed to correspond to a decline in American fortune, as the country which, for a century, had run a trade surplus with the rest of the world, now began to run a trade deficit, largely because of its massive involvement in the Vietnam War.

Japan, on the other hand, was by now moving from strength to strength. The high-technology, high-value-added export strategy brought in under the Ikeda cabinet in 1960 had continued the trajectory begun in the mid 1950s.[17] Between 1960 and 1965, when its economy moved into surplus for the first time since the war, Japan's real GNP grew by an average of 10% every year – double that of the U.S.[18] 1965 was also the year that the U.S.-Japan trade balance first switched to Japan's favour; albeit by a comparatively paltry $334 million (a far cry from the $50 billion it would eventually tally in the mid 1980s).[19] However, the psychological impact of this historical moment in the U.S. – Japan relationship, added to the challenges from the

[15] Calvocoressi, *World Politics Since 1945*, 188.
[16] *Ibid*., 190.
[17] Gary Allinson, "The Structure and Transformation of Conservative Rule," in Andrew Gordon (ed.), *Postwar Japan as History* (*op. cit*., 1993), 135.
[18] Michael Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation* (op. cit., 1997), 181.

Third World, and the increased competition from the European community, only added to the pressures on the U.S. at a time of even greater and more immediate problems vis-à-vis the war in Vietnam, which, by now (the early 1970s), was crippling the domestic U.S. economy, further undermining its status as the global hegemon.

The Nixon Doctrines

The initial U.S. response to this pressure, not surprisingly, was an abrogation (albeit a brief one) of the roles (world banker and world policeman) which had precipitated these problems. Lyndon Johnson had actually begun this process in 1968, by capping escalation of the Vietnam war,[20] but it was his successor, Richard Nixon, who would oversee the most radical redefinition of U.S. hegemony — and of the U.S.-Japan relationship — since the war. At the policy level, this saw, for example, the abrogation of important Bretton-Woods provisions; in particular, the de-coupling of the U.S. dollar from the gold standard, effectively ending the fixed-exchange rate system which had been at the heart of the post-WWII restructuring agency.[21] At the same time, Nixon adopted an openly antagonistic economic policy towards Japan, the details of which will be discussed below.

On the political front, there was an unprecedented shift in policy towards the Soviet Union, which reflected deeper changes in the Cold War. By the early 1970s, the Soviet Union was estimated to have achieved (or be about to achieve) rough nuclear parity with the U.S.. Rather than compromise the U.S. economy even further however, by a costly (and probably futile) attempt to restore U.S. superiority, Nixon, under Kissinger's guidance, implemented a range of political and economic incentives designed to moderate Soviet behaviour, that came to be known as

[19] *Ibid.*
[20] *Ibid.*, 210.
[21] Including, of course, the favourable yen-dollar exchange rate, which had been a major factor in postwar Japanese economic recovery and growth. *Ibid.*, 231.

détente.[22] Meanwhile, overtures were also made towards China, on the logic that "triangular diplomacy" with Moscow and Beijing would not only hasten the end of the Vietnam War, but, in the long term, serve Washington's interest in restoring global equilibrium.

Nixon's period in power was, as Cumings points out, a truly pivotal one for U.S. - Japan relations.[23] While on the one hand, Nixon's foreign policy agenda retained all the key assumptions about the nature of the Cold War and the need for U.S. vigilance, it was also a time of strategic shifts in method — including, as Nixon himself put it, "sticking it" to U.S. allies (such as Japan and Korea) who would not cooperate with the new burden-sharing philosophy.[24] However, while the reverberations from the "Nixon shocks" would continue to be felt, particularly within the U.S.-Japan relationship, for decades to come, Nixon himself would soon be gone. In 1974, the legacy of Vietnam caught up with him on the Watergate affair, and he was forced to resign, succeeded by Gerald Ford (August 1974-January 1977), and then by the Democrat Jimmy Carter (1977-1980), who came to power as a 'liberal' alternative to the corruption and power politics chicanery of the Republicans.

Carter: the Beginning of the End of Détente

When Carter assumed the Presidency, he did so among a widespread hope, both within the U.S. and abroad, that détente policy would be expanded into genuinely peaceful relations with the Soviets and other U.S. 'enemies.' However, from the moment Carter came to power, a series of events around the world saw many in the U.S. begin to denounce the whole détente experiment as a failure and as an opportunity for America's enemies to take advantage of its weaknesses. The period between 1978 and 1979 saw Soviet involvement (or that of its Cuban proxy) in

[22] *Ibid*., 225.
[23] Bruce Cumings, "Japan's Position in the World System" (*op. cit*., 1993), 55.
[24] Schaller, *Altered States*, 211. In addition to the economic attacks on Japan, which are discussed in more detail further below, Nixon also imposed "burden sharing" policy on South Korea, withdrawing a division of American troops, and pressing the South Korean government hard in textile negotiations. Cumings, "Japan's Position in the World System," 55.

conflicts in Central America, Poland, Sub-Saharan Africa, Iran and Afghanistan. These conflicts, combined with allegations that Moscow was reneging on arms controls agreements, were seized upon by anti-détente groups in the U.S., and by late 1978, Carter was under enormous pressure from both Republican and Democract critics insisting on a return to a more assertive and aggressive U.S. foreign policy world wide. These fears were only compounded by the seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran in November 1979, which convinced many in the policymaking elite that the U.S. was no longer feared and respected as global hegemon. The spectre of a power vacuum rapidly being filled by Soviet influence (even as the Islamic regime in Iran rapidly made clear its contempt for both of the superpowers and their ideologies) was subsequently lent further credence by the events over Christmas 1979 which, hard upon the embassy seizure in Iran, saw the Soviet Army move into Afghanistan. This was the final confirmation for many in the U.S. that détente was just an opportunity for the Soviet Union to gain global advantage over the U.S., and behave in ways it never would have had when the U.S. was the undoubted hegemon. It was also a useful underlining of the Committee on Present Danger's assessment that "the two superpowers have utterly opposing conceptions of world order."[25]

At the centre of the anti-détente push in the U.S. was a right-wing group supporting Ronald Reagan, then the governor of California, who began to rekindle the language and logic of the early Cold War, invoking in particular Kennan's early logic that the only way to 'deal' with the Soviet Union was by superior force of arms and a power politics rationale. In the face of this challenge, Carter hastily re-invented himself as a born-again hawk, increasing the defence budget, instituting a grain embargo on the Soviet Union, and enunciating the "Carter Doctrine," under which he pledged to defend U.S. oil interests in the Persian Gulf region against "outside powers."[26] In the

[25] Committee on Present Danger, cited by Simon Dalby, *Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), 96.
[26] Schaller, *Altered States*, 225.

last months of his presidency, he instigated a massive military buildup, "designed to re-establish strategic superiority over the Soviet Union, reassert control over the Western alliance, re-impose authority in the Middle East, and consolidate strength in the Pacific through strategic cooperation with both China and Japan."[27] The result was that as détente collapsed completely around the beginning of 1980, it did so amid a welter of recrimination and antagonistic rhetoric reminiscent of the early Cold War years, with the two superpowers reverting (rhetorically at least) to their original Cold War positions. And, in this atmosphere, Reagan swept to power in the U.S. in 1981.

Reagan: The New Cold War

From his first days in office, Reagan set about accelerating the fundamental shift in the tone and direction of U.S. foreign policy that Carter had begun. Détente and post-Vietnam angst were rapidly discarded in favour of a reformulated notion of American hegemony, centred on the notion that the world required strong, central leadership if order was to be restored, and that leadership must come from the United States. Accordingly, in the wake of Afghanistan and Iran, the Reagan administration vowed to correct the failures of the détente strategy, and the weaknesses of U.S. military and diplomatic power which had seen it humiliated by small regional non-Western powers. The most immediate target of the détente backlash of course, was the Carter Administration, and (in shades of the emergence of Realism vs. idealism in the 1920s and 1930s) 'liberalism' in general, which was now blamed for undermining Western global strength and rendering the West 'vulnerable' to superior Soviet nuclear forces.[28]

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[27] *Ibid*., 253.

[28] In this context, it is worth noting Norman Podhoretz's claim that Reagan was not actually opposed to détente per se, so much as Carter's "soft headed" handling of it. "Even the tough policies of the Reagan administration," Podhoretz argues, were "entirely consistent with the theory of détente as spelled out by the post-presidential Richard Nixon, and in some of the writings of Henry Kissinger, because their conception of détente did indeed involve a component of power. Détente had to be policed, and the only policeman available was the United States." Norman Podhoretz, "The Rise and Fall of Containment," in Terry Deibel and John Lewis Gaddis (eds.), *Containing the Soviet Union: A*

At the broader, strategic level, the new Reagan doctrine had three major themes, which, in the early 1980s, were articulated as part of a resurgent American voice in the world (with broader support from the conservative governments now elected in both Western Europe and Japan).[29] First, the U.S. had to re-build its military strength and close the so-called "window of vulnerability" opened up during the détente years. Second, there was a policy of "neo-containment," which represented, essentially, an updated version of the containment policies of the early Cold War years, now re-invoked to counter what was seen as a new phase of Soviet expansionism during détente. This policy was structured around a diffuse network of 'alliances' with Third World nations,[30] and the broadly-conceived 'Reagan doctrine," under which the U.S. reserved the right to intervene to destroy regimes it considered hostile. With regard to the costs of this renewed "world's policeman" role, the rhetoric of burden sharing was also revived. Finally, Reagan promulgated the values of a world-wide free trade policy based on market principles and Western 'liberal' institutions as the basis of future order and prosperity (i.e., the IMF, the World Bank and GATT).[31]

All of these themes, as I will explain below, had particular implications for Japan, which was to re-emerge in the 1980s as the centrepiece of American strategic thinking – and, somewhat paradoxically, as the focus of U.S. ire and resentment. Indeed, in many ways, it was the U.S.-Japan relationship that would prove the most profound influence on the debate whose intellectual framework was defined by the events above. This framework of course, was neo-Realism.

Critique of U.S. Policy (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1987), 227.

[29] Schaller, *Altered States*, 253.

[30] Informal, that is, in terms of the absence of formal treaties, with the ties being underpinned by (often clandestine) arms transfers, military aid, and economic aid. Terry Deibel, "Alliances for Containment," in Deibel and Gaddis (eds.), *Containing the Soviet Union* (*op. cit.*), 114.

2. Neo-Realism: Reformulating Global Order in the Post-Vietnam Era.

Neo-Realism, as its name suggests, claims to carry on the central intellectual heritage of 'traditional' or 'classic' Realism, while at the same time seeking to remedy the defects that rendered Realism vulnerable to critical challenges of the type described above. On the one hand consequently, neo-Realist scholars in IR uphold the basic assumptions of Realism as inviolable: i.e. the fundamentally anarchical nature of the international realm, the primacy of the nation state as actor in this realm, and the pursuit of power and self-interest as the primary motivation of all actors, even when cooperative or integrative behaviour is evident (as in trading, political regimes such as the EC).[32] On the other hand, neo-Realism has acknowledged two major weaknesses in the traditional orthodoxy which it now sought to overcome. The first was its tendency toward reductionism; 'reductionism,' in this context, signifying the Realist tendency to concentrate on the behaviour of individual states per se. The second perceived weakness was Realism's failure to recognise that economic factors were crucial in the contemporary era. Hence the neo-Realist concern with the global International Political Economy (IPE) rather than International Relations (IR) in the traditional sense.[33]

I touched on the first of these issues in Chapter Two, in explaining the way in which the most influential neo-Realist, Kenneth Waltz, reinstated some old positivist principles to 'overcome' the problem of reductionism in Realism. In his *Theory of International Politics* (1979), Waltz had confronted this problem by arguing that Realists should not be looking at the way states behave, but appreciating why they behave in the way they do. The reason why, he insisted, was that the behaviour of states and all other actors in the international system is determined by the structure of

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[31] Dalby, *Creating the Second Cold War*, 164.
[32] John Gerard Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization* (London: Routledge, 1998), 9.
[33] Scott Burchill, "Realism and neo-Realism," in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater (eds.), *Theories of International Relations* (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1996), 83.

that system, which is anarchical, and which imposes its security dilemma logic upon all actors, regardless of their intention or will.[34]

As indicated previously, this structuralist perspective, which was presented as an unchanging, irreducible 'law' of international life (and therefore beyond change, and critical reassessment) was not accepted, even in its heyday, by the more incisive of IPE analysts, primarily because it could not explain the relationship between the parts (the states and other actors) and the whole (the anarchical system).[35] By the early 1980s, an even more profound challenge was under way, as some within the IR and IPE fields began to question the positivist underpinnings of perspectives such as Waltz's with its propositions concerning structural 'laws,' and systemic hierarchies which are just 'spontaneously' generated, like markets.[36] Indeed, it was in response to this crude reassertion of positivism within neo-Realism that a new phase of IR analysis emerged in the 1980s and 1990s — and in the chapters to follow, I will concentrate more directly on aspects of this new Critical Social Theory literature, particularly as it has been associated with new thinking in Japanese Studies.

The point for now though, is that in the early 1980s, with Reagan in the White House and U.S. foreign policy once more assertive around the world, many within the analytical community in the U.S., in particular, were beginning to reformulate the post-Vietnam world order in terms derived from the neo-Realism of figures such as Waltz. Some of those who followed Waltz's lead, as indicated, articulated their reservations about some elements of his position (e.g., Ruggie). And some, like Stephen Krasner and Robert Keohane and Robert Gilpin, continued to emphasise more complex themes concerning the role of regimes and liberal institutions and the significance of 'economic' power in the 1980s — albeit, while remaining more or less committed to the notion, as Krasner put it in 1983, that "outcomes related to

[34] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (op. cit., 1979), 10.
[35] See my comments in Chapter Two (69-70) regarding the reaction to Waltz's claims by Ruggie and Ashley, in particular.
[36] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 90.

either regimes or behaviour ultimately remain a function of the distribution of power among states."[37]

It was from this second phase of neo-Realism, I suggest, that much of the tension developed between Japan and the U.S. in the 1980s. To explain why this is so, it is necessary to touch briefly on one particularly important element of neo-Realism – its commitment to *Hegemonic Stability Theory*. This is a perspective which encompasses both the wider U.S. foreign policy attitude to the world during the Reagan and Bush Presidencies, and the more precise direction taken by neo-Realists in their attempts to fuse basic Realism principles with elements of neo-classical economics.

Hegemonic Stability Theory

In its broader context, Hegemonic Stability Theory emerged from the Reagan Doctrine's view of why there had been global disorder in the period of the 1970s and 1980s; the answer being that there had been a loss of faith in the 'American Way' after Vietnam, and in the basic value system which had prevailed in the years following WW2.[38] In the neo-Realist community, the answer was similar, but more specific. It argued that there had been a loss of faith in U.S. strategic leadership and, just as importantly, in the Bretton Woods System constructed to provide economic stability and leadership after WW2.[39] In this way, neo-Realist literature added a further dimension to the argument that, if order was to be restored at the global level, so must U.S. hegemony be. It was an economic dimension, whose key source was the U.S. economist Charles Kindleberger, and his ideas about modern economic history as the struggle for hegemonic power.

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[37] Stephen D. Krasner, "Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables," in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), *International Regimes* (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1983), 357.
[38] Dalby, *Creating the Second Cold War*, 215.
[39] Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 213.

In 1973, Kindleberger had written a book called *The World in Depression*,[40] in which he argued that the major cause of the global Depression of the early 1930s was that the global market had no one state capable of maintaining order in conditions of fiscal anarchy. Britain, Kindleberger suggested, had been "unable," and the United States (more reprehensibly) "unwilling," to assume responsibility for the major tasks of world economic stabilisation.[41] From this, Kindleberger drew two conclusions. The first stated that all markets, at all levels, require a single orderer — a hegemonic presence capable of enforcing and maintaining stability.[42] Secondly, that if one understands the world in market terms, and if one reads history as the struggle for market hegemony, it is clear that when there has been a hegemon in the market there has been systemic order and market efficiency — *and when that hegemonic presence has declined or disappeared there has been disorder and anarchy*.[43]

This rather simplistic reading of complex events proved a major inspiration for the emerging neo-Realist literature; which, after all, as Keohane would later make clear, preferred its theoretical frameworks "elegant" and "parsimonious."[44] Kindleberger's conclusions thus became a catalyst for Hegemonic Stability Theory, which in turn, I argue, became a central tenet of U.S. foreign policy during the 1980s and 1990s. In this context, the theoretical logic was simple enough. In the period between WW2 and the early 1970s, there was an acknowledged and powerful hegemonic force in the market: the United States, and in this period, the market worked efficiently (at least for those capable of competing in it). Since the 1970s, however, for a range of reasons, the hegemon has been in decline, and the world has entered a period of increased disorder, which could lead to a more obvious anarchy if legitimate order is not restored.

[40] Charles P. Kindleberger, *The World in Depression: 1929-1933* (London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1973).
[41] *Ibid*., 292.
[42] *Ibid*., 307.
[43] *Ibid*., 308.
[44] Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond" (*op. cit*., 1986), 191.

Thus scholars such as Robert Gilpin (1981), began, on this basis, to invoke a rather nostalgic vision of the international order associated with British preponderance in the 19th century, and American dominance in the immediate postwar period (on which more will be said presently). For Gilpin, both *Pax Britannica* and *Pax Americana* had "ensured an international system of relative peace and security," because "Great Britain and the United States *created and enforced the rules of a liberal international economic order*"[45] (emphasis added). A few years later, Keohane added a dimension of sorts to this perspective, by arguing that while there was scant empirical evidence to support 'crude' (i.e., military power-based) hegemonic stability theory, a more 'refined' version of this theory (taking into account economic regimes and the internal dynamics of powerful states) "makes some contribution to understanding recent changes in the international politics of oil, money and trade."[46]

As mentioned above, it was with respect to Japan in particular that Hegemonic Stability Theory (or one aspect of it at least), would have greatest resonance for U.S. academics and policymakers. This was the notion (popularised by Reagan) that a major cause of hegemonic decline is *a decrease in respect for hegemonic power* – not merely by enemies of the hegemon, but by "free riders," or actors in the global market who benefit from stable world order, without contributing to it. This, it is argued, increases the burden on the hegemonic power, who has to underwrite the free rider. More specifically, from this perspective, there has been one major free rider in the post-WWII global marketplace – Japan. As a result, and after all the years in which Japan had been proudly (and paternalistically) presented to the world as the U.S.'s best Cold War asset, the U.S. and its analytical sector now began to re-define Japan as, at best, a problem-child. And, it is from this perspective that I wish to move into the second task of this chapter, adding some detail and precise analysis

[45] Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 144.
[46] Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 214.

to the sketch thus far presented on complex themes and issues. I will start by analysing the way in which Japan gradually came to be re-presented as a major reason for U.S. hegemonic decline. From here, I will consider the impact of the 'Japan problem' on both International Relations, and a (by now) rapidly developing Japanese Studies literature.

3. NeoRealism, U.S. Foreign Policy and Japan as 'Problem-Child.'

> Thus the paradox: the success of the U.S.-Japanese alliance has been its undoing. The near total achievement of great ambitions conspires with the waning of great fears to leave the two nations today without a clear conception of what each needs or wants from the other.
>
> Graham T. Allison, 1972.[47]

Allison's statement, I suggest, accurately captures the suspicion and confusion that had already begun to penetrate U.S. images of Japan in the 1970s, as it became clear that Japan was destined to transcend the role planned for it in Cold War Containment strategy. As many scholars have acknowledged however, the fault lines which now began to appear on the surface of the "rickety old San Francisco system"[48] had, in truth, been integral to the postwar U.S.-Japan relationship since its inception. The broader world view upon which the relationship depended (i.e., that of the U.S. as the undisputed hegemon of the 'free world') and which relegated Japan to the status of a militarily subordinate satellite, ultimately abetted Japan's recovery, as the U.S. continued to promote and protect Japan's economic interest both at home and abroad in the name of Kennan's 'great crescent.'[49] On the Japanese side, savvy economic policies, including the introduction of long-term fiscal and economic planning, and the "income doubling" scheme introduced by the Ikeda administration (1960-64) to

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[47] Graham T. Allison, "American Foreign Policy and Japan," in Henry Rosovsky (ed.), *Discord in the Pacific: Challenges to the Japanese-American Alliance* (Washington: Columbia Books, Inc., 1972), 9.
[48] John Dower, "Peace and Democracy in Two Systems" (*op. cit.*, 1993), 20.
[49] *Ibid.*, 12.

boost domestic consumption, made the most of these concessions.[50] Between 1960 and 1970, average Japanese incomes outdid even Ikeda's expectations by not just doubling, but *trebling* – creating a mass consumer market that encouraged high-speed growth, and completed the recovery of Japanese industry from its wartime devastation.[51]

By the end of the decade however, Japan was well beyond its recovery phase. Its GNP had overtaken that of Germany, it had a 3.2 billion dollar trade surplus with the U.S., and Japanese capital was now being poured into the newly industrialising economies of Southeast Asia.[52] In contrast, as already noted above, the U.S. economy was heading for recession, undermined by the costly entanglement in Vietnam and an increasingly competitive world economy.[53] By the end of 1971, the ballooning balance-of-payments deficit was approaching $29 billion, and for the first time in nearly a century the U.S. experienced an overall merchandise trade deficit of around $2.27 billion. Add to this situation a trade deficit with Japan of $3.2 billion, and it was easy to see why Japan, in the minds of many within the U.S., was rapidly becoming, as Kinhide Mushakôji put it, "something of a prodigal son."[54]

Japan and the "Nixon Shocks"

This was certainly one of the things on Richard Nixon's mind as he sought to extricate the U.S. from Vietnam.[55] By 1970, Nixon had become increasingly bitter towards Japan, primarily over the Satô government's failure to cooperate fully with America over Japanese textiles exports, after the U.S. had formally undertaken to withdraw nuclear weapons from Okinawa and return it to Japanese sovereignty by

[50] Laura E. Hein, "Growth Versus Success" (*op. cit.*, 1993), 114.
[51] Schaller, *Altered States*, 161.
[52] Takurô Seiyama, "A Radical Interpretation of Postwar Economic Policies" (*op. cit.*, 1989), 50.
[53] William K. Tabb, *The Postwar Japanese System: Cultural Economy and Economic Transformation* (*op. cit.*, 1995), 95.
[54] Kinhide Mushakôji, "The American-Japanese Image Gap," in Rosovsky (ed.), *Discord in the Pacific* (*op. cit.*, 1972), 230.
[55] Cumings, "Japan's Position in the World System," 55.

1972.[56] His mood had not been improved by Japanese press reports hailing the textiles impasse as a victory for "independent foreign policy."[57] In this context, the 1971 move to normalise relations with China (thereby enhancing Sino-Soviet tensions) as part of the détente strategy without consulting Japan, was a calculated insult; not, as some suggested at the time, a mere misjudgement or oversight.[58]

More importantly, Nixon's visit was a powerful, if crude reminder, of the fundamental structural inequities built into the U.S.-Japan relationship from its beginnings – inequities which Nixon (egged on by early Japan bashers such as Treasury Secretary John Connally), was now prepared to remind the Japanese of in any number of ways.[59] This was certainly the motivation underlying his New Economic Policy (announced fittingly enough, on VJ Day 1971), which revoked easy Japanese access to the U.S. market (by slapping a 10% surcharge on imports), imposed "voluntary" quotas on Japanese textile exports, and unilaterally devalued the dollar reserves that Japan had built up as financial support to the Vietnam War campaign (a move which also, of course, pushed up the cost of Japanese imports in the U.S.).[60] The following year, Nixon pushed through an agreement with Japan which included 'voluntary' export restrictions on textiles and which, in a forerunner of the interweaving of economic and security issues in the 1980s, threatened to tie Okinawa's restoration to Japanese sovereignty to economic cooperation with the U.S.[61]

On the strategic front too, there were signs that the U.S. was changing some of its attitudes and policies where Japan was concerned. This was implicit in Nixon's 1969 Guam Doctrine, which, while it did not revoke U.S. responsibilities concerning

[56] Schaller, *Altered States*, 217-20.
[57] *Ibid*., 222.
[58] Donald Hellmann, *Japan and East Asia: The New International Order* (New York: Praeger, 1972), 135.
[59] Jun Eto, "Japan's Shifting Image," in Rosovsky (ed.), *Discord in the Pacific* (*op. cit*., 1972), 223.
[60] Tabb, The Postwar Japanese System, 95.
[61] Saburô Okita, "Dynamics of the Economic Relationship," in Paul Gordon Lauren and Raymond F. Wylie (eds.), *Destinies Shared: U.S.-Japanese Relations* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 85.

Japanese security, indicated the need for a 'burden sharing' role on the part of the Asia 'asset.' As Nixon explained it:

> as far as the problem of military defence [is concerned] except for the threat of a major power involving nuclear weapons... the United States is going to encourage and has a right to expect that this problem will be increasingly handled by, and the responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves.[62]

"Responsibility," in this context meant, among other things, Japanese responsibility to "shoulder the concerns of *Realpolitik* in Asia," under the continued guidance of the U.S.-Japan military alliance.[63] Accordingly, while the Guam Doctrine seemed to coincide with Japanese establishment desires for a more independent and autonomous Japanese position in the region, the U.S. perspective was somewhat different; centred as it was on the notion that Japan was to accept a higher cost for its 'subordinate dependence' within the U.S. global strategic plan after Vietnam. This became clear under Nixon's New Economic Doctrine, which saw a free-floating dollar pushing up the price of domestic weapons production in Japan, effectively ending the surge towards productive autonomy that had been pursued since the late 1960s by the Self-Defence Agency.[64]

Hard upon the "Nixon shocks" of course, came the OPEC crisis and oil shock of 1973, which caused Japan's 'miracle' growth to grind temporarily to a halt. This eventually proved a decisive factor in Japan's consolidation of its economic great power status, as Japanese industry shifted its focus from heavy industries to the high-tech, service-oriented products for which it would become famous in the 1980s.[65] Nevertheless, at the time, the oil shock, as indicated earlier, exposed deep tensions in

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[62] Nixon press release, July 25, 1969, cited in W. W. Rostow, *The United States and the Regional Organisation of Asia and the Pacific: 1965-1985* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), 58.
[63] Hellmann, *Japan and East Asia*, 139.
[64] Michael J. Green, *Arming Japan: Defence Production, Alliance Politics, and the Search for Postwar Autonomy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 59-60.
[65] Tabb, *The Postwar Japanese System*, 96.

the U.S.-Japan relationship[66] -- tensions that would only increase when the crisis was over, and a revamped Japanese economy really began to make a mockery of Dulles' 1954 surmise that "the Japanese don't make the things we want" by threatening U.S. market shares in products such as steel, television sets, automobiles and electronics.[67] By the end of the 1970s, a deep sense of unease was more or less entrenched in some sectors of U.S.-Japan relations, as U.S. manufacturers, in particular, grew increasingly bitter at what they saw as "unfair" Japanese strategies regarding market protection.

Japan in the 1980s: "Burden Sharing" and Bashing in the Lead-up to the Gulf War

The development of coherent neo-Realist perspectives on the world in the harsher atmosphere of the Reagan era saw a further and sometimes ironic dimension added to the U.S.-Japan relationship, as the U.S. began to re-assert its "world policeman" role. In the context of a renewed Cold War, and especially with regard to Reagan's fears about Soviet naval capacity and strategic intent in the Pacific, Japan once again became a geo-strategic 'asset,' as neo-Realist observers urged a return to the strategies and perspectives of the Kennan years. Asia -- especially Northeast Asia -- once more became a strategic focal point, with analysts like Martin Weinstein, for example, propounding the need for a renewed U.S. commitment. "The security affairs of Northeast Asia," Weinstein warned in 1983,

> have been especially neglected since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. One of the effects of the American failure in Vietnam has been a tendency to disengage psychologically from the whole region that carries the taint of Vietnam... the sense that Americans have a vital stake in Northeast Asia and that American actions and omissions have a major impact on this region is far weaker now than it was after the Pacific War or the Korean War.[68]

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[66] Many Japanese for example, believed that the quadrupling of oil prices during the 1970s was abetted by Nixon and Kissinger in order to help restore the balance of trade to favour the United States. Cumings, "Japan's Position in the World System," 56.
[67] Okita, "Dynamics of the Economic Relationship," 83.
[68] Martin E. Weinstein (ed.), *Northeast Asian Security After Vietnam* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983), vii-viii.

From the perspective now prevalent, the obvious solution to this neglect was the restoration of U.S. hegemony in Northeast Asia, and the restoration, therefore, of the order that prevailed in that region after 1945. Akira Iriye was another arguing this case, and while he went beyond the rather simple hegemonic stability assumptions of Weinstein, he too emphasised the future need for a powerful "regime coordinator" in the post-Vietnam period.[69] Continuing this theme, Daniel Okimoto added another twist to it, in reminding the U.S. that if it did not take on its traditional responsibilities in the region, the resulting anxiety might tempt the Japanese to "go nuclear." Utilising a kind of reverse psychology on the U.S. in the neo-Realist era, Okimoto warned that:

> the loss of U.S. strategic superiority, expansion of Soviet capabilities, the Vietnam debacle and withdrawal and the uncertainty of domestic support for U.S. commitments overseas... have all had a corrosive effect on Japanese perceptions... [Consequently] the seeds of doubt have been planted and with deterioration in the global or regional balance, these doubts could very well grow.[70]

None of this was quite what it appeared in the 1980s, however. For all the talk of a renewed U.S. 'world policeman' role emanating from Washington and variations on the Hegemonic Stability Theory theme from elsewhere, the emphasis was always on a 'burden sharing' strategy also. Moreover, by the 1980s, 'burden sharing' for neo-Realists had come to mean more than simply shouldering the costs of a global military buildup, with equal, if not greater emphasis being placed on the responsibility of U.S. allies playing their part in the orderly maintenance of Reagan's global trading regime.

This, for example, was what Leonard Sullivan, an ex-Pentagon official and national security consultant, had in mind when he spoke of the issues facing the U.S. in the mid-1980s version of Acheson's 'great crescent' which, for Sullivan, took in South America, the Middle East, Europe and North and Southeast Asia. In this context

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[69] Iriye, "Security and Stability in Northeast Asia: a Historical Overview," in Weinstein (ed.), *Northeast Asian Security After Vietnam* (*op. cit.*, 1983), 25.

Sullivan also had 'free-riders' on his mind when he outlined a major problem facing the U.S. hegemon in its newly defined role in the Reagan Doctrine. Criticising, in particular, "America's relentless underwriting of West European and Japanese security," Sullivan warned that in the new Cold War of the 1980s:

> it is becoming ever more urgent that all who wish to reap the benefits of the current prosperity show the same willingness to contribute... these contributions are substantial and must be shared. When they are not, perceptions of freeloading can undermine any voluntary cooperative venture. In short, partnership may be voluntary, but it is not free. Participation begets costs.[71]

At the time that Sullivan was advocating his burden-sharing prescriptions, Japan was already well established in the U.S. policymaking (and public) imagination as one of the worst examples of states which were "reaping the benefits" without "contributing." Since the early 1980s, Japan's growing trade surplus had been seen as a threat to the stability of the (U.S. led) international system. Economic tensions between the two countries now encompassed not just markets for goods, but capital markets, distributions systems, and financial services.[72] More than any other nation in the world, it was argued, Japan depended on a liberal trading system (and accordingly, in the Cold War logic of the 1980s, a secure world order) to feed, clothe and satisfy its people. Yet Japan, its critics argued, continued to do less than any other nation to maintain this order. As the business economist James Abegglen put it, "all of Japan's interactions with the rest of the world in trade, investment, aid and defence, can be interpreted as those of a country acting purely in self-interest, with regard only to consequences for itself."[73] To make matters worse, by the mid 1980s, the trade deficit between Japan and the U.S. had blown out to over $50 million,[74]

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[70] Daniel T. Okimoto, "Japan and the United States: Security Options," in Weinstein (ed.), *Northeast Asian Security After Vietnam* (*op. cit.*, 1983), 64.
[71] Leonard Sullivan, "A New Approach to Burden Sharing," in *Foreign Policy* 60 (Fall 1985: 91-110), 93.
[72] Okita, "Dynamics of the Economic Relationship," 87.
[73] James Abegglen, "Narrow Self-Interest: Japan's Ultimate Vulnerability," in Diane Tasca (ed.), *US-Japanese Economic Relations: Cooperation, Competition and Confrontation* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980),27.
[74] $55 billion as of 1986, according to M. O'Donnell. "Japan, the United States and Economic Development in the Asia Pacific Region," in Lauren and Wylie (eds.), *Destinies Shared: US-Japanese Relations* (*op. cit.*, 1989), 115.

with Japanese trade profits increasingly being ploughed back into U.S. financial assets such as banks, securities, and real estate.[75] By the end of the decade, the U.S. had become the world's largest debtor country, while Japan had become its great creditor, making it not merely an economic, but a financial superpower.[76]

Meanwhile, Japan was coming under increased criticism on military and security issues, with the Reagan administration, in particular, expressing frustration at the extent and speed of Japanese military spending and a perceived lack of Japanese support for the strategic agenda of neo-Containment.[77] The idea, during the 1980s, had been to gradually cajole Japan into assuming a regional military role more commensurate with its economic influence while keeping it technologically dependent upon the U.S.; a policy which, from the perspective of the Reagan Doctrine, made both economic and strategic sense.[78] Maintaining Japanese dependence upon costly military technology, it was argued, would not only lock Japan more securely into the neo-Containment strategy, but would also contribute towards bringing the economic relationship back to a more even keel.[79] These expectations however, were soon dashed; even with the steady growth of Japan's military capability under the Nakasone Administration (1982-87), Japanese defence spending failed to satisfy U.S. expectations. Similarly, while Nakasone's "new internationalist" agenda seemed, initially at least, to correspond to both general burden-sharing expectations and the neo-conservative strategic agenda of the Reagan administration, its emphasis remained firmly nationalist.[80] Its main aims were to

[75] Thus contributing to U.S. budgetary deficits. Peter Moody, *Tradition and Modernisation in China and* Japan (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1995), 326.
[76] Dower, "Peace and Democracy in Two Systems," 29.
[77] Raymond F. Wylie, "The U.S. Japanese Security Relationship," in *Destinies Shared* (*op. cit.*, 1989), 63.
[78] Green, *Arming Japan*, 95-96.
[79] Cumings, "Japan's Position in the World System," 56.
[80] Nakasone's hawkishness in military affairs for example, was congruent with the anti-détente backlash; in 1983, he famously referred to Japan as "an unsinkable aircraft carrier, putting up a tremendous bulwark of defence." Under Nakasone, Japan undertook the defence of its own sea lanes, breached the symbolic 'one percent' of GNP on defence spending established under the Yoshida Doctrine, and participated in the Strategic Defence Initiative. Sydney Giffard, *Japan Among the Powers: 1890-1990* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994),184-86.

consolidate Japan's position in the global economy, and to reassert a strong Japanese national identity in the world.[81]

This was hardly the stuff of dutiful, subordinate Japanese partnership envisaged in U.S. circles, and in this context, it is not surprising that some of the most bitter trans-Pacific diplomatic wrangles broke out under Nakasone's leadership, culminating in the revelation, in 1987, that for some years the Tôshiba Corporation had violated COCOM rules by selling computer software and machine tools to the Soviet Union that could be used in submarine construction.[82] Congress responded by imposing sanctions on selected Japanese electrical imports, and, more memorably, several Congress members hanged an effigy of Toshiba Corporation on the steps of the Capitol, and bludgeoned a Toshiba portable radio with a sledgehammer.[83] Admittedly a more literal example of "Japan bashing" than most, such actions reflected an increasingly prevalent atmosphere of distrust and dislike; a feeling, as the journalist James Fallows put it in 1989, that there was "a basic conflict between Japanese and American interests." For Fallows, as for many others, this conflict arose from:

> Japan's inability or unwillingness to restrain the one-sided and destructive expansion of its economic power. The expansion is one-sided because Japanese business does to other countries what Japan will not permit to be done to itself. It is destructive because it will lead to exactly the international ostracism that Japan most fears, because it will wreck the postwar system of free trade that has made Japan and many other nations prosperous, and because it will ultimately make the U.S.-Japan partnership impossible to sustain.[84]

In this way, and throughout the decade, Japan came to be seen in the U.S. in increasingly schizophrenic terms. On the one hand, it remained a more or less undisputed 'free world' ally at a time when the global dichotomy between free/non-free world was back in vogue. On the other hand, Japan itself was perceived as an

[81] Kenneth B. Pyle, *The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era* (Washington: AEI Press, 1992), 100-103.
[82] Schaller, *Altered States*, 254.
[83] *Ibid*.

increasing threat to 'free-world' interests, at least when the term was used as a synonym for U.S. interests, as it often was by the Reagan Administration (and by Hegemonic Stability Theorists and neo-Realists generally in the analytical community).[85]

To read the above is, I suggest, to assume that nothing very much had changed at the policymaking and intellectual centre of the IR community with regard to Japan at the end of the 1980s. In some ways however, it had. While the 'black box' attitude continued to prevail among many (particularly, of course, when it came to Japan-bashing rhetoric which, by its very nature, required nothing more complex than a black box), there was also a thriving Japanese Studies community in the West, which offered a far more complex and variegated picture of Japanese life and society. Much of this community and its output, as I will demonstrate in later chapters, remained very much on the outskirts of the discussion of Japan's international role. Yet some of it was profoundly influential, intersecting with the more complex picture of the world that by now, had been conceded by International Relations and its neo-Realist mainstream in particular. It is to this literature, and to one figure in particular, Chalmers Johnson, that I now turn.

4. Neo-Realism, Revisionism and Japanese Studies: Explaining Japan.

Johnson remains one of the best-known Japanese specialists outside Japanese Studies, primarily because of his status as the pioneer of a perspective now known as Japan revisionism. In the broader IR context of course, revisionism generally refers to a body of work which in the 1960s and 1970s began to revise the official and orthodox accounts of the Cold War.[86] In Japanese Studies, it has a more specific connotation, one that is associated with the efforts of Western intellectuals, politicians and journalists to understand the significance of the Japanese political

[84] James Fallows, "Containing Japan," in *Atlantic Monthly* (May 1989: 40-48), 41.
[85] Masao Miyoshi, *Off Center* (*op. cit.*, 1991), 63-65.

economy, beginning around the late 1970s.[87] And, as Japanese growth began to challenge the U.S. perception of postwar order and stability through the 1980s, Japan revisionism became almost synonymous with the 'Japan bashing' perspective touched on above.[88]

I would argue however, that, at its best, the revisionist perspective, particularly in its earliest stages, represents something more than this. Indeed, that it represented one of the more substantial early attempts to deal with the implications of Japanese economic power by confronting, to some extent, the 'givenness' of mainstream IPE perspectives and the limitations imposed on thinking about Japan installed after 1945 in IR. On the other hand there is little doubt that the revisionist genre in Japanese studies was also a major conduit of neo-Realist influence, or, in the 1980s, that this influence underlay the tendency in revisionist literature to see Japanese 'difference' as 'threat.' Both of these aspects are integral to understanding the importance of Johnson's contribution to contemporary images of Japan, and they are never more evident than in his most famous work (and one of the most influential books on Japan ever written), *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*.[89]

Johnson: Theorising the Economic Miracle

MITI is the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and in Johnson's study its role in the direction and nature of post WW2 Japanese economic development was used to illustrate how Japan had evolved a style of industrial policy that fitted into neither the dominant Anglo American form of free-market capitalism, nor its major Cold War alternative of centrally planned socialism. Through MITI,

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[86] Lynn Eden, "The End of U.S. Cold War History? A Review Essay," in *International Security* 18:1 (1993: 174-207), 119.

[87] 'Revisionism' as a description of this effort however, was not actually taken up until the late 1980s. According to David Williams, the term 'revisionism' as it pertains to anti-Japanese commentary was coined by the editors of *Business Week* in 1989. Williams, *Japan and the Enemies of Open Political Science*, 232.

[88] E.g., in the work of Masao Miyoshi, who refers to Chalmers Johnson (see below) as "the 'Godfather' of revisionists and bashers." Miyoshi, *Off Center*, 68.

[89] Chalmers Johnson, *Miti and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982).

Johnson argued, Japan "has invented and put together the institutions of capitalism in new ways, ways that neither Adam Smith nor Karl Marx would recognise or understand."[90] It is this distinction, and the (albeit modest) questioning of conventional economic theory it involves that has been the basis of *Miti and the Japanese Miracle*'s "pathbreaking" theoretical status among general political economists and Japan specialists alike. In particular, for those trying to articulate and explain the increasing sense of disjunction between Japanese and U.S. interests, in a world where Cold War divisions still offered only two categories of belonging in the international system, Johnson's work went beyond just another description of Japanese economic development. Rather, as one admirer later noted, it introduced new concepts for understanding Japan that were "later embraced and debated seriously by the discipline of political science as a whole."[91] In this respect, *Miti and the Japanese Miracle:*

> ushered in a era of research by American Japan specialists that addressed the political economy and that began to reassess the transwar institutional communities... As in earlier periods, the Japan scholars mostly followed, rather than led, the intellectual developments in the [political science] discipline. But for the first time ever, they had in the Johnson volume a beacon *that illuminated equally theory and Japan*.[92] (emphasis added)

For Johnson, the central 'theoretical' issue at stake in understanding Japan's position in the 1980s global political economy was the need to break away from the intellectual and analytical traditions of what he called the "projectionists... writers who project onto the Japanese case Western - chiefly Anglo American - concepts, problems and norms of economic behaviour."[93] Johnson identified four main "theoretical approaches" utilised by Western analysts in explaining Japanese economic growth. The first, he termed the "anthropological" approaches (e.g. Vogel and Pye) which postulated cultural essentialisms as factors in Japanese success (e.g.

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[90] *Ibid*., 8.

[91] Richard J. Samuels, "Japanese Political Studies and the Myth of the Independent Intellectual," in Richard J. Samuels and Myron Weiner (eds.), *The Political Culture of Foreign Area and International Studies: Essays in Honour of Lucien W. Pye* (Washington: Brassey's, 1992), 31.

Confucian work ethic and Japanese groupism) [94] The second approach he termed the "pure" economics perspective (e.g. in the work of Hugh T. Patrick) which explains Japanese growth in terms of the natural outcome of global market forces. The third category encompasses those approaches which concentrate on the "unique" structural influence of unusual Japanese institutions (such as the lifetime employment system or enterprise unionism), and the fourth represents the (then) major U.S. Government and neo-Realist perspective, based on "free rider" themes.[95]

While rejecting none of these approaches out of hand, Johnson argued for a broader socio-historical context which took into account not only Japan's location within the IPE over the past century or so, but also the complex matrix of relationships in Japanese society concerning the government, the bureaucracy and the public. It was this unique combination of internal/external circumstances, or 'situational imperatives,' Johnson argued, that had forced the Japanese governing elite to adopt a "developmental state policy" over the hundred years or so of Japan's modernisation. The foremost characteristic of the developmental policy, he explained, was the tendency of the ruling elite to set substantive social and economic goals. In contrast, the "regulatory state" (of which the U.S. is an example), was more "market rational... concern[ing] itself with the forms and procedures – the rules, if you will – of economic competition, but not... with substantive matters."[96] Both systems Johnson argued, rely on and promote distinct types of economic and political decisionmaking, but they lead to very different structural relationships between government, industry and the bureaucracy. Accordingly, the history of MITI and its role could be seen as a microcosm of the history of Japan as a developmental state in the world political economy.

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[92] *Ibid*., 32.
[93] Johnson, *Miti and the Japanese Miracle*, 6-7.
[94] Johnson interprets the much-cited Japanese preference for "consensus" for example, as a result of the social and economic misery of the 1940s, which "made all Japanese equally poor," and provided the incentive for mass economic mobilisation. In other words, it was based on "changes in historical circumstances and political consciousness and not [as many Modernisation/*Nihonjinron* theorists argued] on unique social values." *Ibid*., 239.
[95] *Ibid*., 8-15.

Just as important as the distinction between developmental and regulatory states in Johnson's argument, however, was his explanation of why Japan had not been recognised as a developmental state within mainstream Western political and economic theory. As he pointed out, the idea of the developmental state was, after all, not particularly foreign to Western economic thought, being located within the *Handelspolitik* ("neomercantilism" or "economic nationalism") school of thought developed by German thinkers such as Weber and Dahrendorf.[97] The problem, however, argued Johnson, was that in this context it becomes a theme dominated by "the prevalent and peculiarly Western preference *for binary modes of thought* in the field of political economy" (emphasis added). Thus:

> In modern times Weber began the practice with his distinction between a "market economy" *(Verkehrwirtschaft)* and a "planned economy" *(Planwirtschaft)*. Some recent analogues are Dahrendorf's distinction between "market rationality" and "plan rationality," Dore's distinction between "market-oriented systems" and "organisation-oriented systems," and Kelly's distinction between a "rule-governed state" *(necromantic)* and a "purpose-governed state." [98]

This, for Johnson, now gave a hint of the more immediate problem concerning the way in which Western scholars and policymakers understood (or misunderstood) Japan, and why its behaviour had come to be perceived as threatening by so many in the U.S. The point, he argued, was that Western "binary modes of thought" in the post WW2 period had became dominated by Cold War ideology to the extent that "the existence of the developmental state *in any form other than the communist state* has largely been forgotten or ignored as a result of the years of disputation with Marxist - Leninists."[99] Consequently, because Japan does not 'fit' into either of the categories within this dichotomised perspective it was always being represented (in

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[96] *Ibid*., 18-19.
[97] *Ibid*., 18.
[98] *Ibid*.
[99] *Ibid*.

the English-speaking West, at least) as "a variant of something other than what it is."[100]

It is on this issue, I suggest, that the critical contribution of *Miti and the Japanese Miracle* deserves recognition, not just within Japanese Studies, but as Samuels suggests, "within the discipline of political science as a whole."[101] On this issue, Johnson's acknowledgement of the intellectual straitjackets imposed by Cold War Realist dichotomy, which forced 'Japan' and its economy either into a category like the U.S., or like the USSR, also enabled him to recognise, albeit implicitly and to a limited extent, beyond the 'black box' of the state-as-actor in the international system. Thus, in terms which were to become more obviously part of the Critical Social Theory perspectives in IR and Japanese Studies in the 1980s and 1990s, Johnson's revisionist approach began to explore, not just the factors imposed upon Japan in order to define it (e.g. as Western asset), but also the complex *internal* factors – the particular social, political and economic power relationships between the Japanese bureaucracy, the Japanese government, Japanese business elite and (to a lesser extent), the Japanese people, that have also come to define Japan as a modern state, and determine its position in the world.

On these issues, Johnson's approach was undoubtedly more thoughtful than the (hitherto dominant) Modernisation Theory approach in Japanese Studies, which merely sought to show how Japan had successfully evolved from a feudal order, to become "a superior and even more efficient expression of liberal democracy."[102] For Johnson, Japanese development, particularly in the post-WW2 period, had been a far more complex, tension-filled process of bureaucratic trial and error, in which the social and political action motivated by public fears and angers (over issues such as pollution, industrial relations and bureaucratic control) had played a major role. In this context, Johnson was (rightly) scornful of how easily "admirers of the

[100] *Ibid.*, 17.
[101] Samuels, "Japanese Political Studies and the Myth of the Independent Intellectual," 31.

tranquillity of Japanese society during the 1970s [e.g., Reischauer and Jansen] forgot the strikes, riots, demonstrations and sabotage that marked the period 1949-1961."[103]

The broader notion that Japan needed to be looked at on its own terms had, of course, been around for somewhat longer than the more specific political economy perspective Johnson brought to it in the *Miti* study. In this sense, *Miti and the Japanese Miracle* reflected the legacy of the more 'liberal' scholarship mentioned above, that developed out of reactions to the Vietnam War — reactions that, in some cases, had been quite evident in Japanese Studies from the early 1970s. In 1972 for example, when the Japanese-American Assembly met to discuss the new tensions in the San Francisco System, it was obvious that a number of participants, not all of them Japanese, related these tensions to a dominant and perhaps inappropriate 'Western' (U.S.) understanding of global life. It was in this context that Graham Allison spoke at length on the necessary challenges to the U.S. foreign policy establishment, and its "prevailing set of basic assumptions and simplifications about what was happening in international politics."[104] Assumptions, which for Allison, had effectively broken down in the aftermath of Vietnam, along with the "moral authority" of the U.S. and the "widespread domestic public consensus" associated with earlier U.S. foreign policy perspectives.[105] Developing this theme, another delegate, George Packard, blamed a "Eurocentric bias" in U.S. teaching methods for the "abysmal national ignorance" within the U.S. about non-Western countries, and the tendency of its foreign policymaking elite to arrogantly dismiss the need for area specialists.[106] The dangers of this state of affairs, Packard argued, had been clearly demonstrated in Vietnam, where available experts who might have been able to offer more nuanced interpretations of the Vietnamese struggle and its people were often

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[102] Harootunian, "America's Japan/Japan's Japan" (*op. cit.*, 1993), 203.
[103] Johnson, *Miti and the Japanese Miracle*, 197.
[104] Allison, "American Foreign Policy and Japan," 19.
[105] *Ibid.*, 20-23.
[106] George R. Packard, "A Crisis in Understanding," in Rosovsky (ed.), *Discord in the Pacific* (*op. cit.*, 1972), 133-134.

deliberately excluded in favour of those who were willing to project the simplistic ('black box') orthodoxy advocated by the intellectual and political elite.[107]

Similarly, there was evidence that the "binary modes of thought" later criticised by Johnson, were already making inroads at this time, particularly among Japanese scholars impatient with the seeming inability of the U.S. to countenance Japan as an international equal. Addressing the issue of increasing trade-related tensions between Japan and the U.S. in this regard, Yonosuke Nagai had criticised the tendency in U.S. foreign policy to "see [all] rivals in monolithic terms," along the lines of a Soviet Threat or China Threat.[108] Speaking directly to the issue of strategic ethnocentricity, Masao Kunihiro suggested, further, that linguistic and cultural differences could no longer be ignored in state interactions. Japan, he argued, literally did not 'speak' the language of international relations in the way that the U.S. did. Thus, "the first step in improving U.S.. - Japanese communication," Kunihiro stated, "should be for Americans to discard the idea that this Western logic is *the* universal thought structure for all the 3.6 billion inhabitants of this globe."[109]

I would argue that what Johnson achieved, via *Miti and the Japanese Miracle*, was, effectively, to pull many of these various, emerging discontents together, by providing one of the first empirically rigorous studies of *why* "Western logic" could not be unthinkingly applied to the Japanese postwar experience. As such, his work was vital in creating the space for subsequent explorations of Japan which have also gone beyond both the 'black box' theme, and the Modernisation narrative of Japan as the super-achiever of the Western liberal democratic model. Works as diverse as Ross Mouer and Yoshio Sugimoto's studies of Japanese social diversity (1986),[110]

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[107] *Ibid*., 140-142.
[108] Yonosuke Nagai, "Some Observations on the Perception Gap," in Rosovsky (ed.), *Discord in the Pacific* (*op. cit*., 1972), 201.
[109] Masao Kunihiro, "U.S.-Japan Communications," in Rosovsky (ed.), *Discord in the Pacific* (*op. cit*., 1972), 163.
[110] Ross Mouer and Yoshio Sugimoto, *Images of Japanese Society: A Study in the Social Construction of Reality* (London: KPI Limited, 1986).

Gavan McCormack's questioning of democratic institutions in Japan (1986, 1996),[111] and the 'new wave' of economic histories which, like *Miti and the Japanese Miracle*, probe the tensions and contradictions of Japan's postwar growth, (Tessa Morris-Suzuki and Takurô Sciyama, 1989; Laura Hein, 1990 & 1993, and William K. Tabb, 1995),[112] have all been created in this space.

Johnson's Debt to Realism/neo-Realism: The 'Bashing' Connection

The specific contributions of these and other 'post-revisionist' scholarship will be explored in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. For now however, I wish to return to the claim made above, regarding the intersection of the revisionist perspective, and of Johnson's work in particular, to the themes discussed at the beginning of this chapter. More specifically, I argue that the revisionist perspective harbours lingering overtones of the dominant (Realist/neo-Realist) IR and IPE perspectives discussed above — overtones which ultimately limited many of Johnson's insights in *Miti and the Japanese Miracle*, and which have remained especially influential within the sector of Japanese Studies charged with discussing Japan's international relations.

These limitations are evident in Johnson's perspective, I suggest, as soon as one starts to probe *Miti and the Japanese Miracle* for some of the broader, more basic assumptions he makes about the world in which Japan exists as a 'modern state.'[113] For, despite Johnson's interest in adding an 'internal' dimension to his analysis of Japan, he was/is not particularly concerned with challenging the basic, dominant perception of what states are and how they behave in the international system. This becomes quite clear at the end of *Miti and the Japanese Miracle,* where Johnson

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[111] Gavan McCormack & Yoshio Sugimoto, *Democracy in Contemporary Japan: A Reader* (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1986), and Gavan McCormack, *The Emptiness of Japanese Affluence* (*op. cit.*, 1996).
[112] Tessa Morris-Suzuki and Takurô Seiyama, *Japanese Capitalism Since 1945* (*op. cit.*, 1989). Laura E. Hein, "Growth versus Success: Japan's Economic Policy in Historical Perspective" (*op. cit.*, 1993), and *Fuelling Growth: The Energy Revolution and Economic Policy in Postwar Japan*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990). William K. Tabb, *The Postwar Japanese System* (*op. cit.*, 1995).
[113] Johnson, *Miti and the Japanese Miracle*, 300.

concludes that the diversity of modern states can best be understood in terms of their priorities. Thus:

> Today there are welfare states, religious states, equality states, defence states, revolutionary states, and so forth. All this is a way of saying that the innumerable things a state does can be arranged in rough rank order according to its priorities, and that a state's first priority will define its essence.[114]

On this basis, the clue to understanding Japanese success in the international system is, ultimately, the particular priorities the Japanese state has been forced to adopt – its 'situational imperatives' which determine every state's development. This, as we have seen, is where Johnson regards Western projectionism as having failed, because the particular "situational imperatives" that have faced Japan during its period of development (and which account for the unique characteristics of domestic institutions such as MITI) fall outside rigidly defined postwar Western categorisations.

The point is however, that 'situational imperatives' of any kind exist for Johnson as the result of a more fundamental ordering system in the world of states. And, it is when he attempts to explain how this system works that Johnson seems to abandon his reservations about Western projectionism, and, ironically, starts to sound very much like the neo-Realists that dominated IR/IPE thinking in the West when he wrote *Miti* – responding, as Kenneth Waltz would, by pointing to the structural conditions for rational action on the part of market actors. Thus:

> The priorities of the Japanese state derive first and foremost from an assessment of Japan's situational imperatives, and are in this sense a product not of culture or social organisation or insularity but of [systemic] rationality... During the 1920s and 1930s Japan tried to solve the economic problems it faced by handing over to the state the responsibility for economic development. It goes without saying that what the state did during the 1930s made the situation worse, not better, but the fact that there may have been preferable alternatives to the ones adopted does not detract from the rationality of its [systemic] priorities. [115]

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[114] *Ibid.*, 303.
[115] *Ibid.*, 307.

In other words, whatever 'priorities' cultural and historical difference might bestow on a society like Japan, it and all other states must ultimately conform to a broader standard of "rationality" derived from the structural "situational imperatives" imposed upon the state system out there in the real world. From this perspective, Johnson's argument is less about understanding the diversity of states per se, than it is about understanding the diverse priorities that all states pursue for a core set of uniform reasons — reasons drawn from a reductionist understanding of *the* state as rational utilitarian actor which has directed mainstream (i.e., Realist and neo-Realist) IR and IPE analysis over the past six decades or so. This is the other (positivist directed) side to Johnson's revisionist contribution which insisted that it was possible to understand Japan not as any "variant" of a Western economic model, but *"as it really is."*[116]

It is in this context, I argue, that *Miti and the Japanese Miracle* connects to the more hardline stance towards Japan that, by the time of its publication, was starting to solidify among Reagan-era neo-Realists and Hegemonic Stability Theorists. During this time, a number of otherwise 'generalist' scholars began to turn their attention to the Japan problem, as a particularly salient example of the new complexities facing the U.S. in the changed circumstances of the post-Vietnam era. One of the more prominent figures in this grouping was Robert Gilpin who in contributions to *The Political Economy of Japan* (1987)[117] and other works, outlined many of the themes which became the new IPE and IR orthodoxy inn the 1980s regarding Japan as 'problem-child.'

Gilpin, of course, is a major IPE scholar who over a number of years has brought some classical Realist assumptions to his works on the reality of the international system. Like other scholars of his ilk though, Gilpin would acknowledge the

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[116] *Ibid*., 17.

[117] *The Political Economy of Japan* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987-1992), was a mammoth research project coordinated by Yasusuke Murakami and Hugh T. Patrick, and designed to be the definitive Japanese Studies text for the 1980s/early 1990s. Volume II, *The Changing*

changed circumstances of the post-Vietnam period and integrate his perspectives into the fully fledged neo-Realism of the 1980s. Nevertheless, in 1975, he maintained that the traditional principles of power politics still applied, even in an interdependent global economy.[118] Moreover, claimed Gilpin, while a liberal economic order characterised by "relatively free trade, currency convertibility, and freedom of capital movement"[119] was dependent on a certain level of cooperation among otherwise conflicting state actors, "the historical record suggests that... the existence of mutual economic benefits is not always enough to induce nations to pay the costs of a market system or to forgo opportunities of advancing their own interests at the expense of others."[120] Accordingly, and in line with Kindleberger's understanding of the structural necessities of the international system-as-market, Gilpin proposed the need for a hegemonic orderer, given that the system does not work via "the operation of an invisible hand and in the absence of the exercise of power."[121]

It was this same perspective that Gilpin brought to his analysis of Japan ten years later, in the context of what he saw as a "new protectionism" in the global system, engendered specifically by the Japanese and detrimental to the U.S. sponsored strategies of 'free-trade.' Japan, he indicated, was not playing fairly (i.e. by hegemonic rules) but had "changed the rules of the [international trading] game" by inspiring other industrialising states to adopt similar patterns of economic policy; in particular, a "state interventionist" approaches.[122] This, argued Gilpin, was placing even more strain on the global trading system and of the ability of the hegemon to control it. And while "all major industrial economies," Gilpin argued, were being

International Context (1987) was edited by Daniel Okimoto and Takashi Inoguchi (whose own contribution to IR/Japanese Studies is covered at some length in Chapter Seven).

[118] Gilpin, "The Nature of Political Economy," from Robert Gilpin, *U.S. Power and Multinational Corporation: the Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment* (New York: Basic Books, 1975); reproduced in Robert J. Art & Robert Jervis (eds.), *International Politics: Anarchy, Force, Political Economy and Decision-Making* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1985), 287.

[119] *Ibid*.

[120] *Ibid*.

[121] *Ibid*., 288.

encouraged by the U.S. to go along with "the regime of liberalised trade," the Japanese example was undermining the efforts of the U.S. systemic orderer.[123] Indeed, for Gilpin, the deterioration of the liberal trade regime (and the decline of the U.S. hegemon) stemmed largely from the fact that by the mid-1980s, "almost every advanced industrial country had begun to emulate Japan's industrial policies."[124]

In keeping with the general attitude of fear and mistrust in the U.S. concerning Japan and in line with neo-Realist perspectives on the world, Gilpin warned also about the problem of "alternative hegemons" when it came to ordering the global IPE. The problem, he argued, was primarily one of 'legitimacy,' based on the historical record of aspiring hegemons:

> Unless this legitimacy issue can be resolved or somehow transcended, economic nationalism and regionalism will make deeper inroads into the postwar regime of liberalised trade. What this intensifying problem demonstrates is that a liberal economic order must rest on a firm political and ideological base. The United States and its conception of a liberal order dominated the postwar era. With the relative decline of U.S. power *and the rise of powers with different conceptions of legitimacy* the future of the liberal world economy has become severely threatened.[125] (emphasis added)

For Gilpin, of course, Japan was the actor in question whose "conceptions of legitimacy" were not congruent with the liberal postwar order, and which now threatened the ability of the only 'legitimate' hegemon to maintain that order. This was a theme he later spelt out in his major work, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (1987) where he insisted again that it was Japan and the Japanese system, more than any other factor, that was undermining the efficient and legitimate order of the 1980s IPE. This, he concluded, was because:

> Whereas Western economies are based on belief in the superior efficiency of the free market and individualism, the market and the individual in Japan are not relatively

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[122] Gilpin, "The Changing Trade Regime," in Inoguchi and Okimoto (eds.), *The Political Economy of Japan, Volume II: The Changing International Context* (*op. cit.*, 1988), 140-41.
[123] *Ibid.*, 147.
[124] *Ibid.*, 163.
[125] *Ibid.*, 168.

> autonomous, *but are deeply embedded in a powerful nonliberal culture and social system.*[126] (emphasis added)

From Gilpin's neo-Realist perspective then, Japan had become, at best, a 'problem-child' in global terms, because it no longer did what the legitimate economic hegemon wanted it to and even more disturbingly, it no longer seemed to be following the social, cultural and political rules laid down by the U.S. after 1945. Japan, in short, was no longer controllable by the U.S. and from a neo-Realist perspective, of course, where there is dissent and difference there is disorder – and where there is disorder, there is anarchy close by. For Gilpin thus, this disorder came with the protectionist example set by Japan, an example which underlay the hegemonic decline of the global orderer and had anarchical implications for the free-market system.

For all this, Gilpin is not a 'Japan Basher' per se in the way the term came to be used in the late 1980s. Nor, as indicated above, is Johnson. My point, however, is that the development of *both* revisionism and its 'Japan Bashing' variant was intrinsically connected to the attitudes and perspectives of the Reagan Administration and U.S. foreign policy in the 1980s – and the development of those attitudes and perspectives in much neo-Realist inspired literature, particularly that centred on 'hegemonic' themes. If one looks at the major themes of Japan bashing: (i) Japan as fundamentally 'different' to the West, (ii) the difficulty if not impossibility of Japan ever becoming truly 'Western,' (i.e., 'normal') and (iii) the problem/threat that Japanese difference poses to the West, all of these themes rely on the broader assumptions of anarchy/competition among nation states. Moreover, and as indicated above, these themes were always intrinsic to *Miti and the Japanese Miracle*, and the subsequent revisionist literature it inspired.

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[126] Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1987), 391-2.

This remains the case in some of Johnson's own contributions, post-*Miti*, and post-Cold War. Indeed, if anything, in the years after *Miti*'s publication, I suggest, as Johnson became less interested in probing the 'internal' factors which might enlighten contemporary observers of Japan, much of his work has increasingly complemented the neo-Realist mainstream which, in one form or another, continues to insist that all states (and other actors) must comply with structural or 'situational imperatives.' This shift in emphasis has been accompanied by a corresponding shift in tone, reflecting the unpopularity of any sort of 'moderation' towards Japan in the U.S., in the years following *Miti*'s first appearance. In the wake of the establishment of Japan as the world's largest creditor nation, the blowout of the U.S./Japan trade deficit by billions of dollars, and the confirmation (through the Gulf War) of Japan's 'selfish' free-riderism on security issues, there is a harder line apparent; one which emphasises the need for the U.S. to invoke what power it possesses, in containing the Asian/Japanese onslaught.

Thus in 1992, and again in 1995, Johnson borrowed the rhetoric of Michael Friedman and Meredith LeBard to emphasise the inevitability of conflict between the U.S. and Japan, should things remain the same between them, for structuralist reasons associated with the (Realist) security dilemma, in that, "both are responsible nations living in a dangerous world."[127] Unlike LeBard and Friedman however, Johnson does not believe that the U.S. and Japan are headed for armed conflict. His predictions have a more contemporary (neo-Realist) ring to them, concerning global conflicts over "technonationalism" and an IPE strategy, and above all, a deliberately free-riding Japan that has attempted to strengthen its position vis-à-vis the U.S. by prolonging the Cold War economic/security relationship, "built on a badly outdated

[127] George Friedman and Meredith LeBard, *The Coming War with Japan* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), cited in Johnson, "Japan in Search of a Normal Role," in *Daedalus* 121:4 (1992:1-33), 16. Johnson later returned to the Friedman/LeBard argument in *Japan: Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1995), 322.

division of labour."[128] In this context, Johnson has remained critical of the U.S. elite, and its failure to recognise how the U.S. has been duped into an outmoded and unsustainable role.

> A more imaginative administration might have re-evaluated America's strategic interests in Japan in light of long-term changes in strategic and economic trends. It might have concluded that a regional balance of power among China, Japan and ASEAN, maintained in part by the United States in return for greater American participation in the Asian economy, was needed for the next century. Instead, as the United States attempts to reassure the region with its continuing defence commitment, the economic factors creating a more independent Asia are exposing the frailty of the U. S. position.[129]

Accordingly, and echoing Gilpin, Johnson warns that the U.S. needs to seriously re-think Japan's continued "protectorate status" in the post-Cold War world, forcing it instead to evolve into a more normal power, "a country with a balanced portfolio of economic, technological, military and other forms of power used in concert with its allies, and under firm control of the nation's political leaders."[130] In addition, he argues, the U.S. must adopt a far tougher economic stance towards Asia, principally by refusing to continue to serve as "the absorber of other nations gross surpluses of production."[131] It is, in short, the modulated vision of U.S. hegemony explained in Chapter One, that has been popular among many IR theorists and Japan specialists since the late 1980s – global leadership propped up by a renewed emphasis on military burden-sharing, and a greatly increased willingness to invoke economic levers in the pursuit of U.S. interests.

My point in discussing Johnson in this way, in regard to both his *Miti* book of the 1980s and his later work, is to try and personify the revisionist literature that emerged in response to the neo-Realism in IR and the reasserted hegemonic ambitions of the U.S. during the Reagan era. My point also was to indicate the

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[128] Johnson, "Ending Japan's Protectorate Status," in Selig S. Harrison and Clyde V. Prestowitz (eds.), *Asia After the "Miracle:" Redefining U.S. Economic and Security Priorities* (Washington: The Economic Strategy Institute, 1998), 110.
[129] *Ibid.*, 115.
[130] *Ibid.*, 116.

connections between these themes, and to illustrate how the theory and practice of the Cold War years still resonates very powerfully through the literature on, and attitudes towards, 'Japan' in the current era. There was however, an additional task here, and one which could only be achieved by also emphasising the positive, incisive contribution in Johnson's *Miti* book. It was to indicate that for all the influences of positivism, Realism/neo-Realism and the Cold War, there have been, and are, other ways of thinking about IR and IPE and Japan which have other kinds of implications in practice.

In the chapters to come, I intend to bring these perspectives into the debate, and in doing so, re-capture Johnson's best contribution; namely, his effort towards opening the 'black box' of Japan. First however, I want to set up the broader framework for this process, by saying something about the critical responses to the fudamental assumptions behind Realism/neo-Realism. This is the task of my next chapter.

[131] *Ibid.*, 118.

CHAPTER FIVE

CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY: EXPLORATIONS BEYOND 'INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:' IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 'JAPAN' QUESTION.

This chapter begins the second section of this thesis, in which, having illustrated the connections between orthodox perspectives on IR and some dominant perceptions of Japan in Japanese Studies, I examine some important alternative perspectives on both. More specifically, in this chapter, and the ones to follow, my concern is to engage some of the ways in which both IR and Japanese Studies have, in recent years, begun to connect to the insights and attitudes of a new kind of scholarship broadly defined as Critical Social Theory (CST).[1]

Critical Social Theory is not a single approach per se. Rather, as George and Campbell have explained, it is an umbrella term for a range of critical approaches to International Relations, some of them very different, which emerged in the 1980s.[2] It is simply not possible for me to examine all of these approaches in great detail within the confines of this thesis, but nor, I argue, is it necessary, given the nature of the particular 'connection' project outlined in Chapter One. My main concern, consequently, is to explain how certain arguments and texts become positioned under the CST umbrella and to connect their themes to a Japanese Studies context. My discussion begins with an outline of the broader historical and intellectual circumstances in which critical approaches began to penetrate IR debates in the 1980s. I will then briefly engage some of the most important themes associated with the critiques of mainstream IR via these approaches. Finally, I will set up the framework for the chapter that follows, by saying something, briefly, about the broad

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[1] Jim George and David Campbell, "Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration of Difference: Critical Social Theory and International Relations." *International Studies Quarterly: Journal of the International Studies Association* 34:3 (1990): 269-293, on p. 269.
[2] *Ibid.*, 282.

contemporary context in which CST themes have become important for Japanese Studies.

1. The 'Third Debate;' Re-Opening IR to Critical Debate in the 1980s and 1990s.

> These (CST) debates point to no necessary conclusion. They mandate no single position. Instead, they suggest the opening up of "thinking space," a space of thought that is exploited by a variety of dissident voices who would speak in reply to the dangers and opportunities of political life in the late twentieth century.
>
> Jim George and David Campbell, 1990[3]

As the above passage suggests, the diversity of CST approaches to International Relations is itself a commanding feature of their 'criticality.' This diversity however, does not prevent the identification of prominent themes within the CST challenge to IR; most notably (for this thesis), its shared antipathy to Realism and, by extension, to the scientism that Realism in its (largely) U.S. articulation, represents. In this context, while the emergence of CST in the 1980s was very much part of the renewed liberal response to the social, economic and political impact of Reaganism, both domestically and abroad, it was also different from previous critical encounters within the IR field.

As Yosef Lapid explains, the so-called 'third great debate' that CST generated within IR circles did not simply focus on Realism/neo-Realism and the disciplinary and policy orthodoxies of the IR community, but on the historical, political and intellectual processes by which such orthodoxies had come to prominence in the IR field in the first place.[4] In this respect, the 'third debate' marks the moment when International Relations was confronted by a range of critical challenges which had been part of the analytical agenda in many others sectors of the humanities for years — for example, in philosophy, history, the philosophy of science, anthropology and

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[3] *Ibid.*, 269.

sociology.[5] Until relatively recently, IR had kept this critical incursion at a distance via the dichotomy which distinguished 'domestic' theory and practice from the purportedly discrete realm of inter-state relations.[6]

The emergence of a CST dimension to IR theorising however, has seen this dichotomy, and indeed, the processes of dichotomous thought per se, problematised and critically assessed. This has been the case most obviously in regard to the critical debate surrounding neo-Realist orthodoxy in IR, and its claims for an enhanced 'scientific' understanding of contemporary global life, which, as I mentioned in Chapter Two, and more expansively in Chapter Four, is underwritten by neo-Realism's reliance on positivism. More specifically, it is underwritten by the (positivist) assumption that there is a fundamental distinction between 'fact' and 'value;' the former being theory-neutral. As discussed previously, this has allowed both Realism and neo-Realism to claim objective knowledge of an (anarchical) world of states 'out there' – a mode of thought which remained intrinsic to the 'black box' thematic of IR (and its Japanese Studies sub-branch) for most of the postwar period.

From the outset, the CST challenge was founded upon a profound scepticism about this claim to objectivism, and a deeper and more comprehensive approach to knowledge and political society than had previously been the case in IR. Consequently, its effect was to open up the major premises and assertions of orthodox IR perspectives, for so long the taken-for-granted basis of (Cold War) policy prescription, to questions of ontology and epistemology. Or, in other words, to the questions about 'how we know the world.' As I argued in Chapter Two, these questions have rarely, if ever, been at the forefront of mainstream IR theorising, or its

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[4] Yosef Lapid, "The Third Debate. On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era." *International Studies Quarterly* 33:3 (1989): 235-253, on p. 236.

[5] Mark Hoffman, "Conversations on Critical International Relations Theory," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 17:1 (1988): 91-95, on p. 91. As a number of scholars (e.g., George, *op. cit.*, 1994; Devetak, *op. cit.*, 1996; Smith, *op. cit.*, 1996) have pointed out, both the first and second "great debates" (realism vs. idealism in the inter-war period; behaviouralism vs. classical theory in the postwar period) were not concerned with questions of epistemology, but instead accepted, implicitly, "a rather simple and, crucially, an uncontested set of positivist assumptions which have fundamentally stifled debate over both what the world is like and how we might explain it." Steve Smith, "Positivism and Beyond" (*op. cit.*, 1996), 11.

Japanese Studies dimension. In recent years however, their inclusion in critical debates has seen IR opened up to a wide range of 'unconventional' approaches, including some previously 'alien' perspectives based on European 'sociology of knowledge' premises (e.g. German hermeneutics via Gadamer and Mannheim); unconventional philosophy of science approaches (e.g. via Kuhn and Feyeraband); issues concerning the relationship between social language and reality (e.g. via Wittgenstein and Sassure);[7] and the role of orthodox IR thinking in the larger rationalist framing of the modern world.[8]

In short, as R. B. J. Walker explained it in 1980, the point has been to force Realist and neo-Realist thought to confront a shift under way in the wider social theory debate, which has seen scholars from a wide variety of backgrounds attempting "to make a decisive break from the comfortable, deeply ingrained and indeed addictive Western habit of making a separation between subject and object, between the knower and the world to be known."[9] In this regard, CST scholarship, in an IR context, is not just about the post-Enlightenment surge towards positivism as the exemplary modern knowledge form, e.g., as in neo-Realism. Rather, it is concerned with the whole (historical and philosophical) process by which modern (primarily Western) forms of knowledge *as power* have served to disenfranchise and exclude other ways of thinking and being, particularly at the global level.[10]

The nature of this challenge is perhaps best exemplified by two particular branches of CST thought: Critical Theory, which has brought the concerns of two generations of Frankfurt School scholarship to bear on IR (in particular, via the work of Habermas), and Postmodernism/Poststructuralism, which utilises the works and influences of (primarily) French scholarship, notably Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. While these do not, by any means, exhaust the possibilities for thinking about IR from new

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[6] *Ibid*., 239.
[7] George and Campbell, "Patterns of Dissent," 272-73.
[8] Jim George, "International Relations and the Search for Thinking Space: Another View of the Third Debate," *International Studies Quarterly* 33:1 (1989): 269-279, on p. 272.

and critical perspectives, I have chosen them as most representative of the broad critical themes which I wish to consider in the context of the 'Japan question' in the chapters which follow. Accordingly, I turn now to a brief discussion of these two perspectives, in their IR context.

2. Critical Theory.

Critical Theory's philosophical background has been described elsewhere in the depth and detail it demands.[11] But it is Critical Theory's acknowledgement of the knowledge-power nexus that has generated its major appeal amongst IR specialists, particularly those unconvinced by the detached scientism of (in particular) neo-Realism. And, it is this nexus, represented in Critical Theory terms, which led some CST scholars in the early 1980s to focus on the positive aspects of Traditional Realism, arguing that the historical sensitivity and critical openness discernible in the work of scholars such as E. H. Carr, could and should be distinguished from the reductionism and closure associated with neo-Realist positivism.

Richard Ashley: Recovering a 'Critical Theory' of International Relations

One of the most explicit (and influential) arguments of this kind came from Richard Ashley who, in 1981 sought to illustrate how, increasingly in the postwar period, Realism had become systematically reduced to a single knowledge form – scientific rationalism – in the interests of producing a unified, "technical" knowledge and a theory of control suited to the circumstances of the Cold War.[12] Rejecting this perspective, Ashley proposed the need to explore the "deeper relations between realist concepts, knowledge claims, and modes of inquiry and grounding, on the one

[9] R. B. J. Walker, *Political Theory and the Transformation of World Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Centre of International Studies, 1980), 4.
[10] George, *Discourses of Global Politics* (*op. cit.*, 1994), 22.
[11] E.g., in Richard Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism* (*op. cit.*, 1983), chapters 1-3. Specific influences include Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm and Leo Lowenthal, as well as Jurgen Habermas, who is perhaps the single most important conduit of Frankfurt School thought in an IR context. Richard Devetak, "Critical Theory," in Burchill and Linklater (eds.), *Theories of International Relations* (*op. cit.*, 1996), 146.
[12] Richard K. Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests," *International Studies Quarterly* 25:2 (1981): 204-236.

hand, and the world of social action, on the other." His aim was not simply to condemn or dismiss Realism per se, but, in Habermasian terms, to expose some of the "critical tensions that make realism, at least potentially a vital, open ended tradition."[13]

With this in mind, Ashley sought to distinguish between the "technical" or "modern" (neo)realism of scholars such as Waltz, which denies the intersubjective relationship between the theorist and the social circumstances under which theory is produced, and a more interpretivist route traversed, however rudimentarily and sporadically, by "practical" Realists such as E. H. Carr, John Herz and Hans Morgenthau. This "practical" strain of Realism, Ashley argued, had critical potential because it sought a knowledge of IR, not in order to more effectively control an objectified environment (a là Waltz),[14] but in order to understand how, in the contemporary world of states, it is possible:

> to be and behave as a worthy member of one's traditional community with its intersubjective and consensually endorsed norms, rights, meanings, purposes and limitations on what the individual participant can be and might become.[15]

For Ashley, this was not about countering Realism with 'idealism.' Rather, as he went on to explain in some detail, it represented a genuinely emancipatory approach to a hitherto closed discipline, by opening up a conceptual space in which notions of power and national interest can be perceived as derivative of historical, political and cultural interpretation, rather than as the pre-theoretical "givens" of a technical-rationalist image of reality.[16] It was an approach, he argued, which offered a more progressive understanding of reality, centred as it was on the historical and political interests of human actors, rather than the mechanical operation of systems or

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[13] *Ibid*., 206-7.
[14] Waltz himself, as Ashley pointed out, is quite straightforward on this point, acknowledging that "the urge to explain is not born of idle curiosity alone. It is produced also by the desire to control, or at least to know if control is possible." Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (*op. cit*., 1979), quoted in Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests," 217.
[15] *Ibid*., 212.
[16] *Ibid*., 214.

structures. In short, Ashley wrote, a Critical Theory approach represents (in Habermasian terms) the potential for thinking and acting:

> freed from unacknowledged constraints, relations of domination, and [the] conditions of distorted communication that deny humans the capacity to make their future through free will and consciousness... in short... exercising reflective reason to dissolve limits on the self-conscious development of life and thereby restore to men and women a true awareness of their place in history and their capacities to make the future.[17]

These themes were also at the forefront of Ashley's most powerful contribution to the CST agenda in IR: "The Poverty of Neorealism" (1984).[18] While I have already cited this essay in Chapter Two, for its specific criticisms of the positivist underpinnings of Waltz's "technical realism," it warrants a further (if brief) mention here. In this 1984 work, Ashley's critical sights were focused on the way in which neo-Realism, in the name of scientific scholarship, had effectively betrayed the critical potential of Traditionalist Realism.[19] Consequently, Ashley proposed, neo-Realists such as Waltz, Gilpin, Tucker, Keohane and Krasner, had effectively reduced Realist thought to a:

> positivist structuralism that treats the given order as the natural order, limits rather than expands political discourse, negates or trivializes the significance of variety across time and place [and] subordinates all practice to an interest in control.[20]

Ashley represented this neo-Realist approach as "an orrery of errors," set upon a "self-enclosed, self-affirming joining of statist, utilitarian, positivist and structuralist commitments," held together at its core by a positivist/empiricist epistemology.[21] Accordingly, Ashley wrote, neo-Realism is a theory "by and for positivists," which "excludes all standpoints that would expose the limits of the given order of things."[22] This it did, at one level, by refusing to problematise its state-as-actor model, thereby

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[17] This is Ashley's reading of the realism of John Herz (although not one that Herz himself necessarily agreed with, as his response to Ashley's article in the same volume indicates). *Ibid*., 227.
[18] Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," *International Organization* 38:2 (1984): 225-286. Reprinted in *Neorealism And Its Critics* edited by R. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). All subsequent page references are from the version published in *Neorealism And Its Critics*.
[19] *Ibid*., 228.
[20] *Ibid*.
[21] *Ibid*., 248.

treating as given, the "existence, boundaries, identifying structures, constituencies, legitimations, interests, and capacities to make decisions" of modern states.[23] As such, and for all its "scientific" posturing, neo-Realism excluded the state-as-actor from the very falsificationist process it claimed as essential to establishing worthwhile knowledge. Consequently, Ashley concluded, the state-as-actor approach, ironically, represented for neo-Realism precisely what neo-Realists claimed it did for Traditionalism: a "metaphysical commitment prior to science and exempted from scientific criticism."[24]

As I indicated earlier, Ashley focused in particular on what he saw as the theoretical "poverty" of Kenneth Waltz's structuralism, stressing its tendency, on the one hand, to grant the anarchical structure of IR "a life of its own independent of the parts, the states-as-actors," while, on the other, seeking to establish "the independence of the structured whole from the idealized point of view of the lone, isolated state-as-actor."[25] In this way, Ashley argued, neo-Realism had ended up with the worst of both theoretical worlds, encompassing, as it did, "atomism's superficiality combined with structuralism's closure."[26] Moreover, these limitations were not just relevant to Waltz, he argued, but also to many of those who have ostensibly sought to detach themselves from Waltz's "conventional" structuralist approach — in particular, the so-called "modified structuralists" such as Krasner and Keohane, and political economists such as Gilpin (see Chapter Four). Accordingly, in 1984, Ashley was ready to acknowledge these and others (Kindleberger, Tucker, etc.), as participants in the "collective movement or project" of neo-Realism.[27]

Since its publication almost twenty years ago, "The Poverty of Neorealism," has been widely criticised, not only by those whose scholarship it attacked, but also by those broadly sympathetic to Ashley's position, and the philosophical issues he

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[22] *Ibid.*, 237.
[23] *Ibid.*, 238.
[24] *Ibid.*, 240.
[25] *Ibid.*, 255.
[26] *Ibid.*, 256.

raised.[28] Moreover, Ashley himself has since shifted radically away from the emancipatory Critical Theory themes that pervaded his earlier work, towards the postmodernist perspectives that will be discussed below. For all this, "Poverty" remains one of the most important contributions to the CST debate in IR. Its status as a major catalyst for the critical agenda of the 1980s and 1990s has been widely acknowledged, and others (notably Andrew Linklater) have continued to develop the Habermasian themes Ashley introduced in the 1980s, in a complex and ongoing debate.

The remainder of this section however, continues the Critical Theory contribution to IR via a slightly different route to that taken by either Ashley or Linklater, primarily through the work of Robert Cox, whose particular emancipatory perspective draws not only on the Habermasian themes mentioned above, but others derived from Gramsci and (antistructuralist) Marxism in general. Cox is of interest to this thesis on two counts: first, and most obviously, because his work represents a major contribution to the Critical Theory literature under discussion in this chapter. But as I will show subsequently, Cox has also influenced the transference of Critical Theory perspectives within Japanese Studies, through his specific comments on Japan's search for a global role. In Chapter Seven, I will return to these comments and the insights they hold for the globalisation debate in particular. For now, I will concentrate on Cox's more general significance within IR's 'third debate.'

Robert Cox: Hegemony, Historicism, and the Challenge to 'Problem-Solving' Theory

Like Ashley, Cox, in the early to mid 1980s, was concerned with resuscitating the critical potential of IR, a potential which he too regarded as having been usurped in the Cold War period by a "technical" or "problem solving" neo-Realism. In this respect, Cox was also influenced by Frankfurt School perspectives, most obviously in his pivotal 1982 essay entitled "Social Forces, States and World Order," where he

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[27] *Ibid*., 249.
[28] For a summary of this debate, see George, *Discourses of Global Politics*, 174-76.

warned of the dangers of positivist thinking at the core of Cold War policy making processes. More generally, Cox sought to undermine the generally ahistorical analysis of positivist-dominated approaches to the world – a tendency, he argued, which had been integral in particular to post-Vietnam neo-Realism, as it continued to frame its image of global reality in terms of an anarchical state system centred on traditional power politics impulses and hierarchical structures.[29]

The problem with such a view, Cox proposed, was that it blinded its adherents to significant systemic change, and to more specific changes in relations within and between states. As a result, he suggested, the mainstream IR analytical and policymaking community continued to frame their questions and answers around a fundamental and unchanging substrata of assumptions detached from any historical frame of reference, thus dictating that "with respect to fundamentals [e.g., the nature of man, the nature of states, and the nature of the state system], the future will always be like the past."[30] In short, Cox argued, in a now-famous passage, Realism and neo-Realism remained embedded within a "problem-solving" paradigm of thought, which simply accepted the (perceived) status quo as the 'is' of the world and sought, in this context, only to make the existing system work more efficiently. This "problem solving theory," he argued:

> takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and political power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action. The general aim of problem-solving is to make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble. Since the general pattern of institutions and relationships is not called into question, particular problems can be considered in relation to the specialised areas of activity in which they arise.[31]

In contrast, Cox argued, a Critical Theory approach is concerned with questions of how any 'is' is historically, politically and intellectually produced. Or, more

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[29] Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 10:2 (1981): 126-155. Subsequently re-published in Keohane's edited volume, *Neorealism And Its Critics* (*op. cit.*, 1986). All subsequent page references are from the version published in *Neorealism And Its Critics*.

[30] Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders," 212.

specifically, it seeks to expose the process by which taken-for-granted perspectives and responses to IR are historically, politically and intellectually produced – in order that this process might be questioned, reassessed and changed. This historicist approach, he explained, could be traced back to the eighteenth century scholar Giambattista Vico,[32] for whom the nature of man and of human institutions (including states and the state system) "should not be thought of in terms of unchanging substances, but rather as a continuing creation of new forms."[33] To think this way, is to understand that:

> human institutions are made by people – not by the individual gestures of "actors" but by collective responses to a collectively perceived problematic that produces certain practices. Institutions and practices are therefore to be understood through the changing mental processes of their makers. There is, in this perspective, an identity of subject and object. The objective realities that this approach encompasses – the state, social classes, the conflict groups... and their practices – are constituted by intersubjective ideas.[34]

This was a vital enterprise for Cox because it made possible that which positivism deemed impossible, in that it brought the externalised, essentialised world of IR and IPE 'out there' back to earth, back to its social, political and ideological roots. At the 'theoretical' level, this allowed Cox to revive one of Habermas' (and Ashley's) major concerns about the way in which a technical-rational knowledge form (e.g. positivism) had been imposed inappropriately upon social and political practice, thereby limiting and distorting such practice.

In Cox's later work, and in particular, his 1987 book *Production, Power and World Order*,[35] this was a concern aimed specifically at the way in which 'economics' and a value-free market logic have become the basis upon which neo-Realists frame the world. For Cox, this neo-Realist perspective represents a "misleading

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[31] *Ibid*., 208.
[32] And, in a more direct IR context, to E. H. Carr. *Ibid*., 208.
[33] *Ibid*., 213.
[34] *Ibid*.
[35] Robert W. Cox, *Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).

oversimplification," in that it tends to regard all interstate systems as "essentially the same insofar as they all lack a supreme world authority."[36] In fact, he argued:

> There have been important qualitative and structural differences between successive world orders in the modern era... The qualitative differences between world orders touch the nature and incidence of wars, the manner of resolving disputes, and the creation and distribution of wealth and poverty. These differences between one structure of world order and its successor are shaped by the forms of state and production, and stabilised structures of world order in turn provide a framework conducive to certain forms of state and production.[37]

Cox's point here was that when one looks at world order from this 'historicist' perspective, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to conceptualise such orders in terms of neo-Realist 'problem solving' theory, in which the most powerful state assumes the role of orderer, and in which any potential change to the prevailing order is viewed negatively.[38] This is not to suggest that Cox's work is about denying the impact of great powers, or of hegemony in general. Rather, his conceptualisation of the world order question understands hegemony, not in neo-Realist terms, but in broader (Gramscian) terms, as the "fit between power, ideas and institutions."[39]

Hegemony, in this sense, is not just about the dominance of a single world power, but rather, "dominance of a particular kind, where the dominant state creates and order based ideologically on a broad measure of consent, functioning according to general principles that in fact ensure the continuing supremacy of the leading state or states and leading social classes."[40] In *Production, Power and World Order*, this perspective allowed Cox to pursue a series of detailed critical investigations into the practices of Western hegemonic control (via global capitalism and the major economic and political institutions of the state system such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the G7). Just as importantly, it has allowed him (and those influenced by his scholarship) to explore space for counter-hegemonic perspectives and action in

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[36] *Ibid*., 7.
[37] *Ibid*.
[38] For example, as I argued in Chapter Four, the metamorphosis of Japan in American perspectives from "successful junior partner" to "threat" in the 1980s.

those areas of the world either taken for granted in the hegemonic system (e.g. *Japan*) or effectively ignored by it (e.g. the Third World).[41]

Integrated with themes drawn from Gramsci and other aspects of European social theory, Cox's work has been the catalyst for a range of critical incursions into IR and IPE right up to the present day. Of particular significance to the following chapters is the way in which many of these Coxian approaches have emphasised the need for a broader, more comprehensive analysis of world order — one which takes account of supposedly 'domestic' issues (e.g. issues of class, culture, race and ethnicity) in the attempt to better understand and help transform IR on behalf of those effectively ignored or marginalised by neo-Realist power politics. It is in this respect, in particular, that Critical Theory approaches to IR are vital to the 'connection' project of this thesis because, as the following chapter will illustrate, while the examination of 'domestic' tensions and identities is already a well-established source of debate in Japanese Studies, such themes have had almost no impact upon discussions of Japan's international relations.

To understand the reasons for this, one needs to do more than simply stress the relevance of the domestic to the international, and vice versa. Rather, it becomes necessary to engage the structures and assumptions that underwrite these very categories, and which continue to make it difficult to connect Japanese Studies with International Relations. This is where another dimension of the CST agenda — postmodernism — becomes an important analytical tool in the process of opening up the 'black box' that is Japan in International Relations.

3. Postmodernism and International Relations

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[39] Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Order," 224.
[40] Cox, *Production, Power and World Order*, 7.
[41] Notably, Stephen Gill; e.g., in "Gramsci and Global Politics: Towards a Post-Hegemonic Research Agenda," in Stephen Gill (ed.), *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

It is not my intention in this chapter to explore very deeply the ongoing and complex philosophical debate that has developed over postmodernism.[42] This debate has been extensively canvassed by others far more qualified than I.[43] Suffice it to say that my own position is essentially a positive one in relation to much of the postmodernist critique of IR orthodoxy; but like many others, I have considerable reservations about its sometimes overly esoteric tendencies — some of which have been evident in the application of postmodern themes to Japanese Studies.[44] For now, I seek only to explain the significance of some of the more general postmodern insights that have been influential in opening up a closed IR orthodoxy since the early 1980s.

International Relations as Discourse: Postmodernist Perspectives

Of particular significance here, is the way in which postmodernist scholarship has problematised the previously taken-for-granted premises of Realist/neo-Realist thought. To achieve this, postmodernist writers have invoked Foucault and Derrida (and, implicitly, Nietzsche) to re-address the story of Western dominance of the modern world, and of Western rational-science as the basis of modern global knowledge. The major result of this has been the further illustration of the many silences within mainstream IR theorising, on the relationship between power and knowledge. As I suggested in Chapter Two, the orthodox social science perspectives that underwrite Realism and neo-Realism, assume a certain immunity of knowledge from power. Consequently, from an orthodox perspective, the study of IR "requires the suspension of values, interests and power relations in the pursuit of balanced (objective) knowledge — knowledge uncontaminated by external influences and

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[42] For the purposes of clarity, I will refer in this section only to 'postmodernism,' while remaining aware of the claims some make for "poststructuralism."

[43] E.g., George (*op. cit.*, 1994), Devetak (*op. cit.*, 1995), Smith (*op. cit.*, 1996) and Linklater (*op. cit.*, 1996).

[44] Specifically, I have in mind some postmodern literary/cultural theory writings on Japan, and especially those works which seem keen on developing the idea of Japan's 'special,' even 'unique' contribution to the postmodern scene. A good summary of such literature can be found in the introduction to Charles Wei-Hsun Fu and Steven Heine (eds.), *Japan in Traditional and Postmodern Perspectives* (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1995), x-xii. While I am generally in accordance with Heine/Fu that this particular genre of postmodernist Japanese Studies is interesting and needs to be acknowledged much of it is simply too far removed from the central themes of my thesis to be usefully dealt with in this chapter.

based on (pure) reason." [45] This is certainly the position of Waltz, who proposes that 'good' theory can be abstracted from reality only by "leaving aside the personality of actors, their behavior and their interactions." [46]

This view however, has been challenged by postmodernism; most famously through the work of Michel Foucault, who argued that social and political realities cannot be studied independently of the ideology and power relations employed by the namers and makers of those realities. Knowledge, Foucault argued, is a hugely complex system of exclusion, in which some voices are accorded meaning (and/or 'truth,') and others not.[47] Knowledge, in this sense, becomes the struggle of 'discursive practices.' In this context, the term "discourse" encompasses something more than just language, referring to "the broader matrix of social practices that gives meaning to the way that people understand themselves and their behaviour."[48] A discourse, thus, does not 'describe' reality per se; instead, it establishes particular categories of meaning that explain reality in particular ways. [49] As successive defenders of this idea have emphasised, this is *not* to say that reality "doesn't exist," but that *it does not exist independently of the meanings we ascribe to it* — meanings which are inextricably connected to the social structures and power relations within which our knowledge of the world is created. Consequently, a discursive approach to knowledge understands that:

> The subject of knowledge is situated in, and conditioned by, *a political and historical context*, and constrained to function with particular concepts and categories of knowledge. Knowledge is never unconditioned. As a consequence of the heterogeneity of possible contexts and positions, there can be no single,

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[45] Richard Devetak, "Postmodernism," in Burchill and Linklater, *Theories of International Relations* (*op. cit.*, 1996), 181.
[46] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 80; see also my remarks in Chapters Two, 65-70, and Chapter Four, 14-15.
[47] Michel Foucault, "The Order of Discourse" (1981); reprinted in Michael J. Shapiro (ed.), *Language and Politics* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publisher Ltd., 1984), 110.
[48] George, *Discourses of Global Politics*, 29.
[49] Bradley Klein, *Strategic Discourse and its Alternatives* (New York: Center on Violence and Human Survival), 4.

> Archimedean perspective which trumps all others. There is no 'truth,' only competing perspectives and 'regimes of truth.'[50] (emphasis added)

It is in relation to this issue, that Donna Gregory, for example, has described the task of postmodern approaches to IR as one of "strange-making" — that is, distancing and querying the dominant processes, facts, perspectives and concepts of International Relations, in order to show how they are socially, textually, and linguistically constructed, inevitably at the expense of other possibilities of meaning.[51] "Strange" of course, has a double significance here, given the intrinsic strangeness of postmodernist techniques to a discipline which, as I argued in Chapter Two, has generally avoided, 'philosophical' questions of knowledge and meaning. Yet as a number of scholars have pointed out, all that is really being asked here, are the "how" questions, or, as Ashley puts it:

> How, by way of what practices, are structures of history produced, differentiated, reified and transformed? How, by way of what strategies, displacements and shifting emphases, are fields of practice pried open, bounded and secured? How, by way of what manoeuvres and in opposition to what resistances, are regions of silence established?[52]

In asking these questions, rather than the "what" question that tends to predominate in conventional IR, we begin to approach the issue of "what matters" in IR in a fundamentally different way. From a postmodern "how" perspective, therefore, social and political worlds appear, not as objectively observable phenomena, but as a complex network of discursive practices which impose meaning and value. Or, to invoke another key term from the postmodernist lexicon, they appear as *texts*. The concept of textuality in postmodernist thought is derived, in particular, from the work of Jacques Derrida, but is integral also to the discourse analysis of Foucault, and to the semiotic analyses of writers as diverse as Roland Barthes, Umberto Ecco, and

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[50] Devetak, "Postmodernism," 185.
[51] Donna Gregory, "Introduction," to James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (eds.), *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989), xiv.
[52] Richard K. Ashley, "The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Politics," *Alternatives* 12:4 (1987): 403-434, on p. 409.

Jean Baudrillard.[53] Like 'discourse,' this term pays special, but not exclusive, attention to linguistic practices, in teasing out the ways in which people "make facticity" via the particular representational practices they employ.[54] Much of Derrida's analysis has been devoted to disclosing these practices, particularly in regard to the post-Enlightenment search for an essential, universal rationality. Derrida used the term *logocentricism* to describe this process, in which identity, unity and meaning are achieved by a series of exclusions and oppositions from the original (logo), in a continuous metanarrative of dichotomies: self/other, identity/difference, realism/idealism, and so on.[55] A postmodern textual strategy seeks to radically unsettle these conceptual oppositions, by exposing the internal instabilities within dominant texts, discourses and institutions. Employed in an IR context, these methods have been utilised to probe some of the more taken-for-granted certainties of Realism and neo-Realism.

Deconstructing the 'Great Texts' of IR: The 'Machiavelli' Issue

One of the more obvious ways in which textual/discursive strategies have been employed in IR is in the problematisation of IR itself as a coherent 'discipline,' centred around a permanent set of problems, themes, and questions, as represented by the eminent scholars of the day. As I explained in Chapter Two, this has been achieved in part through the privileging of thinkers who, via their 'great texts,' are deemed to have captured the essence of the present in their readings of the past. In this way, IR can indeed be represented in terms of a coherent 'tradition,' (i.e., Realism), traceable from Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Rousseau, through to the seminal twentieth century figures of Carr, Morgenthau, and Waltz.[56]

From a postmodernist perspective, the representation of these voices as a coherent tradition depends on the possibility of differentiating Realism from other textual

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[53] Gregory, *International/Intertextual Relations*, xviii.
[54] Michael J. Shapiro, "Textualizing Global Politics," in Der Derian and Shapiro (eds.), *International/Intertextual Relations* (*op. cit.*, 1989), 14.
[55] *Ibid.*, 15-16.

traditions. This can only be done however, when internal differences among/within the dominant tradition are suppressed or ignored. Postmodern approaches seek to expose these differences, and in so doing, disrupt the certainty with which particular texts are ascribed their categorical status (e.g., "realist," or "idealist"), and accorded a place within particular traditions. It reads these texts, as it were, "'against the grain,' highlighting those points where the tradition must remain blind to tensions or differences that would otherwise put its continuity and coherence in doubt."[57]

One of the best examples of this strategy comes from R. B. J. Walker, whose 1989 examination of the "politics of origins" in IR thinking focused in particular on the contribution of Machiavelli.[58] For generations of IR theorists, Machiavelli has been a key figure in establishing the foundational wisdom of the discipline on questions of human nature, structural necessity, power, the state, and national interest. More specifically, according to Walker, it is Machiavelli who, through his seminal text, *The Prince*, has afforded Realism a linear credibility in a representation of history set upon a theme of structural anarchy, in which power always reigns over ethics, ends always justify means, and all (relevant) human behaviour can be rationalised in terms of *raison d'etat*.

For Walker however, this is an extremely caricatured reading of Machiavelli – in the sense that it deliberately marginalises those aspects of his scholarship that might render problematic his status as a "paradigmatic Realist."[59] Machiavelli's emphasis, for example, on the need to distinguish "between violence in general and the minimum recourse to violence in pursuit of *virtu*," somewhat contradicts the more familiar, straightforward image of the Machiavelli who insists also on the necessity "for deception and dirty deeds if a price is to remain in power."[60] Moreover, Walker

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[56] See Chapter Two, 9-10.
[57] Devetak, "Postmodernism," 192.
[58] R. B. J. Walker, "*The Prince*, and 'The Pauper:' Tradition, Modernity and Practice in the Theory of International Relations," in Der Derian and Shapiro (eds.), *International/Intertextual Relations* (*op. cit.*, 1989), 29. NB: This essay was subsequently updated and re-published as the second chapter of Walker's 1993 work, *Inside/Outside*, which is discussed in more detail below.
[59] Walker, "*The Prince*, and 'The Pauper,'" 32.
[60] *Ibid.*, 33.

argued, if one reads Machiavelli beyond *The Prince*, thus locating his 'great text' in a broader context that includes, for example, *Discourses on Livy*, *The History of Florence*, and *The Art of War*, it becomes difficult, if not impossible to continue representing him (as orthodox IR accounts have tended to do), as an archetypal Realist whose sole concern is the timeless essence of political life. From this broader perspective Machiavelli appears:

> as someone trying to make sense of historically specific circumstances *and attempting to do so in the discursive categories then available to him*... while it may be possible to trace a "tradition" that may be called Machiavellian, it is one concerned less with "realism" or "power politics" than with "humanism," "republicanism," or "civic virtue."[61] (emphasis added)

The point of Walker's exercise, as he makes clear, is not to make a claim about what Machiavelli 'really' meant, or even to dismiss the dominant (Realist) readings of him. Rather, it is to illustrate that these *are only readings* — and that as such, their status is not derived from any correspondence with an essentialised meaning present within the text, but from specific discursive practices "that have turned a historical problematic into an ahistorical apology for the violence of the present."[62]

Double-Reading Realism: The Sovereignty/Anarchy Problematique

Demonstrating how the repression of internal textual tensions works to produce a stable effect of homogeneity and continuity is, I suggest, of special relevance to Japanese Studies on two counts. Most obviously, it suggests that the same textual strategies used by scholars such as Walker to query the textual and disciplinary coherence of IR, can be applied, with similar effect, to the major texts that have shaped dominant images of Japan, and Japanese society. More fundamentally however, and as indicated above, the exposure of these tensions is also important in exploring (and questioning) the very assumptions which make it possible to speak about 'Japanese Studies' in the first place. Assumptions which divide our knowledge

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[61] *Ibid*.
[62] *Ibid*.

of the world between the domain of the domestic and the international, and which ascribe profoundly different structural conditions to either. In an IR context, this dichotomy has been absolutely integral to Realism, and its certainty about the irreducible, state-centric reality of global politics. This is never more evident than in regard to the concept of state sovereignty. In traditional narratives, state sovereignty is almost synonymous with the concept of state power and the legitimate use of state violence to maintain order within the boundaries of the state, and, in Hobbesian terms, the rationale for state authority in an anarchical world.[63] From the systemic perspective of neo-Realism, sovereignty is important in terms of the state as a rational actor, engaged in making choices in the (analogised) marketplace. Indeed, sovereignty is such a taken-for-granted assumption in IR that it has come, in the words of one scholar, "to seem quite uninteresting, the preserve of legal scholars and constitutional experts rather than the subject of heated exchanges among social and political experts."[64]

From a postmodernist perspective however, this status has been achieved at the cost of a profound silence about the discursive circumstances under which such an historically specific notion as sovereignty has been invoked as the sole way of understanding political life. Scholars such as Ashley, for example, have questioned this assumption by relocating the issue of sovereignty in its broader context; i.e., that of the emergence of the sovereign individual in post-Enlightenment philosophy.[65] This silenced tension, Ashley suggested in 1988, is at the core of the establishment of the sovereign state as the most potent form of modern man's resistance to the (anarchic) darkness 'out there.' The point here is that to reconcile the principle and practices of individual sovereignty at the state level with peaceful relations at the interstate level requires the elimination of differences *within* the sovereign state, so that it can be represented as "a well-bounded sovereign entity possessing its own

[63] George, *Discourses of Global Politics*, 200-201.
[64] Walker, *Inside/Outside*, 62.
[65] Richard K. Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 17 (1988):227-262, and "Living on

'internal' hegemonic centre of decision-making capable of reconciling "internal" conflicts and capable, therefore, of projecting a singular presence."[66] In this way, Ashley argued, the sovereign state effectively *becomes* sovereign man, the site of modern reason in opposition to an externalised, anarchical world.[67]

Walker has also taken up this issue, in a work whose title, *Inside/Outside*, directly invokes the sovereignty/anarchy dichotomy in Realist thought and practice, and its reification of:

> an historically specific spatial ontology, a sharp delineation of here and there, a discourse that both expresses and constantly affirms the presence and absence of political life inside and outside the modern state as the only ground on which structural necessities can be understood and new realms of freedom and history can be revealed.[68]

The 'spatial ontology' that Walker refers to is derived from, among other things, the constructs of Elucidean and Newtonian geometry, and their impact upon the cultural forms of seventeenth century Europe. In this historically specific historical-intellectual context, he argued, we can see the emergence of the connection between ideas of inviolable, sharply delineated geographical space, and the conceptions of state territoriality, sovereignty and anarchy – a connection intrinsic to contemporary International Relations thought and practice. On this basis, International Relations appears, not just as an ongoing discussion about 'power politics,' or 'trade,' or even 'globalisation,' but rather, "as a celebration of [cum warning of] an historically specific account of the nature, location and possibilities of political identity and community."[69] This, despite the fact that the fracturing and dispersion of political

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Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War," in Der Derian and Shapiro (eds.), *International/Intertextual Relations* (*op. cit.*), 1989.
[66] Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State," 245.
[67] *Ibid*.
[68] R. B. J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), ix.
[69] *Ibid*., 15.

identity among a multiplicity of sites has been "a familiar, though selectively forgotten, characteristic of modern political life for several centuries."[70]

For Walker then, like Ashley, the demarcation of authentic political life and identity within the territorial 'container' of the sovereign state represents the means by which a concept of anarchy can be represented as the natural condition of relations *between* states. Natural, in the sense that on the *inside*, justice and law, freedom and social progress can be pursued within clear spatial limits; while on the *outside*, relations between states can be understood as the negation of the community presumed to be possible inside the sovereign state – represented, variously, as politics without centralised authority, or as an international anarchy, or as the more or less mechanical 'system' of the (post-Waltzian) neo-Realists.[71] In this way, anarchy becomes integral to the discourse of the modern state, and its claims to sovereign identity. Indeed, read this way, the inherent anarchy of the 'outside' (i.e., the violent, ungovernable realm of the international sphere) becomes the tacit condition that makes claims to a monopoly on permanent order and universality on the 'inside' possible. It is, accordingly, this claim to universality made *within* the state that becomes the ground against which "a tradition of international relations theory may be constructed through a discourse of negation."

> Against order, anarchy; against peace, war; against justice and legitimate authority, mere power and rules of accommodation; against progress and emancipation, mere contingency and eternal return. The only alternative to negation, of course, turns out to be an affirmation of the hope that *someday, somehow,* all that is presumed to be possible inside may be extended to the outside – a hope that is constantly deferred, and indeed can only be specified as a condition of its own impossibility in anything other than the bounded space of the sovereign state.[72]

I will return to Walker's inside/outside metaphor in Chapter Seven, where it is particularly important, I argue, in understanding how globalisation issues are affecting the debate over Japan's global role. For now, my point is that these critical

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[70] *Ibid.*, 161.
[71] *Ibid.*, 169-171.

postmodern incursions into the conceptual framework of Realism and their questioning of 'irreducible' conceptual and structural realities are absolutely integral to understanding how Japan's global role came to be framed in the dominant way that it has been (see Chapters Three and Four). Moreover, and as indicated above, they are also an important prelude to understanding how and where the concerns being taken up by a more critically inclined Japanese Studies literature might be usefully integrated into the question of Japan's 'international' agency.

Before this literature is taken up in any detail however, there is one more element of the postmodern CST contribution to IR which requires brief discussion — the issue of identity. Or, more precisely, the role of 'otherness' in constituting the identity of the sovereign state, and its privileged status as procurer of human security and safety. This topic has of course, already been touched upon above in relation to the sovereignty/anarchy dichotomy, and its spatial demarcation of the state as the container of political community. In this demarcation the question of 'otherness' is pivotal; for it is the definition of who is *not* included within these boundaries that makes it possible to define a state (e.g.'Japan') at all.

Postmodernist approaches have sought to tease out this question of identity in IR, by examining the practices of representation and exclusion by which certain identities are privileged, and other excluded or marginalised. From this perspective, the issue of security, for example, becomes something more than the defence of territorial integrity from threats 'out there' in the anarchical world system. It becomes, instead, an issue inherently about the danger *inside* states as much as that *between* them. The dangers that multiple, ambiguous and shifting sites of identity within the state represent to its production of domestic 'order,' and its pursuit of foreign policy on behalf of a unified, sovereign whole. To put it another way, when one begins to recover and re-examine the voices of those *inside* the state whose difference has been ignored, silenced or repressed in the name of domestic order, one begins then to

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[72] *Ibid.*, 152.

understand the way in which the differences *between* states have been invoked to justify this control. As I will show in the following chapters, this is of particular relevance to a Japan context, where the image of an unusually, even 'uniquely' homogeneous Japanese society continues to mask the processes by which this unity has been imposed.

For now, however, the final section of this chapter pursues this theme through the work of David Campbell, who has written extensively on the constitution of foreign policy and security from the perspective described above. Here, I am particularly interested in Campbell's recent work on the breakdown of the former Yugoslavia and the Western response to the subsequent violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as it appears in his 1998 book, *National Deconstruction*.[73] While such events may seem far removed from the problems currently confronting Japan, Campbell's analysis of them is, as I will argue, of vital importance in addressing the inside/outside divide that currently separates Japanese Studies from International Relations.

Identity, Violence, and 'Problematising Bosnia'

In *National Deconstruction*, Campbell was not, as he made clear from the outset, attempting to write a 'true' account of the events that occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1993 and 1996; or even write about Bosnia per se. Rather, he was concerned "primarily with 'metaBosnia,' the array of practices through which Bosnia (indeed competing 'Bosnias') comes to be."[74] More specifically, he was concerned with how conventional, dominant understandings of sovereign identity relate to the inadequacy of dominant understandings of 'international' violence – an inadequacy that, he argued, has been tragically illustrated via events in post-Cold War Yugoslavia.

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[73] David Campbell, *National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).
[74] *Ibid*., ix-x.

In this context, Campbell sought to outline the very specific role that conventional understandings of identity and political community (i.e., those informed by the identity-sovereignty nexus discussed above) had played in the Western 'solution' to the crisis. In particular, he proposed:

> the idea that the national community requires the nexus of demarcated territory and fixed identity – were not only insufficient to enable a response to the Bosnian war, *they were complicit in and necessary for the conduct of the war itself*. This is because inscribing the boundaries that make the installation of the nationalist imagery possible requires the expulsion from the resultant "domestic" space of all that comes to be regarded as alien, foreign and dangerous.[75] (emphasis added)

For Campbell, this process of inscription/expulsion was exemplified in the international community's recourse to 'ethnicity,' and the existence of "age old" ethnic divisions between Serbs/Muslims/Croats, as a key explanatory factor. Over and over, he pointed out, the conflict was spoken of by politicians and military spokespeople in terms of ethnic 'sides,' ancient hatreds and essentially irresolvable animosities.[76] This perspective, Campbell argued, was a rather simplistic one. It ignored the fact that not all Serbs were represented by Radovan Karadzic and the official Serb/Yugoslav representation of the conflict (as "a 'civil war' involving an 'ethnic struggle' between groups who cannot, and do not want to, live together);"[77] nor did it acknowledge the views of hundreds of Bosnian individuals who expressed their bemusement and outrage with the segregationist response of the international peace-makers which eventually became the Vance-Owen plan.[78]

More tellingly, from the postmodern "deconstructivist" perspective taken by Campbell, the 'ancient animosities' thesis entails a teleological reading of history

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[75] *Ibid*., 13.
[76] *Ibid*., 49-51.
[77] Official Serb/Yugoslav response to the ICJ, 1993, cited by Campbell in *National Deconstruction*, 44. For example, Campbell writes, the Serb Civic Council, which supported the sovereignty of the Bosnian republic throughout the war, issued a statement to "the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina," urging them to remember that "Bosnia-Herzegovina is an internationally recognised state, its legitimate authorities guarantee equal human and civil rights for all people, irrespective of their ethnic allegiance and religious belief." *Ibid*., 47.
[78] See Campbell's examples, *op. cit*., 93-95.

that, in Derridean terms, "locks up, neutralises, and finally cancels historicity."[79] Focusing on the 'historical' constitution of the conflict, Campbell argued, implies that the hostility had an identifiable point of origin, being transmitted from generation to generation until it reached the present. Such representations, he pointed out, have very tangible political consequences because:

> *if conflicts represented as "ethnic" are understood as no more than settled history or human nature rearing its ugly head, then there is nothing that can be done in the present to resolve the tension except repress or ignore such struggles.* In this view, the historical animus has to be enacted according to its script, with human agency in suspension while nature violently plays itself out.[80] (emphasis added)

Inevitably, Campbell pointed out, the problematisation of the violence in 'ethnic' terms also carried over into the eventual solution to it proposed by the international community. Here, the same terms of reference that had initially paralysed international intervention in the carnage, saw the majority of intellectual/policymaking parties concerned opt for the 'ethnicisation' of Bosnia, by dividing it into provinces with a clear ethnic majority in each. It was a response, Campbell writes, which not only reflected assumptions about territory and identity remarkably similar to those of Karadzic, but which ultimately sanctioned more violence (i.e., against the new 'ethnic minorities' it inevitably created in the new zones).[81] Yet it was seen as the only response possible, because the (Realist) frame of reference in which it was conceived, cannot itself conceive of any form of political identity that is not bound up in the sovereign state, and in turn, to the norm of territorial and cultural alignment in an anarchical world.[82]

In the wake of Bosnia, the continuing power of these assumptions has been borne out most strongly by the conservative backlash (in the U.S. and Europe in particular), against multiculturalism, which has seen a number of commentators (most notably, Samuel Huntington), issuing dire warnings about the possibility of "balkanisation at

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[79] Derrida, cited in Campbell, *op. cit.*, 83-84.
[80] Campbell, *National Deconstruction*, 84.
[81] *Ibid.*, 162.

home."[83] This perspective, as Campbell observed, has often acted as a post-Cold War replacement for traditional threat perceptions, in the sense that:

> Within the United States, this logic plays itself out in the way multiculturalism is perceived as a threat to the unity of America, a tearing asunder of the collective ideal that founds the nation...Of course, it is this very logic that provided both the basis for the Bosnian war, its representation, and the international community's diplomatic response.[84]

In *National Deconstruction*, Campbell's point was not to produce a superior solution to the Bosnian crisis from the detachment of hindsight. Nor was he unaware of the very real constraints under which those involved in the crisis were operating. His point, however, was that these constraints should not prevent us from reconsidering the assumptions that limited positive, humane decisionmaking about what was 'possible' in regard to Bosnian identity and community, and trying to find alternative, less destructive approaches.

One possibility, according to Campbell, lay in radically deconstructing the notion of democracy, away from its dominant meaning as "a select, [universal] range of rules and governing regulations involving periodic elections, universal franchise, and limits on executive power,"[85] to "a particular attitude or spirit, and ethos, that *constantly has to be fostered*"[86] (emphasis added). A culture of democracy understood in these terms, Campbell argued, denaturalises and unsettles the dominance of particular identities and their accompanying powers. In the context of Bosnia, he suggested, this democratic ethos might help to open up different avenues for thought and practice, particularly with regard to the questions of ethnicity and multiculturalism. More specifically, it harbours the potential to foster an "emancipatory ideal" of multiculturalism, which "*on the one hand* affirms cultural diversity without situating it, while *on the other hand* recognises that

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[82] *Ibid.*, 165.
[83] *E.g.*, in the work of Krauthammer (1991), William Lind (1991), and of course, Samuel Huntington (1996). *Ibid.*, 166-67.
[84] *Ibid.*, 166-67.
[85] *Ibid.*, 194.

multiculturalism can itself succumb to an enclave mentality that suppresses cultural interdependence and plurality."[87]

The use of the present tense here is important, indicating Campbell's rejection of the notion, popular in the aftermath of the Dayton agreement, that the scale of the violence in Bosnia and the hatreds it inflamed have somehow gone 'too far' for democratic/nonethnic/multicultural ideals ever to be reclaimed. Without ignoring the very real effect of the violence in dividing communities along ethnic lines, Campbell argued that this was not the only option being pursued by Bosnian people, citing numerous efforts (mainly by local communities, but also by some individual units associated with the UNHCR and IFOR) to develop and implement proposals for political space that would be "legitimised by their resistance to exclusivism and enabled by the multiplication of sources of sovereignty."[88]

I have dwelt at length on Campbell's work here, because it speaks about some of the most pressing themes that haunt contemporary discussions of International Relations: identity, citizenship, and international responsibility. And, like the other examples discussed above, it speaks to these issues in a way which seeks to disrupt the (Realist) certainty associated with the traditional responses who would have us believe that there is no other way to engage with the problems of contemporary life; that to question the underpinnings of the options we have, would be to leave us adrift with no options at all.

For postmodernist scholars such as Ashley, Walker and Campbell, and for a Critical Theorist like Cox, this process of disruption is a wholly positive one. It provides us with the opportunity to confront IR, not as a set body of knowledge which informs us about the possibilities for responding to issues according to their location along the inside/outside divide, but as a particular set of (discursive) processes by which

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[86] *Ibid*., 196.
[87] *Ibid*., 208.
[88] *Ibid*., 234. Campbell's examples include efforts to establish an independent press in Sarajevo, the Antiwar Campaign in Zagreb, the establishment of a market in the borderlands adjoining the Zone of

"identities are formed, meaning is given, and status and privilege are confirmed."[89] It resists holistic, totalising responses to the predicaments of global life, whether they are framed in terms of power politics inevitability, or state sovereignty, or economic rationalism. Above all, in allowing people to understand the processes by which they, and their identity, and their status are constituted, it lends support to those seeking to question the conditions of their lives, and participate in the decisions that affect them.

All of these claims, I suggest, can be further substantiated in the context of Japan, and the concerns I outlined at the beginning of this thesis in regard to dominant discussions of Japan's global role. While this is predominantly the work of the following chapter, I wish to conclude the present discussion with a few brief comments on the general significance of the CST agenda to Japan. My initial concern here is to show how CST themes are potentially useful in refiguring the relationship between 'International Relations' and 'Japanese Studies.'

4. Complicating the Japanese State: The Significance of CST Approaches

In pinning down the most important contribution that CST approaches bring to the debate over Japan's global role, I want to re-engage at least three introductory questions that I brought up in Chapter One. First, how is it that some issues (formal bureaucratic procedure, foreign policymaking institutions, political leadership), are regarded as clearly more 'important' in discussing Japan than others? Second, why is it so difficult and uncomfortable to move beyond the state-centric image of Japan as an international actor, to probe into the everyday activities and predicaments of Japanese people? Finally, what process or processes, do debates on Japanese society, identity and citizenship remain marginalised from the analysis of Japanese foreign policy?

Separation under the auspices of an IFOR unit, and the UNHCR program to establish inter-entity bus routes in Bosnia. *Ibid.*, 236-37.

[89] George, *Discourses of Global Politics*, 216.

These questions, I suggest, have been at least partially answered in the discussion above – most particularly in Walker's metaphor of inside/outside which, as noted, delineates not only the possibilities of political community according to pre-given geospatial coordinates, but creates a particular division of labour with regard to knowledge: 'political theory' on the *inside*; 'international relations' on the *outside*. One result of this, Walker pointed out, is a type of vacuum within IR when it comes to theories of the state. Questions of civil society, economy, and politics, he argued, remain the prerogative of "those who are concerned with life within states, rather than relations between them."[90] Equally, complex historical structures (states, diplomacy, governance) become convenient transition points between 'internal' and 'external' activities; e.g.: "between defence and foreign policy conceived as the limits of domestic politics within, and the mere relations in which states are engaged without."[91]

As Campbell's work also demonstrates, this is an approach replete with dangers, not least because it continues to allow an effective abrogation of personal/international responsibility for the terrible things that happen to occur on the 'inside' of spatially-demarcated sites of belonging. And, as this chapter has sought to illustrate, it is an approach increasingly rejected by those influenced by CST perspectives, who are no longer willing to side-step the ethical implications of knowledge detached from power, theory disconnected from practice; theory that merely seeks to 'describe' and interpret the facts of power politics, hegemony, 'ethnic strife,' and so on. The alternative space available to IR scholarship is one in which questions are asked:

> not only of the immediate circumstances of power politics, but of the whole process by which a discourse affording identity, influence, credibility, and power to some among the global population is represented as universally and unproblematically "real" for all (e.g., the national interest, the new world order, state security, common sense, the revolutionary manifesto).[92]

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[90] Walker, *Inside/Outside*, 125.
[91] *Ibid*.
[92] George, *Discourses of Global Politics*, 229.

Just as importantly, a critical approach to International Relations now turns its attention toward people who have traditionally been excluded from traditional IR analysis because they lack 'power' on the scale deemed necessary to command serious attention. These are people who, as in Campbell's study for example, have chosen (often unwittingly) to resist the categories of identity being thrust upon them in the 'ethnicisation' of Bosnia. More generally, they are people who, for a whole range of reasons, and all over the world, have chosen to resist the processes and categories that define them and their possibilities, whether these are expressed in terms of race, gender, economic rationalism, or just 'progress.'[93]

These are people, more immediately, who are of interest to those within Japanese Studies who have engaged the conventional, state-centric Japanese foreign policy perspective in a range of critical ways. In so doing they have sought to fill out the 'black box' of the Japanese state, and call into question the conventional assumptions we make about what it means to be 'Japanese' per se. A critical approach to IR needs this type of Japanese Studies, because in confronting essentialised generalisations about what Japan *is*, it makes it more difficult to speak about Japan's interests, or its 'international role' in unified, essentialised terms. Accordingly, in the following chapter, I begin to flesh out these 'other Japans,' and their potential impact upon the way we ask the Japan Question in IR.

[93] See my comments on Walker's *One World/Many Worlds* (*op. cit.*, 1989), in Chapter One, 29-30.

CHAPTER SIX

OPENING THE 'BLACK BOX:' OTHER 'JAPANS' AND JAPANESE STUDIES

This chapter continues to engage the themes introduced in Chapter Five, where I looked at the way in which the major assumptions of International Relations theory and practice have been challenged by Critical Social Theory (CST) approaches. In this chapter, my aim is to show how this challenge intersects with questions asked about Japanese life, society and identity by some Japanese Studies literature. This connection, as I argued in the previous chapter, occurs when debates about security, national interest and Japan's global role framed in the predominantly state-centric terms of orthodox (Realist and neo-Realist) IR theory, are rendered problematic by opening up the 'black box' image of Japan as a unified (and more or less homogeneous) nation state. In this context, Japan's spatial and temporal frontiers, often assumed to be inherently stable and fundamentally established, turn out to be as recent and contested as those of any other nation state. Similarly, Japanese claims to unique levels of social, ethnic and cultural homogeneity turn out to be much more tenuously grounded.

For some, of course, the resulting picture of a complex, multifaceted Japan has prompted a sense of crisis that, in many cases, is linked to the uncertainty of the post-Cold War era, and of globalisation, and of anxieties concerning Japan's national presence in the world. These reactions and the debates surrounding them I will engage in the chapter to follow. For now, I wish to concentrate on the responses of those for whom the opening of the 'black box' represents a more positive enterprise,

one which allows them to question the categories and assumptions that define them as 'Japanese.'

1. Critical Japanese Studies: Challenging the Homogeneity Thesis.

To some extent, Japanese Studies has always been critical of International Relations, or, more precisely, that IR which represents the academic and foreign policymaking concerns of the postwar United States. Over the years, this criticism has been directed in particular at the failure of the U.S. (and the 'West' more generally) to appreciate and understand the socio-cultural differences between Japan and the Western state system — the dominant framework of IR theory and practice. Indeed, it was in this context that Reischauer condemned the failure of his contemporaries to appreciate the need for a linguistically and historically informed 'approach to Asia' to aid U.S. interests in the region (see Chapter Three). Later, in the wake of the Vietnam War, as part of a broader re-assessment of area studies approaches, centred on the behaviouralism that had dominated social scientific research in the United States during the 1950s and 1960s, Lucien Pye would develop this theme in an IR context, arguing that conventional definitions of power in Western IR theorising did not take into account the fundamental differences of 'Asian' political culture, and its influences on foreign policy decisionmaking.[1] In the case of Japan, Pye insisted (as had Johnson a few years previously), the West had failed to grasp that Japan was a fundamentally different type of state: one in which Confucian traditions had intersected with Japan's 'unique' structure of social relations and the modernising

[1] Lucien Pye, *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press/Harvard University Press, 1985).

influences of technology, to facilitate a particularly successful experiment of modern developmentalism.[2]

However, while Japanese Studies of this ilk went some way towards exposing the culture-neutral, society-neutral approach of a mainstream Realism wholly concerned with the systemic 'outside,' it remained more preoccupied with the differences *between* Japan and the West, rather than identifying heterogeneity *within* Japan. In this context, it actually served to reinforce the homogeneous, holistic images of Japanese life and society that have conventionally been privileged in an IR context.

This is perhaps best demonstrated in the post-WWII discussions of Japanese national identity, known collectively as *nihonjinron* or the 'theory of Japaneseness. *Nihonjinron* draws much of its framework from early Japanese ethnographic and philosophical studies which sought to portray Japan as having a unified, homogenous 'national character,' of which the best known remains Watsuji Tetsurô's 1943 classic, *Fûdô* ('Climate').[3] It also owes a large debt to Western scholarship, including Ruth Benedict's classic anthropological study, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (1945), and Reischauer's own *Japan: Past and Present* (1947), both of which emphasised the importance of understanding Japan as a unified totality, whose fundamental difference from 'Western' (read U.S.) society and culture was located in a distinct national character. In the 1960s and 1970s, an expanding Japanese sociological literature rephrased these perceptions of distinctiveness and homogeneity in 'modern' social scientific phraseology, explaining Japanese people

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[2] *Ibid.*, 170-181.

[3] This work was written around Watsuji's belief that human societies are profoundly shaped by their natural settings. Japan, he argued, had a unique climate distinguished by regular, distinct seasons, but also by the unpredictability of typhoons and floods. This, he asserted, accounted for the unique and

and society in terms of nationally uniform psychological and linguistic characteristics[4] and patterns of social organisation.[5]

Since the 1970s, these and other Japanese texts 'explaining' Japanese society and culture have been translated and read widely in the West, and their assumptions continue to have a profound impact upon Western scholarship; particularly that concerned with Japanese economic, business and diplomatic practices.[6] Yet for other scholars, the image of an homogeneous Japan, explicable in terms of a single 'group model' was never convincing, and it was from these concerns that a more genuinely critical Japanese Studies began to emerge in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

The problem, as Herbert Bix explained it in 1980, was not that the group model descriptions were wholly inaccurate, but that they had come to assume the status of immutable, inviolable 'facts' about the nature of Japanese society, to the extent that alternative accounts tended to be effectively ignored.[7] As a result, thinking about Japan had become "concentrated in particular directions," for example:

> on the group rather than the individual agent, on the relationship between elites rather than classes, on how people act towards social organisations rather than toward

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complex sensitivity to nature in the Japanese spirit, as displayed through Japanese art, gardens, architecture and literature. Watsuji, cited in Morris-Suzuki, *Re-Inventing Japan* (*op. cit.*, 1998), 57.

[4] Takeo Doi, *Amae no Kōzō* (The Anatomy of Dependence; Tokyo: Kobundo, 1971). This work interprets Japanese social relations through the concept of *amae*, or the "tendency [of Japanese people] to behave self-indulgently, presuming on some special relationship which exists" between oneself and others (*Ibid.*, 29). In *Tozasareta Gengo: Nihongo no Sekai* (Closed Language: The World of Japanese; Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1975), Takao Suzuki argued that the linguistic restrictions and structures of Japanese language determine social relationships.

[5] Nakane Chie, *Tateshakai no Ningen Kankei* (Personal Relations in a Vertical Society; Tokyo: Kodansha, 1967, translated 1973). Nakane argues that the structures of Japanese society (corporations, universities and bureaucracies) are modelled on the hierarchical structure of the Japanese family, or *ie*. For further comments on this structure, see the section on feminism, below.

[6] Herbert Bix, "Japan at the End of the Seventies," *Bulletin of Concerned Asia Scholars* 12:1 (1980: 53-60), 55.

[7] *Ibid.*, 54. Bix's essay is specifically directed at Ezra Vogel's *Japan as Number One: Lessons for America* (London: Harvard University Press, 1979).

> objective situations, and on a single set of consensus values and value structures which appear to mediate the group and individual interactions of the Japanese.[8]

Bix also argued that this emphasis on an holistic, homogeneous Japan was directly linked to the rise of Japan as a major economic power, and the enormous corresponding rise in Western interest in the 'secrets' of Japanese success. This, he suggested, had intensified the tendency to portray Japan's 'difference' to the West in absolute terms, ignoring or downplaying those characteristics which did not comply with the images of rapid economic growth.[9]

This (albeit modest) questioning of the 'black box' was echoed and expanded during the 1980s by a number of both Western and Japanese scholars. In 1986 for example, Ross Mouer and Yoshio Sugimoto produced one of the first book-length challenges to 'homogeneous Japan,' in their study, *Images of Japanese Society*.[10] Like Bix, Mouer and Sugimoto were concerned by the extent to which knowledge of Japan revolved around particular, selective assumptions about the essential nature of Japanese society and identity: those emphasising cultural homogeneity, behavioural uniformity, the absence or avoidance of conflict, the sanctity of hierarchy and the pre-given, 'structural' character ascribed to Japanese interpersonal relations (e.g., as represented in Nakane's 'vertical society').[11] The result, they argued, was a 'monolithic' conception of the Japanese individual, which marginalises and excludes the experiences of Japanese people (e.g., women, Ainu people, *burakumin* and Chinese/Korean minorities, among others) who do not easily fit its categorisations.[12]

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[8] *Ibid.*, 54.
[9] *Ibid.*, 58.
[10] Ross Mouer and Yoshio Sugimoto, *Images of Japanese Society: A Study in the Social Construction of Reality* (London: KPI Limited, 1986).
[11] *Ibid.*, 54.
[12] *Ibid.*, 55

"In a manner not too dissimilar to the way in which economic man and political man are conceptualised," Mouer and Sugimoto wrote, "we are given a rather uniform Japanese man. The probability that any two Japanese may have been produced from different moulds is never seriously examined." [13] Once established, the authors argued, this image of 'Japanese man' is posited against an equally monolithic conceptualisation of 'Western man' who is assumed to be everything Japanese man is not (i.e., individualistic, open and egalitarian).[14]

Mouer and Sugimoto's challenge to this image of Japanese people was itself conducted from an orthodox social science viewpoint, which utilised numerous statistical, linguistic, and economic studies to evaluate whether there was indeed any sound foundation to the group model, and the patterns of 'Japanese' social behaviour derived from it. But it provided some interesting results. Their work showed for example, that, on the evidence of available social scientific literature, Japanese people could be represented as *both* group oriented and capable of supposedly 'Western' traits such as spontaneity, autonomy and individual self-interest, according to the specific circumstances at hand.[15] Similarly, their study threw doubt on the quintessentially 'homogenous' nature of Japanese life and society, illustrating instead, strong class divisions, significant regional variation, and vibrant sites of social and political activism.[16] These findings led Mouer and Sugimoto to ponder another, important issue: namely, the extent to which particular images of reality become self-fulfilling so that, in John Vasquez's terms, "new information that conforms to existing images tends to be emphasised, and information that is

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[13] *Ibid.*
[14] *Ibid.*, 62.
[15] *Ibid.*, 200.
[16] *Ibid.*, 99-128.

dissonant with the images is often not seen, ignored, or explained away." [17] Their conclusions, in this regard, are significant in light of the themes canvassed by this thesis (especially Chapter Five). In particular the conclusion that the dominant Japanese image of 'reality' had become so ingrained in orthodox thinking that it promoted particular patterns of behaviour within Japanese society which sought to compliment that 'reality.'[18]

Since Mouer and Sugimoto's work was first published, the task of investigating the possibility of different Japanese social realities has been taken up by a number of Japanese Studies specialists. Today, there is an ever-expanding literature on Japan that continues the project of revealing the experiences and perspectives of those who have found little or no representation within orthodox categories. Some of this literature openly echoes the more 'philosophical,' themes discussed in the previous chapter; some of it simply concentrates on revealing and discussing what one scholar

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[17] John A. Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics: A Critique* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1983), 78. There is an interesting parallel to be drawn, I suggest, between Vasquez's 1983 study of power-politics Realism and *Images of Japanese Society*. Both works confront a dominant, taken-for-granted representation of reality (in one case, the behaviour of Japanese people; in the other, the behaviour of states in the international system), and show it to be, at best, a one-sided and highly selective *image* of that reality. Moreover, both do so *in the terms associated with 'good' orthodox social scientific technique*; i.e., on the evidence of available literature and its records of the 'facts.'

[18] Mouer and Sugimoto were able to show, for example (via survey data) how this tendency is particularly apparent in the assumed correlation between Japanese group-orientation and Japanese economic success — with very powerful results for Japanese labour relations. "Attributing Japan's remarkable economic growth largely to uniquely Japanese cultural traits," they argued, "encourages workers to accept other forms of discipline associated with tradition, and this acceptance in itself can shape the work force into something more closely resembling the ideal worker advocated by management." Mouer and Sugimoto, *Images of Japanese Society*, 169. This tactic, the authors argue, is also utilised by non-Japanese people; for example, by Australian businessmen who have invoked the stereotype of Japanese work practices in their attempts to combat trade unionism at home. *Ibid.*, 170. Similarly, they write, the popular notion of Japan as "uniquely unique," (and therefore inaccessible to foreign understanding) has been utilised, to powerful effect, in Japan's dealings with the world: e.g., during the 'bashing' years of Japan's relationship with the United States, when Japanese trade negotiators and commentators were prone to explain criticism of Japanese economic and business practices as 'culturally' ignorant (and therefore, racist) *Ibid.*, 171.

has termed the "other Japan."[19] In either case the importance of this literature is its exposure of Japanese 'realities' which make it difficult, if not impossible to adhere to a unified, homogeneous and unchanging image of the Japanese state — as, for example, a 'black box' in the international system of states, whose behaviour is described and prescribed according to a given set of assumptions. To put it another way, if we accept that there are multiple 'Japanese' realities, we accept that there can be multiple 'Japanese' perspectives on the world and on Japan's international role. It is this acceptance in the work of critical Japanese Studies which connects it to the CST/IR agenda outlined in the previous chapter.

Consequently, for the remainder of this chapter, I will address two particular sites at which critical Japanese Studies has confronted the dominant 'Japan' in this broad CST context. And while the categories chosen here — gender and race — do not exhaust, by any means, the possibilities for speaking about 'other Japans,' they do represent particularly vibrant sources of contemporary debate over (a) what it is to be 'Japanese,' and (b) how these meanings might impact upon Japan's international role. In particular, the discussion of these issues within contemporary Japanese Studies contradicts both the 'homogeneous' image of Japan, and the broader Realist/neo-Realist assertion that anything more than an homogeneous Japan is superfluous to the consideration of Japan's post-Cold War international role.

2. Feminism, Japanese Studies and International Relations.

When feminists in the 1960s and 1970s began to challenge and question the notion of specific gender roles in (Western) society, they did so via a broad principle that

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[19] Joe Moore, introduction to Joe Moore (ed.), *The Other Japan: Conflict, Compromise and Resistance Since 1945*, (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), ix-x.

remains important in the CST approaches to International Relations outlined in the previous chapter — namely, that there is nothing irrevocable or unchangeable about social roles or human social practices per se. Consequently, even as feminist movements continue to grow and diversify, they have remained broadly connected to the insistence that gendered divisions of labour, social standing and political power cannot be derived from or justified by any irreducible, foundationalist 'facts' contained within 'history,' social tradition, or 'human nature.' Rather, as feminists around the world have noted, the marginalisation and/or subordination of women in everyday life is absolutely integral to the 'theoretical' processes by which established political and social practices are given their 'real' meaning.[20]

This point is, of course, particularly important in an International Relations context, where, for many feminist thinkers and writers, the process of breaking down gender barriers is not simply about creating more space for women to participate in the world of diplomacy and inter-state relations. Rather, it is about showing *how* the very definition of "what matters" in International Relations replicates the gendered hierarchies established in theoretical traditions that have seen "man" become "the exclusive interpreter and keeper of various interrelated contracts of importance to other "men" and their creations of nation states and theories." [21] As Sandra Whitworth puts it:

> Feminists who [have] sought merely to uncover the activities of women in international relations most surely have been disappointed and only able to lament the continued under-representation of women in these spheres. Feminists who seek to uncover the ways in which international institutions contribute to the creation and

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[20] J. Ann Tickner, *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 19.

[21] Christine Sylvester, *Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1994). 82.

> maintenance of particular gender relations, by contrast, may discover that while women as real living human beings are often nowhere to be found, understandings of their appropriate relationships and behaviour abound in the practices of international relations.[22]

It is in this context that feminist writers and thinkers have sought to disrupt some of the more established discursive practices of a Realism which accords no visibility to women as agents in the processes that define war and peace, order and security. Some of this work has echoed the textual strategies discussed in the previous chapter, by drawing attention to the gendered assumptions that permeate the work of IR's 'great texts.' Thus, Christine Sylvester has pointed to the way in which thinkers such as Machiavelli, and later, Hobbes and Rousseau, assume the distinction between the public realm of the state, and the private sphere of the home.[23] This distinction, she argues, has seen men and women traditionally positioned within different "civil spheres" of existence, to the extent that:

> "Women" were in a household-based civil sector and "men" were the nationals on whose behalf the state conducted international politics. Since "men" were also the legal heads of households, they had a foot in each possible demarcated sphere. "Women," by contrast, were sequestered in the texts of these philosophical authorities.[24]

In this way, Realist "Statecraft" becomes "Mancraft," not only because the institutionalised forums of power and prestige remain dominated by men, but because the particular attributes valorised and privileged by Realism in confronting a violent, anarchical world 'out there' remain the 'male' ones of objectivity, autonomy

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[22] Sandra Whitworth, *Feminism and International Relations: Towards a Political Economy of Gender in Interstate and Non-Governmental Institutions* (London: MacMillan, 1994), 3-4.
[23] *Ibid.*, 80.
[24] *Ibid.*, 25.

and tough-mindedness — not 'female' subjectivity, weakness and emotion.[25] The experiences of women are thus marginalised and forgotten, because they are not seen as relevant in the realm of international politics where, as J. Ann Tickner notes, the characteristics associated with a culturally dominant, "hegemonic" masculinity "are projected onto the behaviour of states whose success as international actors is measured in terms of their power capabilities and capacity for self-help and autonomy."[26]

A feminist scholarship which confronts these practices then, also confronts the origins and legitimacy of social and political institutions. Instead of the pre-assumed hierarchy that Realism ascribes to structure and agency, the relationship *between* structure and agency is brought back into focus.[27] As a result, feminist scholars of IR have also been able to re-ask the question of what/who matters in an IR context, often by drawing upon a broad literature on and/or by women in other, related areas such as history, political and social theory, and development studies.[28] Through these accounts of women's lives, work and relationships women begin to "re-appear" in the processes and relations of global life; often as victims, but also as participants and actors; especially in non-governmental, counter-hegemonic movements for change such as environmental groups, peace groups and human rights movements.

In the process, as Jan Jindy Pettman has observed, feminism has split and re-grouped, and produced different kinds of theorising about gender, that have differing resonance in relation to particular topics or approaches in IR. Thus:

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[25] *Ibid.*
[26] Tickner, *Gender in International Politics*, 6-7.
[27] Whitworth, *Feminism and International Relations*, 50-51.
[28] *Ibid.*, 56.

> radical feminists and others working on male violence have helped document gender-specific violence across state and community borders, and at times joined in uneasy ways with liberal rights rhetoric to argue women's rights as human rights. Socialist and marxist feminists have raised significant questions about the nature of women's power and politics. In recent years some of these tendencies have metamorphosed through debates within feminism informed by attention to difference/s among and between women, between first and third world women for example. Here black, ethnic minority and 'third world' feminists have called on first world feminists to examine their/our own class, cultural and national locations, and strengthened moves towards internationalising the feminist account.[29]

For Pettman, the emergence of these different (and sometimes conflicting) feminist concerns is a positive development, which points to the sheer accumulation, energy and interest of feminist scholarship that has begun to "put pressure on the IR borderlands."[30] Like Sylvester, Tickner and Whitworth, she acknowledges too, that pressure is also being exerted from *within*, as CST perspectives deploy theoretical moves both useful and familiar to a feminist perspective, by drawing more generalised attention to the politics of knowledge making — "asking how we come to ask the questions we ask in/as IR, pointing to other voices, those not heard in their views of the world."[31] By asking these questions in a more open context (i.e., of all categories of 'otherness' rather than just gendered ones), Pettman suggests, CST has helped to move feminist inquiry beyond its initial concern to illustrate the gendered nature of International Relations, and push for female inclusion in previously closed arenas.[32] Increasingly, she argues, feminist scholars in International Relations have come to recognise gender as only one constitutive part of multiple and possibly

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[29] Jan Jindy Pettman, "Gendering International Relations," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 47:1 (1993): 47-60, on p. 48.

[30] *Ibid.*

[31] *Ibid.*, 49.

[32] Pettman, "Border Crossings/Shifting Identities," in Michael J. Shapiro and Hayward R. Alker (eds.), *Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 275.

conflicting identities — leaving little room for complacency within (particularly Western) feminist scholarship, as women everywhere are forced to confront their own possible complicity in other repressive and/or displacing configurations of power based on class, ethnicity, nationality or even age.[33]

Feminism in Japanese Studies

The themes identified above as generally important in feminist re-workings of IR are, I suggest, of special relevance to Japanese Studies. Despite their comparative neglect in mainstream social and political histories of Japan, notions of gender have generated wide-ranging and complex debates in Japanese society, and have been important, if often implicitly so, in conceptualisations of Japan's role in the world. The understanding of (Realist) statecraft-as-mancraft is undoubtedly important in understanding this role, but so are some of the more specific ways in which gendered divisions of subjectivity have operated in Japanese society.

As the historian Sharon Sievers has pointed out for example, the emergence of a significant (if not very coherent) feminist agenda in late nineteenth/early twentieth century Japan was very much part of the intense public discourse on the future and direction of Japan's modernisation into a "European-style" nation state.[34] When Japan's ruling elite embarked on the task of re-modelling the Japanese state in concordance with Western European conceptualisations of world order and security, Sievers argues, they found themselves under considerable pressure to improve the legal, political and educational status of Japanese women — both from 'outside,' as

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[33] *Ibid.*, 275.

[34] Sharon L. Sievers, *Flowers in Salt: The Beginnings of Feminist Consciousness in Modern Japan* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983), 10-11.

Japan encountered Western notions of modernity and civilisation,[35] and from 'inside,' as the rapid flow of foreign technology, culture and ideas into Japan saw many women mobilise to present their own agendas for political and social change. Political activists and intellectuals in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries such as Kishida Toshiko and Fukuda Hideko used the burgeoning popular rights movement to argue for the inclusion of women in the changes sweeping Japanese society.[36] Lecture and study groups, "freedom houses" and other cooperative societies aimed at expanding women's political interests and participation began to proliferate; and women workers, particularly in the textile industries, began to organise more formally in the effort to achieve better wages and working conditions.[37]

Inevitably, these efforts were subject to hostility and repression from the male-dominated Japanese state elite which, despite some initiatives relating specifically to women, such as compulsory education, remained reluctant to engage women in the changes sweeping Meiji society. At a time when the pursuit of national unity and stability were seen as critical to augmenting Japan's power and status in the world system, women's attempts to engage with the modernising process and redefine their roles and options were seen by many as potentially destabilising, and even dangerous. The result was an increasingly co-ordinated series of manoeuvres by the Meiji oligarchy designed to control and restrict the modernisation of Japanese women —

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[35] According to Sievers, the deference accorded to American women, even in the 19th century, impressed and puzzled Japan's elite. "The way women are treated here," commented an attendant to the 1860 Japanese envoy to the U.S., "is like the way parents are treated in our country." Yanagawa, cited in Sievers, *Flowers in Salt*, 1.

[36] Some prominent male intellectuals and academics such as Fukuzawa Yukichi and Mori Arinori also argued for improvements in the treatment of women — but without necessarily advocating equality. Sievers, *Flowers in Salt*, 18-20, and 30-45.

[37] Sievers, *Flowers in Salt*, 83-86.

ranging from official guidelines decreeing the 'proper' physical appearance and mode of dress,[38] to more direct restrictions on political participation.[39] Finally, in 1898, the Meiji Civil Code sought to confine the role of women to the home once and for all, by denying them the status of independent legal persons.[40] The broad framework for these directives, as Chizuko Ueno and others have argued, was the popular concept of the Japanese family, or *ie*,[41] a structure in which personal roles and status are both fixed and gender dependent, emphasising vertical relationships between parents and children, the ultimate power of the (invariably male) household head, and the importance of continuing the family name.[42]

In short, Japanese women's lives were crafted to fit in with concepts of statehood and citizenship not at all dissimilar to the Western philosophies and political theories which defined 'statecraft' as 'mancraft.' Here too, familiar dualisms were brought into play — between public/private, modern/traditional, and active/passive — to delineate the roles men and women were expected to fulfil. The result, as Tessa Morris-Suzuki has pointed out, was that whereas modernity and national power in Japan came to be emphatically associated with masculinity and the 'public' domain, women, on the other hand, were seen as the custodians of tradition, and their domain — the home — the site of 'feminine' continuity and stability.[43] And, while women were portrayed in official discourse as equal participants in Japan's modernisation,

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[38] For example, the 1872 ban on short hair for women reflected the Meiji elite's dilemma of needing Japan to appear 'civilised' to the West, while insulating women from the effects of modern change. Hence, 'feudal' practices such as tooth-blackening and eyebrow-shaving were discouraged along with 'modern' short hair. Sievers, *Flowers in Salt*, 14-15.

[39] In 1890, women were included under Article 5 of the Police Security Regulations, effectively banning them from any form of political activity. Sievers, *Flowers in Salt*, 110.

[40] *Ibid.*, 111.

[41] Chizuko Ueno, "Modern Patriarchy and the Formation of the Japanese National State," in Denoon et. al., *Multicultural Japan: Palaeolithic to Postmodern* (*op. cit.*, 1996), 215.

[42] *Ibid.*, 217, and Sievers, *Flowers in Salt*, 111.

with their own role to play in the strength and unity of Japan as a nation (predominantly as producers of sons and teachers of patriotism),[44] it was a role which could never be confused with the male destiny of nation building — of 'statecraft.'

Morris-Suzuki adds a further, interesting dimension to this perspective, by pointing out that the dichotomy between the household as a (female) site of tradition, and the public (male) realm of technological and social change was reflected not just in Meiji legislation, but also in more subtle shifts of industrial policy: such as the gradual re-delegation of traditionally 'female' work (e.g., silk production) to men, as production processes began to adapt modern (and therefore 'male') technology.[45] For all this, the Meiji distinction between female (private) and male (public) spheres of agency, even when backed up by legislative and industrial practice, was largely an imaginary one:

> Women's lives, like men's, were transformed by the social and economic changes of the Meiji and Taishô eras. Women formed the larger part of the factory workforce until World War I and also played a crucial and often neglected role in managing and keeping the accounts of the tens of thousands of small family firms which dominated Japanese manufacturing and commerce throughout the early decades of the century. But the *concept* of woman as source of continuity, and man as agent of change, became a particularly enduring leitmotiv in evolving notions of nationhood.[46]

In the postwar period, gendered concepts of modernity and tradition and the social roles defined by them would become even more imaginary, as Japanese women acquired full civil rights and greatly expanded opportunities for work and education under the Occupation.[47] The changed postwar status of women was interwoven with fundamental shifts in economic and demographic patterns, as self-employed family

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[44] Tessa Morris-Suzuki, *Re-Imagining Japan* (*op. cit.*, 1998), 112.
[45] Sievers, *Flowers in Salt*, 112.
[46] Morris-Suzuki, *Re-Inventing Japan*, 113.
[47] *Ibid.*
[48] John Dower, *Embracing Defeat* (*op. cit.*, 1999), 128-30.

households gave way to nuclear, wage-earning households, and enormous numbers of Japanese people began to migrate from rural to urban areas.[48] The straitened economic conditions of the late 1940s and early 1950s also saw a dramatic increase in the number of women working outside the home.[49]

Yet despite these profound socio-economic changes, existing images of gender in postwar Japan and the social relations they privilege have remained strangely resistant to modification, leading other scholars to contemplate their influence on the problems and opportunities faced by Japanese women today. In particular, critical attention has been focused on the way in which the concept of *ie* (family structure, or household) enshrined in prewar and wartime Japan continues to be privileged in contemporary Japanese economic, political and social life. Both before and during the war, government propaganda such as the 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education (*Kyôiku Chokugo*) and later, the proclamation on the "Way of the Subject" (*Shinmin no Michi*) repeatedly imprinted the image of the *ie* on the public imagination, conflating filial obedience and harmonious family relations with good national subjectivity.[50] Notions of Japanese homogeneity and superiority were encapsulated in the notion of *kokutai*, or 'national polity,' by which all Japanese people were included in a unique family state united around the emperor, in a structure which

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[48] Eiko Shinotsuka, "Women Workers in Japan: Past, Present, Future," in Joyce Gelb & Marion L. Palley (eds.), *Women of Japan and Korea* (Temple University Press, 1994), 96-98, and Sandra Buckley, "Altered States: The Body Politics of 'Being-Woman,'" in Gordon (ed.), *Postwar Japan as History*, (*op. cit.*, 1993), 350.

[49] The majority tended to be unmarried women who quit work upon either marriage or, at the latest, following the birth of a first child. However, the increased demand for labour during the high growth years of the late 1950s and 1960s saw more women begin to return to work after marriage and childbirth; a pattern which was reinforced by the restructuring of the Japanese economy towards 'tertiary' industries subsequent to the 1973 oil crises. The recent recession notwithstanding, this pattern continues to characterise women's employment in the 1990s, as reflected in the persistent "M curve" in female employment statistics. Eiko Shinotsuka, *Josei ga Hataraku Shakai* (Working Women in Society; Tokyo: Keisô Shobô, 1994), 18-22.

[50] Gavan McCormack, Introduction to Denoon *et.* al. (eds.), *Multicultural Japan* (*op. cit.*, 1996), 1-2.

mirrored traditional, hierarchical relations between the (male) household head, and the other members of the idealised extended family.[51]

As many writers on Japan have pointed out, the *ie* structure, like the 'group model,' '*amae*,' and other concepts invoked to explain Japanese society, is a highly selective, if not "invented" representation of Japanese social reality.[52] Despite this, as the feminist scholar Etsuko Yamada argues, such images remain central to contemporary understandings of Japan.[53] If anything, she suggests, concepts such as *ie* have been reconfigured in the postwar period of Japan's economic ascent to suit new definitions of national interest, for example, through modern corporate practices which maintain the prewar ideal of dividing work and social roles along strictly gendered lines.[54] The prewar metaphor of the "country-as-family" (*kazoku kuni*) which obligated men to work outside the home (often as soldiers) and women to give birth and raise their children to be good citizens, has, Yamashita argues, been exchanged in the postwar era for that of the "company-as-family" (*kazoku kigyô*), according to which 'company soldiers' in the service of large-scale corporations dedicate their working and social lives to the good of their company, while women take care of the housework and the children at home.[55] In this way, the assumption that gender roles and relationships should be rigidly structured to serve the good of the larger state/corporate whole remains intact — encouraged, as Yamashita points out, by state and corporate

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[51] Etsuko Yamashita, "Sengo Shakai to Josei: Shokuba to Kazoku no Henyô" (Women in Postwar Society: Changes in the Family and the Workplace), in Kazuko Tsurumi and Yamashita Etsuko (eds.), *Otoko to Onna no Jikû* (Timespace of Gender; Tokyo: Fujiwara Shoten, 1993), 618.

[52] Chizuko Ueno, "Modern Patriarchy and the Formation of the Japanese National State," in Denoon *et. al.* (eds.), *Multicultural Japan* (*op. cit.*, 1996), 220.

[53] Yamashita, "Sengo Shakai to Josei," 617.

[54] *Ibid.*, 619.

[55] *Ibid.*, 620. Incidentally, the chacater for *zoku* in these expressions is not (as might be anticipated), the second character of the Japanese word for 'family' (*kazoku*), which denotes 'membership,' but a different character also read as 'tsku,' or 'sunawachi,' denoting conformity or settledness.

practices which reward those who conform to the social expectations of the *ie* norm.[56]

As indicated above however, the actual patterns of women's employment in Japan, particularly in the postwar period, have moved very far away from the *ie* ideal. From a feminist perspective however, particularly one attuned to the broader CST awareness of theory *as* practice, the 'theoretical' images privileged in *ie* ideology continue to pose problems for women, especially when it comes to career opportunity and job security.[57] What is even more interesting however, from a feminist IR perspective, is the way in which these gendered assumptions have been equally affirmed and replicated in dominant images of Japan as an *international* actor — most especially, in its image in the West as a global economic 'superpower.'

As political economists from Chalmers Johnson to Robert Cox have acknowledged, Japan's rapid postwar modernisation and high growth were achieved via a particular structure of production relations in which a broad economic 'periphery' of small and medium-sized enterprises provided 'flexible' labour supplies and conditions for the

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[56] For example, in postwar legislation that grants significant tax concessions and special allowances for non-earning spouses, and "corporate welfare" such as company-sponsored housing and leisure activities which "gather families in under the company umbrella." Yamashita, "Sengo Shakai to Josei," 621-22.

[57] Ueno, "Women and the Family in Transition in Postindustrial Japan," in Gelb and Parry (eds.), *Women of Japan and Korea: Continuity and Change* (*op. cit.*, 1994), 27. Legal reforms such as the 1986 Equal Opportunity Law have done little to rectify the situation, because they fail to impose adequate sanctions on firms which fail to promote women or place them in career-track employment. Teruko Inoue, "Nihon no Joseigaku to 'Sei Yakuwari'" ('Gender Roles' and Womens' Studies in Japan, in Teruko Inoue and Chizuko Ueno (eds.), *Nihon no Feminizumu (III): Seiyakuwari* (Japanese Feminism III: Gender Roles; Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995), 16-17. Similarly, there is little or no legal provision in Japan regarding issues such as child care or maternity leave for full-time workers, because of the implicit assumption that it is 'natural' for women to put child-rearing ahead of career opportunities. Nakano Mami, "Ten Years Under the Equal Employment Opportunity Law," in *AMPO: Voices From the Japanese Women's Movement* (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 71-72. The superficiality of women's integration into the economic 'core' as equal participants has been further exposed in the past few years, with women, both at the core and the periphery, usually the first victims of recession-prompted redundancy. Yamashita notes that any of the more promising trends of the late 1980s and early 1990s, such as the increased hiring of women for career-track employment by large corporations, are currently in decline again. Yamashita, "Sengo Shakai to Josei," 621.

conglomerate core as it developed through the 1950s and 1960s.[58] Moreover, labour relations within this periphery (which continues to constitute the majority of Japanese production processes) are characterised by lower wages, the predominance of part-time and/or temporary employment, and minimised labour conditions (e.g., insurance, leave and workers' compensation).[59] The point is, of course, that the majority of workers within this periphery are women, who have traditionally been more willing to accept the conditions on offer, due to constraints of time, education and opportunity.[60]

In contrast, the most readily acknowledged characteristics of 'Japanese' business management have only ever applied, in reality, to a minority of Japanese workers, within which women comprise an even smaller minority. These include the conditions accorded by large-scale Japanese corporations to their (overwhelmingly male) permanent workforces, such as lifetime employment, company-specific unionism and seniority-based promotion.[61] Yet during the 1970s and 1980s when Japan's economic strength was at its peak, works such as Ezra Vogel's *Japan as Number One*, 1979), Robert Cole's *Work, Mobility and Participation* (1979), William Ouchi's *Theory Z* (1981) and James Abegglen's *Kaisha: The Japanese Corporation* (1985), represented precisely these practices, and the rather narrow sector of corporate Japan that they apply to, as *the* central reality of Japan's economic

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[58] Robert Cox, "Middlepowermanship, Japan and Future World Order," *International Journal* 44 (1989: 824-862), 845.

[59] Dorrine Kondo also explains these conditions, in *Crafting Selves: Power, Gender, and Discourses of Identity in a Japanese Workplace* (London: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 35-37.

[60] Yamashita, "Sengo Shakai to Josei," 622.

[61] Andrew Gordon, "Contests for the Workplace," in Gordon (ed.), *Postwar Japan as History*, (*op. cit.*, 1993), 391.

miracle.[62] In the process, Japanese women were doubly marginalised — not just 'at home' by attitudes and expectations that restricted their participation in the economic core, but in images of Japan as an international actor that privileged, and continue to privilege a specifically male reality over the economic and social spheres in which women do participate.

In a 1992 work entitled *Feminizumu Mondai no Tenkan* (The Changing Problems of Feminism), Kanai Yoshiko has confronted problems such as these by examining the potential for existing sites of resistance for Japanese women as part of their integration with economic and social change in the world.[63] Kanai, who has written extensively on feminist theory and political movements, is particularly interested in the pursuit of what she calls "alternative relativity" (*kankeisei no oruterunatibu*), or interrelated modes of alternative economic, political and social life. Kanai sees Japanese women as a particularly important force in pursuing these alternatives, given their already established record of participation in local and regional initiatives such as recycling drives, consumer co-operatives, and environmental and peace movements.[64] At the same time, she acknowledges that these spheres of action have largely been ignored by those wielding conventional political power in Japan. One of the problems, Kanai suggests, is that many local and regional organisations in Japan are currently developed by and for 'housewives' whose participation is motivated largely by an immediate concern for the wellbeing of themselves and their families, and who have not thought directly or deeply enough about the broader political/social/economic structures which generate the need for their participation in

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[62] Of these texts, Vogel's was the only one which explicitly proposed Japan as a model for the United States to follow.

[63] Yoshiko Kanai, *Feminizumu Mondai no Tenkan* (The Changing Problems of Feminism; Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 1992), 86.

the first place.[65]

Kanai's argument is interesting, I suggest, because it is clearly looking for other dimensions and sources of agency for Japanese women beyond the major (postwar) Japanese feminist concern with achieving parity within the male-dominated institutions of conventional political and economic power. From her perspective, women cannot be satisfied with working for change within existing parameters. Rather, they need to be aware of broader currents of thought and practice which challenge the status quo at the international, as well as the national and local level, from a variety of standpoints: ecological, racial, and economic. Women also need to work harder, Kanai argues, towards achieving a more inclusive, less 'gendered' approach to issues of equality and security.[66] "A good feminist politics," she writes:

> is not one which simply encloses all problems within the extant prism of 'women's problems.' The 'politics of sex' cannot only be about politicising 'women's problems;' rather, it needs to achieve a more global perspective that takes into account many alternative patterns of work and economy.[67]

Kanai's sentiments are echoed by other feminist writers who have turned their attention to the global dimensions of Japanese feminism — in particular, the extent to which 'women's problems' connect to Japan's postwar status as a major economic actor in the world system. One result of this shift has been the enthusiasm with which feminist thought and practice in Japan has begun to debate what Ôgoshi Aiko terms a "feminism of human rights" (*jinken no feminizumu*).[68] While the theoretical

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[64] *Ibid.*, 88.
[65] *Ibid.*
[66] *Ibid.*, 90-93.
[67] *Ibid.*, 90.
[68] Aiko Ôgoshi, "Kindai Nihon no Feminizumu no Kadai: 'Sabetsu,' 'Kankyô,' 'Ajia.' (Issues for Feminism in Modern Japan: 'Discrimination,' 'Environment,' 'Asia') in The Femirôgu Association

underpinnings of 'human rights feminism' are still being explored and developed from a number of angles, it is broadly centred on a shared perception that more needs to be done in Japan to understand and confront the ways in which discrimination against and exploitation of Japanese women is being replicated among other members of Japanese society, and also abroad through the internationalisation of Japanese economic practices. More controversially, it seeks to re-cast Japanese women as perpetrators, as well as victims of these internationalised patterns of repression and discrimination.

A particularly important example of Japan's role in globalised patterns of exploitation and discrimination is the internationalisation of the sex trade. When Japanese companies began to invest more heavily abroad in Southeast Asia during the 1970s, Japanese tourism also increased, and with it, the phenomena of all-male 'company holidays' (*kaisha ryokô*) to locations such as China, South Korea and Thailand. Purchasing sex on these holidays is not only permitted, but often encouraged by superiors and tour operators, as illustrated by the coining of the term "prostitution tour" (*baishun tsûa*, or *baishun ryokô*).[59] During the 1980s however, this trend became more internalised, as more women began to come to Japan from Southeast Asia, Latin America and even Russia, to work as hostesses, exotic dancers and prostitutes. Many of the *Japayuki-san* ("Miss Going-to-Japans") actually come to Japan on legitimate visas, due to a clause in Japanese immigration laws which

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(eds.), *Femirôgu 5: Feminizumu no Kadai* (Femirôgu 5: Topics for Feminism; Kyoto: Genbunsha, 1994, 153-175), 156.

[59] Kyôko Kikuchi, "Shûen Toshite no Gaikokujin Josei Rôdôsha" (Foreign Women Workers on the Periphery), in Tsurumi and Yamashita (eds.), *Otoko to Onna no Jikû*, (Timespace of Gender; *op. cit.*, 1993), 573-74. That this remains a contemporary phenomena is illustrated by the controversy generated over a 1994 Japanese tourism company's publication of the *Tai Baishun Handobukku* (Thailand Prostitution Guidebook), which provides directions and recommendations about brothels in Thailand to prospective Japanese purchasers. "Protest Over Brothel Guide," *South China Morning Post* 20/01/1995, from Reuters Email News Services (Article no: 000585113953).

allow entry to work under the category of "religion, sport, and entertainment," in contrast to the huge, and even more peripheralised population of male foreign workers (*gaikokujin rôdôsha*) in Japan,[70] who are mostly employed illegally at heavy manual jobs in construction and manufacturing. Despite this, the *Japayuki* are subject to the same exploitation and discrimination suffered by their male counterparts: lower wages than their Japanese colleagues, penalties for time missed due to illness or injury, and chronic overwork.[71] Moreover, many of the women are tricked into coming to Japan by agents who promise them more legitimate 'entertainment' employment as dancers or waitresses; once arrived, their passports are confiscated and they are forced into prostitution in order to pay back exorbitant agency 'bonds' and transport costs.[72]

That Japanese feminism is becoming more aware of the broad context of these issues — i.e., the context of the general exploitation of Third World labour in a globalised economy — is illustrated not only in recent scholarship.[73] Movements which initially began struggling in the 1970s for government acknowledgement and restriction of "prostitution tours" by male company workers for example, have gradually broadened their agenda to include activities such as promoting the human rights of

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[70] Both *Japayuki* and the more common term for foreign labourers, *gaikokujin rôdôsha*, are technically gender-neutral; however, the former always refers to female workers, while the latter is usually used for male workers.

[71] Kikuchi, "Shûen Toshite no Gaikokujin Josei Rôdôsha," 591-93.

[72] Akiko Yamashita, "Sei rôdô wo dô kangaeru ka: sekushuariti to bunka to keizai no kankei" (How Do We Consider Sexual Labour? Drawing Connections Between Sexuality, Culture and Economics), in The Femirôgu Association (eds.), *Femirôgu 5: Feminizumu no Kadai*, (*op. cit.*, 1994, 130-148), 134-35. English accounts of internationalised prostitution in Japan include Okura Yuri, "Promoting Prostitution," and Murata Noriko, "The Trafficking of Women," both in *AMPO: Voices From the Japanese Women's Movement*, (*op. cit.*, 1996).

[73] Such as Ôgoshi's essay, *op. cit.*, and Ueno Chizuko's 1998 *Nashonarizumu to Gendâ* (Engendering Nationalism; Tokyo: Seidosha, 1998), which is discussed below. Kanai has also commented directly on this issue, pointing out that "if women in the first world can achieve their liberation only through exporting the problems related to the sexual division of labour in their own society, this is nothing but globalisation of the structure of sexism." Yoshiko Kanai, interviewed by Etsuko Kaji in "Politicised

exploited (mostly female) workers in Japanese-owned factories overseas, and for more accountability on the part of Japanese foreign investors towards problems such as environmental damage and the dislocation of small-scale local economies in regions that attract Japanese capital.[74] Within Japan, organisations such as Asian Labourers Solidarity, the Asian Women's Association, and the Association of Concern for Asian Women in Japan address a wide range of concerns associated with the transnationalisation of the Japanese economy; including the economic and human rights of (male) foreign construction and factory labourers working in the Japanese black economy, Southeast Asian women trapped in the domestic sex industry, and the plight of Southeast Asian 'imported brides' in rural Japan.[75] They have also campaigned successfully for policy changes regarding sex tourism, such as the recent criminalisation of the overseas purchase of sex from minors.[76]

Even more recently, Japanese feminism has started to address one of the most painful legacies of Japan's modern history: the "comfort women" who were drafted into brothels set up in Southeast Asia by the Japanese Imperial Army prior to and during WWII. Although exact numbers are not known, it is estimated that between 80,000 and 200,000 women, of whom about 80% were Korean, were 'recruited,' many of them forcibly, to serve as sex labourers to Japanese forces in Japan's occupied

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Women, Womanised Politics: Feminism in Japan," *AMPO: Japan-Asia Quarterly Review* 22:2-3 (1991: 26-30), 27.

[74] Kaji, "Politicised Women, Womanised Politics," 30.

[75] See, for example, the special edition of AMPO Japan-Asia Quarterly Review (19:4, 1988), which contains essays on this issue, including Yamashita, "Japan imports brides: can isolated farmers buy consolation?" (22-31), 28-29; Shizuko Ôshima, "Gathering the Fires of HELP" (32-39), and Eiichiro Ishiyama, "Moving Beyond Simple Charity"(40-43). Ishiyama's article also contains a guide to the network of regional organisations addressing issues associated with Asian labour in Japan (*Ibid.*, 42).

[76] The law, which also criminalises child prostitution and pornography in Japan, was passed by the Diet on May 18, 1999. "Bill Banning Child Prostitution, Pornography Enacted;" Kyodo News Service Archives at http://home.kyodo.co.jp. An English translation of the law is available at the Japanese Ministry of Justice website, at http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/CRAB/law01.htm.

territories.[77] It was not until the early 1980s however, that the comfort women's plight became widely publicised in South Korea; and it took another decade before some of the survivors of this policy began to come forward, seeking apology and redress through the Japanese courts.[78] Their claims were consistently rejected by the Japanese government, until conclusive documentary evidence implicating the state directly in what McCormack has described as "probably the largest-scale state-sponsored rape in history," was unearthed and published in 1992.[79] While the Japanese government finally admitted "deception, coercion and official involvement" in the comfort women scandal in August 1993, it declined to offer any official apology or monetary compensation to the women, arguing that all such matters had long been settled under Japan's postwar peace settlements with Southeast Asian nations.[80] Successive administrations have persisted with this stance in the face of significant international pressure — including a 1994 recommendation by the International Commission of Jurists that the Japanese government formally apologise and pay compensation to surviving comfort women.[81]

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[77] Both Japanese women and women of other occupied territories (such as Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Burma and the Pacific islands) were also used as comfort women. Chunghee Sara Soh, "The Comfort Women Project" (at http://userwww.sfsu.edu/~soh/comfortwomen.html (1996-97), 2.

[78] The first official action was lunched in December 1991 by a group of thirty five Korean women, followed by another group from the Philippines in September 1993. Ueno, *Nashonarizumu to Gendâ*, 99.

[79] McCormack, *The Emptiness of Japanese Affluence*, 249. The papers in question were discovered at the National Institute for Defence Studies by Professor Yoshimi Yoshiaki, and published in the *Asahi Shimbun* on January 11, 1992 (Soh, "The Comfort Women Project," 3). Until August 1993, the official government line on the comfort women was that although the prostitution business existed, it had been run by private contractors. This position continues to be supported by a powerful coalition of conservative politicians and academics, including the controversial "Group to Make New History Textbooks" set up by Tokyo University academic Fujioka Nobukatsu. "Many Voices Join in Battle over 'Comfort Women'," *Japan Times* 20/05/1997 (http://www.japantimes.co.jp/home.html).

[80] Kazuko Watanabe, "Militarism, Colonialism, and the Trafficking of Women: 'Comfort Women' Forced Into Sexual Labor for Japanese Soldiers" (in *Bulletin of Concerned Asia Scholars* 26:4, 1994, sourced online at http://csf.colorado.edu/bcas/sample/comfdoc.htm), 3-4.

[81] Ben Hills, "Japan Shuns War Brothel Ruling," *The Age*, November 11, 1994. In 1995, the (then) Hashimoto administration oversaw the establishment of a private fund, the Asian Women's Fund, to cover monetary compensation to former comfort women. The AWF is seen by many however, as an attempt by Japan to further deny the state's complicity in establishing and maintaining the comfort

The effects of the comfort women issue on Japanese feminism have been evident in the enthusiasm with which non-government associations in Japan, including those mentioned above, have campaigned for a formal official apology and compensation to the victims, while organising practical support activities such as collecting oral testimony from survivors, and providing financial and emotional support for those pursuing legal options.[82] However, the comfort women's plight has also forced many Japanese feminists (and feminists interested in Japan) to confront new and often difficult questions, about history, nationhood, citizenship and ethnicity; and about the range of ethnical stances that emerge when different narratives of victimisation *within* the category of gender are taken seriously.

On this latter issue, Chizuko Ueno, one of Japan's most prominent feminist thinkers, has argued that Japan's long silence over the comfort women is connected to, among other things, the tendency to gloss over (if not omit) the complicity of Japanese women (including many early 'feminists') in the ideologies and propaganda that sanctioned the forced prostitution of women whose marginalised status (as both women and colonised peoples) made them the least eligible, and least able to resist being used and disposed of in the service of the state.[83] The same feminist scholarship that has worked to have women acknowledged as agents in Japan's history rather than passive, 'indoor' recipients of destiny, Ueno suggests, must now acknowledge their capacity as co-perpetrators, rather than innocent victims of the

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women system — including the South Korean government, which has discouraged acceptance of AWF money by former comfort women. Chung-hee Sara Soh, "The Comfort Women Project," 4-5.

[82] Watanabe, "Militarism, Colonialism, and the Trafficking of Women," 7; and Yûko Suzuki, *Sensô Sekinin to Gendâ: 'Jyûshugi Shikan' to Nihongun 'Ianfu' Mondai* (War Responsibility and Gender: the 'Free History' Perspective and the 'Comfort Women' Problem; Tokyo: Miraisha, 1997), 199-200.

[83] Ueno, *Nashonarizumu to Gendâ*, 15-16.

structures that produced the 'comfort women.'[64] Her comments are echoed by other writers like Sayoko Yoneda and Kazue Muta,[65] as well as Yûko Suzuki, who has written extensively on the comfort women issue. Suzuki is particularly critical of what she describes as a tendency, even among Japanese feminists, to settle for "second best," resolutions of the comfort women issue (such as the controversial Asian Women's Fund) instead of continuing to push for full acknowledgement of the government's culpability.[66]

There seems little doubt that Japanese feminists will remain committed to the struggles for social and political change that have always been integral to feminist theory and practice in its broader context. As I have shown, this necessarily involves challenging those images of the Japanese state that have marginalised and ignored women as passive, insignificant participants. To this extent, Japanese feminism has already confronted some of the issues seen as important in Western feminist challenges to International Relations — especially the mythical distinctions between 'male' and 'female' categories of social and political agency which lie at the heart of Realism's silent assumption of 'statecraft as mancraft.' Inevitably however, and as

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[64] Ueno, *Nashonarizumu to Gendâ*, 30. As part of her argument, Ueno points to the fervent nationalist affiliations of some of Japan's most famous prewar feminists, including Ichikawa Fusae [1893-1981], who was both a prominent prewar campaigner for women's sufferage, and an organiser of the United Women's Group, which was created to support the government's National General Mobilisation Strategy. *Ibid.*, 39-42.

[65] Yoneda's essay examines the nationalist leanings of one of Japan's most famous feminists, Hiratsuka Raichô (1886-1971), arguing that her support of the imperial system was not forced upon Hiratsuka temporarily during the politically oppressive circumstances of the 1930s and 1940s, but was rather an integral part of her rather "bourgeois" feminism, which was centred around the rights of mothers, and heavily influenced by Swedish writers such as Ellen Key. Yoneda Sayoko, "Hiratsuka Raichô no 'sensô sekinin' ron josetsu" (A Preface to the Debate over Hiratsuka Raichô's 'War Responsibility'), *Rekishi Hyôron* 4 (1996). Muta Kazue's argument is a more general one, focussed on the need to examine how prewar and wartime distinctions between male and female roles in Japanese society, by eliminating women from 'direct' participation in the killing fields of WWII, have also subsequently helped to absolved them from a sense of responsibility for the war, despite their obvious complicity in wartime social and economic structures. Muta, "Senryaku Toshite no Onna" (Women as Strategy), in Teruko and Ueno (eds.), *Feminism in Japan, Vol. III* (*op. cit.*), 117-18.

[66] Suzuki, *Sensô Sekinin to Gendâ* 236.

the comfort women debate illustrates, the re-working of images of Japan to include women as significant and powerful agents of change has broadened the feminist agenda, opening new categories of identity and victimisation. Japanese feminists now find themselves having to make ever more complex distinctions and connections, which demand the kind of continuously self-reflexive attitude integral to Critical Theory and postmodern approaches, and the general CST challenge to orthodox IR.

One of the best expressions of this development comes from Ueno, who suggests that Japanese feminism is currently undergoing 'transnationalisation' (*kokumin kokka wo koeru feminizumu*), as it encounters issues and narratives that cannot be dealt with within the convenient unit of the nation state.[87] By 'transnationalisation,' Ueno is not speaking of vague (and, to her, facile) concepts of 'international sisterhood' or 'world citizenship' which, in enveloping us in a sense of international community just as "imagined" as that of the nation state,[88] allow us to somehow shuffle off the burden of our specific histories. Rather, she writes, a transnationalised feminism is about understanding — and taking responsibility for — our identity and capacity for action as human beings composed of "a complex bundle of relativities (*kankeisei*); of gender, nationality, occupation, positionality, race, culture, ethnicity and so on."[89] Just as none of these categories can be escaped from or denied, Ueno argues, neither can any one of them ever constitute an exclusive, fixed claim to identity in the world. In these terms, Japanese feminism has perhaps begun to understand the interwovenness of these categories; and as such I suggest, is emerging as a

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[87] Ueno, *Nashonarizumu to Gendâ*, 185-187.

[88] Benedict Anderson's expression, of course. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991).

[89] Ueno, *Nashonarizumu to Gendâ*, 197.

particularly powerful site of critical international theory and practice.

3. The Myth of the Mono-Ethnic State: Race and Identity in Japan's International Relations.

When theories of International Relations come into contact with the notion of 'race,' they touch upon a set of assumptions that have gained wide acceptance only in the last 150 years or so. As Kwame Anthony Appiah argues, while nearly every known human society seems to have had views about what accounted for human and social difference, it was in mid-nineteenth century Europe that a "distinctively modern understanding of what it was to be a people" emerged[90] This understanding, Appiah suggests, had at its heart not only the new scientific conceptions of biological heredity and evolution being developed by scholars such as Darwin, but also the understanding of people *as a nation* — defined by the shared essence that flows from a common cultural and linguistic descent — that had accompanied the emergence of modern European states (such as Italy or Germany).

In this sense, the development of an image of the world as divided into a few, radically different ethnic groups, or 'races,' defined in terms of fundamental, biologically inheritable, moral and intellectual characteristics was not just an attempt to impose some sort of manageable order on the incredible human diversity in the world that had been revealed to European society over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[91] It was also an intellectual framework for practices of inclusion and exclusion — practices that could be used to draw the 'included' into the community of the modern nation-state. In short, concepts of race became increasingly

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[90] Kwame Anthony Appiah, "Race," in Frank Lentricchia & Thomas McLaughlin (eds.) *Critical Terms for Literary Study* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 274-76.

[91] Morris-Suzuki, *Re-Inventing Japan*, 81.

intertwined with concepts of nation, as illustrated in the work of scholars such as George Buffon (1866), who argued that different races developed out of the repetition of particular historical experiences, which gradually created diversity out of a single human species.[92]

It is perhaps a measure of this intertwining of race and nation that, until quite recently in International Relations, 'race,' along with related concepts such as 'culture,' 'civilisation' and 'ethnicity,' has not generally been at the forefront of analysis of the essential dynamics of global life. As I explained in Chapters Three and Four, these dynamics are understood, first and foremost, in (Realist) terms of "the relative position of state units on a systemwide map of capabilities,"[93] with the behaviour of states being determined by external, systemic forces (i.e., states are presumed to be uniform in behaviour, whatever they might be in composition). From this perspective, and until relatively recently, race, culture, civilisation and ethnicity have been, at best, important only as elements within the ill-defined phenomena of "nationalism," which, for most Realists and neo-Realists, functions at most as an exacerbator, not a primary cause of the fundamental tensions between states in the world system.[94]

In the post-Cold War period, this relegation of race to a supplementary determinant of conflict between states has, to some extent, been reconsidered. The Balkans crisis, the turmoil in Rwanda and the religious/ethnic conflicts in Indonesia, to name a few

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[92] Buffon, cited in Morris-Suzuki, *Re-Inventing Japan*, 79.

[93] Sujata Chakrabati Pasic, "Culturing International Relations Theory: A Call for Extension," in Josef Lapid and Fritz Kratochwil (eds.), *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 85.

[94] This is Lapid and Kratochwil's analysis of neo-Realist approaches to issues of nationalism, in "'Revisiting the 'National:' Toward an Identity Agenda in Neorealism?" in Lapid and Kratochwil (eds.), *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, (*op. cit.*, 1996), 111.

of the more obvious examples, suggest that "understandings of what it is to be a people" are no longer easily fitted into the extant territorial boundaries of nation states. Some of these understandings assume the same alignment between territory and ethnic/cultural identity that intertwines 'race' with 'nation,' and from there, with the notion of the state. Others however, are less obvious. For example, in the case of the Ainu people of Japan (discussed below), or Aboriginal people in Australia, who can be depicted in terms of a hugely complex range of social, ethnic and territorial subdivisions, the spatial qualifications for statehood will probably never be achieved. Yet the demands of such people to be acknowledged as a separate 'race,' are undeniable, and in some cases, have even garnered some (albeit limited) results. Meanwhile, everywhere within states there are ethnic and/or religious 'minorities' whose sense of belonging transcends their location as citizens of a particular state.

For some within the International Relations community of course, these multiple articulations of identity are quite resolvable within established parameters of knowledge. Racial tensions which have erupted into (often bloody) quests for new nations, for example, are resolvable within the major premises of IR theory and practice — in particular, the anarchy premise. Thus John Mearsheimer (1990, 1992), has argued that the 'ethnic' nationalist tensions erupting and re-erupting in post-Soviet Europe are, if anything, confirmation of the neo-Realist logic of anarchy as still endemic to the international system, being part and parcel of the expanding global order that has replaced the tight, if artificial control of 'unruly' forces that characterised the Cold War.[95] More famously, Samuel Huntington (1994, 1996) has

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[95] John Mearsheimer, "Disorder Restored," in Graham Allison and Gregory Treverton (eds.), *Rethinking America's Security* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1992), 216-18, and "Back to the Future," 1990, in which he argues that 'hypernationalism' is part and parcel of the expanding global disorder that has replaced the tight control of anarchic competition during the Cold War. On

offered a perspective in which broad, overarching alliances or 'civilisations' (defined predominantly on racial/ethnic grounds) become the new global 'paradigms' of an everlasting human conflict.[96] In either case, the emergence of a different basis for belonging — what Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach call "different polities"— is explained away as epiphenomenal to more basic forces: namely, anarchy, the security dilemma, and power-balancing.[97]

In short, the 'new' question being asked of race in IR is one that fits entirely within accepted categories and assumptions. David Campbell, whose work on this issue in *Deconstructing Nationalism* (1998) was covered in the previous chapter,[98] has sought to explain why this is so by distinguishing between the concept of 'Foreign Policy' (understood, in conventional International Relations terms, as the external policy orientation of pre-established states with secure identities),[99] and the 'foreign policy' practiced *inside* the borders of the sovereign state; that is, "all practices of differentiation or modes of exclusion... that constitute their objects as 'foreign' in the process of dealing with them."[100] This foreign policy, Campbell explains:

> is divorced from the nation or the state as a particular resolution of the categories of identity and difference, and applies to confrontations that appear to take place between a self and another located in different sites if ethnicity, race class, gender or geography (with those sites themselves being constituted in the process). Operating at all levels of social organisation from the level of personal relationships through to

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this basis, Mearsheimer's proposed solution to the breakdown of the former Yugoslavia is the creation of ethnically separate states, thereby re-asserting the adequacy of neo-Realism as a framework for understanding interstate anarchy. *Ibid.*

[96] Huntington, *Clash of Civilisations* (*op. cit.*, 1996), 6-7.

[97] Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, "Global Politics at the Turn of the Millennium: Changing Bases of 'Us' and 'Them,'" *International Studies Review* 1:1 (1999): 77-107, on p. 79.

[98] See Chapter Five,

[99] Campbell, "Violent Performances: Identity, Sovereignty, Responsibility," in Lapid and Kratochwil (eds.), *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory* (*op. cit.*, 1996), 167.

[100] *Ibid.*,170.

> global orders, foreign policy in this sense has established conventional dispositions through which new instance of ambiguity or contingency can be apprehended.[101]

In short, foreign policy works to secure the unified, autonomous national identity on whose behalf Foreign Policy operates. It is thus all about the (internal) containment of challenges to the national identity constituted by Foreign Policy practices.[102] The discussion to follow takes up this theme in terms of the race and identity issue in Japan and the challenges posed to orthodox perspectives on these issues by a critical Japanese Studies.

Race and Identity in Japan: The Myth of Tan'itsu Minzoku Kokka

> In those States in which ethnic religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.
>
> International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1979, Article 27.[103]

> The right of any person to enjoy his own culture, to profess and practice his own religion or to use his own language is ensured under Japanese law. However, minorities of the kind mentioned in the Covenant do not exist in Japan.
>
> Japanese government report on human rights conditions, 1980.[104]

As the above exchange suggests, to try and speak about sub-national articulations of race and identity in a postwar Japanese context, is to confront some of the most powerfully embedded images of Japanese life and society, and in turn, of Japan as a

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[101] *Ibid.*
[102] *Ibid.*
[103] Cited in Takemasa Teshima, *Toward the Shattering of the Myth of the Mono-Ethnic State: Japan, the Ainu and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples*. Dissertation (PhD) submitted to the University of Washington, 1995 (Washington: UMI Dissertation Services, 1995), 196.
[104] *Ibid.*

geopolitical entity. The image of Japanese society as 'uniquely' homogeneous and monocultural, as I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, has been a major influence in the development of postwar Japanese Studies, and perhaps the most important dimension of this image is the perception of Japanese people as *racially* homogeneous. This perception is often expressed by describing Japan as a *tan'itsu minzoku kokka* (literally, "a single race state"). Invoked in this phrase, the Japanese word for "race" (*minzoku*) is not unlike the concept described above by Appiah: namely, an "understanding of what it is to be a people," that goes beyond biological and evolutionary categories to incorporate broader notions of community defined via language and tradition, and, especially in the postwar period, notions of territorial integrity.[105]

A good explanation of this reading of *minzoku* is found in the writings of the historian Yoshihiko Amino, who has highlighted the way in which anthropological and archaeological images of the Japanese people as racially homogeneous are interwoven with dominant historical myths of Japan as an ancient, sharply defined geopolitical entity. Mainstream, or "common sense" (*jôshiki*) accounts of Japanese ancient history, Amino observes, invariably emphasise the special homogeneity that geographical Japan, as an "island country," (*shimaguni*) accorded the Japanese people, whose prehistoric physical origins are found in the *Jômon* civilisation that populated the Japanese archipelago between about 10,000 and 300 BC.[106] These

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[105] McCormack, Introduction to Denoon *et. al.* (eds.), *Multicultural Japan* (*op. cit.*, 1996), 1-2.

[106] Yoshihiko Amino, *Nihonron no Shiza* (The Origins of *Nihonron*; Tokyo: Kogakkan, 1994), 32-34. Gavan McCormack writes that even the designation of the prehistoric *Jômon* people as 'Japanese' is problematic, given that patterns of culture and authority sufficiently homogeneous for the consciousness of living in 'Japan' to become widespread did not emerge until the twelfth century. On this basis (and as Amino also notes) "neither the culture and people of *Jômon*... or Yayoi..., nor the Yamatai kingdom of the Wa people, nor even Prince Shôtoku (574-622), were, strictly speaking, 'Japanese;' all were *pre*-'Japanese' dwellers and civilisations of the archipelago." McCormack,

people, the *jôshiki* argument goes, eventually accepted and propagated the rice-growing culture that permeated Japan from the West sometime during the *Yayoi* age (*ca* 400 BC to AD 300), and which is now held to be 'fundamental' to the ethnic identity of the Japanese people, via a universal set of rituals, values and hierarchies associated with the Japanese emperor, or *tennô* (who is sometimes referred to as the "Rice King").[107]

The special (i.e., 'unique') social, linguistic and cultural practices that characterise the Japanese as a monocultural, homogeneous, rice-growing and rice-eating 'race,' are perceived to have remained more or less intact throughout the period of Japan's encounter with other, 'foreign' civilisations. Orthodox Japanese history texts, Amino points out, tend to make much of the fact that, since 'Japan' was formalised as a country name sometime in the late seventh century AD, the 'Japanese people' have successfully resisted 'foreign' invasion or domination.[108] In this way, he writes, the notion of the Japanese as a 'single race' (*tan'itsu minzoku*) has become inextricable from the notion of Japan as a 'single state' (*tan'itsu kokka*).[109]

For Amino however, these "commonsense" perspectives narrate a particularly one-sided and static account of Japanese history; one that not only ignores the experiences of those 'foreign' civilisations that were eventually invaded and subjugated by the modern Japanese state (such as Ainu society in the north, and the Ryûkyû Kingdom, or Okinawa, in the south), but which, more problematically, effaces the historical ambiguities within the development of this state. Amino's own

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"Kokusaika: Impediments in Japan's Deep Structure," in Denoon *et. al.* (eds.), *Multicultural Japan* (*op. cit.*, 1996), 68.

[107] Amino, *Nihonron no Shiza*, 40. In English, see also Amino's essay on "Emperor, Rice, and Commoners," in Denoon *et. al.* (eds.), *Multicultural Japan* (*op. cit.*, 1996), 235-244.

[108] Amino, *Nihonron no Shiza*, 60-68.

explorations of ancient and medieval Japanese history indicate for example, that the location of Japanese ethnic and cultural identity in ancient and nationally uniform modes of agricultural production (i.e., the Japanese people as a 'rice-growing' culture) is factually problematic. Even after the ninth century AD, when rice cultivation as the basis of a particular socio-political order had been imposed on significant areas of central Japan by the Yamato state,[110] numerous surviving historical records and artefacts suggest profound regional variations in agricultural and other modes of production, with up to fifty percent of the population engaged in non-agricultural pursuits such as fishing, salt-making, shipping and artisan work. These trends continued as urban centres grew and the circulation of money came to permeate Japanese society.

Moreover, Amino argues, it is worth bearing in mind that, until the mid to late eighteenth century when Japan began to have sustained contact with the West, most ordinary Japanese people would have had little or no cause to actively invoke a 'Japanese' identity. Rather, identity was focussed on local and regional communities.[111] In short, he concludes:

> the argument that from Jômon times there has been in Japan a 'single race' (*tan'itsu minzoku*) and a 'single state' [*tan'itsu kokka*] is a baseless fabrication. An appreciation of this makes any simplistic linear periodization of the Japanese archipelago problematic, to say the least. It is also obvious that, historically, views of

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[110] *Ibid.*, 67-68.

[111] Amino, "Emperor, Rice and Commoners," 236-9.

[111] Amino, *Nihonjinron no Shiza*, 168-69. This intensely localised sense of identity was also observed by the 19th century ethnographer Lafcadio Hearn, who wrote that many Japanese ghost stories could be traced back to thirteenth and fourteenth century modes of social organisation. During this period, Hearn notes, it was not uncommon for 'outside' intruders into local communities to be executed, often for no other reason than they were 'strangers.' Hearn, "Japanese Folklore," in *Lafcadio Hearn: Japan's Great Interpreter* (*op. cit.*, 1992), 64.

> the emperor [*tennô*] and likewise of 'Japan' (*nippon*) have been far from homogeneous throughout the Japanese archipelago.[112]

In another recent contribution to the discussion of Japanese identity, Tessa Morris-Suzuki also argues that the notion of *tan'itsu minzoku* is itself only one of the complex, sometimes contradictory ways in which "Japan" has been delineated and defined over the past few centuries. Until the early nineteenth century she points out, the relationship between the Japanese state and those regional communities who, according to their proximity or otherwise from the geopolitical centre, exhibited varying degrees of connection to core notions of 'Japaneseness,' was based on a perception of these frontier regions as 'foreign' or 'exotic.'[113] It was a perception heavily influenced by the Chinese world view of "a series of concentric circles of increasing strangeness," in which 'foreignness' (expressed as 'barbarity') was delineated according to spatial distance from the familiar centre.[114]

Japanese encounters with Europe from the late eighteenth century onwards, Morris-Suzuki writes, saw the foundations of this world view challenged by a profoundly different spatial vision — that of a post-Westphalian world divided into clearly bounded nation states whose location was defined in a universal mathematical language.[115] As its peripheral frontiers came into closer and closer contact with European powers, Japan began to mould its own national boundaries against encroachment, incorporating 'exotic' peripheral communities into a clearly defined, modern nation. In the process, their exoticness was re-interpreted in terms of "backwardness" rather than "foreignness" — that is, Morris-Suzuki points out, in

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[112] Amino, *Nihonron no Shuza*, 85-86.
[113] Morris-Suzuki, *Re-Inventing Japan*, 10.
[114] *Ibid.*, 15.
[115] *Ibid.*

terms of time, rather than space.[116]

The Japanisation of the Ainu as 'foreign policy'

One of the most notable examples of this shift in conceptualising difference and peripherality, concerns the fate of the *Ainu* people of what is now Hokkaido, the northernmost of modern Japan's four main islands. The exact ethnic origins of the Ainu remain a subject of ongoing discussion among anthropologists and archaeologists; but it is widely thought that what is now regarded as Ainu culture evolved in Hokkaido around the thirteenth century AD. Archaeological and anthropological studies show that Ainu society was originally structured around small communities called *kotan*, which conducted activities such as hunting and fishing in defined areas of land — without however, subscribing to concepts of private (individual or communal) ownership.[117] Like many other aboriginal peoples, the Ainu did not keep written records, but developed a rich oral literature, structured around a complex set of spiritual relationships with the natural world upon which they depended. What has survived of this literature through the generations, hints at a complex and stratified society, with local cultural variations influenced by Ainu contact with other northern peoples living in the Sakhalin peninsula and the southern Kuriles.[118]

Prior to the nineteenth century, the Ainu were regarded by successive central Japanese administrations as a "barbarian" foreign race; who nonetheless controlled

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[116] *Ibid.*, 86.
[117] *Ibid.*, 11.
[118] Richard Siddle, "Ainu: Japan's Indigenous People," in Michael Weiner (ed.), *Japan's Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity* (London: Routledge, 1997), 21.

important resources that the Japanese people (*wajin*) desired.[119] Cultural contacts, trade and armed clashes between 'Japan' and 'Ezochi' (the Land of the Ainu) are thought by some scholars to date as far back as the sixth century AD;[120] but it was with the rapid increase in Japanese settlement of the south-western coast of Ezochi during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries that the economic and political relationship between the Ainu and the people they called *Yuanshisam* ("Neighbours of the Land,") began to assume the dimensions of colonial hierarchy. By the mid-eighteenth century, Ezochi had been divided into several trading posts by the *wajin* merchants aligned to Japan's northern feudal domains, with Ainu people relocated in their thousands from their traditional living grounds to provide labour in the trade and fishing ports, sometimes under conditions of semi-slavery.[121] The last systematic uprising of Ainu people against their dispossession and exploitation, the Kunashir-menash Revolt, took place in 1798.[122]

In the late eighteenth century however, as Westphalian notions of national territory began to embed themselves in the consciousness of Japan's ruling elite, and as Russian traders, missionaries and settlers began to make increasing cultural and linguistic inroads into northern Japan and what was then left of Ainu society, Japanese policy towards the Ainu underwent a sharp strategic change. In order to help consolidate and protect Japan's northern borders, Ainu people were strategically redefined as 'Japanese,' and, in stark contrast to previous separatist policies, they were encouraged to learn the Japanese language and adopt *Wajin* customs over their

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[119] Kôhei Hanazaki, "Ainu Moshir and Yaponeisa," in Denoon *et. al.* (eds.), *Multicultural Japan* (*op. cit.*, 1996), 118.

[120] Teshima, *Toward the Shattering of the Myth of the Mono-Ethnic State*, 44.

[121] Siddle, "Ainu: Japan's Indigenous People," 22.

[122] I.e., only one year after Australia was claimed on behalf of the British Empire as *terra nullis*. Hanazaki, "Ainu Moshir and Yaponesia," 119.

traditional social and religious practices.[123] While this assimilationist approach was temporarily reversed during the 1820s,[124] it was a forerunner to the more comprehensive 'Japanisation' of the Ainu periphery accomplished under the Meiji Restoration, which saw Ezochi fully incorporated into the modern Japanese state as 'Hokkaido,' in 1869. Under Meiji legislation, the Ainu were officially recognised as Japanese subjects (*heimin*), but with the added stipulation of "former aborigine" (*kyû dojin*), inscribing the widespread perception of them as a doomed, primitive race, destined to either die out or be thoroughly assimilated into the more temporally advanced culture of the "Japanese people."[125]

To facilitate this process of assimilation, the Ainu language was prohibited, as were "primitive" customs such as burning the houses of the deceased, tattooing around the mouths of women, and the wearing of earrings.[126] Access to land became another powerful tool of 'civilising' strategy; while some land was set aside in Hokkaido by the government for Ainu usage, it was ceded to them only at the discretion of the Meiji Imperial Development Agency (*Kaitakushi*) when the Ainu people involved were deemed to have made 'adequate progress' towards civilisation — usually acknowledged when they agreed to use the land for growing crops rather than hunting or gathering.[127]

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[123] Prior to this, Ainu people had been forbidden to wear Japanese clothes or speak the Japanese language, and were discouraged from engaging in land cultivation — no doubt, as both Morris-Suzuki and Siddle point out, in order to emphasise their status as a subordinated 'foreign' people. Siddle, "Ainu: Japan's Indigenous People," 222, and Morris-Suzuki, *Re-Inventing Japan*, 18-19.

[124] I.e., in response to the perceived withdrawal of the Russian menace. The northern domain, which had been temporarily placed under the central administration of the Japanese state, was briefly returned to the control of the local *daimyô*. Siddle, "Ainu: Japan's Indigenous People," 230.

[125] Hanazaki, "Ainu Moshir and Yaponesia," 120.

[126] Teshima, *Toward the Shattering of the Myth of the Mono-Ethnic State*, 92.

[127] *Ibid.*, 87-89. The introduction of private ownership of land was a disaster for the Ainu, not just in the obvious sense that they were finally, fully deprived of their traditional sphere of existence, but also because the feudal trading zone system it replaced had at least provided the already dispossessed with a regular, if exploitative means of subsistence. As the *Wajin* population increased rapidly and

Here, in short, is a particularly excellent example of (Campbell's description of) 'foreign policy' at work, whereby difference is suppressed within the borders of the state, to produce a unified, autonomous national identity. In this respect, and like the subjugation of women into specific gender-based social roles, the Japanisation of the Ainu was integral to Japan's 'Foreign Policy,' in that it was carried out in the name of strengthening the Japanese state (in accordance with Realist logic) against the threatening world 'out there.'

Japanese Colonialism as 'Multiculturalism'

This was also an enterprise enhanced by the expansion of Japanese power into Southeast Asia during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. By the 1920s, Japan had extended its domain to Taiwan (1895), Kwantung (1905), Korea (1910) and the Pacific Mandated Territories (1919), and later, would achieve *de facto* control over large areas of China.[128] By this time too, Japanese feelings of resentment towards the West were becoming increasingly embedded in the concept of *minzoku*. The refusal of the Western powers to introduce a clause on racial equality into the Versailles Treaty, and the restrictions on Asian immigration imposed by Western countries (including of course, the White Australia Policy) encouraged and justified images of Japan as the victim of Western racism.[129] One response of course, was the assertion of images of Japanese racial purity and homogeneity, which represented the Japanese people as blood descendants of a single (quasi-divine) imperial line.[130] This representation of Japaneseness drew heavily upon the writings of late Tokugawa

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development began to focus more and more on agricultural production, the value of Ainu labour decreased, meaning that Ainu people became even more marginalised. *Ibid.*, 84-85.

[128] Morris-Suzuki, *Re-Inventing Japan.*, 86.

[129] John Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 45.

scholars such as Motoori Norinaga, who had argued the innate superiority of Japanese culture, encapsulated in the Japanese Spirit (*Wakon*) and preserved through the family of the Emperor.[131] Incorporated into 1920s and 1930s nationalist discourse, these images of purity and uniqueness became an integral part of the notion of *kokutai*, or national polity, which both codified both the relationship of Japanese people to the state, and the divine right of Japan to lead Asia against the racist and corrupting influences of the West.[132]

Yet notions of racial purity were by no means the only, or even the most influential dimension of *minzoku* debate during Japan's period of colonialism. Indeed, as Morris-Suzuki has argued, the everyday problems of colonial administration in Asia were particularly influential in prompting other scholarly explanations of Japanese race and identity — including those based on theories of Japanese racial *hybridity*, which depicted the Japanese as having emerged from the integration of diverse peoples into an organically united society.[133] Thus, during the 1920s and 1930s, writers such as Kita Sadakichi argued that the 'uniqueness' of the Japanese race lay not in actual, biological racial purity, but rather, in their unique ability to mould disparate ancestral groups into a single political and cultural community.[134] On this basis, Japan was both superior to the West, which attempted to represent white superiority as a 'scientific' fact, and the most appropriate champion of the 'Asian peoples' because it was capable of broadmindedly integrating many different 'foreign' influences. In short, it was superior because it represented the most

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[130] McCormack, "Kokusaika: Impediments in Japan's Deep Structure," 268.
[131] Michael Weiner, *Race and Migration in Imperial Japan* (London & New York: Routledge, 1994), 12-13.
[132] McCormack, "Kokusaika: Impediments in Japan's Deep Structure," 269, and Dower, *War Without Mercy*, 1-30.
[133] Morris-Suzuki, *Re-Inventing Japan*, 90.

advanced point in "a universal progress whose actors were not individuals or ideas or social systems but ethnic nations."[135]

As is well known, the realities of Japanese colonial rule in Asia were often at odds with this image of Japan as the vanguard of human progress and multicultural tolerance. Under the various slogans of Asian unity, inter-racial harmony and, of course, "co-prosperity," the subjects of Japanese colonial policy were subjected to terrible abuses and exploitation; in one of the worst wartime examples, nearly 4,000 Chinese and Korean prisoners and peasants who were tortured and experimented on in the name of medicine at the infamous Unit 731 in Harbin, were denied even a human, let alone a racial identity, by being designated as *maruta*, or 'logs.'[136] Within Japan proper, images of Asian unity sat in uneasy contrast to the treatment of Japan's long-established and substantial ethnic Chinese, Taiwanese and Korean communities,[137] where 'incomplete' Japaneseness could be (and frequently was) equated with suspect political allegiances. This was tragically illustrated in the aftermath of the great Kantô Earthquake of 1923, when more than 2,000 Korean (and 400 Chinese) residents in Japan were murdered by vigilantes, police and soldiers on suspicion of crimes such as inciting rebellion, or poisoning the water supply.[138] The correlation of Korean ethnicity, in particular, with 'subversive' political commitments, was so entrenched in early twentieth century Japan, that it generated

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[135] Kita, cited in Morris-Suzuki, *Re-Inventing Japan*, 91.

[136] *Ibid.*, 106.

[137] McCormack, "Kokusaika: Impediments in Japan's Deep Structure," 272. For a fuller account, see McCormack, *The Emptiness of Japanese Affluence*, 262-264.

[138] Vasishth, "A Model Minority: The Chinese Community in Japan," in Weiner (ed.), *Japan's Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity* (*op. cit.*, 1997), 127.

[139] *Ibid.*, 128. Ironically, the Chinese community of Yokohama eventually played a vital role in post-earthquake recovery, financing rebuilding projects and re-establishing businesses. *Ibid.*, 128-29.

the ubiquitous term *futei senjin* ("Korean malcontent").[139] During the war, Chinese and Korean residents were treated like enemy nationals, forcibly relocated away from militarily sensitive areas and sometimes confined to special ghettos.[140] And, as the war continued, Japan supplemented its domestic and colonial labour mobilisation by conscripting (mostly) Korean workers from the peninsula to serve in mines, factories and construction sites, often under appalling conditions.[141]

As Morris-Suzuki's work in particular demonstrates, these practices were not implemented under a single 'theoretical' strategy, but rather, were part of a dense, convoluted network of different ideas and ideologies, in which notions of racial uniqueness, ethnic commonality and 'universal' human civilisational advancement co-existed at different levels, and in which the sheer ambiguity of terms such as *minzoku* allowed "a continuous slippage backward and forward between different levels of justification."[142] Thus, for example, the "melting pot" imagery of Japanese origins advocated by scholars such as Sadakichi Kita for could be used, on the one hand, to justify the assimilation of Korea and Taiwan into a 'multicultural' Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. On the other, it could be (and was) used to impose hierarchies *within* the melting pot, via the logic that Japan's colonial subjects were still "incomplete" Japanese — in the process, as it were, of being merged into a Japanese *minzoku* that represented the most advanced point in "a universal progress

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[139] Kang Sang-Jung, *Futatsu no Sengo no Nihon: Ajia Kara Tou Sengo 50-Nen* (Two Postwar Japans: A View from Asia Fifty Years On; Tokyo: Sainichi Shobō, 1995), 40, and Morris-Suzuki, *Re-Inventing Japan*, 105. Conversely, the terms *han-Nihonjin* ("half-Japanese") and *hikokumin* ("non-national;" lit., a person with no nationality), in the prewar period, did not depict people of mixed national ancestry, but 'full-blooded' Japanese citizens who were seen as showing insufficient enthusiasm for Japan's war effort. *Ibid.*

[140] Vasishth, "A Model Minority," 130.

[141] While precise numbers were not recorded, it is estimated that around 725,000 Korean ordinary labourers and 145,000 military labourers were mobilised and sent to mines, construction sites and factories in Japan, China, Sakhalin, Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. *Ibid.*, 129.

[142] Morris-Suzuki, *Re-Inventing Japan*, 87.

whose actors were not individuals or ideas or social systems but ethnic nations."[143] Accordingly, while Korean and Taiwanese subjects were classified as 'Japanese' under the Meiji Family Registration Code, like the Ainu, they fell into a special sub-category of "overseas residents."[144] As 'Japanese,' they were subject to military and labour conscription; yet their 'impure' Japaneseness also marked them down as subject to different treatment where convenience dictated — for example, as providers of cheap, disposable labour and, in the case of the comfort women, free disposable sex.[145]

Postwar Discourses of Identity in Japan: The Minzoku *Legacy*.

I will return to the flexibility of notions of 'Japaneseness' in the following chapter. For now, my point is that the homogeneous image of Japan encapsulated in *tan'itsu minzoku* turns out to be highly contestable — even, as Morris-Suzuki's work demonstrates, in terms of its universal appeal among those who have sought to pin down 'Japaneseness' in the past. So why then, does it remain so strongly associated with contemporary Japanese identity? One of the reasons for this, I suggest, has to do with the much simpler understanding of collective identity that was adopted by postwar Japan, as part of its role in U.S. Realist theory and practice. Within this discourse, as I argued in Chapters Three and Four, 'Japan' could be understood only in one way — as a coherent, sharply bounded nation state in an anarchic world system, where the security and well-being of human communities could only be achieved by defending the territorial boundaries of the state against external threats.

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[143] *Ibid.*, 106.

[144] Kang, *Futatsu no Sengo no Nihon*, 60.

[145] Vasishth, "A Model Minority," 130. Between 1943 and 1945 approximately 42,000 Chinese were transported from the mainland to Japan as 'volunteer' labour. 11,000 of them perished, mostly due to malnutrition or work-related accidents. *Ibid.*, 131.

This was particularly true of the immediate postwar period, when the circumstances of Japan's defeat and its aftermath saw Japan subjugated to this understanding to a unique degree. Japanese identity, 'racial' or otherwise, simply did not matter to the Occupation authorities, beyond the fact that it coloured in the boundaries of a particular spatial unit that was to be moulded into a dependable ally on the 'right' side of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation. To this extent, as I have shown, Japanese tendencies towards 'Asian' group mentality and conformity had to be manipulated in the 'right' direction,[146] but little or no attention was paid to the complex interwar debates on race and ethnicity that had formed the intellectual background to Japan's disastrous wartime ventures.

One important result of the preoccupation with making Japan into a dependable frontline ally of course, was the Occupation's rapid reinstatement of the conservative ruling elite who had engineered these ventures, and who were, not surprisingly, disinclined to pursue issues of domestic responsibility for the war; far less, the complexities of wartime *minzoku* discourse. Instead, emphasis was placed on the need for Japan to look to the future and rebuild its strength, this time without the inspiration (and responsibilities) of imperial glory.[147] The stripping back of Japan's colonial possessions thus induced a return to narratives of racial unity, even purity, that was, in many instances, encouraged by an Occupation policy already prioritising Japan's role as a strong link in Kennan's 'great chain.' Under the 1952 peace settlement for example, the some two million Korean, Taiwanese and other colonial subjects who remained in Japan were shorn of their Japanese citizenship — and with

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[146] See Chapter One, 15.

[147] John Dower, "Race, Language and War in Two Cultures," in John Dower (ed.), *Japan in War and Peace* (*op. cit.*,), 287.

it, of course, the right to Japanese war and disability allowances.[148] Later, U.S. patronage also facilitated the normalisation of Japanese relations with Southeast Asia under comparatively favourable terms for Japan; in particular regarding wartime reparations, which were kept to a minimum to aid Japanese recovery and development.[149]

Perhaps most influential of all however, in terms of postwar Japanese identity debate, was the retention of the wartime emperor. Hirohito's absolution from criminal responsibility for the war was an integral aspect of the peace settlement, and his reinstatement (albeit in modified terms) as the spiritual foundation of Japanese racial identity would provide a key postwar rallying point for conservative visions of national unity.[150] Gavan McCormack suggests that it is, ironically, the much-vaunted 'symbolic' status of the postwar imperial institution which has discouraged critical Japanese incursions into the mythologies of racial superiority and homogeneity (such as *kokutai*) that it encapsulates, despite their obvious continuing influence in Japanese social and political life.[151] The postwar popularity of the "common sense" historical narratives criticised by Amino (see above), which chart the origins of primordial Japaneseness and weave them into a persuasive vision of Japan as a *tan'itsu minzoku kokka*, are one aspect of this influence, as are the *nihonjinron* (Japanese civilisation theory) perspectives mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, which openly correlate Japanese 'uniqueness' and homogeneity with the achievements of the postwar Japanese economy.

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[148] McCormack, Introduction to Denoon *et. al.*, *Multicultural Japan* (*op. cit.*, 1996), 11.

[149] Yasuaki Ônuma, *Tan'itsu Minzoku Shakai no Shinwa wo Koete: Zainichi Kankoku/Chôsenjin to Shutsuryûkoku Kanri Taisei* (Overcoming the Myth of the Mono-Ethnic State: Korean Citizens of Japan and the Immigration Bureaucracy Regime; Tokyo: Toshindo, 1986), 32-37.

[150] McCormack, *The Emptiness of Japanese Affluence*, 172.

[151] McCormack, "Kokusaika: Impediments in Japan's deep structure," 273.

In the 1980s, Japanese racial identity became an international issue as the friction caused by Japan's assault on U.S. economic hegemony prompted accusations of 'racism' on either side of the Pacific. Nakasone's 1989 comparison of the achievements of 'homogeneous' Japan with the rampant social problems of polyglot America, which was relayed indignantly around the Western world, remains perhaps the most famous articulation of *tan'itsu minzoku kokka*.[152] Yet the image of Japan his remarks called up was, as I argued in Chapter Three and the beginning of this chapter, already deeply ingrained in Western discourse: homogeneous, unified; in short, the example *par excellence* of "territorial and cultural alignment," that had been praised while Japan still fit the definition of 'junior partner;' but which now stood as an indictment of Japanese 'unfairness' and 'deviousness.'[153]

Post-Cold War Shifts in Thinking about 'Japaneseness'

In the post-Cold War period however, these holistic articulations of Japanese national identity look less and less convincing — and the simplistic assertion of unique and unified Japanese 'difference' from the rest of the world, an increasingly problematic basis on which Japan might pursue a meaningful international role. It is in this atmosphere I suggest, that the unresolved vicissitudes and ambiguities of prewar and wartime *minzoku* discourse have returned to haunt the debate over 'Japaneseness.' To borrow Campbell's terminology, it is not just Japan's Foreign Policy that is under pressure in the search for a global role, but also its 'foreign policy' — the policies of

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[152] Dower, "Race, Language and War in Two Cultures," 279.

[153] Dower notes the breathtaking speed with which totalising racial images swing from negative to positive and back again, without losing any continuity in the process, has been illustrated in John Dower's superb essay on how the racial imagery invoked at the height of 'Japan bashing' — the Japanese as "tribal," "robot-like," and "unstoppable" — duplicates the racist stereotypes that dominated Anglo-American thinking about Japan during World War II. "The superman," Dower writes, "has been resurrected as the superpower, and again it is suggested that occult powers lie behind

exclusion/inclusion that determine what it is to be 'Japanese' in the world.

Some of the immediate signs are promising for those who have laboured, over many years of neglect and marginalisation, to achieve better understanding and acknowledgement of the many sub-national understandings of "what it is to be a people" that exist within the spatial borders of the Japanese nation state. In recent years in particular, the expansion of international communication networks and better dissemination of information has enabled many minority groups in the world to garner support for their agendas beyond national boundaries. This is certainly the case with the Ainu activists who, since the late 1980s, have effectively used international forums and links with other groups of indigenous peoples in the world (such as Australian Aboriginals and Inuits) to successfully lobby for government recognition and protection of their identity.[154] In the most significant development to date, in May 1997, the Japanese government passed the Ainu Cultural Promotion Law (replacing the 1899 "Former Natives Protection Act"), which aims:

> to realize the society in which the ethnic pride of the Ainu people is respected and to contribute to the development of diverse cultures in our country, by the implementation of the measures for the promotion of Ainu culture... the spread of knowledge related to Ainu Traditions, and the education of the nation, referring to the situation of Ainu traditions and culture from which the Ainu people find their ethnic pride.[155]

The new law is by no means completely satisfactory to many Ainu people; with many arguing that it does not go far enough to recognise the distinct rights of the Ainu as

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this accomplishment — miracle men, secrets of success, an inscrutable Zen of management, and indomitable and inimitable Japanese spirit." Dower, "Race, Language and War in Two Cultures," 283.

[154] Morris Suzuki, *Re-Imagining Japan*, 183.

[155] Ainu Cultural Promotion Act, sourced on the website of the Foundation for Research and Promotion of Ainu Culture, at http://www.frpac.or.jp/english/e_index.html

indigenous people.[156] Yet it is still important, in that it explicitly recognises the existence of Japan as an ethnically and culturally diverse nation (in a complete reversal of Japan's 1980 response to the ICCP, cited above). Moreover, it does so in a way that is different from the prewar acknowledgement of Japan's 'multicultural' origins, because rather than using multiculturalism to assert the validity of Japanese leadership in an ongoing process of assimilation, the law acknowledges and, to some extent, defends the concept of a racially and cultural diverse Japan.

Elsewhere however, progress towards acknowledging a more 'multicultural' or 'multiracial' Japan remains slow, if not stagnant. One particularly important example is the treatment of the descendants of Korean people who either migrated to Japan or were conscripted as forced labour between 1910 and 1945. Most of the second and third generations of *zainichi kankoku/chôsenjin* (literally, "South and/or North Koreans resident in Japan")[157] are indistinguishable from 'Japanese' citizens, in that they were born in Japan, speak Japanese as their first, if not only language, and in many cases, have assumed Japanese names.[158] Despite this, they are designated foreigners, who, from the age of fourteen must carry the same alien registration card

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[156] Siddle, "Ainu: Japan's Indigenous People," 46.

[157] The nationality of *zainichi chôsenjin* (North Koreans resident in Japan) is something of a grey area in Japanese law, due to the lack of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea. As Yoshihiro Sorano has pointed out for example, children of de facto relationships between North Korean men and Japanese women lose their Japanese citizenship upon gaining formal recognition from their fathers. Sorano, introduction to Yoshihiro Sorano and Kô Changyu (eds.), *Zainichi Chôsenjin no Seikatsu to Jinken* (The lifestyles and human rights of North Korean citizens in Japan; Tokyo: Asahi Shoten, 1995), 14. See also Chong Yong-Hye's comments on this issue, below.

[158] Usually to avoid discrimination; for example, according to Nakagawa Nobuo, over ninety percent of *zainichi chôsenjin* children who attend 'Japanese' schools assume false Japanese names, an arrangement given tacit consent to by school staff because of the potential for such students to fall victim to racist bullying. Nakagawa, "Nihonjin Gakkô ni kayou chôsenjin seitotachi" (North Korean Students in Japanese Schools), in Sorano and Kô (eds.), *Zainichi Chôsenjin no Seikatsu to* Jinken (*op. cit.*, 1995), 171.

issued to other, more short-term foreign visitors to Japan.[159] More seriously, *zainichi kankoku/chôsenjin* continue to face significant discrimination when it comes to educational, employment and even marriage opportunities in Japanese society. Apart from being legally barred from many public service appointments, they face more subtle discrimination from many of the larger private Japanese corporations. Many of these companies use the results of company entrance examinations, or even privately circulated name lists, to weed out applicants from 'undesirable' backgrounds: not just *zainichi kankoku/ chôsenjin*, but also *burakumin*, descendants of atom-bomb and pollution victims, and those whose families are tainted by illegitimacy or divorce.[160]

Kaori Okano's 1994 case study of the employment choices of *zainichi* and other minority high school students (particularly those from lower socio-economic strata) suggests that this tends to create a ghettoising cycle, whereby 'disadvantaged' students do not attempt to break down invisible discriminatory barriers, but resign themselves to pursuing employment in areas where they know they will be accepted — such as Korean-owned banks and businesses.[161] And, while there are some statistical indications of an improvement in public perceptions of *zainichi*, inasmuch as they can be measured, the persistence of racial stereotypes remains evident. As recently as 1995 for example, in incidents distressingly reminiscent of the 1923 lynching of suspected *futei senjin*, anger and concern over North Korea's suspected

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[159] *All* foreign nationals who enter Japan for more than 90 days are required to register with the Department of Immigration, after which they are issued with a *gaikokujin tôroku shômeisho*, or Alien Registration Card, which carries a fingerprint of the owner.

[160] Field, *In the Realm of a Dying Emperor* (*op. cit.*, 1990), 200; and Morris-Suzuki, *Re-Inventing Japan*, 196.

[161] Kaori Okano, "'Modern' Japan and Social Identity: Minority Youth in School to Work," in Alberto Gomes (ed.), *Modernity and Identity: Asian Illustrations* (Bundoora: LaTrobe University Press, 1994), 216-220.

nuclear missile program provided yet another motive for thuggish attacks on *zainichi chôsen* high school students.[162]

Overall, and especially since the 1980s, the problems faced by *zainichi kankoku chôsenjin* have attracted greater attention in Japan, and a substantial network of lawyers, writers and lobby groups has made some headway in raising public awareness of racial discrimination.[163] More recently too, in a development of particular interest to this thesis, some *zainichi* writers have begun to link the status of *zainichi kankoku chôsenjin* to a broader, more 'international' debate about states, nations and (post-colonial) identity that relates closely to the themes introduced at the beginning of this section. One of them is the writer and political theorist Kang Sang-Jung, who has invoked Edward Said's arguments about Western Orientalist stereotyping, to show how the problems faced by *zainichi kankoku chôsenjin* cannot be debated separately from the construction of 'Korea' and Koreans' in nineteenth and early twentieth century Japanese colonial policymaking.[164] 'Korea,' Kang argues, was to modern Japan what the (Middle Eastern) Orient was to Europe — i.e., a terrain of inferior, even barbarian backwardness, that helped to define Japan's identity as a modern, "European style" colonial power, and justify its expansionist

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[162] Maeda Akira, "*Chima Chogori* shûgei jiken e no torikumi" (Taking action against acts of *chima chogori* violence), in Sorano and Kô (eds.), *Zainichi Chôsenjin no Seikatsu to* Jinken (*op. cit.*, 1995), 162. The victims are nearly always female students of (North) Korean-run high schools, who are easily identifiable as *zainichi chôsenjin* because of their distinctive school uniforms based on the *chima chogori*, or Korean national dress. As of 1994, over 160 recorded "*chima chogori* incidents" of aggression had been recorded, including verbal abuse, surreptitious cutting of hair and uniforms with scissors, and physical violence. *Ibid.*, 165.

[163] For example, lobby groups have successfully campaigned for modification (if not abolition) of the Alien Registration Cards carried by *zainichi* citizens, the right of local councils to appoint foreign citizens to some public positions, and the modification of textbooks carrying offensive terms. In one case for example, the term *bakachon*, a slang term for 'stupid Korean' was removed from a commonly used high school English language textbook after protests initiated by a high school English teacher. Nakagawa Nobuo, "Nihonjin Gakkô ni Kayou Chôsenjin Seitotachi," 174.

[164] Kang, *Futatsu no Sengo no Nihon*, 28.

policies.[165] In the postwar period, he writes, the image of *bankoku chôsen*, or "backward Korea," has been maintained in the discursive practices of the Japanese state — both indirectly, via the retention of institutions and symbols (flag, anthem, [Yasukuni] shrine and above all, emperor) which embody (however "symbolically") the myth of monocultural, monoracial Japanese purity, and more directly; for example, via the narratives of Korean and Japanese 'history' privileged in the high school textbooks approved by the Ministry of Education, which tend to highlight Japan's 'civilising' influence on Korea, and represent the war as an unfortunate intervention in an otherwise well-meaning attempt to propel 'Asia' forward into modern strength and solidarity.[166]

For Kang, as for many other scholars, the failure of Japanese people to confront other, less sanguine readings of their past and relate them to present practices of exclusion and discrimination makes a mockery of the continuing quest for an "international contribution" (*kokusai kôken*) or "international responsibility" (*kokusai sekinin*) for Japan — catch-phrases of government and media debates over Japan's international relations since the early 1990s. "Surely," he asks, "the just settlement of the past is the first 'international responsibility' that Japan must fulfil if it is to participate in a peaceful international order? What sort of 'international contribution' can Japan possibly hope to build on the deliberate neglect of this task?"[167] Kang's questions are particularly relevant I suggest, given Japan's ongoing

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[165] *Ibid.*, 34-37.

[166] *Ibid.*, 53-58. This attitude was clearly evident at the restoration of diplomatic relations between South Korea and Japan in 1965, when a Japanese delegate, Takasugi Shin'ichi proclaimed "Japanese rule over Korea was a good thing for Koreans. Certainly, we outlawed their language and imposed Japanese-style names. But these actions only stemmed from our good intentions. We wanted to give them the status of true Japanese. Unfortunately, the war frustrated our efforts, but Korea today would be a more civilised country if Japan had ruled it for another twenty years." Quoted in McCormack, "Kokusaika: Impediments in Japan's Deep Structure," 274.

[167] Kang Sang-Jun, *Futatsu no Sengo no Nihon*, 147.

preparations to participate in the Theatre Missile Defence Agreement, which is regarded by many within Japan's defence establishment as being necessary to deter the 'North Korea Threat' to Japan.[168]

A slightly different, but interrelated, perspective is offered by another *zainichi* writer, Chong Yong-Hye, whose writing is also influenced heavily by the themes of postcoloniality and hybridity, particularly as addressed in the works of writers such as Trin Minh-ha, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, and Julia Kristeva. In a 1996 essay entitled "Overcoming Identity," Chong sets out to question the particular world-view implied in the very attempt to categorise succinctly between 'Korean' and 'Japanese' ethnic identities.[169] The very term *zainichi kankoku/chôsenjin*, Chong suggests, is problematic as a basis for contesting discrimination against Korean citizens, because it was created in the first place to help define and sustain a particular concept of 'pure' Japaneseness — that embodied in the phrase *tan'itsu minzoku kokka*.[170] Translated literally into the Korean language, she points out, *zainichi kankoku/chôsenjin* becomes an unwieldy and unnatural, even nonsensical, term. Even in the Japanese in which it was originally invoked, it resists definition, being almost as ambiguous as the notion of 'blackness' in contemporary America and Western Europe.[171] Moreover, Chong argues, the attempt to categorise difference in this way — in neat, 'ethnic' bundles that fit comfortably within the boundaries of the nation state, discourages us from thinking about other 'sub-discriminations' and

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[168] See the June 2, 2000 Global Beat debate: "What is *Really* Driving the Missile Defense Debate?" at http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/pubs/ib59.html, 7-8.

[169] Chong Yong-Hye, "Aidentiti wo koete" (Overcoming Identity), in Shun Inoue, ed., *Sabetsu to Kyôsei no Shakaigaku* (The Sociology of Discrimination; Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996), 5.

[170] *Ibid.*, 14-15.

[171] Some of the categories which make questionable the basis of *zainichi* definition, Chong writes, include the children of mixed Korean-Japanese parentage, the Korean citizens who have become

abuse *within* 'minority' categories. As an example, she cites the widespread and well-documented sexism within the *zainichi* movement, which continues to be predominantly male-oriented, and which has traditionally turned a blind eye to issues of sexual and physical abuse.[172]

Chong's point here is not to dismiss the importance of struggles to reclaim marginalised and suppressed identities, nor is it to deny her own Korean heritage. It is, rather, about the dangers of accepting victimhood based on predefined 'minority' categories, which, ultimately, help to reify the boundaries of the 'majority.' "It is not as if I myself," she points out, "was somehow 'born' a *zainichi kankoku/chôsenjin*." Rather:

> I *became* one through the discrimination that is so widespread within Japanese society, and through the movements which try to struggle against that discrimination. In other words, I *learnt* how to be a 'zainichi.' Accordingly, if I refer to myself as a 'zainichi,' I am only proclaiming that I will take upon myself the role that has been defined for me by this [discriminatory] Japan."[173]

Chong's answer to this dilemma is to reject *both* the notion of a 'pure' Japaneseness, and the 'minority' categories it needs to justify itself, defining herself instead as an 'impure Japanese,' and thereby circumnavigating altogether the myth of *tan'itsu minzoku kokka*, and its defining 'opposite' categories (of Chineseness, Koreanness, and so on).[174] Should this sense of self start to proliferate in Japan, she suggests, the whole notion of sharply defined 'Korean' and 'Japanese' identities will become

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naturalised Japanese citizens, the Japanese women who married Korean citizens long before the division between North and South, and *zainichi* who go to live in other countries. *Ibid.*, 16.

[172] *Ibid.*, 10-11.

[173] *Ibid.*, 17.

[174] *Ibid.*, 18.

"worm-eaten."[175] This is important, for it takes the struggle against discrimination beyond the crucial first step of self-assertion by 'minorities:'

> "Coming out," and reclaiming or establishing one's identity, is not in itself emancipatory, and cannot therefore constitute an end in itself. Rather, it is only the first step, and only one method for attacking the discrimination that is built into the very structure of identity. The real challenge starts *after* that step. What really liberates one in the struggle against discrimination, is to demand, and realise, *freedom from having* any *identity forced upon one, and the freedom to come and go as one pleases across all boundaries.*[176]

As this chapter suggests, the confrontation of these issues in a Japanese Studies context is a relatively recent exercise — recent, in the sense that while there has always been some resistance to the dominant image of 'homogeneous Japan,' it is only now that these critical perspectives are beginning to make their impact widely felt, both within Japan, and elsewhere, among those receptive to the idea that notions of 'Japan' and 'Japaneseness' are constantly being re-interpreted and re-imagined by people, motivated and constrained by a myriad of different circumstances.

To acknowledge these different Japans, I argue, is to participate almost automatically in the broader CST approaches outlined here and in the previous chapter, and their rejection of Realism and neo-Realism as the only way to understand the world. Moreover, to show that issues of Japanese identity have implications and effects beyond the spatial boundaries that formally contain and define them under the entity of 'Japan' is to question the logic of representing global life only in terms of "the relative position of [nation] states on a systemwide map of capabilities."[177] It is, in short, to resist the (illusory) sense of certainty offered by clearly demarcated lines

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[175] *Ibid.*, 14.
[176] *Ibid.*, 19.

that delineate homogeneity and unity within the nation state, difference, conflict and uncertainty without, and which deny the power and relevance of attempts to transgress these lines and seek new formations of community and citizenship in the world.[178]

While the continuing power of dominant demarcations (Japan as state, Japan as nation) should not be overlooked, the pressures on them described above will surely survive and continue to grow, and with them, the debate over terms such as *kokusaika, kokusai kôken*, and *kokusai sekinin* (internationalisation, international contribution and international responsibility). In the process, contests for the definition of 'Japan' start to intersect with broader strains of thought about the shifting, changing nature of the 'international' realm. This, I suggest, is the space in which Japanese Studies encounters one of the hottest concepts in the contemporary International Relations lexicon: *globalisation* — and this is the topic of my next, and final, chapter.

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[177] Pasic, "Culturing International Relations Theory," 85.
[178] This is also Walker's point of course, elaborated in *Inside/Outside*, 174-76.

CHAPTER SEVEN

GLOBALISATION, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND JAPAN

This chapter concludes the thesis. It follows on from the two previous chapters, where I focussed on the challenges to orthodox IR posed by CST literature, and the way in which this debate is influencing a critical Japanese Studies literature which seeks to understand Japanese life, society and identity in more complex, incisive ways. In this chapter, my aim is to further explore this thematic intersection via the theme of globalisation, providing, in the process, some initial conclusions about the possibilities for expanding future debate on Japan's international role in the 21st century.

Globalisation can be seen, I suggest, as both a strange, and a particularly apt site for this discussion. It is strange because many of the dominant images of what globalisation is and how it works, seem to transcend the framework within which it is possible to speak about a cohesive "global role" for Japan. These are the images which, as Jan Aart Scholte argues, depict globalisation, for better or for worse, as the increasingly "supraterritorial dimension of social relations."[1] Scholte identifies four contexts for this "supraterritoriality." *Ecological* supraterritoriality occurs through planetary climate change, ozone depletion, worldwide epidemics and the decline of biodiversity.[2] *Economic* supraterritoriality has seen the increasing removal of government restrictions on the movement of capital and goods between countries, as well as the establishment of twenty-four-hour, round-the-world financial markets,

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[1] Jan Aart Scholte, "Towards a Critical Theory of Globalization," in Eleonore Kofman and Gillian Youngs (eds.), *Globalization: Theory and Practice* (London: Pinter, 1996), 46, and *Globalization: A Critical Introduction* (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000), 16-17.

whose location is rendered irrelevant through technology's temporal annihilation of geographical space.[3] *Normative* supraterritoriality occurs through the expansion of worldwide standards, e.g., of measurement, human rights, as well as the spread of non-territorial networks of solidarity among groups such as women, the disabled, and indigenous peoples (see previous chapter).[4] Finally, Scholte writes, there is a *psychological* dimension to globalisation, evident in "a growing consciousness of the world as a single place, an awareness reinforced by everyday experiences of diet, music and dress, as well as by photographs from outer space showing planet earth as one location."[5]

While many have celebrated the perceived trend towards a "borderless world," regarding it as the beginning of a more peaceful, prosperous age,[6] others are far more ambivalent, even pessimistic about it; arguing that the opportunities it offers continue, in practice, to be available only to a minute proportion of the world's people, and are being achieved at the cost of the marginalisation and impoverishment of an expanding socioeconomic periphery.[7] Moreover, there are many commentators on the globalisation debate who are sceptical of the extent to which globalisation has actually proceeded, pointing to supposedly 'global' processes which remain embedded in the logic and structure of interstate relations. Thus Stephen Krasner, for

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[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Ibid.*, and see my comments in Chapter Six.

[5] Scholte, "Towards a Critical Theory of Globalization," 46.

[6] Kenichi Ohmae, *The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Inter-linked Economy* (London: Fontana, 1990). An even more famous expression of this 'celebratory' tone comes from Francis Fukuyama, who, in 1992, suggested that the end of the Cold War spelled the beginnings of a new, more peaceful and prosperous age of Western liberal-democratic hegemony. Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (London: Penguin, 1992).

[7] E.g. Richard Falk, in *Predatory Globalization: A Critique* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), 50. Scholte, for example, cites data collected by UNCTAD which suggests that the world's 48 poorest countries will collectively *loose* $300-600 million per annum as a result of reduced exports and increased food imports under the Uruguay Round agreements. Scholte, *Globalization: A Critical Introduction*, 215.

example, has argued that what we treat as a new phenomena under the rubric of "globalisation," is in reality nothing more than the economic interdependence and neoliberal regime behaviour that has been a feature of international life for many years.[8] From this perspective, "globalisation" does nothing to alter the basic realities of world politics, in which states remain the primary actors. So-called "global" corporations, for example, ultimately remain located within territorial states, and their actions subject to control by state authorities. Similarly, institutions of supposedly transnational governance such as the UN have not exercised power independently of their state members.

Ian Clark has added an interesting dimension to this debate by suggesting that globalisation in IR theory and practice remains dominated by the ontological "Great Divide" that delineates a fundamentally different nature of life within, and without, the boundaries of the nation state. For Clark, this continuing demarcation of inside/outside ensures that, for most people, globalising processes (whether economic, ecological, social and technological), are presumed to be *fundamentally separate from the state* — whether one is 'pro' globalisation or 'anti,' it; and regardless of whether one believes that the state is a subject of globalisation, or a principal agent in its management. As a result, debates over globalisation in IR have become overwhelmingly focussed on (a) the resilience or otherwise, of the sovereign state to global processes; and (b) the nature of globalisation as "cause or effect." Throughout such exchanges, thus:

> we are repeatedly confronted with simple choices that revolve around the state as the subject or object of globalisation. Substantively, we are invited to choose between

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[8] Stephen D. Krasner, "Economic Interdependence and Independent Statehood," in R. H. Jackson and A. James (eds.), *States in a Changing World: A Contemporary Analysis* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 301-2.

> the state as the indispensable political framework for the maintenance of globalisation, and the state as the hapless victim of the globalising forces that threaten it from outside.[9]

In contrast, Clark suggests, globalisation could be better understood in terms of a continual *reconstitution* of the state, "within the vortex of social forces that surround and suffuse it."[10] From this perspective, globalisation is not merely about a series of transnational or international processes, but rather, about *the form of the state itself,* occurring "simultaneously within states, and also at the interstices where they encounter each other"[11] (emphasis added). Thus, Clark observes:

> ...only by a consideration of the state caught between the competing pressures emanating from both fields [i.e., domestic and international] can the impact of globalization, and its likely future development, be understood. To make sense of the international structure, one must look at *the identities of the states that help to create it*. To comprehend the behaviour of states we need to see them as repositories of distinctive international orders. (emphasis added)[12]

This understanding of globalisation, I argue, speaks directly to the 'connection' project of this thesis, and, in these terms, globalisation becomes an apt site for this final discussion of it, because it acknowledges an international system in which states such as Japan will continue to seek power and agency, but, like the CST perspectives examined in Chapter Five, rejects the idea that this system is somehow fixed and knowable via the assumptions of (neo-Realist) IR orthodoxy. From this perspective, the 'many Japans' spoken of in the previous chapter are important in understanding the world in which Japan moves as a *global* actor. In short, if we begin to understand the relationship between the (e.g. Japanese) state and the global structure which both

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[9] Ian Clark, *Globalization and International Relations Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 51.
[10] Clark, *Globalization and International Relations Theory*, 10.
[11] *Ibid.*, 66.
[12] *Ibid.*, 68.

defines it and is defined by it as part of a "mutually constitutive and transformative process,"[13] it becomes vital that IR engages with the knowledge about different Japanese realities provided by Japanese Studies. The discussion to follow seeks to tease this theme out of various elements of the debate on Japan in the global era.

1. Globalisation and Japan: Takashi Inoguchi and the 'Dialectics' of Post-Cold War World Order.

Anyone seeking a departure point for a discussion encompassing globalisation, International Relations and Japan, could do worse than the recent work of a prominent and prolific contributor to all of these topics, Takashi Inoguchi. Up to the early 1990s, Inoguchi's perspectives concerning Japan's international role tended to stress the importance of maintaining order and stability via continued U.S. hegemonic dominance.[14] Since the end of the Cold War however, he has sought a more adventurous theoretical framework, influenced by the CST perspectives discussed in Chapters Five and Six. More specifically, Inoguchi has adopted what he terms a "dialectical model" of global change, which acknowledges not only the major forces shaping world politics in the post-Cold War period, but also the contradictions and anomalies contained within these forces. Such a model, he argues, eschews the

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[13] *Ibid.*

[14] In 1984 for example, Inoguchi argued that international roles for states outside that of hegemon divided into the categories of "challenger," "free rider," "supporter," and "spoiler," suggesting that Japan fell naturally into the role of "supporter." Takashi Inoguchi, "Keizai Gijitsu Taikoku no Sentakushi" (Japan's Images and Options: Not a Challenger But a Supporter), *Chuō Kōron* (October, 1986): 96-114, on p. 98. Reiterating and expanding this stance a few years later, Inoguchi presented four possible future models of international order: "Pax Americana II" (the status quo, anti-declinist scenario of scholars such as Russet and Strange), "Bigemony" (joint U.S.-Japan management of the international system favoured by Gilpin and Brzezinski), "Pax Consortis" (a global regime where no single actor dominates), and "Pax Nipponica" (e.g. Vogel's vision of Japan as "number one"). Inoguchi, "Four Japanese Scenarios for the Future." in Kathleen Newland (ed.), *The International Relations of Japan* (London: Millennium Publishing Group, 1990), 215. Here, Inoguchi designated Pax Americana II as the most feasible and "most desirable" option for the short-to-medium term, because "it entails fewer risks to the United States as well as to the rest of the world," and because "a large majority of responsible Japanese leaders have found it virtually impossible to think beyond a

traditional "Newtonian" dynamics of mainstream IR narratives, which represent change in unilinear terms, and instead, seeks to bring to light "the mutual action of inherently contradictory factors within the same process."[15]

Inoguchi has explained his dialectic model at length in two key post-Cold War publications: *Gendai Nihon Gaikô(Contemporary Japanese Foreign Policy*, 1993) and *Sekai Hendô no Mikata* (*The Standpoint of Global Change* 1994).[16] In both works, he begins by extending Fukuyama's metaphor of the "end of history," representing the uncertainty and instability characterising post-Cold War global politics in terms of not one, but three "ends:" the "end of the Cold War," the "end of geography" and the "end of history."[17] These "ends," Inoguchi explains, refer to "the primary features of change unfolding on a global scale in the three areas of international security, the world economy, and domestic societies."[18] Thus:

> The "end of the Cold War" refers in particular to the current unease of the United States as it realises the long-term decline of the technological and economic competitiveness that underwrites its hegemonic status, even as it retains, for the foreseeable short-term, its current global military supremacy. The "end of geography" encompasses the uncertainty and unease that has accompanied the isolation of national economies and particular regional economic sectors from the power of global capital, even as the barriers to a borderless global economy and single world market governed by uniform standards are removed. And the "end of history" refers to the often violent and unstable results that have accompanied the decline of centrally planned economies and authoritarian governance.[19]

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world where the United States is of primary importance to Japan and where the Japan-U.S. friendship is a major pillar of global stability." *Ibid*., 220-21.

[15] Inoguchi, *Sekai Hendô no Mikata* (The Standpoint of Global Change; Tokyo: Chikuma Shobô, 1994), 36.

[16] Takashi Inoguchi, *Gendai Nihon Gaikô: Seikimatsu Hendô no Naka de* (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobô, 1993). Available in English under the title *Japan's Foreign Policy in an Era of Global Change* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).

[17] Inoguchi, *Gendai Nihon Gaikô*, 5-7, and *Sekai Hendô no Mikata*, 36.

[18] Inoguchi, *Sekai Hendô no Mikata*, 37.

[19] Inoguchi, *Gendai Nihon Gaikô*, 6, and 115-117.

As he later explains, Inoguchi is actually using the metaphor of conclusion here to critique Fukuyama's triumphalist approach, and the presumptions of any sort of 'endism' in the face of so much uncertainty and instability.[20] Thus, in Inoguchi's dialectic model, these 'ends' do not represent literal end states, but ongoing, competitive processes that are generated and sustained by fundamental, transformative forces working within and across the conventional dimensions of IR concern — national security, global economy and state sovereignty. The result, he asserts, is a series of continual challenges, and counter-challenges to the way we view these categories, and the practices associated with them.

Overarching these categories is the fundamental force of technology. Thus, Inoguchi argues, military technology such as ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons and the recent Theatre Missile Defence Systems project, has rendered concepts of national security obsolete and with them, the traditional (Realist) image of an anarchical world.[21] Satellite technology has similarly transformed the nature of economic activity and the market, by making long-distance transactions both instantaneous and continual, thus intensifying the removal of control over economic processes from the sovereign state to a global financial elite.[22] Finally, technology has transformed domestic political processes through the advent of a global media network.[23] In Inoguchi's model then, technology is represented as the key force effecting what Scholte refers to as "supraterritoriality," although Inoguchi does not refer to global change in this way. Instead, he speaks about the ever-increasing "relativisation (*sôtaika*) of the sovereign

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[20] *Ibid.*, 115.
[21] Inoguchi, *Sekai Hendô no Mikata*, 100-103.
[22] *Ibid.*, 128.
[23] *Ibid.*, 158.

state," through the pervasive power of technology. First and foremost, he argues, it is technological progress which:

> has forced us to look at security in terms of 'international,' not 'national' security. Technological progress means that the 'national economy' is meaningful only within the context of the 'international economy.' Similarly then, technological progress means that the government of a domestic society is only meaningful within the context of a relativized state sovereignty.[24]

In keeping with Inoguchi's broader dialectic perspective, the very "relativising" processes engendered by technology are acknowledged as producing powerfully destabilising consequences, as structural adjustments lead to the growth of forces that resist and challenge globalisation. For example, he argues, one can see the increasing pressures on United State hegemony exerted by the proliferation of nuclear weaponry which has seen, among other things, the emergence of a new "backlash" generation of traditional Realists and hegemonic stability theorists, re-asserting the endemic anarchy of the international system and the need to shore up national security.[25] In an economic context the pressure towards uniform global 'rules' for economic behaviour prompts both national and regional responses of economic protectionism, especially in areas "where labour and capital cannot be re-allocated adequately enough to offset the social costs of market liberalisation."[26] Finally, democracy within the state is being re-worked via new sites of political articulation, mainly at local, grass-roots levels as the management of state affairs is increasingly affected by

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[24] *Ibid.*, 159.

[25] *Ibid.*, 106-7. This is a good point, and one which is borne out, I suggest, by the re-birth of Star Wars via the Theatre Missile Defence Project, which, for all its emphasis on transnational security cooperation, is emphatically nationalist in focus.

[26] *Ibid.*, 192-94. In a separate essay on his 'dialectics' theme, Inoguchi connects the rise of Islamic social movements in Egypt and Algeria in the 1990s to the fact that global economic liberalism has so far done little to improve the lot of an impoverished majority in these countries. Inoguchi, "Dialectics of World Order: A View from Pacific Asia," in Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sørensen (eds.), *Whose World Order? Uneven Globalisation and the End of the Cold War* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 122-23.

global forces and the minuscule "global elite" (i.e., those with access to cutting edge technology) who control these forces).[27] In this context, Inoguchi argues, while some issues such as welfare, education, health and the (local) environment will come to depend more on local, rather than national democratic systems, in other areas, such as international aid, the processes of development will, increasingly, be linked to the activities of international corporations.[28] As a result, state politics will increasingly be defined in terms of a continual series of adjustments between "global" and "local" interests. Thus:

> Instead of "think globally, act locally" the opposite, "think locally, act globally" will become the catchphrase of the next century. Undoubtedly, this mindset will become important not only for say, environmentalists, but for the global economic and financial elite as well. Politicians in local democratic polities will most likely have to learn to exist within the definition of global interests.[29]

Within the broader model of global change proposed by Inoguchi, Japan's international role becomes a similar issue of balance and adjustment between various dialectical forces — not just the competing forces of globalisation and resistance mentioned above, but the specific historical and political constraints that have influenced Japan's international relations during the Cold War. Japan's fate in WWII and its subsequent role under U.S. Cold War strategy, Inoguchi observes, prevented it from taking a major global or regional "leadership" role in the postwar world.[30] In the post-Cold War period however, the indicators of international "leadership" have changed, as military and even economic hegemony become less important than the power of input into the structures and institutions that facilitate and govern global

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[27] Perhaps, according to Inoguchi, as few as 0.01% of the world's population. Inoguchi, *Sekai Hendō no Mikata*, 80.
[28] *Ibid.*, 197-200.
[29] *Ibid.* See also *Gendai Nihon Gaikō*, 185-195.
[30] Inoguchi, *Gendai Nihon Gaikō*, 200.

integration. From Inoguchi's perspective, it is this power of "global formatting" that Japan most needs to cultivate in order to develop the type of international role that has been expected of it since the Gulf War first precipitated the debate of post-Cold War 'responsibility'.[31]

While this may sound like familiar ground (see Chapter One), Inoguchi develops this point in *Sekai Hendô* in an interesting way, particularly with reference to Japan's potential role in the global economy. The initial post-Cold War perception of a simple capitalist "victory" over communism, he argues, is having to give way to a more complex vision of *many different capitalisms* (*shihonshugi no samazama no ruikei*), all influenced by various cultural, geographical and even linguistic contexts,[32] and all increasingly in competition with each other for the power to "construct the rules of the global economy."[33] Yet while the "end of geography" and the march towards a single world market has intensified the pressure to adopt uniform global financial and economic norms Inoguchi argues, it is by no means clear which particular combination of these norms will dominate.

All current "variants" of capitalism Inoguchi suggests, exhibit strengths and weaknesses; Japan's particular strengths for example, include "pragmatic emphasis on the market, a significant state role in the equipment of vital social infrastructure, and a national tendency towards self-reliance and hard work."[34] Inoguchi is concerned however, that Japanese, or indeed any non-Western "capitalist values" exert minimal influence in global economic and financial decisionmaking: witness, for example, the ongoing struggle for an enhanced Japanese role in the World Bank

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[31] *Ibid.*
[32] Inoguchi, *Sekai Hendô no Mikata*, 141.
[33] *Ibid.*, 144.

and the IMF, and the way in which the major states of the EC have "passed-over" Japanese advice on Russia's post-communist economic restructuring by European nations.[35] This state of affairs is further illustrated, he suggests, by the failure of Japan to emerge as a "political great power" with respect to foreign aid.[36]

Global Governance and Global 'Formatting Power' in a Supraterritorial World

Inoguchi's work, I suggest, provides a good overview of the themes and concerns that are prevalent in many Japanese discussions of globalisation. In particular, the 'global formatting' theme he raises in *Sekai Hendô* reflects an increasingly commonly held view in Japanese circles about where real national power lies in a "supraterritorial" world. It is evident, for example, in the Diplomatic Bluebooks published annually by Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). For some years now, MOFA's analysis of Japan's foreign policy options has been structured first and foremost around "transborder issues" (terrorism, arms proliferation, the movement of capital, environmental concerns, international immigration and so on), organised in terms which broadly correspond to Inoguchi's 'three end' dimensions of economy, geography, and security.[37]

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[34] *Ibid.*, 51.

[35] *Ibid.*, 152. In the case of the Russian economy, Inoguchi claims, recommendations from Japan's Economic Planning Agency for a slower, more gradual shift from the state-controlled economy to a free market were largely ignored by major players who favoured a "shock transition." *Bid*, 153.

[36] Inoguchi, *Sekai Hendô no Mikata*, 154. Despite Japan's current status as the world's biggest donor of foreign aid, its government remains curiously unable to implement the type of "political conditionality" (such as tying aid to democratic reform and human rights improvements in target countries) that has emerged as a major element in the financial programs of the IMF and World Bank — i.e., in the institutions where Japan most needs to increase its profile if it is to have a significant input into the *formatting* of global structures and practices. *Ibid.*

[37] *Diplomatic Bluebook 1998: Japan's Diplomacy Toward the 21st Century — New Developments and New Challenges Facing the International Community* (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1998). Sourced online at the MOFA website, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/index.html.

The 1999 Bluebook for example, cites "diversification of threats," "diversification of national power," and "the progress of globalization" as the three most pressing themes for Japan at the end of the 20th century.[38] In short, the book notes:

> The wave of globalization is irreversible, and total control over the curl of that wave is impossible. Bearing these realities firmly in mind, we need to sustain an inventive approach to globalization which will make maximum use of the dynamism of this to further promote world stability and prosperity.[39]

As subsequently explained, MOFA's "inventive approach" to maximising Japan's opportunities in the irreversible wave of globalisation is not unlike that advocated by Inoguchi — most particularly, with regard to the focus on 'formatting' power within existing international institutions. Not surprisingly, foremost on the *Bluebooks*' agenda for increasing Japan's formatting power is reform of the United Nations, which, MOFA argues "can no longer avoid enhancing its functions so that it may respond adequately to challenges towards the 21st century."[40] While reform is needed in several areas, the one which most interests MOFA is reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).[41] More specifically, the issue of a permanent seat for Japan on the Council, which has been brought up annually in the *Bluebook* since 1997, and which, as I argued in Chapter One, is seen as one of the most crucial trade-offs for Japan continuing to increase its 'global responsibility.'[42] Elsewhere, other signs of the concern with formatting power include the Ministry of Finance's project

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[38] "The Progress of Globalization," *Diplomatic Bluebook, 1999: Japan's Diplomacy With Leadership Toward the New Century*. Sourced online at the MOFA website (*op. cit.*, 1999)
[39] *Ibid.*
[40] *Ibid.*, Chapter I, Section D: "Global Efforts and the Role of Japan — The United Nations."
[41] The other areas cited are financial reform (primarily due to delayed payments from the US) and better management of development assistance.
[42] "Japan Lines Up 141 Countries for U.N. Plan," *The Japan Times*, Saturday October 28, 2000.

to promote the further internationalisation of the yen,[43] the (successful) campaign by a Japanese national to secure the UNESCO directorship, and the general push by both MOFA and MITI to increase the number of Japanese citizens working for international organisations.[44]

As I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, the preoccupation with issues such as these is connected to dominant images of globalisation in IR, as "supraterritoriality," or, in Inoguchi's terms, the increasing "relativisation" of state sovereignty. In this respect, the concerns expressed above are very much a continuation of the neo-Realist/neo-liberal perspective discussed briefly in Chapter One.[45] They propose that international institutions are the most effective way of maximising and managing interdependence among states (especially economic interdependence), and that Japan's options as a global actor are dependent on the extent to which it can maximise its role in these institutions, and the supraterritorial regimes they create. The sovereign state thus remains the main actor in globalisation, despite its reduced power to act independently to pursue its interests.

This is true, to some extent also, of Inoguchi's model, which, for all its emphasis on the dialectic nature of globalisation, and the 'relativisation' of traditional state sovereignty, still regards the former predominantly as an interaction between state-based elites and economic forces 'out there' in the world system. This view is borne out in Inoguchi's conviction that "localised" reactions or resistances to globalisation can never ultimately overcome its power. Any impact that critical resistance might have can, he suggests, be effective only within the framework that (technology-

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[43] "Internationalization of the Yen for the 21st Century: Japan's Response to Changes in Global Economic and Financial Environments," published on the Ministry of Finance Website at http://www.mof.go.jp/ english/if/e1b064b.htm.

[44] Hanai, "English is Not the Answer" (*op. cit.*, 2000), 2.

driven) globalisation defines, given that such groups are without the power accorded to states and other major actors (such as international corporations), who can play a "formatting role" in global institutions.[46]

The problem with this perspective on globalisation, I suggest, is that it lacks any sense of the "mutually constitutive and transformational" relationship between globalisation and the state which I touched on at the beginning of this chapter. As such, both Inoguchi's 'dialectic' model and the more widespread emphasis it encourages on increasing Japan's "formatting power," fail to cover two important aspects of globalisation. The first concerns the extent to which particular forms of the Japanese state, especially postwar Japan, have already contributed to particular global regimes and processes. The second concerns the impact of globalisation *within* Japan — in relation, for example, to the critical social struggles on Okinawa which represent both sub-national and supraterritorial implications in the global age. This is not about the 'relativisation' of Japanese sovereignty by global pressures, as Inoguchi's work implies. Rather, it concerns the changes taking place in Japanese society and identity which both affect, and are affected by global transformations taking place on the 'outside.' As does the increasingly important issues associated with migrant workers in contemporary Japan.

I will touch on both of these themes shortly, to illustrate how these aspects of globalisation testify to the "mutually constitutive and transformational" dimensions of the dilemmas facing Japanese people in the post-Cold war world. For the moment however, I want to connect this present debate to themes introduced earlier, by saying

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[45] See Chapter One, 38-40.

[46] Thus, in *Gendai Nihon Gaikō*, Inoguchi dismisses the potential international agency of groups such as "human rights movements and peace movements," which, he argues, "tend to be viewed [in Japan]

something of the way in which Robert Cox's Critical Theory perspective has contributed to this kind of understanding of Japan's global role in the 21st century.

2. 'Middlepowermanship:' A Critical Theory Approach to Japan's Role in the New Global Order.

Here, it is Cox's interest in the emergence of Japan as a potential "middle power" that is most important, a role, he emphasised, in 1989, that was not simply a supporting 'satellite' role within an extant hegemony commonly associated with orthodox foreign policy thought and practice. [47] Rather, a genuine "middlepowermanship" role for Japan would be founded on its ability to facilitate the shift to an altogether different type of (post-hegemonic) world order, in which power would not be confined to dominant states, or even states per se, but is diffused among multiple levels. Because structural change per se was not 'fixed,' or determined according to historical inevitability, middlepowermanship, Cox argued, was "something that has to be rethought continually in the context of the changing state of the international system."[48]

More specifically, for Cox, this meant that the tensions and dislocations that were by then becoming more evident in Japan's postwar politico-economic system, were both a function of shifts in the global structure of production, and an opportunity for alternative social forces *within Japan* conducive to the emergence of a multi-level world order. Consistent with his broader position, Cox emphasised that this structural change was not something that had 'just happened' to Japan. If anything,

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as radical groups and are mostly pushed into the corners of society." Inoguchi, *Gendai Nihon Gaikô*, 188.

[47] Robert W. Cox, "Middlepowermanship, Japan and Future World Order." *International Journal* 44 (1989): 824-862.

[48] *Ibid.*, 825.

he suggested, postwar Japan had played a key role in the post-1970s restructuring of the global economy, through its part in the development of a "post Fordist" mode of production, in which large-scale mass production was displaced by more flexible, complex production systems, able to produce a variety of outputs quickly in a global market. Indeed, in a certain sense:

> *Japan pioneered this kind of production organisation* with its dual structure for the labour force, part established and secure, part non-established and precarious. The global restructuring process has taken over Japanese practice (but without its commitment to social and employment stability) and has extended it by reducing the privileged core and expanding the segmented peripheries of employment. The result has been a global shift in power relations to the advantage of capital and the disadvantage of labour. (emphasis added)[49]

From Cox's perspective, thus, the changes underway *within the Japanese state*, and the changes within a globalising international political economy, are essentially symbiotic and codependent, rather than dichotomous or antagonistic. This is important, not least because Cox's perspective generates quite different questions about power and agency in global change, than does Inoguchi's. Like Inoguchi and MOFA, for example, Cox regards international institutions as important in the management of structural change. Yet he is able to recognise that these institutions themselves, as creations of the Westphalian state system, are necessarily limited as agents of change as long as they remain ultimately answerable to existing states. The *interlocuteurs valables* for the social forces at work transforming states, Cox argued, cannot be the centres of accountability to states.[50] Rather, he suggested, what was needed was:

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[49] *Ibid.*, 846.
[50] *Ibid.*, 836.

> a decentred, fragmented structure of international institutions in which some relatively autonomous segments of international organization become agencies of reflection and dialogue that can respond to emerging social forces and help work out strategies and goals for change in polity, economy, and society.[51]

On this basis too, Cox saw the type of political culture in Japan dismissed by Inoguchi as 'local' (and therefore ineffective in resisting global change), as potentially important in facilitating commitment to counter-hegemony and the middlepowermanship ideal. If the impetus for structural change, he argued, does not just come from forces 'out there' in the world, then nor is it generated solely through existing state institutions and the 'multinational' business elite. It can also come from new sites of political culture, developed by people whose concerns encompass both local and global concerns: the environment, human rights, unequal social development and even multiculturalism.[52] For Cox, in the late 1980s, the power of this alternative political culture in Japan remained uncertain and underdeveloped, and its future direction indeterminate. His point was however, that it should not be ignored — that it represented something more than a fragmented, perpetually marginalised response to irresistible global forces 'out there.'

This insight continues to ring true today, as I will try and illustrate in the latter half of this chapter, by again engaging directly with the mainstream debate on Japan's global role which, as I argued in the first half of this thesis, has to be understood in the context of its role in the Cold War security framework of the United States, and the 'Japanese' identity connected with this role. In the following discussion, I will look at two ways of confronting this identity question in the global era. The first is drawn from the 'mainstream' response to globalisation described above; i.e., in terms of a

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[51] *Ibid.*
[52] *Ibid.*, 859-61.

fundamentally competitive relationship between the sovereign identity of the state, and the forces of globalisation. The second however, connects to the discussion begun in the previous chapter, by showing how groups within Japan who have traditionally been excluded from a majority 'national' identity (e.g., on Okinawa), as well as to those who are coming to Japan as a result of global forces (e.g., migrant workers), are perhaps changing Japan from the 'inside' in ways which will impinge upon its identity and role as a global actor.

3. Globalising Japanese Identity: Japan's Global Role from the 'Inside.'

One of the most interesting recent statements on globalisation and Japanese identity, I suggest, can be found in the writings of Eisuke Sakakibara, a former deputy finance minister for international affairs, and until recently, a candidate for the directorship of the International Monetary Fund.[53] Sakakibara first shot to domestic and international prominence in the early 1990s when he published a book asserting that Japan has developed a different "regime" of capitalism from the 'West,' derived from and reflecting the specific characteristics (and merits) of Japanese society. The principles of this regime, Sakakibara argued, which include, among other things, "putting people first" and "merit-based equal opportunity which rejects hereditary rights and the control of capital," constitute a particular socio-economic "paradigm" which needs protection from the relentless pressure on Japan to assimilate its economic practices with Europe and the United States.[54]

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[53] International Monetary Fund Press Release 00/18: "IMF Board Receives Nomination for IMF Managing Director." Sourced online at http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm.

[54] Eisuke Sakakibara, *Bunmei toshite no Nihon-gata Shihon Shugi: 'Tomi' to 'Kenryoku' no Kōzu* (Japanese-style Capitalism as Civilization: the Structures of 'Wealth' and 'Authority.' Toyko: Toyko Keizai Shinposha, 1993). Also, *Shihonshugi wo Koeta Nihon*, iii-iv.

In 1998, Sakakibara reiterated and updated this argument in a work with the rather imposing title, *Structural Reform for the New Century: From Progress to Symbiosis*, in which he debates the dangers and opportunities facing Japan's socio-economic "paradigm" in a rapidly globalising world economy.[55] The "progress" of Sakakibara's title refers to a linear, (Newtonian) sense of universal progress, associated unequivocally with the post-Enlightenment West, and portrayed by Sakakibara as endlessly striving toward "an ultimate, ideal world order."[56] In the post-Cold War world, he argues, this "universalist progressivism" (*shimpô shugi*) is reflected in the increasing rationalisation of the global market and the homogenisation of economic and financial practices, especially via the "cyberisation" (*saibâ-ka*) of economic transactions via computer technology.[57] The result is a type of "capitalist fundamentalism" or "market fundamentalism" (*shihon genrishugi/shijô genrishugi*) which Sakakibara perceives as being more or less directly derived from the postwar politico-economic hegemony of the United States, and which, he argues, is potentially destructive of human society and identity in many parts of the world. Sounding rather like Huntington in reverse gear, Sakakibara asserts that "it is probably these 'fundamentalisms' and not Islamic or communist fundamentalism, which now pose the greatest threat to the twenty-first century world."[58]

Here again are many of the themes which permeate the broader (mainstream) globalisation debate, and which have already been discussed above — technology, economic interdependence, and above all, the tension between increasing "supraterritoriality," and the sovereign identity of the state. From Sakakibara's

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[55] Eisuke Sakakibara, *Shinseiki e no Kôzô Kaikaku: Shinpo kara Kyôsei e* (Structural Reform for the New Century: From Progress to Symbiosis; Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbunsha, 1998).
[56] Sakakibara, *Shinseiki e no Kôzô Kaikaku*, 33.
[57] *Ibid.*, 40.
[58] *Ibid.*, 166.

perspective however, these tensions necessitate something more than the assertion of "multiple capitalisms" (Inoguchi), or the need for UN reform (MOFA), given that the issue at stake, he argues, is not just the future structure of the world political economy, but the very shape and character of "human civilisation itself." At a time when integrative global forces are exerting unprecedented pressure on state sovereignty, Sakakibara warns, societies which don't reach beyond generalist "ideologies" such as "Western-style democracy, peace, and the omnipotence of the market" to assert a national and/or regional identity have no useful role to play in the global network of the future. They will be absorbed by other regions and other countries. [59] "Only the countries and regions able to assert and, to a certain extent *universalise* (emphasis added) their distinct cultures and histories" Sakakibara concludes, "will become important players in the new, globalised international system."[60]

It would be wrong to deduce from this that Sakakibara is against globalisation per se; for he is not. He is fiercely critical however, of the extent to which the structures that govern global forces — the United Nations, the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO, among others — remain dominated by 'Western' values and assumptions. Accordingly, while conceding that many of the integrative processes associated with globalisation and global regimes are inevitable and even positive, Sakakibara is concerned about the need to promote, and increase the 'hybrid' nature of global regimes. What is needed, he argues, is a fundamental shift in "intellectual frameworks" — away from the unilinear, unidirectional (Western) "progressivism" that currently dictates globalisation, and towards a state of "symbiosis" (*kyôsei*) in

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[59] *Ibid.*, 32-34.
[60] *Ibid.*, 169.

which there is room for many different modes of socio-economic organisation to co-exist.[61] Explaining further, Sakakibara describes this proposed shift in religious terms: away from the "monotheism" of Western liberal-democratic progressivism, to a "polytheism" of many different politico-economic civilisations (*seiji keizai bunmei*) — in short, a state of "multicivilisational symbiosis" (*tabunmeishugiteki kyôsei*).[62]

It probably comes as little surprise that Japan is the country that is foremost in Sakakibara's mind when it comes to resisting and challenging 'Western progressivism.' Like other Asian countries he argues, Japan was subject to a long period of "enforced (Western) modernisation" (*kyôsei sareta kindaika*) when it came into contact with Western power during the eighteenth century.[63] During the postwar period however, when most other Asian countries were employing the benefits of modernisation to reject colonial rule and forge strong, cohesive national identities, Japan, Sakakibara points out, was being subjugated to the ideological framework of the United States in the name of the Cold War. The result, he argues, is that Japan, for all its remarkable postwar achievements, has failed to develop the secure sense of national identity (*kunigara*) or national awareness (*kokumin ishiki*) that will be vital in weathering the effects of global integration. More damagingly, it has failed to take advantage of the tools and techniques that now constitute real power in an increasingly integrated world. Like Inoguchi, Sakakibara believes that these tools are centred in technology, and in particular, the "information revolution" of the late twentieth century.

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[61] *Ibid.*, 34.
[62] *Ibid.*, 36.
[63] *Ibid.*, 82-84.

Sakakibara is particularly concerned by the extent to which Japan remains an "information-closed-country" (*jôhô sakoku*) — a phrase that refers scathingly to the period of Japan's international isolation (*sakoku*) prior to the arrival of Admiral Perry in the mid-nineteenth century and Japan's subsequent emergence as a modern nation state in the state system. For Sakakibara, this closure is signified not only by actual levels of engagement with technology (for example, the low rate of internet usage within Japan compared to other OECD countries),[64] but also by issues such as the general ineptitude of Japanese people in foreign languages — especially English, "the *de facto* language of communication on the Internet, and in the global economy."[65]

Japan as a Globaliser of Values?

Many scholars of Japan, I suspect, would be inclined to dismiss Sakakibara's arguments as yet another nationalist diatribe on *nihonjinron*, or Japanese uniqueness, and certainly there are elements of this stance in his work.[66] Even were this not the case, it is difficult to overlook Sakakibara's tendency (much like Inoguchi) to

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[64] *Ibid.*, 132.

[65] *Ibid.*, 171.

[66] Most Japan specialists would be aware of the significance of the textual influences cited by Sakakibara in the opening pages of *Shinseiki*, which include the work of the Japanese naturalist Imanishi Kenji. Kenji's 1950s studies of the social behaviour of monkeys and other animals disputed the (Western) Darwinian notion of evolution and natural selection, arguing instead for a natural order of coexistence (*sumiwake*), that living creatures create instinctively within their natural habitat (Imanishi, cited in Sakakibara, *Shinseiki no Kôzô Kaikaku*, 28-29). Sakakibara's extension of this notion of coexistence to human societies, whereby "human social and economic systems are created out of the traditions and instinct for co-existence of human beings"(*Ibid.*, 29) is also a borrowed idea; this time, from the famous (and conservative) Japanese social theorist Kawakatsu Heita. Kawakatsu, whose writings have been profoundly influential in debates on national identity in Japan, is probably most famous for his assertions about the influence of geographical space on the formation of cultural and racial identity, and in turn, the impact of culture upon the human economy (for a synopsis of his arguments, see Morris-Suzuki, *Re-Imagining Japan*, 145-149). From Sakakibara's perspective, a healthy world order involves a multiplicity of these cultural-social-economic structures, co-existing with each other, as opposed to a single, universal structure informed by the paradigm of "Western progressivism." (Sakakibara, *Shinseiki e no Kôzô Kaikaku*, 32). In order that this state of multicivilisational symbiosis can be achieved however, the non-Western societies that have held

effectively ignore Japan's role in creating the very processes he damns as "Western progressivism." Despite this however, Sakakibara's work is interesting, I argue, for what he is really trying to come to grips with in *Shinseiki*, and in a far more forthright way than many others who have tackled this topic, is nothing less than the globalisation of *values*. More specifically, he is asking if it is possible for Japan to survive without managing to project, or at least protect, one of the key aspects of state sovereignty as traditionally defined: the state as a source of values, and accordingly, identity.

In this respect, Sakakibara's argument invokes some of the most powerful tensions surrounding the contemporary globalisation debate. As many scholars have noted, some of the most compelling evidence for globalisation revolves around the emergence of institutions of global governance which, by definition, presume some degree of normative consolidation and universalisation.[67] Thus, many discussions of globalisation invoke the emergence of some sort of global civil society, in which certain broad values (democracy, human rights, peace, protection of the environment) are, increasingly, being universalised through the aspirations of organisations such as the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, or even Amnesty International.[68] On the other hand, there are those who argue that because the effects (particularly the beneficial effects) of globalisation are so profoundly uneven, the pull of forces which help define communal identity (race, culture, nationality, proximity from the wealth-creating processes of the global economy) are becoming ever more

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themselves in thrall to the Western, progressivist ideal of an ultimate 'end state' of homogeneous liberal democracy must re-assess and re-assert their post-Cold War identities. *Ibid.*, 54.

[67] Clark, *Globalization and International Relations Theory*, 127.

[68] *Ibid.*, 129.

complex, ensuring that social values become a major site of contestation.[69] As Claude Ake puts it:

> Globalization produces many losers and many more who worry about losing. It alters economic and political relations in the local space, it threatens cultures. Some are universalised, but even this is a threat, for in universalising, it also transforms. It eradicates some, museumises others. It collapses distance and conjures proximity that can be discomforting. In universalising certain values, globalisation can exacerbate scarcity, competition and conflict.[70]

Both of these perspectives, I suggest, are resonant not only within Sakakibara's argument, but in general debate over Japan's role in a globalising world. As mentioned above, the Diplomatic Bluebooks, and other official articulations of Japan's global role contain frequent references to Japan's role in achieving "human security" — the 1999 Bluebook devoting an entire section to the discussion of Japan's "efforts toward the realisation of a better global society."[71] "Human security," in this context, covers:

> all the menaces that threaten human survival, daily life and dignity — for example, environmental degradation, violations of human rights, transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, refugees, poverty, anti-personnel landmines, and other infectious diseases such as AIDS and strengthens efforts to confront these threats. As these are all cross-border issues, coordinated action by the international community will be important, as will linkages and cooperation among governments, international organizations, NGOs and other parts of civil society.[72]

On the other hand, and as Sakakibara's work suggests, there remains a strong perception that the mapping out of contemporary global "civil society" remains very much a Western (or, more truthfully, U.S.) enterprise, in which the universalisation

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[69] *Ibid.*

[70] Claude Ake, "The New World Order: A View From Africa," in Holm and Sørensen (eds.), *Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War* (*op. cit.*, 1995), 27.

[71] *Diplomatic Bluebook 1999* Chapter II Section 3: "Efforts Toward the Realization of a Better Global Society."

of certain values and norms rides roughshod over the cultural claims of non-Western communities and homogenises them into a global (economic, social, cultural) whole. Sakakibara of course, is not the first Japanese commentator to suggest this, and in this respect, his comments are only the latest instalment in a discussion that dates back to Japan's first sustained encounter with the West.

The notion that Japan needs to adapt the tools of global management (IT, membership of international organisations, an ODA program committed to furthering "global civil society"), even as it strives to resist and reject "Western progressivism" for example, is strikingly akin to the efforts of late Meiji and early Shôwa intellectuals to define a world view in which Japan was recognised as culturally different but *equivalent* to the West.[73] As Stefan Tanaka has argued, this involved a sharp distinction between the absorption of 'universal' tools and technologies that were deemed vital to Japan's survival in the modern state system, and the absorption of "Western" culture and values. Thus, he suggests, the Meiji historian Taguchi Ukichi's assertion that Japanese scholars "study physics, psychology, economics, and other sciences not because the West discovered them, *but because they are the universal truth*" [emphasis added].[74] On the same basis, I suggest, Sakakibara is eager for Japanese people to accept tools and techniques (even the English language!) that will fortify Japan's participation in the power processes of an increasingly 'globalised' world order structure, while maintaining that "national identity" is something fundamentally separate from this project. To put it another way, from Sakakibara's perspective, the tools of globalisation are precisely what Japan needs in

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[72] *Ibid.*

[73] Stefan Tanaka, *Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts into History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 47.

[74] Taguchi Ukichi (1855-1905), quoted in Tanaka, *Japan's Orient*, 37.

order that it can *export* the core values of Japanese identity — thereby not only surviving the globalisation process, but enhancing it, on Japan's terms.

The idea that re-discovering a Japanese identity is not merely to benefit Japan, but is important in preventing the homogenisation of other non-Western societies is significant. Among other things, it explains the recent tendency to represent 'Japanese' values and identity more broadly, as 'Asian' values.[75] Sakakibara, for example, notes the "natural affinity" between Japan and other Asian societies, which makes Japan a potential leader in the championing of multicivilisational symbiosis.[76] In this respect too, his arguments tap an already substantial body of opinion. In 1993 for example, another distinguished Japanese bureaucrat, Ogura Kazuo, argued that it was not sufficient for Asian countries to master 'Western' economic, political and cultural practices.[77] Rather, he stated, it was high time that "the traditional spirit of Asia" began to "export values of a universal world nature." [78] Elsewhere, Takeshi Nagano has explained how the unique "Japanese-style management" of the 1980s (*nihon-teki keiei*) is set to become "East Asia-style management" (*tôyô-teki keiei*); while Minobu Honda and his colleagues have argued the existence of a particular and unique "ethos" that underpins "Asian progress."[79]

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[75] For discussions on this topic, see Hein and Hammond "Multiculturalism in Japanese Perspective," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 1 (Summer 1992): 145-169; David Wright-Neville, "The Politics of Pan Asianism" (*op. cit.*, 1995), Morris-Suzuki, *Re-Imagining Japan*, 178-79, and Gavan McCormack, *The Emptiness of Japanese Affluence* (*op. cit.*, 1996), 167-68.

[76] Sakakibara, *Shinseiki e no Kôzô Kaikaku*, 200-201.

[77] Kazuo Ogura, "'Ajia fukken' no tame ni" (For the 'restoration of Asia'). *Chuô Kôron* 7:1993, 60-73, on pp. 61-63. Ogura cites the East Asian economic boom, the achievement of "more or less democratic" political systems, and the proliferation of Asian musicians in Western classical orchestras as respective examples of Asian mastery of 'Western cultural practices.' *Ibid.*, 61.

[78] *Ibid.*, 64. Like Inoguchi and Sakakibara, Ogura also appreciates the importance of "formatting power," arguing that, while the self-evident worth of Asian values will ultimately aid their global dissemination, more active promotion strategies (such as the setting up of more institutes within Asia to encourage the study of Asia by foreigners) are also needed.

[79] Takeshi Nagano, "Nihon-teki keiei kara Tôyô-teki keiei e" (From Japanese Management to East Asian Management), *Bungei Shunju* June 1992, 142-49; and Minobu Honda *et. al.*, *Ajia Hatten no Etosu* (The Ethos of Asian Progress; Tokyo: Keisô Shobô, 1995). For a good discussion of these and

As Morris-Suzuki has pointed out, the actual definition of 'Asian values' in examples such as these has been consistently vague.[80] "In many new Asianist writings," she observes, "Asia itself appears less as a clearly defined reality than as the goal of an inchoate longing which combines nostalgia for lost values and traditions with the dream of a yet-undefined alternative model of modernity."[81] My own perspective is that such vagueness also fulfils a more specific purpose, providing as it does a conveniently flexible conceptual framework for resisting the incessant, homogenising pressures of global forces 'out there' in the world — one that works on both 'regional' and 'national' levels, as convenience dictates. This is particularly important in a Japan context, because in many cases, efforts to produce a cohesive Japanese national identity have, not surprisingly, sought inspiration from the period prior to Japan's postwar subjugation to "western progressivism" — the period of Japan's conquest of Asia prior to and during WWII.

Thus for example, the Japanese government recently passed a bill which formally endorses the *hinomaru* flag (the "Rising Sun;" red circle on a white background), and the song *kimigayo*[82] as official national symbols.[83] The 'official' status of both song and flag as national symbols is longstanding; both date back to the Meiji restoration. In the wake of WWII however, they were widely rejected by Japanese people, as symbols of emperorism and militarism, and accordingly, of the havoc and suffering visited on so many Japanese and Asian people during the first half of the 20th

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other similar works in English, see Laura Hein and Ellen H. Hammond, "Homing in on Asia: Identity in Contemporary Japan," *Bulletin of Concerned Asia Scholars* 27:3 (1995): 2-17.

[80] Ogura's list of "universal" Asian values for example, ventures no further than a series of generalised remarks about diligence in work and education, respect for the aged, and emphasis upon family ties and group harmony over the wishes of the individual. Ogura, "Ajia Fukken," 68.

[81] Morris-Suzuki, *Re-Imagining Japan*, 179.

[82] Translated as "Thy Reign," the song is a vow of loyalty to the Emperor of Japan.

[83] Asako Murakami, "The Rising Sun Rises Again," New California Media Online, at http://www.ncmonline.com/in-depth/1999-08-13/rising.html.

century. Consequently, although both have routinely been brought out to represent Japan at 'international' venues such as the UN, or the Olympic Games, the government's position prior to the passing of the bill (in August 1999) was that Japan did not actually have an "official" flag or anthem.[84] Public acknowledgement of their 'official' status is therefore a significant move, and while it remains a hugely controversial one among some sectors of Japanese society,[85] there is also little doubt that for many, it represents a positive step — a way of fortifying community, of celebrating some level of national cohesion in the face of so much that is uncertain and fragmentary.

Another important sign of attempts to enhance a particular sense of "strong" national identity, and one that is deeply interwound with the *hinomaru/kimigayo* issue, has been the renewal of debate over the teaching of wartime history in Japanese secondary schools. As previously indicated, the broadening of the "comfort women" debate, following the end of the Cold War did bring about a measure of government openness on previously taboo topics, including some moderate revisions of school textbook guidelines by the Ministry of Education to allow the (albeit limited) inclusion of references to wartime acts of Japanese aggression.[86] Since the mid

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[84] This itself is a dubious proposition, given the ubiquity of both the *hinomaru* and *kimigayo* at national and international venues. A particularly good discussion of this ambiguous status can be found in Norma Field's *In the Realm of a Dying Emperor* (*op. cit.*, 1990), 15-40, where she examines the case of an Okinawan activist prosecuted by the government for burning the flag at a national athletics meet.

[85] Rejection of both flag and song has always been particularly strong in Hiroshima, where wartime pain and suffering came to be epitomised in the atomic bombing, and in Okinawa (see below). According to the Ministry of Education, only about 18 percent of Hiroshima high schools sang the anthem at school graduation ceremonies in 1998, as opposed to a national average of 80 percent. In March 1999, the principal of Sera High School in Hiroshima committed suicide after pressure from the local school board to have the anthem sung at the 1999 graduation ceremony. Newsweek International, "When a Flag Is Not a Flag," March 29, 1999. Sourced online at http://www.dailydavos.com/nw-srv/printed/int/_asia/ov3213-2.htm.

[86] From April 1997, school history texts were approved for use, which refer to the "forcible abduction of comfort women," as well as accounts of the Nanjing Massacre and other atrocities. Gavan McCormack, "Holocaust Denial à la Japonaise" (Japan Policy Research Institute Working Paper No. 38: October 1997), 2.

1990s however, these gradual moves by the state to face up to responsibility have been met by a strong backlash, led in part by two university-based groups: the Association for the Advancement of Liberalist View of History (*Jyûshugi Shikan Kenkyûkai*), founded in 1995, and the Society for the Making of New School Textbooks in History, founded in December 1996.[87] The central figure in both these organisations is a Professor at Tokyo University, Nobukatsu Fujioka, who, according to the Association's official website, "has worked for public awareness of grave masochistic slants in Japanese history education."[88] Like Sakakibara, Fujioka is profoundly concerned by what he sees as the failure of postwar Japan to develop a strong sense of national identity — although in his case, the origins of this failure are represented more specifically as the loss of a "distinctive Japanese historical consciousness:"

> Today, Japan has a well-developed economy and is in a position to make great contributions to world peace and prosperity, if she so chooses. However, I believe that our conventional historical self-perception is actually pulling us away from a sense of international responsibility and true integrity. ...Modern Japan seems to lack a strong self-image of what she is, what kind of country she wishes to become, what ideals she cherishes. These are all matters deeply related to the prevalent view of Japan's history, which I and my colleagues call the masochistic view.[89]

The sentiments expressed by Fujioka are neither new nor insignificant. As I have argued previously (Chapters Four and Six), the circumstances of Japan's postwar role ensured the preponderance of a conservative, nationalist political elite, many of

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[87] *Ibid.*

[88] "At The Frontlines: Professor Fujioka Speaks Out on Education Issues, Comfort Women, Creation of a New Textbook," *Jyûshugi Shikan Kenkyûkai* English website, at http://www.jyuu-shikan.org/e/. The *Jyûshugi Shikan Kenkyûkai* site provides a number of links to like-minded organisations online, such as the anonymous "The Other Side" site, at http://members.tripod.com/~funkytomoya/massacre/sample01.htm, and the Japanese site, "Comfort Women's Issue: Presenting the Idea That the Japanese Government is Not Responsible, at http://www.wink.co.jp/~yosiinwatch/comfortwomen.html.

whom were openly opposed to the "one country pacifism" enshrined in Article Nine (see Chapter One). Throughout the Cold War years, the LDP harboured a powerful clique committed to the restoration and/or further empowerment of signs, symbols and practices associated with the prewar Japanese state: army, anthem, flag, (Yasukuni) shrine, and emperor (in the form of an enhanced role for the imperial institution in government).[90] Above all, these people have favoured the revamping of the Japanese educational system, with the aim of installing a "proper" understanding (and veneration) of the abovementioned symbols. Such an understanding, as McCormack has pointed out, involves a distinct shift in emphasis and interpretation of the war; more towards the old prewar Shôwa vision of Japan's "liberation" of Asia from Western imperialism, with decreasing emphasis on issues such as Imperial Army atrocities.[91]

Whose Japan? Whose Values?

All of the examples cited above are integral to the debate over 'real' responsibility and Japan as a genuine global player in conventional (i.e., neo-Realist terms) that has been followed throughout this thesis. Flag, anthem, a 'proud' ("non-masochistic") sense of history — one might even go so far to say that Japan could not participate in its new, more "responsible" role in the US-Japan defence partnership without first settling such issues, because such symbols are vital underwriters of the notion of territorial and cultural alignment. They are part of a state-centred identity that confers the capacity to be taken seriously as a military, political, or economic

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[89] Nobukatsu Fujioka, lecture given to the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan, February 25, 1999. Sourced online at the *Jyûshugi Shikan Kenkyûkai* English website (*op. cit.*).
[90] Carol Gluck, "The Past in the Present" (*op. cit.*, 1993), 75.
[91] McCormack, "Holocaust Denial à la Japonaise," 6-7.

'actor.'[92] In this respect, the timing of Japan's "resurgent nationalism" (a favourite phrase of media coverage of this topic) is not hard to understand. Yet as Sakakibara's work illustrates, the regeneration of past national symbols is something more than the staking of a claim to global responsibility. It is also about the effort to *shore up Japanese identity against the forces of globalisation.*

This is true, moreover, not only in relation to the threats to Japanese sovereignty perceived in the increasing supraterritoriality of international society. The regeneration of national symbols are also a response to the globalisation of the Japanese state from *within* — to the 'relativisation' of state authority not from the exogenous forces of economic liberalism, or 'Western progressivism,' but from increasingly disparate focal points of identity on the inside of the state, many of which, in recent years have begun to acquire 'supraterritorial' dimensions of their own.

Some of these sources of identity were discussed in the previous chapter: the Ainu people's struggle for recognition, feminist concerns, and the citizenship issues raised by ethnic minorities. Such examples, as I argued there, belie the temptingly either argument that 'restoring' a single, unified sense of Japanese national identity is both possible, or necessary to ensure Japan's survival in the globalised world of the future. The possibility of multiple 'Japans' however, cuts directly to the 'theoretical' problems raised in this chapter and throughout this thesis, of continuing to conceptualise the state's agency primarily in terms of its engagement with global forces 'out there.' Such a possibility indicates that the way in which the state responds to 'globalisation from within,' how it attempts to control and direct the

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[92] This view is supported by Fujioka himself, who has described the personal "revelation: (*tenkō*) he

different reactions of people to both the dangers and the opportunities posed by globalisation, is a much more complex issue than any simple response to 'external' forces. To illustrate more precisely what I mean, I will conclude this chapter with two final examples of Japan's 'globalisation from within,' both of which have significant things to say about Japan's capacity as a global actor.

Okinawa: Sub-National Identities in an Era of Globalisation

Properly speaking, "Okinawa" is the name of only the largest island in the Ryûkyû archipelago, a 400 mile chain of one hundred and forty-odd small islands that snakes Southwest into the Pacific Ocean, following the bulge of southern China towards Taiwan. Since 1879 however, "Okinawa" has also been the formal title of the prefecture which incorporates most of the Ryûkûs into the Japanese state, and, via the (Realist) correlation between territoriality, sovereignty and security, places Japan in strategic geographical proximity to Southeast Asia.[93] This location has shaped Okinawan history, and in turn, what is generally referred to in Japanese political discourse as the "Okinawa Problem" (*Okinawa Mondai*).

Like Hokkaido (see Chapter Six), Okinawa was initially regarded by Japan's ruling elite as an exotic, peripheral foreign territory, but was assimilated and rapidly 'Japanised,' as the Westphalian state system began to impact on Japanese world

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underwent during the 1991 Gulf War, when it became evident to him that Japan was fundamentally emasculated as an international actor. *Ibid.*, 8.

[93] The Okinawan capital Naha is actually closer to Taipei (635km), Shanghai (830km) Seoul (1350km), Manila (1465km), and Hong Kong (1465km) than it is to the Japanese administrative capital. The closest large Japanese city to Naha is Fukuoka (780km).

views from the late eighteenth century.[94] As with the Ainu however, the degree of Okinawa's integration into Japan proper was always ambiguous. During World War II, this ambiguity had devastating consequences for Okinawan people as, on the one hand, they were pressed to sacrifice their lives and livelihoods as loyal Japanese subjects; while on the other, they were subject to systematic discrimination and sometimes horrific abuses by Japanese army troops, particularly as the war situation became more desperate.[95] And, when invasion by the US became inevitable, Okinawa was deemed expendable in the final defence of what (then) Prime Minister Konoe termed the 'integral mainland' or *koyu hondo*.[96] In this way, the stigma of "incomplete" Japaneseness that had been attached to Okinawan people since Meiji times, was conveniently re-invoked to justify the prolongation of the war in order to obtain an honourable settlement — i.e., one which would not ultimately compromise the sovereign identity of 'integral Japan.'[97]

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[94] Steve Rabson, "Assimilation Policy in Okinawa: Promotion, Resistance, and 'Reconstruction" Japan Policy Research Institute Occasional Paper No. 8, October 1996, sourced online at http://www.jpri.org/. In the twelfth year of the Meiji era (1879), the Ryûkyûs, which had effectively been under Japanese control since 1609, became Okinawa Prefecture. The formal transformation of a distant island outpost to an integral part of the Japanese empire necessitated the transformation of its people into 'civilised' Japanese nationals and loyal imperial subjects; and Ryûkyûan people thus became the targets of a sustained campaign by Meiji modernisers in Tokyo to eradicate indigenous language and any other "backward" cultural practices seen as incompatible with Japanese citizenship. Aniya Masaaki, "Kindai Nihon to Okinawa" (Modern Japan and Okinawa), *Hôgaku Zeminâ* 505 (January 1997): 22-25, on pp. 23-24. The suppression of Okinawan language in particular was carried on well into the postwar period, with local schools required to punish children who spoke 'dialect' as late as the late 1950s. Norma Field, *In the Realm of a Dying Emperor* (*op. cit.*, 1990), 72.

[95] Few Okinawans conscripted for the war effort for example, ever actually received proper military training, but were assigned instead to "military labour," which meant tasks such as digging trenches, building airstrips, and carrying supplies. Following the invasion and during the Battle for Okinawa, many Okinawan civilians were ejected by Japanese soldiers from the caves and tombs in which they had sought shelter, forced or persuaded to commit group suicide (a phenomena subsequently celebrated in official history textbooks as patriotic "collective self-determination"), or simply executed outright as suspected 'spies.' Kôji Aikyo, "Okinawa ga tô Kokumin Kokka," (Okinawa Questions the 'Nation State'), in Hiroshi Nakaji and Asaho Mizushima (eds.), *Okinawa to Kempô* (Okinawa and the Constitution; Kyoto: Hôritsubunka-sha, 1998), 29.

[96] *Ibid.* The questionable geographical logic of referring to a 'mainland' within Japan, a nation of small islands, is a tradition which persists among both Okinawans and 'mainlanders' today; made meaningful by its demarcation of the psychological, as well as geographical distance between core and periphery. Thus, Okinawan dialect refers to Okinawan people as "uchinanchu" (inside people) and mainland Japanese as "yamatanchu" (those from Yamato), "Yamato" being another term for "Japan." Field, *In the Realm of a Dying Emperor*, 76.

[97] *Ibid.*

This flexible conceptualisation of 'integral Japan' was again evident in the Occupation and its aftermath, when Okinawa was bound over indefinitely to the U.S. as a major military base site in return for the restoration of Japanese sovereignty.[98] While U.S. bases were established throughout postwar Japan, those located on the Japanese mainland were subjected to an entirely different set of rules, with the terms and conditions for introducing U.S. forces and equipment subject to at least nominal prior consultation. Okinawa however, was subject to no such provisions, and in time, it became a strategically vital deployment site for many of the United State's more controversial forms of weaponry, including biological, chemical and nuclear weapons.[99] In this respect, Okinawa's continued suspension from Japanese administration (long after the restoration of Japanese sovereignty in 1947) was also useful in balancing Japan's obligations under the Security Treaty, with the postwar commitment to a national identity based on peace and non-nuclearism — ironically, the very identity which contemporary commentators from Hashimoto (see Chapter One) to Sakakibara now reject as incompatible with a genuine 'global role' for Japan.[100]

As many scholars have pointed out, citizen's protests over the scale and nature of the U.S. military presence in Okinawa were predicated by and large on the demand for Okinawa to be returned to Japan, and throughout its occupation, Okinawan affinity

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[98] Initially, land deemed necessary for U.S. military purposes was simply confiscated; however, under the 1951 San Francisco Peace Settlement, this was replaced by a compulsory leasing system which guaranteed indefinitely the right of the U.S. "to exercise all and any power of administration, legislation and jurisdiction" over Okinawa and the rest of the Ryûkyûs. Article 3 of the San Francisco Treaty, reproduced in *Kihon Jôyaku/Shiryôshû* (Basic Documents of International Law), 2nd edition (1992), 477.

[99] John Michael Purves, *Island of Military Bases: A Contemporary Political and Economic History of Okinawa*. Published on the *Contemporary Okinawa: Politics, Economy and Society* website created by John Purves at http://www2.gol.com/users/johnrach/Base.html. Chapter II-1-4.

[100] For example, Okinawa could not be included when the Satô administration introduced Japan's "three nos" antinuclear policy (no construction, no possession, and no introduction of nuclear weapons) in December 1967. John Dower, "Peace and Democracy in Two Systems, 25-27.

with Japan persisted in the face of U.S. attempts to weaken it.[101] When reversion to Japan was finally achieved in 1972 however, Okinawan hopes for a genuine "parity with the mainland" were shattered.[102] As it became clear that reversion would facilitate neither the de-militarisation, nor the "de-Americanisation" of Okinawan economy and society, Okinawans from all walks of life and many different political persuasions expressed their betrayal by *both* the U.S. and Japan. As one commentator put it:

> During the war Okinawa acted as a shield for the defence of the homeland, and over 100,000 of our comrades lost their lives in that effort. After the war Okinawa became a spoil of victory, a means with which to settle the problem of defeat. Okinawa was sacrificed and entrusted to the rule of an alien people. Now it is to be placed in the uncertain position of becoming a keystone of the Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty, o that it may help to protect the peace and safety of Japan and the Far East. To this day Okinawa is, as it has always been, the sacrificial lamb of state power.[103]

None of this is intended to simplify what was, and remains, a complex relationship between Okinawan people, the bases, and mainland Japanese society. The perceived economic benefits that the bases bring to Okinawa have always competed with their environmental and social impact; and prior to the end of the Cold War at least, the bases were regarded by many Japanese and even Okinawan people as making a real and necessary contribution to Japan's security in the region and the world. With the end of the Cold War however, ambivalence about the bases has increased dramatically, leading many to question the foundation on which so many different

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[101] Morris-Suzuki, *Re-Inventing Japan*, 180-181, and Gabe Masaaki, *Nichibei Kankei no Naka no Okinawa, (Okinawa in U.S. -Japan Relations*; Tokyo: Sanichi Shobô, 1996), 95.

[102] "Parity with the mainland" was a catchphrase of anti-base protests throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Today however, Okinawa continues to host approximately 75 percent of the total number of U.S. military forces stationed in Japan under the Security Treaty terms (a figure that is invariably coupled by journalists and critics with the fact that Okinawa constitutes less than one percent of the total land mass of Japan). L. Eve Armentrout Ma, "The Explosive Nature of Okinawa's 'Land Issue' or 'Base Issue,' 1945 - 1977: A Dilemma of United States Military Policy," *Journal of American - East Asian Relations* 1 (Winter 1992): 435 - 463, on pp. 440-44.

aspects of human security for a community deemed to be an "integral part of Japan," are to be deferred indefinitely in the name of *national* security.[104]

There is no sign for the foreseeable future of any genuine reduction in the U.S. military presence, with the bases deemed by both the Japanese and U.S. government as vital to the U.S. - Japan Mutual Security Treaty. Recently however, there are many signs of a resurgence of 'Okinawan' identity which, like other formerly distinct national entities (for example, Wales in Great Britain), seeks to revitalise Okinawan culture, language and art. Even more interestingly, there are many signs that Okinawa is seeking to engage the globalisation phenomena independently, in order to try and decrease its chronic economic dependence on both the bases and the mainland. Thus, in recent years, there has been a marked interest in proposals such as that for a "New South China Economic Zone" which would seek the relaxation of immigration and other legal restrictions in order to allow Okinawa to attract more of the wealth created by China's increasing participation in the global economy.[105]

At its most ambitious, this proposal envisions Okinawa as the potential 'hub' of a regional grouping not unlike the EU, whereby Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong,

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[103] Chobo Yara, cited in John Purves, *Island of Military Bases* III-6:1, at http://www.niraikanai.wwma.net/pages/base/chap3-5.html.

[104] Problems routinely cited by Okinawan people protesting against the U.S. military presence include restriction of movement (due to military manoeuvres and restricted access to base sites), noise pollution from training exercises, pollution from the dumping of weapons-related waste, the injury and death of civilians in military training accidents, and incidents of violence and/or intimidation of the civilian population by U.S. military personnel. In September 1995, the latter issue was briefly catapulted to international attention following a particularly repugnant act of violence against an Okinawan child by three US marines. Even before this incident however, opinion polls returned extremely low levels of support for the bases: e.g., in a poll conducted by the Prime Minister's Office in March 1995, only 7.8 percent of Okinawan respondents expressed "positive support" for the bases. The remainder were divided between "reluctantly accepting" the bases (31%); feeling that the bases were "unnecessary" (24.9%); and being "completely opposed" to them (29.4%). *Yomiuri Shimbun*, March 5, 1995, cited in Purves, *Island of Military Bases* III-6:I (*op. cit.*).

[105] Yoshikawa, "Okinawa/Fukkien Keizai Kenkiku no Kôsô to Jitsugenka" (The Conception and Realisation of an Okinawa/Fukkien Zone: Towards Co-Existence with China), in the Public Lecture Committee of Okinawa International University (ed.), *Ajia no Dnynamizumu to Okinawa* (Okinawa and Asian Dynamism; Anami Ren Shôichi, 1997), 12.

Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand would be bureaucratically unified by what Kenichi Ohmae terms a *Yuimâru*, or "Region State Parliament."[106] Equally important however, are proposals to diversify the Okinawan economy from the 'inside;' including initiatives such as locally controlled eco-tourist enterprises, and the expansion of the local manufacturing sector. These type of initiatives tend to garner broader public support, because they are aimed specifically at redressing the outflow of profit to large, mainland corporations (a particularly pressing issue with regard to the tourist industry), and tend to be more attuned to concerns over environmental sustainability.[107]

While it remains difficult to predict the future of any of these projects, it seems probable that Okinawan people will continue to seek beyond the 'Japan' of which they remain part, for solutions to improving their communities and their lives.[108] And this, I suggest, is where the role of the state in relation to globalisation becomes something other than a unified 'national' response to external forces, whether this is manifest in the quest for global 'formatting power' (via institutions of supraterritorial governance), or in the maintenance of a cohesive national identity against the homogenising effect of supraterritorial values. It becomes, rather, and as I have argued above, about the control of globalisation *from within the state*. In this context, the reaction of the Japanese central government to the emergence of a localised 'Okinawan' identity, and its tolerance, or otherwise of the conditions which

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[106] Kenichi Ohmae, "The Rise of the Region State," *Foreign Affairs* 72:2 (Spring 1993), 79.

[107] While tourism currently ranks second only to central government transfers in terms of Okinawa's balance-of-payments receipts, it remains controversial in terms of the environmental damage it causes, and because the majority of revenue from tourism and related industries continues to flow back to the mainland corporations with the capital to invest in infrastructure. During the 1980s, spiralling land prices saw many Okinawan people squeezed even more tightly between the land demands of military bases and luxury resort hotels. Hiroshi Kakazu, *Sustainable Development of Small Island Economies* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 137-8.

will allow this identity to flourish, is only one potential litmus test of how genuinely "innovative" its global agency can be.

Multicultural Japan? Citizenship, Immigration and Japan's Global Role

Another critical example of Japan's global agency in relation to the 'inside' concerns one of the most poignant aspects of globalisation in its contemporary phase — the globalisation of human movement. In March 2000, Japan's Ministry of Justice issued a long and detailed document titled the "Basic Plan for Immigration Control."[109] In its introduction, the Plan explains that:

> The number of foreigners entering and living in Japan has increased and the relationship between the Japanese people and foreigners has become closer, resulting in foreigners having a greater influence on Japanese society. As a result, it has become difficult to realize [the] proper administration of immigration control by simply determining whether or not to permit foreigners to enter and stay in Japan one by one... Moreover, as a result of the increased awareness of foreigners in Japan, the numerical increase of foreigners and the expansion of their activities, the immigration control administration is increasingly calling for ways the Japanese people should live with foreigners in harmony.[110]

The trend of immigration to postwar Japan began in the 1960s, when Japanese capital began to flow outwards to the Asian region and beyond. As the Basic Plan acknowledges however, not just the volume, but the nature of this immigration has changed dramatically in the 1990s. Whereas previously, the emphasis was on the intake of industrial and corporate "trainees" who were expected to eventually return permanently to their country of origin, today more people are coming to Japan for far

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[108] This is also happening at the opposite end of the Japanese archipelago, where the end of Cold War tensions has seen a renaissance of trade relations, as well as various cultural and educational exchanges. Morris-Suzuki, *Re-Inventing Japan*, 177-78.
[109] "Basic Plan for Immigration Control" (provisional English translation), sourced online at the Japanese Ministry of Justice website, at http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/index.htm.
[110] *Ibid.*

longer periods of time.[111] In 1998, the number of foreigners "registered to live in Japan"[112] hit an all time high of 1.51 million, or about 1.2 percent of the total population — a figure which does not include the people who come to Japan illegally to work (see below).[113]

The dilemma of how to achieve a balance between the inflow of globalising influence to the state, and the maintenance of a national identity that allows the state to persist as an effective actor in the world is never more apparent than when the 'inflow' to the state consists of human beings. Like many other wealthy societies, Japan is dogged by the demographics of a declining birth rate and a rapidly ageing society.[114] It faces a chronic shortage of labour in the next half century, particularly in 'unskilled' labour in the manufacturing, construction and service industries. This means that not only will the inflow of "permanent residents" to Japan continue to increase, but, as globalisation continues to deepen the gulf between wealthy and poor nations, so too will the influx of people seeking, legally or otherwise, to become part of Japan's economic periphery. Either way, the dominant, if largely mythical image (see previous chapter) of an "homogeneous" Japanese society — the Japan integral to the nationalistic visions of the Oguras, Sakakibaras and Fujiokas — will surely be placed under increasing strain. The Japanese government's response thus far, and it is exemplified in the Basic Plan for Immigration Control, is to try and resolve this dilemma via exerting strict control over the foreigners who must be allowed to come.

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[111] "Basic Plan for Immigration Control," 3.

[112] Japan's Alien Registration Law (1947) requires any foreign national entering Japan for a period of more than 90 days to be registered with Immigration Control and issued a fingerprinted Alien Registration Card.

[113] Of this number, around 35% are "special permanent residents," or *zainichi chôsen/kankokujin* (see previous chapter). "Basic Plan For Immigration Control," 4.

[114] "Japan Must Open Up to Immigration: Study," *The Japan Times* October 12, 2000. Sourced online at The Japan Times Archives, at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20001012b5.htm.

In practice, this has resulted in initiatives such as the easing of legislation to grant special visa status to foreign nationals of Japanese descent, enabling them to work legally in Japan.[115] The reasoning behind this move is clear enough: those with Japanese blood in their veins will be easier to assimilate into Japanese society, and are less likely to cause "friction in Japanese society" through their visible 'foreignness." Inevitably however, the reality has been somewhat different. The vast majority of foreigners who have sought to take advantage of this type of visa are South Americans whose parents or grandparents became part of the huge Japanese exodus to Brazil, Peru, Argentina and Mexico prior to WWII. Culturally and linguistically Latin, their lives in Japan have often been made more difficult by the expectation that because they look Japanese, they will somehow find it easier to integrate into Japanese society.[116]

The preference for assimilationist (rather than 'multicultural') solutions to the globalisation of human movement is also apparent in the Japanese government's approach to those who don't qualify for entering Japan legally, but who come anyway, driven by desperate economic circumstances in their own countries. Such people, as Hein and Hammond have noted, tend to be "darker-skinned Asians, from poor, often formerly colonial, and often ethnically diverse nations,"[117] who come to Japan on tourist visas and find work in the 'black' economy, usually as unskilled labour (or, in the case of women, in the 'entertainment' industry; see previous

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[115] Ellen Hammond and Laura E. Hein, "Multiculturalism in Japanese Perspective," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 1 (Summer 1992: 145-69), 155-56. The same law that made it easier for foreigners of Japanese descent to gain working visas prescribes fines and prison terms for employers caught hiring illegal immigrants.

[116] Additionally, and ironically, this move has caused discomfiture among many conservative Japanese commentators (i.e., those most opposed to "multiculturalism" in Japan), because they cannot come to terms with the idea that people who look "Japanese" can now be classed as *gaikokujin rōdōsha* (foreign workers), because the term has such derogatory implications. *Ibid.*, 157.

[117] *Ibid.*, 158.

chapter). Because of this, their presence in Japan is often invoked by conservative commentators to argue against relaxing immigration requirements.[118] In such debates, negative Japanese images of (in particular) U.S. multiculturalism are never very far from the surface, and have often been quite openly invoked to argue against the creation of a similarly large, "foreign" social underclass in Japan.[119]

This stance is echoed by the Basic Plan, which argues that while "several other countries" may have granted periodic amnesties to illegal foreign residents, such measures are nothing more than the attempt to "maintain law and order to the end."[120] The swift processing and deportation of "illegal" residents, it continues, is just as imperative to Japan's successful internationalisation as the encouragement of legal immigration to maintain economic dynamism.[121] The report also concedes however, that in "exceptional circumstances," where the illegal resident in question has established a "close relationship with Japanese nationals," and/or "a deep connection with the Japanese community," that person may be granted a special permit to remain in Japan.[122] Interestingly, the Basic Plan affords barely two paragraphs to the handling of political refugees and asylum seekers, in which it notes the importance of "swiftly stabilizing the status of a person who needs protection as a genuine refugee," and continuing to prevent the "abuse" of the refugee recognition system.[123]

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[118] *Ibid.*, 160.

[119] See my comments on "America bashing" during the 1980s in Chapter Four; also the more recent examples cited by Hein and Hammond (*op. cit.*), 158-61, and Gavan McCormack's remarks on the multiculturalism debate in his introduction to Denoon *et. al*, (eds.), *Multicultural Japan: Palaeolithic to Postmodern* (*op. cit.*, 1996).

[120] "Basic Plan for Immigration," 29.

[121] *Ibid.*

[122] *Ibid.*

[123] *Ibid.*, 31-32.

On the one hand then, the Basic Plan emphasises the sharp distinction between "foreigners" and "Japanese," and the strict control over the conditions under which the former may enter and stay in Japan. Yet on the other, as we have seen, it also concedes intriguing *gradations* of "foreignness," for example, by allowing some people easier entry to Japan because, although foreign, they claim a residual genetic "Japaneseness." Even more importantly, it concedes the possibility of even "illegal" foreigners (some of whom presumably have no such genetic connection) *attaining* some level of Japaneseness — through marriage to Japanese people, or simply through "a deep connection to Japanese society." As I illustrated in the previous chapter, this ambiguity has a long history in Japanese debates over national identity, where assertions of distinct national characteristics were, particularly during Japan's colonial period, often juxtaposed against statements about the capacity of Japan to absorb and assimilate many different ethnic groups.[124]

In the current era however, when the number of people to be subjected to this assimilation process seems likely to increase dramatically, such ambiguity cannot mask difficult questions about the future form of the Japanese state. Allowing foreigners to stay in Japan, and to integrate permanently or semi-permanently into Japanese society is one thing; according them the full privileges of Japanese citizenship, including the capacity to participate in the political institutions and processes which help form the state (e.g., through voting, or through public office), is quite another. Under current Japanese legislation, children born in Japan are not automatically granted Japanese nationality unless they have at least one Japanese parent. Foreigners who wish to become naturalised Japanese citizens have to meet

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[124] Morris-Suzuki, *Re-Inventing Japan*, 170-171. See Chapter 6.

an arduous array of conditions (including changing their surnames to a Japanese surname that can be written in Chinese characters).

My point here is that this distinction between 'real' Japanese people and those who are there merely to make up the economically necessary numbers, can only become more uncomfortable as the numbers of the latter continue to increase. This is not to say that the Japanese state will continue as it is, impervious to the changing nature of Japanese society,[125] but it is to reiterate a theme central to this chapter, which is that the relationship between global forces and the state is multidimensional. Consequently, the issue of Japan's global role is as much about how it manages the occurrence of globalisation within its borders, as it is about any coordinated, state-based response to the world 'out there.'

Thus, it is revealing that, in a period when over 60 percent of the foreigners legally resident in Japan (as well as the vast majority of illegal foreign workers) come from Asian countries,[126] 46 percent of respondents to a recent opinion poll stated that they "don't have positive feelings" towards China, and 49 percent gave the same statement for the ASEAN countries.[127] Similarly, when asked which countries or regions of the world are "friendly," the top five responses were, in order of preference, Hawaii, the West Coast of the U.S., Australia, and the UK. (Taiwan was

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[125] There is, for example thriving activism among *zainichi chôsen/kankokujin* (see previous chapter) for greater participation in the political process, and where such participation depends upon local, rather than central authority (for example in local councils), differing degrees of progress are apparent. Tamakichi Kajita, "Gaikokujin sanseiken: Seiô no keiken to Nihon ni okeru kanôsei (The Enfranchisement of Foreigners: The Experience of Western Europe, and Possibilities for Japan), in Takashi Miyajima and Tamakichi Kajita (eds.), *Gaikokujin Rôdôsha kara Shimin e: Chiiki Shakai no Shiten to Kadai Kara* (From Foreign Workers to Citizens: Problems and Perspectives from Regional Society; Tokyo: Yûhikaku, 1996), 99-122.

[126] Japan Information Network, at http://jin.jcic.or.jp/stat/stats/21MIG22.html.

[127] Opinion Survey on Foreign Affairs, Public Relations Office, Prime Minister's Office, asking "Do you have positive feelings toward the United States, the People's Republic of China, the EU member countries and the ASEAN countries?" Sourced at the Japan Information Network, at http://www.jinjapan.org/stat/_stats/22OPN45.html.

ranked equal sixth with Italy, Singapore came ninth, and Korea tenth). Responses for the countries that Japanese people consider "safe," were also interesting, with Singapore the only Asian destination to make it into the top ten.[128]

The resulting impression that, for many Japanese people, 'Asia' remains associated with the unfriendly, unsafe dimensions of the world 'out there' may be a superficial one, but it connects uncomfortably well, I argue, to state policies that currently either accept Asian people under strictly controlled conditions, partially assimilating them as 'not-quite-Japanese' members of Japanese society, or criminalise their existence, thus containing them 'inside Japan,' but as part of its unsafe, unfriendly socio-economic periphery.

4. Pending a Conclusion: Re-working "What Matters" About Japan from a Globalisation Perspective.

The purpose of this chapter has been to show how and where debate on Japan's global role intersects with the debate over globalisation. More specifically, I have argued that globalisation, for Japan is about a far more complex configuration of processes and ideas than can be incorporated into conventional visions of international agency, and the (state) identity assigned to it. To recognise this, I suggest, is not necessarily to subscribe wholeheartedly to views about the relativisation of state sovereignty pinpointed by Inoguchi, nor is it to succumb to the either/or choice posited by scholars such as Sakakibara and Fujioka, between a re-strengthened state identity and an homogenised, powerless void. As I have endeavoured to show here and in the previous chapter, the diversity and mobility of

[128] Opinion Survey on Foreign Affairs, Public Relations Office, Prime Minister's Office, asking respondents to list "Countries or Regions that are safe." The results were: Hawaii (42.2%),

human beings, and their capacity to adapt to "supraterritorial" and/or localised dimensions, are as evident in Japan, as they are everywhere in the world. The Japanese state is not made redundant by this diversity, any more than it is emasculated by global forces 'out there' in the world. However, it seems increasingly clear that Japan's global role is now as much about what happens *inside* Japan as it is about forming responses to processes and phenomena that occur beyond the territorial borders of Japan. To put it another way, globalisation is not just something that happens to Japan, it is also, quite literally, what Japan makes of it.

To approach globalisation in this way I argue, also highlights the question that I introduced in Chapter One, concerning "what matters" about Japan as a global actor. In the first half of this thesis, I argued that this question has been, and continues to be, asked and answered on the basis of a broader set of assumptions concerning "what matters" in International Relations. The history of Japan's global role, as I showed in Chapters Three and Four, is bound up with the history of IR, or more precisely, the history of Realism, and the process by which it came to dominate IR thought and practice in the post-WWII period. Less obviously, it is an intrinsic part of the discursive processes by which Realism excludes particular areas of knowledge from discussion, by dint of their relevance to the "international." In this context, relevant knowledge about the 'outside' is IR; knowledge about the 'inside' is political theory, or, when the state in question is Japan, it is Japanese Studies. In this way, 'Japanese Studies' finds itself represented in IR through a standard, and fairly limited set of questions about the Japanese state and its policymaking elite, and the particular political/economic institutions that structure Japan's Foreign Policy.

Switzerland (24.9%), Australia (23.8%), United Kingdom (22.2%), Canada (22.2%), Singapore (20.9%), Guam (18.8%), Germany (14.5%), New Zealand (14.4%) and Saipan (12.5%).

In the latter half of this thesis, I have argued that this approach is insufficient, from two, interrelated perspectives. The first, developed in Chapter Five, used CST-inspired critiques of conventional IR theory and practice, to show how and why Realism per se is an inadequate representation of "what matters" about global life in general. The second perspective, which was developed in Chapter Six, but which has also stretched into this chapter, uses a range of critical Japanese Studies literature to illustrate that "what matters" about Japan is also an increasingly complex and volatile issue. Both of these literatures are important in expanding the discussion on Japan's global role. In short, if 'Japan' is not reducible to a single, "black box" entity, then neither is its global role encompassed by a given set of issues and concerns.

This is not to suggest that the conventional themes and issue associated with Japan's global role — security, agency, politico-economic power — have somehow become redundant. It is merely to acknowledge that the circumstances under which these conditions are sought and implemented are not timeless and irreducible; they shift and change, and they have different meanings for different people. Globalisation, or rather, the interpretation of globalisation that I have pursued in this chapter, is an important way of coming to terms with this fluidity, by allowing us to grasp the fact that even as states act to mitigate and/or control the effects of globalisation, they reconstitute themselves to accord with the changes wrought by these effects. This political dynamic is as relevant to Japan as it is to any other society, and it makes it more important than ever that, in Clark's words, we take for granted "neither the identity of the state nor the identity of the system."[129] It is in this sense that globalisation affords the framework for the enhanced, more inclusive dialogue

[129] Clark, *Globalization and International Relations Theory*, 174.

between Japanese Studies and IR that is crucial in enriching debate on Japan's global role.

CONCLUSION

THE BEGINNING OF A CONVERSATION?

The decisions made by the Japanese state about Japan's global role, now and in the future, will continue to be one of the most important areas of concern in International Relations (IR). At present however, discussion of this role continues, I suggest, to remain isolated from many of the profound changes taking place within Japanese society. The problem is not that literature on these changes does not exist, but that it rarely, if ever, is included in mainstream IR discussions of Japan as an international actor. Hence the 'connection' project of this thesis, which has sought to show why this situation exists, and how it might be changed.

I have approached this project from three angles. The first, developed in Chapters Two to Four, sought to illustrate how and why discussion of contemporary Japan in IR developed the way it did. The central issue here, I argued, was Japan's incorporation into a post-WWII world order defined by US Cold War strategic interests, and by its incorporation also within a Realist articulation of US foreign policymaking perspectives, which, as Chapter Two sought to illustrate, is derived philosophically from a broader (positivist) set of assumptions about 'real' knowledge and the capacity for objective responses to a world of anarchical states 'out there.'

Japan's stupendous recovery from the devastation it suffered during the war was very much a product of these Cold War interests, as the U.S. poured capital and resources into ensuring Japan's role as both geostrategic and geo-economic ally during the Cold War Years. However, as I argued in Chapter Three, it was via the Realism that infused

'Western' Cold War thinking in IR that Japan was represented as just another analytical 'black box,' the (social) inside of which was of minimal importance in understanding and responding to the issues deemed important in its capacity as an international actor. Even when the inner dimensions of Japan were addressed, the Japanese Studies literature that undertook this task tended to complement the broader Realist framework, by depicting Japanese life and society in more or less homogeneous terms (e.g., through Reischauer and the Modernisation Theorists). As Japan began to grow out of the role initially envisaged for it in Cold War strategy, the resulting tensions saw some opening of the Japanese Studies agenda, and some (albeit limited) attempts to take into account the profound differences between Japanese and 'Western' society, which had influenced Japan's particular postwar trajectory (e.g., via Chalmers Johnson). Yet the result, especially in IR circles, did not promote any fundamental re-think of 'what mattered,' in relation to Japan as a global actor. Rather, and as I explained in Chapter Four, IR continued to frame its response to the 'Japan' question in Realist terms, albeit via an updated neo-Realist theory, which took into account some of the issues (e.g., economic interdependence) affecting international politics in the post-Vietnam era.

This is where the second angle on the connection project becomes important. It involves an often complex debate concerning the changes that were, by the 1980s, going on within IR circles, as Realism came under a range of critical challenges which I referred to under their umbrella term as Critical Social Theory (CST). My major concern here was to illustrate how CST approaches have forced us to re-consider what and who 'matters' when we seek to understand international politics in the contemporary era. Particularly the requirement that IR theory and practice be discussed as something other than the determined (security dilemma) movements made by 'black box' actors in a

structuralist (neo-Realist) world order. In this regard I argued, CST approaches connect usefully to literature which has taken on the task of opening up the homogeneous, holistic images of Japan and illustrating its internal complexities.

The third and final angle of the connection project concentrated, consequently, on this critical Japanese Studies literature and its explorations of the other Japanese 'realities' it depicts. In Chapter Six, this task was carried out in terms of two particular categories (i.e., gender and race), in order to illustrate the multifaceted actuality of Japanese society and identity. Moreover, this chapter sought to show how the critical Japanese Studies perspectives, in this context, complemented the broad CST-inspired critiques of orthodoxy in the larger IR context. They do so, in particular, I proposed, when they force us to re-think the assumptions which divide knowledge in terms of *either* an 'inside' dimension of the state, *or* as external relations between states. This reconsideration of the inside/outside dichotomy, as I indicated in Chapter Five, is a major concern of CST approaches to IR. A critical Japanese Studies also becomes a vital factor in confronting this either/or divide, by illustrating how many of the 'internal' dimensions of everyday Japanese society have important implications beyond the orthodox geospatial borders of the Japanese state.

Chapter Seven developed this theme further, in the context of the current era of globalisation. In particular, I sought here to demonstrate how globalisation becomes a potential and important site of political and intellectual connection for IR scholars and Japan specialists when the relationship between 'inside' and 'outside' is understood in

"mutually constitutive and transformative" [1] terms. Or, in other words, when the forms and identity of the state itself are acknowledged to play a fundamental role in the production and direction of 'supraterritorial' or 'transnational' forces, even as they are simultaneously affected and changed by these forces.

This reading of globalisation, I argued, can promote significantly different understandings of Japan as global actor. One which acknowledges that Japan's 'global role' is as much to do with the reaction to change on the 'inside,' as it is about state-coordinated policies aimed at coping with increasing interdependence and transnationalisation on the 'outside.' Chapter Seven sought to demonstrate how this occurs, by focussing firstly on the increasingly 'supraterritorial' dimensions of sub-national articulations of identity (e.g., on Okinawa), and secondly, through changes taking place in Japanese society as it responds to an influx of foreign workers seeking to take advantage of (and become part of) Japan's globalising economy. Issues such as these, I argued, make it impossible to take the identity of the Japanese state for granted when speaking about its global role. Rather they make it imperative that any IR perspective seeking to speak of this role remains engaged with the broader literatures and perspectives which chart these shifting and volatile 'internal' dimensions. In short, they necessitate a better 'conversation' between IR and Japanese Studies.

I have sought to contribute to this conversation throughout this thesis, albeit in terms which sometimes might appear rather esoteric and perhaps rather detached from the everyday realities of Japanese life and of IR which they refer to. My point has been, though, that, difficult as the task is, it is necessary to try and expose and 'speak' the

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[1] Ian Clark, *Globalization and International Relations Theory*, 68.

(theoretical) first principles underlying these everyday issues in order that their power and influence be acknowledged and perhaps superseded. A final anecdote might explain this necessity, even in more enlightened times. It relates to a conference on Japanese Studies I attended recently at the University of Warwick in the UK where, for three days, I sat and listened to a fascinating series of debates, which ranged from the hidden political meaning of Japanese postage stamps, to the progress of the Theatre Missile Defence Program. What interested me most however, was the debate which took place on globalisation and Japan. Here, interpretations varied among the speakers about what globalisation meant, but they were agreed that whatever it meant, it had important implications for understanding Japan in the present and future. It was not enough, one of the speakers suggested, just to conceptualise Japanese foreign policy in relation to global forces on the outside. Rather, Japan specialists, whether they were economists, or defence analysts, or political theorists, had to be aware of how global change was affecting Japan on the inside.

And while there was a bit of uncomfortable shuffling of feet and papers, there was acknowledgement, it seemed, that other dimensions were indeed required if the 'Japan' question was to be adequately dealt with in the global context. At this moment however, a particularly illustrious member of the audience proposed that, in his opinion, there had been "a bit too much IR" in the debate. The problem, he argued, was that if Japanese Studies scholars spent too much time discussing "IR theory," they would not be able to remain adequately engaged with an understanding of Japan. More shuffling of papers and feet ensued, and a decision was taken to accept the orthodox wisdom. But perhaps a conversation has begun, nevertheless.

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